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SUMMARY 
 
 
Violent conflicts are a major constraint to food security and agricultural development in many 
regions of the developing world. Rebuilding agriculture is a primary task after a conflict comes to 
an end yet agricultural recovery projects are challenging to implement because governance 
challenges such as corruption and elite capture are wide spread in post-conflict projects. This thesis 
presents a detailed case study of such governance challenges taking two agricultural recovery 
projects in Northern Uganda as examples. 
 
Northern Uganda has been affected by more than two decades ofwar resulting not only in the deaths 
of combatants and civilians but also indisplacementand migration, destruction of livelihoods and 
demolition of both social and physical infrastructure. As Northern Uganda is mainly an agrarian 
region, programs that promote food security and agricultural development play an important role in 
rebuilding the livelihoods of the war affected population.The thesis focuses on two large-scale 
projects that have been implemented in the post-conflict situation of Northern Uganda: the Northern 
Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) a specific post-conflict recovery project and the National 
Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) which is an extension reform project that is implemented 
throughout Uganda, but plays a particularly important role for the agricultural recovery of the 
conflict-affected region. Since governance problems tend to be more challenging in large scale 
operations, these two projects offer a unique opportunity to analyze the opportunities and challenges 
of the different implementation and targeting mechanisms used by these projects. Accordingly, it 
was the goal of this thesis to analyze the two programs in a comparative perspective with the 
objectives to identify the governance problems affecting the two programs, to find the specific entry 
points for these governance problems, to assess the strategies that can be applied to overcome them 
and to generate policy recommendations on dealing with governance problems in post- conflict 
projects that contribute to food security and agricultural development. 
 
Based on an extensive review of the literature on governance challenges in developing 
countries,aconceptual framework was developed that distinguishes between (1) strategies to 
strengthen the capacity and incentives of organizations that implement
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post-conflict projects and supply services to farmers (supply-sideapproaches) and (2) strategies to 
improve the ability of farmers in post-conflictsituations to demand services and hold service-
providersaccountabl(demand-sideapproaches).The empirical research methods applied for this 
thesis included both qualitative and quantitative data collection approaches.The study covered four 
districts of Northern Uganda. Respondents were selected from two sub-counties that were 
purposely sampled in each district. For the qualitative research component, a participatory mapping 
method called“ProcessNet-Map”was applied, which allowed the researcher to identify and analyze 
the various steps of the project implementation process, to identify the actors involved and to 
specify the entry points for governance challenges. The method also makes it possible to assess the 
level ofinfluence of the various actors on the final outcome of the implementation process. 
 
The data from the Process Net-Maps were combined with the insights from focus group 
discussions, expert interviews and a review of relevant documents. For the quantitative research 
component, a household survey was conducted. Overall, 16 process Net-Map interviews were 
conducted and 12 focus group discussions were held. One hundred and four (104) farmers 
affiliated with NAADS and NUSAF were interviewed for the household survey. Moreover 62 
stakeholder interviews were conducted with representatives of government organizations, NGOs, 
civilsociety organizations and other stakeholders involved in the programme. 
 
The results showed that the main supply-side governance challenges were the following; lack of 
adequate skilled human resource capacity; poor targeting (for example, targeting focused on groups 
but left out the very vulnerable who could not join these groups); lack of adequate monitoring to 
control kickback payments by staff andembezzlement of funds; poor financial accountability 
systems and political interference in contracting for goods and services. The maindemand-side 
governance challenges included the following: poor relationships between beneficiaries and 
central/local governmentsresulting in a lack of trust of beneficiaries vis-à-vis both the political 
wing and technical wing of local governments; poor relationships and lack of trust between the 
beneficiaries and the private sector (for example, the beneficiaries believed that the projects 
primarily benefit the private sector (input suppliers, contractors and contracted serviceproviders) 
rather than the farmers; low literacy rates, especially among the youth due to the two decades of the  
war which destroyed the education infrastructure; political patronage and elite capture of goods by 
the well-to-do members of the communities; loss of social capital resulting in social conflicts 
during  project implementation. The analysis showed that the two projects had different provisions 
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in their implementation mechanisms to deal with these governance challenges. However, these 
mechanisms were not sufficiently refined to avoid the problems identified in the study. 
 
On the basis of the analysis the following policy recommendations were developed; On thefarmer’s 
level (demand-side), the following strategies can be applied: use of innovative information delivery 
systems that improve information sharing and transparency such as increasing access to 
information by marginalized groups; more emphasis by project implementers on ensuring that there 
is active participation by the targeted communities in the selection, implementation and 
maintenance of group assets; stronger focus not only on enterprises for market purposes, but also 
on subsistence production to ensure household food security. 
 
On the supply-side, the following strategies were identified: The central and local governments 
should implementmore proactive oversight mechanisms to ensure that both the public and private 
service providers are made accountable to smallholder farmersfor their performance. There is a 
need to fully operationalize the Transparency and Accountability Component (TAAC) of the 
programs.These should not only focus on group targeting, but also ensure that the most vulnerable 
individuals are not leftout. Program planners should put aside funds for project feasibility studies 
and also should invest more in internal program accountability. 
 
Overall, the study concludes that there is no ‘‘silverbullet‘‘ in improving governance of livelihoods 
programs in post-conflict areas. However when both demand and supply-side strategies are 
implemented in a well-coordinated way, the governance challenges inherent in post-conflict 
recovery programs can be confronted more effectively.This will make an important contribution to 
rebuilding the agricultural livelihoods and ensuring food security in conflict-affected regions. 
  
xiii 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
 
Bewaffnete Konflikte stellen invielen Entwicklungsregionen eine wesentliche Herausforderung für 
die Ernährungssicherung und die landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung dar. Nach Beendigung eines 
Konfliktes ist daher der Wiederaufbau der Landwirtschaft eine vorrangige Aufgabe. Jedoch sind 
landwirtschaftliche Projekte in solchen von Krisen betroffenen Regionen besonders schwierig zu 
implementieren, da Governance- Probleme, wie Korruption und die Aneignung von 
Projektleistungen durch lokale Eliten in Post-Konfliktsituationen besonders gravierend auftreten. 
Die vorliegende Dissertation präsentiert eine detaillierte Fallstudie dieser Governance-Probleme, 
die am Beispiel von zwei landwirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbauprojekten im Norden Ugandas 
durchgeführt wurde. 
 
Der Norden Ugandas wurde über mehr als zwei Jahrzehnte von Bürgerkrieg heimgesucht, was zum 
Tod von Kämpfern und Zivilisten sowie zu Migration und Vertreibung und zur Zerstörung der 
Lebensgrundlagen und der sozialen und physischen Strukturen führte. Hilfs-Programme, die 
Versorgung mit Grundnahrungsmittel sichern und landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung fördern, spielen 
gerade im landwirtschaftlich geprägten Nord-Uganda beim Wiederaufbau eine wichtige Rolle. Die 
Dissertation befasst sich mit zwei großen Projekten, die den Wiederaufbauim Norden 
Ugandasfördern: der Northern Uganda SocialAction Fund (NUSAF), ein spezielles 
Wiederaufbauprogramm, und das National Agricultural Advisory Services Projekt (NAADS), ein 
Reformprogramm des landwirtschaftlichen Beratungsdienstes, das im ganzen Land 
durchgeführtwird, in der Region aber für den landwirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau eine besonders 
wichtige Rolle spielt. Da Governance Probleme gerade in Großprojekten verstärkt auftreten, stellen 
diese Projekteeine wichtige Möglichkeit dar, verschiedene  Strategien zur Bewältigung dieser 
Probleme zu analysieren. 
 
Entsprechend war esdas Ziel der vorliegenden Studie, die beiden Projekte vergleichend zu 
untersuchen, um die verschiedenen Governance-Probleme und deren Ursachen zu identifizieren, 
sowie verschiedene Strategien zu bewerten, um diese Probleme zu bewältigen und daraus politik-
relevante Erkenntnisse und Empfehlungen für landwirtschaftliche Wiederaufbauprojekte 
abzuleiten. 
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Auf der Basis einerumfangreichen Literaturübersicht zu Governance-Problemen in 
Entwicklungsländern wurde ein Analyse-Rahmen entwickelt, der zwischen Governance-Problemen 
auf der Angebotsseite (Organisationen, die Dienstleistungen bereitstellen) und Governance 
Problemen auf der Nachfrageseite (Haushalte, die diese Leistungen in Anspruch nehmen) 
unterscheidet. Für die empirische Datenerhebung wurden sowohl qualitative als auch quantitative 
Daten erhoben. Die Studie wurde in vier Distrikten in Nord-Uganda durchgeführt, wobei in jedem 
Distrikt zwei Bezirke (Sub-Counties) ausgewählt wurden. In der qualitativen 
Forschungskomponente kam die Methode des Process ‘‘Net-Map“ zum Einsatz. Dabei handelt es 
sich um eine partizipative Mapping-Methode, mit der die verschiedenen Schritte eines 
Implementierungsprozesses abgebildet werden. Dabei werden auch die relevanten Akteure und ihr 
Einfluss auf das Endergebnis ermittelt. Auf dieser Basis werden die Ursachen von Governance 
Problemen in den verschiedenen Schritten des Implementierungsprozesses eines Projektes 
herausgearbeitet. Die Erkenntnisse aus dem Process Net-Map wurden mit Daten aus Fokusgruppen-
Diskussionen, Tiefeninterviews, Experten-Befragungen sowie der Auswertung relevanter 
Dokumente kombiniert. Für die quantitative Komponente des Forschungsvorhabens wurde eine 
Haushaltsbefragung durchgeführt. Insgesamt wurden für die vorliegende Studie wurden 16 Net-
Maps erstellt und 12 Fokusgruppen-Interviews durchgeführt. In der Haushaltsbefragung wurden 
104 kleinbäuerliche Haushalte befragt, die an den NAADS&NUSAF Projekten teilnehmen. 
Außerdem wurden 62 Interviews mit Repräsentanten der lokalen und zentralen Regierung, 
Nichtregierungsorganisationen und weiteren Beteiligten durchgeführt. 
 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass auf der Angebotsseite, d.h. auf der Seite der Organisationen, die 
Projekte durchführen, folgende Governance-Probleme auftreten: Der Mangel an adäquat 
ausgebildetem Personal stellt eine besondere Herausforderung dar. Trotz bestehender 
Anstrengungen fällt es den Projekten schwer, besonders benachteiligte Zielgruppen zu erreichen, 
da diese oft schwer in den Gruppenansatz zu integrieren sind, der von den Projekten verfolgt wird. 
Darüber hinaus fehlen adäquate Überwachungssysteme zur Vermeidung von 
Schmiergeldzahlungen an Mitarbeiter und der Veruntreuung von Geldern. Außerdem ist die 
Verantwortlichkeit für das finanzielle Management nur unzureichend gewährleistet. Ein weiteres 
Governance-Problem, das aufgezeigt werden konnte, ist die politische Einflussnahme bei 
Vertragsverhandlungen über die Beschaffung von Waren und Dienstleistungen. 
Auf der Nachfrageseite ,d.h. auf der Seite der Haushalte, die an den Projekten teilnehmen, konnten 
folgende Governance-Probleme aufgedeckt werden: Die Beziehung zu der lokalenVerwaltung als 
auch zu lokalen politischenVertretern ist durch einen Mangel an Vertrauen gekennzeichnet. 
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Darüber hinaus besteht auch die Auffassung, dass die Projekte den privaten Unternehmen, die 
Güter und Dienstleistungen für die Projekte bereit stellen, mehr Nutzen als den vom Bürgerkrieg 
betroffenen Haushalten. Die Fähigkeit der Leistungsempfänger, Verantwortlichkeit einzufordern,  
ist auch durch Schwachstellen im Bildungssystem beeinträchtigt. Gerade Jugendliche leiden unter 
fehlender schulischer Bildung, was durch die zwei Jahrzehnte andauernde Kriegssituation bedingt 
ist. Auch wurde soziales Kapital durch den Bürgerkrieg zerstört, was kollektives Handeln 
erschwert. Daher kam es auch zu sozialen Konflikten bei der Implementierung der Projekte. Die 
Analyse der Governance-Probleme zeigte, dass die Projekte durchaus sowohl auf der Angebots- als 
auch auf der Nachfrageseite verschiedene Vorkehrungen zurVermeidung solcher Probleme 
entwickelt hatten. Diese Vorkehrungen erwiesen sich jedoch als unzureichend. 
 
Auf der Basis der Analyse wurden folgende Strategie- Empfehlungen abgeleitet. Auf der 
Nachfrageseite sind folgende Ansätze aussichtsreich: Aufbau innovativer Informationssysteme, die 
Informationsaustausch und Transparenz erhöhen und damit den Zugang für besonders 
benachteiligte Gruppen verbessern. Des weiteren sollten die Projektverantwortlichen gewährleisten, 
dass eine aktivere Teilnahme der Zielgruppen bei der Auswahl, Implementierung und 
Instandhaltung der durch das Projekt geschaffenen Infrastruktur stattfindet. Außerdem sollten die 
Projekte einen stärkeren Fokus auf die Ernährungssicherung legen. 
 
Auf der Angebotsseite wurden folgende Strategien zur Überwindung der Governance- Probleme 
identifiziert: Die zentralen und lokalen Regierungsebenen sollten eine pro- aktivere Rolle 
einnehmen, um zu gewährleisten, dass sowohl die öffentlichen als auch privaten Dienstleister 
stärker in die Verantwortung genommen werden. Dazu sollten die bestehenden Mechanismen zur 
Herstellung von Transparenz und Verantwortlichkeit in diesen Projekten (Transparency and 
Accountability Component-TAAC) gestärkt werden. Darüber hinaus sollten die 
Implementierungsmechanismen nicht nur auf Gruppen ausgerichtet sein, sondern auch besonders 
benachteiligte Individuen erfassen, denen der Zugang zu Gruppen nur schwer möglich ist. 
Projektverantwortliche sollten außerdem Mittel für Durchführbarkeitsstudien bereit stellen und 
mehr in die interne Verantwortlichkeit investieren. 
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Zusammenfassend kommt die Studie kommt zu dem Schluss, dass es keinen Königsweg zur 
Überwindung der Governance Probleme in landwirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbauprojekten gibt. 
Jedoch können diese Probleme effektiver bewältigt werden, wenn Reform-Strategien sowohl 
auf der Angebots-als auch auf der Nachfrageseite inkoordinierter Weise eingesetzt werden. 
Damit kann ein wichtiger Beitrag zum landwirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau und zur 
Ernährungssicherung in Post-Konflikt-Regionen geleistet werden. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of governance challenges which confront 
agricultural livelihoods recovery programs in post-conflict contexts. It provides insights into 
the governance challenges affecting two large agricultural recovery programs (NAADS and 
NUSAF) implemented in post–conflict Northern Uganda. These two programs have different 
implementation approaches and mechanisms, therefore they provide a good comparative case 
study i.e. NAADS is a Local Government Led Private Agricultural Advisory Services 
Delivery Program (LGLP) whereas NUSAF is a Community Driven Development (CDD) 
program. 
The study focuses on Northern Uganda and more specifically the Acholi sub-region which 
was the worst affected by the war conflict compared to other Northern Uganda sub-regions of 
Teso, Lango and Karamoja. In the Acholi sub-region the LRA and Government of Uganda 
(GoU) war conflict created large scale insecurity, injuries and loss of lives, mass displacement 
and migration and loss of agricultural assets on which the population depended for their 
survival for over two decades until the region returned to relative stability in 2006 after the 
signing of the end of hostilities agreement between the LRA and GoU (Baines &Rosenoff , 
2014 ; Birner et al., 2011). 
At the time of the research in 2012 and 2014, the Acholi sub- region was in the early stages of 
post-conflict recovery, that is rebel activities in the region had gradually reduced to minimum 
levels. It should be noted that  the Northern region is undeniably a safer place today compared 
to 10 years ago. In response to the prevailing peace, both the GoU and its development 
partners the aid/humanitarian organizations had transitioned from humanitarian aid to 
livelihoods recovery programs and considerable amounts of funds have been pumped in the 
Northern region of Uganda both through government and the private sector for example, 
NGOs, CBOs and Civil Society Organizations.  
However during the implementation of these livelihoods recovery programs governance 
challenges emerged, for instance, challenges for local state institutions resuming their 
functions fully and having to respond to the overwhelming needs of an impoverished and 
desperate population, inadequate technical capacity and enormous issues of corruption and 
leakage of funds. Another related challenge is that the institutions in the post-conflict North 
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had to catch up with the institutional changes for instance decentralization of the delivery of 
public services at the local government level for which the rest of the peaceful regions of the 
country had gone through uninterrupted for the last two and a half decades. When relative 
stability returned to the North, the IDPs gradually started to leave the displacement camps 
which had existed for over 10 years to go back to their original villages and communities. On 
return the IDPs faced many challenges in the return areas but field experiences show that they 
were also very determined to settle down on their land and rebuild their agricultural 
livelihoods on which they mainly depend on for their survival. At present the former IDPs are 
now popularly called “returnees’’ encouraged by the government and development 
organizations to be self-reliant and to participate in post-conflict recovery programs 
(International Alert, 2008; ACTED, 2010; Gelsdorf et al., 2012). 
During the survey by the author, many of the livelihood-related problems were visible at 
household level, for example, food insecurity, i.e. no visible granaries at many homesteads for 
food storage, which is a sign of food insecurity, lack of improved planting materials/seeds and 
farm tools like hoes, pangas to be able to open the virgin land plus difficulty in accessing 
services like education, health care, mico-credit and inadequate agricultural advisory services, 
especially within the livestock sector.  
1.2 Problem statement 
Emperical evidence from various studies, for example,by the Utstein Anti-Corruption 
Resource Centre (2004), UNDP (2004), Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey (2010), Goovaerts et al. 
(2005) , Nannyonjo (2005) and OECD (2008) indicate that there is growing dissatification 
with the quality of public services delivered to the citizens more so in fragile situations caused 
by war conflict. These studies report deficiencies in the coverage, access, targeting and quality 
of public services and infrastructures. Apart from these challenges another important issue is 
that developing countries have the highest incidence of war conflicts which make even the 
already existing problems of public service delivery worse The effectiveness of livelihood 
recovery programs in post-conflict contexts for example in Northern Uganda has also been 
negatively impacted by a number of governance challenges, for instance high levels of 
corruption, embezzlement of funds, poor targeting leading to  political capture and elite 
capture and institutional capacity problems (Robinson 2005; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 
2010; Birner et al., 2011 & Tusiime et al., 2013). Evidence shows that violent conflicts occur 
more often in developing countries and creates a big number of unemployed people in the 
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country and inequality in income i.e. the majority of the conflict-affected people are 
languishing in poverty (Abuka et al., 2007; Annan et al., 2011; Birner et al., 2011 and Baines 
& Rosenoff, 2014).  
Goovaerts (2005), OECD (2008) and Annan et al. (2011) noted that due to war there is loss of 
productive livelihood options and this results into hardship and frustration in the communities 
and lack of productive activities leading to redundancy of productive labor, for instance 
making the unemployed and particularly the unemployed youth becoming easy targets for 
enlisting by rebel armies who use cash funds and food to lure the youth and other able bodied 
persons into their ranks.  
In Northern Uganda  the conflict that lasted for about two decades led to displacement of over 
90% of the population in the Acholi sub-region. There was loss of lives and agricultural assets 
by the population. GoU (2005/2006) &GoU (2011) noted that Northern Uganda region being 
predominantly an agrarian society, agricultural livelihoods restoration is an important strategy 
for the economic empowenment, recovery of the communities and it also allows opportunities 
for the re-integration of former combatants in the agricultural sector thereby improving their 
livelihood opportunities hence reducing the recurrence of war conflict.  
As peace has returned to the North, it has enabled the communities formerly in IDP camps to 
return to their home villages and begin productive activities in order to rebuild their 
livelihoods which were virtually destroyed during the war. In order to facilitate the 
resettlement process of IDPs, Government with its partners has come up with a number of big 
post-conflict tailor made Agricultural recovery programs e.g.  NUSAF, ALREP (Agricultural 
Livelihoods Recovery Program) and other national programs, for example NAADS to 
rehabilitate livehoods of the war affected people, however challenges like inadequate access 
to basic services, unemployment, lack of human capital as a result of migration and deaths due 
to war, corruption, inadequate technical capacity, frequent land disputes and inefficient 
conflict control measures present a big challenge for agricultural livelihoods recovery in the 
North (Hertz et al., 2007; International Alert, 2010 ; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010). The 
challenge of implementing policies that support small holder farmers are not new. For 
example,Birner & Resnick (2010) and Feder et al. (2010) noted that such policies face 
problems of information assymetries leading to high transaction costs, elite capture, market 
risks, climatic factors and inadequate production assets on the side of the farmers. However, 
field evidence shows that situations of war conflict make such situation noted by the authors 
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above worse and even desperate for the conflict affected communities (Goovaerts et al., 2005; 
Martin et al., 2009).  
The NUSAF project is one of the main government programs designed to help the Northern  
region to catch up with the rest of the regions of the country, spur economic growth and get 
people out of poverty. However many stakeholders are disappointed that the objectives of 
NUSAF have not materialized and its impact is rather moderate. It should be noted that both 
NAADS and NUSAF are largely dominated by private sector participation in the delivery of 
services and goods, just because previous programs which were led by both the central and 
local governments proved a failure (Robinson, 2005 & NAADS, 2000). However, Feder et al. 
(2011) cautioned that the involvement of the private sector should not be taken for granted 
that it will solve all the earlier governance challenges of government implemented programs. 
The authors noted that even in private sector participation in programs challenges have been 
faced, for example, financial mismanagement and procurement challenges. 
Despite the considerable resources mobilized by the GoU and its development partners 
extended to support the rehabilitation, economic recovery and livelihoods of the affected 
communities in the post-conflict area of Northern Uganda, for example, NAADS and NUSAF 
being one of the best funded government programs over the years through both domestic 
resources and donor funding, but impact evaluations, monitoring reports, value for money 
audits and various newspaper reports highlight among others inadequate/poor visibility of the 
program impacts on the ground. There is no doubt that NAADS and NUSAF poor 
performance is one of the most open indicators of what high levels of corruption and project 
mismanagement can do to frustrate efforts to improve the livelihoods of people affected by 
the war conflict. 
Empirical studies on NAADS and NUSAF point to problems of rampant corruption, elite 
capture and lack of sustainability of the agricultural livelihoods interventions (Golooba-
Mutebi & Hickey, 2010 ; Mutimba, 2007; Parkinson, 2008; Parkinson, 2009; Birner et al., 
2011). Similarly many voices from the stakeholders mention that the implementation of 
NAADS and NUSAF has fallen short of the envisioned improved livelihoods and 
development in Northern Uganda ( Robinson , 2005; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010; 
Mutimba, 2007; Parkinson, 2008; Parkinson, 2009;  Birner et al., 2011 ; Bukenya , 2010 ).  
Research shows that the Northern region recorded the biggest percentage decrease of poverty 
compared to other regions of Uganda due to the end of the LRA war but the challenge is that 
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the majority of the country’s poorest people still live in the North. For example for 2009/2010 
poverty level, Central region poverty level was 10.7 %, Eastern was 24.3% , Western 21.8 and 
46.2% Northern (UBOS, 2010) and one of the main reasons advanced is partly due to the 
failure in the effective implementation of special recovery programs like NAADS and 
NUSAF. For example members of Parlianment of Uganda on an assessment of the return and 
resettlement process reported that much of the money injected into the Northern region for 
recovery has had no tangible impact (International Alert, 2008). For example in November 
2007, 20 cases of embezzlement of NUSAF funds were registered by the High Court in 
Kitgum District alone and there have been many other corruption and program 
mismanagement cases related to NUSAF and NAADS as well as its predecessors 
(International Alert, 2008).   
Cases of corruption and financial mismanagement have been common in previous Northern 
Uganda government programs and this sounds a clear warning that things are not going well 
in as far as implementation of livelihood recovery programs is concerned. The fundamental 
problems in NAADS and NUSAF are mainly related to governance problems whereby for 
example transparency, responsiveness, availability of services and effective accountability 
mechanisms in livelihoods recovery services are not adequately addressed (Birner et al., 
2011). There is indeed a need for significant improvement of the implementation procedures 
and the accountability approach that would help to ensure transparency and effectiveness of 
the agricultural recovery livelihoods programs in post-conflict contexts.  
Unfortunately, there is limited information about the causes of the governance challenges, the 
entry points for the governance challenges and the strategies that can be applied in the specific 
post-conflict conditions to enable the internally displaced person (IDP) returnees to rebuild 
their agricultural livelihoods as they return to their villages. In as far as Northern Uganda is 
concerned currently, one of the key challenges for policy makers and program implementers is 
the lack of information on local perspectives regarding post-conflict agricultural livelihoods 
recovery. Most of the information available is in project evaluations, monitoring reports and 
implementation reports dumped in public offices and in addition the available reports do not 
paint or show a clear picture on the governance challenges affecting these programs and 
pinpoint out the specific entry points for these challenges. A good deal of data exists on the 
problems facing the Northern region of Uganda, but little information is available on what 
works and why in post-conflict Northern Uganda in order to build resilient households and 
communities.   
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Another challenge is the fact that even when there is information on what works is available,  
this information is not packaged in a relevant form for policy makers to be able to digest, 
interprete and use it as a reference point for policy making. In addition, although there has 
been a high increase in empirical studies on corruption for example Reinika & Svensson, 2004 
and Reinika & Svensson, 2005 studies of corruption in the education sector and Svensson 
(2003) on studies of corruption and payment of bribes in Ugandan firms, Bouchard (2012) 
study on corruption in the health sector in Uganda, Hunt (2007) on comparative study on 
bribery in health care in Uganda and Peru, there are still gaps in the current state of 
information and knowledge on the matter in agricultural extension services and much more 
remains to be done. There is limited systematic empirical work about the causes and entry 
points of bad governance and corruption in agricultural livelihoods programs and the link 
between bad governance and service delivery in agriculture extension services in post-conflict 
areas. In this study a new innovative research tool, the Net-Map has been employed as one of 
the main methods for data collection and has been developed and used on a number of studies 
to study issues concerning governance (Schiffer & Waale, 2008). The advantage of this tool is 
that it has managed to identify the specific entry points for the governance challenges which 
could not be uncovered with only respondent interviews and field observations.  
The purpose of the thesis is to begin filling this information gap by focusing on the quality of 
governance in agricultural recovery programs in post-conflict contexts. In doing so, this thesis 
will complement the existing empirical literature on governance and agricultural extension 
service provision. The findings from this research will contribute to bridging this knowledge 
gap and also guide the implementation of livelihoods recovery programs in post-conflict 
situations now and in the future. 
1.3 Research objectives and research questions 
The main goal of this study is to contribute to a more effective implementation of programs 
that aim at improving the agricultural livelihoods of  farmers in post-conflict 
contexts.Additionary the main objective of this study is to discover which governance 
challenges the programs are facing and which elements of the programs i.e. NAADS and 
NUSAF work in the post-conflict conditions experienced by the target beneficiaries and under 
what conditions. The study will end with a forward looking conclusion that reflects on how 
these research findings can be applied to ongoing and future agricultural livelihoods work in 
post-conflict Northern Uganda and other countries which have been affected by conflict.  
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 Specific objectives 1.3.1
The specific objectives of this thesis are: 
• To draw on the lessons of experience of the programme implementation and on the 
evidence of what does and does not work where, why and under what conditions; 
• To better understand the governance problems affecting the agricultural livelihoods 
programs in post-conflict situations and to gain deeper insights in the administrative 
procedures of NAADS and NUSAF implementation in order to identify the specific 
entry points for the governance problems; 
• To identify strategies and approaches that can be used to solve the governance 
problems involved in implementations of large agricultural livelihoods recovery 
programs with a specific reference to NAADS and NUSAF programs; 
• To analyze which factors contribute to the suitability of different implementation 
mechanisms to deal with the identified problems and 
• To identify policy options and appropriate program designs to improve 
implementation of post-conflict recovery programs  in the future. 
 Research questions 1.3.2
This thesis aims to address the following research questions: 
• Which general and specific governance problems occur in the implementation of the 
programs that use different implementation mechanisms? These include the Local 
Government-Led Agricultural Advisory Services Delivery Program (NAADS) and the 
Community Driven Development Program  
NUSAF.               
• Why do the above governance challenges occur? 
• What are the strategies that can be used to address the governance challenges? 
• What policy actions are needed to build a strong coordination of the activities of the 
agricultural livelihoods recovery programs in post conflict situations? 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of nine Chapters. Chapter 1 is the general introduction to the thesis, 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review of the study, Chapter 3 develops and discussess the 
Conceptual Framework for the study, Chapter 4 describes the study area and the NAADS and 
NUSAF programs, Chapter 5 describes the research design and methods, Chapter 6 presents 
the qualitative survey results, Chapter 7 discussess these results, Chapter  8 presents the 
quantitative survey results and discusses them. On the basis of the previous chapters, Chapter 
9 presents the reccomendations, conclusions and policy implications and suggested areas for 
future research.    
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
The 2002 World Development Report indicates that in order to ensure good governance, there 
should be absence of corruption in public institutions this is because corruption undermines 
the goals of public policies and leads to undermining the public institutions that are concerned 
with the delivery of public services on which virtually all the poor citizens of the country 
depend (World Bank 2002, pp. 98-99). Here governance is defined as the set of institutions 
and policies that govern the way society is directed, administered or controlled (IFAD, 2013). 
Transparency International (TI) noted that corruption leads to poor governance and as a 
consequence of bad governance there is increased misallocation of the limited resources, 
capture of resources by the elites and embezzlement. Bad governance denies the poor access 
to public services on which they virtually depend.   
 Uslaner, (2012), Persson et al. (2010), Persson et al. (2012) and Mauro (1998) noted that 
international organizations for example the UN, the EU, World Bank and IMF having largely 
not been taking corruption as a serious impediment to development until the late 1990s, the 
anti-corruption item has now been brought back on the agenda of international and national 
development interventions and more especially in developing countries because of the 
frequent failure of development programs to achieve their objectives as a result of the 
corruption menace. For example the study by Myint (2000) and Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2007) 
indicated that corruption is more pervasive in developing countries’ public sector service 
delivery. 
To illustrate the pervasiveness of corruption in the public sector, a survey carried out by Gray 
& Kaufmann (1998) out of 150 public officials from 60 developing countries, the respondents 
ranked corruption occurring in the public sector as the most serious constraint affecting the 
countries’ development processes and programs. Having  noted that corruption is more 
pervasive in developing countries most of which are found on the African continent and 
having realized that corruption is having serious negative effects on the economic, political 
and stability of states, the African Union (AU) has come up with a strategy to combat 
corruption through encouraging member states to sign and implement the convention on 
preventing and combating corruption. 
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Grimes & Wangnerud (2010) argued that as corruption increases in the country, the quality of 
government decreases. The quality of government is the ability of the country to deliver 
public services effectively and efficiently to its citizens (Grimes and Wangnerud, 2010). The 
authors noted that a good quality of government is seen as good governance whereby there is 
good accountability of the government towards its citizens and it strengthens the confidence 
of the people have in the management and administration of public affairs. Good governance 
means that the government has mechanisms that function in a way that respects the rights of 
all of its citizens and all the wishes of the stakeholders in a spirit of democracy (IFAD, 2013). 
Good governance is in short a corruption free public service delivery whereby authority and 
its institutions are accountable, effective and efficient, participatory, transparent, responsive 
and equitable (IFAD , 2013). 
• Definition of corruption 
According to Myint (2000) corruption can be defined as a situation where a public official 
uses the position of his office for his own private gain. Examples of situations when public 
officials practice corrupt behavior include stealing of government assets and property for their 
own private use, outright embezzlement of funds, bribery, extortion and fraud (Myint, 2000).  
Evans (2011) defines corruption as an act by which people in the public administration system 
profit at the expense of their clients i.e. the ultimate beneficiaries of the service. The author 
notes that corruption is when an official abuses his official position for his own personal gain. 
Evans (2011), argues that corruption is an act by which “insiders”profit at the expense of  
“outsiders”, that is conveying the ideas of abuse of position, offending against relationships 
and under-handedness. However Klitgaard (1998) defines corruption as the divergence in 
behavior from the client’s interests to those of the public official’s personal interests for his 
own gain. Klitgaard noted that corruption occurs when for example the civil servant betrays 
the interests of the client (public) in pursuit of his own interests. Heidenheimer (1989) stated 
that, there are two categories of the definitions of corruption, that is the public office centered 
definitions which explain corruption in the public service sector and the behavior centered 
definitions which explains the causes of corruption according to the behavior of the individual 
or individuals for example public interest centered, public office centered and market 
centered. 
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2.2 Theories of corruption 
 De Graaf’s classification of theories 2.2.1
There are six different theories of corruption according to De Graaf (2007). The author argues 
that the choice of the theoretical model is important because it determines which strategies  to 
be undertaken in order to control the particular type of corruption. De Graaf (2007) argues that 
whenever designing strategies to control corruption, it should not be one size fits all , but take 
into consideration the context to determine which strategies work best and under what 
conditions. The author continues to recommend that there is need to study corruption under 
different conditions in order to be able to understand the different control measures and the 
effective policy options to control it. 
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Table 2.1: De Graaf’s classification of theories of corruption 
Theory of 
Corruption 
Major Characteristics Causal Chain 
 
Public Choice 
• Looks at individual level as cause of corruption 
• Part of Institutional Economics i.e. all 
individuals are utility maximizing and 
opportunity cost of being corrupt versus being 
caught will determine whether corruption will 
take place or not. 
• Rational decision making 
leading to a pre-determined 
outcome (s). 
 
Bad Apple 
• Looks at the individual’s background. 
• Assumes that corruption is caused by people of 
wrong moral character and bad values i.e. Bad 
Apples. 
• Individuals generally display criminal behavior.  
• Corruption can be caused by socialization with 
bad groups/individuals. 
• Individual bad character 
causing corrupt acts 
Organizational 
Culture 
• Looks at organizational/group and community 
level. 
• Organizational culture re-enacted by its 
members. 
• Individuals have to behave like other members 
of the organization in order to be accepted. 
• Culture of the individual 
leads to corrupt behavior 
 Clashing Moral 
Values 
• Stronger  family ties, clan or interest group than 
the organization. 
• Obligation of family ties  induces corrupt 
behavior. 
• Can use resources of the organization to benefit 
family and clan. 
• Looks at the level of the individual. 
• Norms and values of 
society that influence 
values of individuals 
Ethos of Public 
Administration 
• It looks at societal and organizational levels. 
• Public administration is taken as a business for 
the individual to maximize profit but not to 
serve the society. 
• Public administration lacks the fundamental 
values to serve society. 
• Caused by societal pressure 
through organizations on 
officials. 
• Pressure on officials leads 
them to lack of integrity 
making them corrupt. 
Correlation 
Theories 
• Relates corruption to variables e.g. colonialism, 
poverty , democracy etc. 
• Looks at all levels i.e. individual, organization 
and society. 
• Lack of integrity 
• Societal pressure 
• Bad character 
Source: Author’s compilation based on De Graaf (2007) 
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 Theory of ethical decision-making in organizations: A person–situation 2.2.2
interactionist model 
Overview 
The interactionist Model of Ethical decision making in organizations assumes that  the ethical 
decision making in an organization is affected by the interaction of the individual and the 
situational components. According to Trevino (1986), three individual variables i.e. ego 
strength , field dependence and locus control affect the individual whether he/she will act in 
an ethical or unethical way. Other factors also affect the individuals’ decision making for 
example situational variables which arise from the job context  and the organizational culture , 
for example the organizational structure, obedience to the authorities, responsibilities of the 
individual to unethical consequences, enforcement of sanctions and rewards for ethical 
behavior (Trevino, 1986). The author argues that the moral development of an individual can 
also be influenced by the characteristics of the job itself  and the moral content of the 
organizational culture. 
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Figure 2.1: Interactionist model of ethical decision making 
 (Trevino, 1986 pp.603)  
2.2.1 Typologies of corruption 
One can distinguish different types of corruption. In the following typologies based on 
different criteria are presente 
2.2.2 Levels of corruption 
Myint (2000) noted that there are two levels of corruption,  i.e. the high and low levels and 
these two levels go hand in hand. Myint describes high level corruption as the type which 
occurs at the top of the public service ladder especially by leading politicians and public 
servants mainly motivated by personal greed and with the high level corruption usually large 
amounts of funds are involved. Greed leading to corrupt behavior is due to political, 
economic, social and cultural factors that motivate these higher public officials to be corrupt. 
On the other hand,a low level corruption is the type that takes place at the lower levels of the 
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public service ladder with lower level civil servants and usually less money is involved e.g. 
underhand small payments for a service, for instance payment to get a faster service of 
obtaining a passport or a driver’s licence (Myint, 2000). 
 Degree of organization 2.2.3
Mauro (1998) and Myint (2000) noted that another type of corruption is well organized and 
chaotic corruption. With organized corruption, officials have a clear strategy from which 
people they will get a bribe from and even have an idea of how much money they will be 
willing to pay them and the officialsdo whatever they promise to the bribe giver. This type of 
corruption usually continues sustainably in organizations or firms (Mauro, 1998; Myint, 
2000). The authors note that chaotic corruption is incidental and caused by opportunistic 
behavior. Everybody is looking for an opportunity and nobody is sure of who is going to give 
him/her a bribe and how much because there is little coordination between the bribe takers 
and the bribe givers. The problem with chaotic corruption is that it is exploitative and 
unknown to the clients. If an individual cannot comply with the corrupt official’s demands, 
then he/she will not get a service (Myint, 2000).     
 Institutional location of the actors 2.2.4
One can distinguish different types of corruption according to the location of the official’s 
administrative office and institution who is engaged in corruption. For instance corrupt 
officials can be located in the local government, the legislature, police, health and the 
agricultural sector (Morris, 2011). 
In a related approach, other authors such as Choo & Kukutschka (2012) and Uslaner (2012) 
noted that one can distinguish types of corruption depending on the relationships between the 
citizens and the government’s bureaucratic structures. For example, political corruption 
results from search for favours from well connected politicians. There is also judicial 
corruption and corruption in the general public service. In these types of corruption, usually 
the sums of money involved are limited,therefore this type is called “petty” corruption (Choo 
& Kukutschka, 2012) . Political corruption is as a result of politicians using their political 
powers to advance their own self-interests, for instance, they influence policies in their own 
favour so that they can win the next elections. This type of corruption usually involves large 
amounts of money because it usually takes place at the highest levels of the political and 
administrative structure of government (Choo & Kukutschka, 2012). Political corruption is 
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influenced by the political circumstances in the country and very difficult to detect because in 
many cases it is concealed. Choo &Kukutschka (2012) gave an example of judicial corruption 
whereby they stated that the entry points for corruption in in the judicial system can manifold, 
for example, during the trial proceedings, during enforcement of decisions by the court, or in 
form of misuse and misallocation of funds allocated to the justice system. 
 Nature of the transactions 2.2.5
Morris (2011) noted that corruption can be classified according to the nature of the 
transactions taking place between the bribe takers and the bribe givers, for example, asking for 
kickbacks, extortion and political capture. The latter occurs in instances where an entire 
institution or agency operate that should act on behalf of societal interests becomes distorted 
due topolitical interests. 
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Table 2.2: Definition of terms related to corruption 
Nature of transaction Main characteristics 
Bribery • Payment as a result of undue influence from either giver or 
recipient of the bribe. 
• Includes kickbacks sometimes called teas. 
• Used to make transactions move faster (to grease the wheels). 
Collusion • Payment made in order to avoid the official regulations or 
sanctions in order to get a service. 
• The corrupt individual usually gets a faster service. 
Embezzlement • This is conversion of money, property and any other assets 
that do not belong to the individual. 
• Usually termed as theft. 
Fraud • Using misleading information or trickery to steal money or 
property from individual or firm. 
• This is extractive corruption. 
Extortion • This is a type of fraud which uses forceful methods to get 
money/ assets from individuals 
Abuse of Discretion • Using the person’s public office to make decisions that favor 
self. 
Favoritism  • Granting benefits e.g public offices , contracts etc. to friends , 
family etc. , this includes kinship corruption, and nepostic 
corruption. 
• Giving opportunities to other people without merit. 
Improper Political 
Contributions 
• Payments by political leaders usually in government to 
influence political situations/decisions.  
Defensive Corruption • This is corruption undertaken in anticipation of certain 
circumstances, i.e. preventing particular individuals or firms  
to bear losses or making others to bear losses.  
• Usually takes place in procurement i.e when bidding for 
contracts. 
Transactive Corruption • Usually by public officials with the aim of avoiding lossess 
and get a profits. 
• Includes evasion of taxes, and other illegal transaction like 
illegal mining, logging etc. 
Investment Corruption • Undertaken in order to get concessions  or permits e.g. 
logging permits in the forestry sector. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Morris (2011) 
 Systemic corruption 2.2.6
One can also differentiate types of corruption by the degree to which they are “systemic.” 
Morris (2011)developed the “Systemic Framework”to capture this aspect. He describes the 
Systemic Framework as the system which focuses both on the individual’s corrupt character 
and on the context in which the corrupt act occurs. For example, corruption can occur in 
institutions where there are no controls to counter the corrupt activities and the motive to 
engage in corruption could be personal interests or could be for the benefit of the clique. The 
author notes that systemic corruption can be found in all institutions of society but it is the 
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pervasiveness of corruption that differs. Other distinctions of corruption could include 
centralized and decentralized corruption which depends on the level of control exercised by 
the political elite over the local officials (Morris, 2011). 
Related to the concept of systemic corruption is the approach by Pedersen & Johannsen 
(2008), who argue that corruption can be active or passive depending on the decision making 
powers of the individuals involved. Corruption is not only private but also occurs among 
particular individuals in the public sphere, especially in politics and government 
administration. The authors noted that it is very important to know the causes and forms of 
corruption at the different levels of public administration in order to design effective 
strategies  and policies to combat it. 
 Motive or purpose 2.2.7
As noted by Morris (2011), one can also distinguish different types of corruption according 
to the motives of the bribe takers, for instance, it can be corruption that purely promotes 
personal interests, but it can also  promote a personal clique, political parties or other 
institutions. The author notes that types of corruption that benefit political parties are 
typically systematic and organized. 
2.3 Dimensions and determinants of corruption 
 Dimensions of corruption 2.3.1
Rodriguez (2005) identified two dimensions of corruption, that is its arbitrariness and the 
degree to which corruption is prevalent in any given country, i.e. reffered to as its 
pervasiveness and also noted that these two dimensions of corruption do not always co-exist. 
Pervasiveness can be measured in terms of how frequently an organization/ firm is asked for 
a bribe and the authors argue that the higher the pervasiveness of corruption the higher the 
costs of corruption to the organization. However arbitrariness is the degree of ambiguity 
which is associated with corrupt transactions, this is because corruption is characterized by 
uncertainity regarding target and number of corrupt transactions which are required for 
approval. In case of arbitrariness of corruption, officials enjoy the advantage of not being 
detected when they engage in corrupt behavior and the ability to plan for control of 
corruption thus diminishes (Rodriguez, 2005). Pillay & Dorasamy (2010) argued that a 
greater degree of discretion by the government officials will increase their opportunities to 
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act in an arbitrary way and thus increase the pervasiveness of corruption and hence less 
accountability and transparency to their clients. 
Pillay & Dorasamy (2010) indicated that where corruption occurs under a particular 
structured institutional settings, in such situations corruption is more predictable and payment 
expectations from the bribe givers are also predictable (see above). In such cases, the 
pervasiveness of corruption is usually high, for example,in case of payments of bribes that 
are given in order to obtain tenders. 
 Determinants of corruption 2.3.2
Sung (2002) noted that occurrence of corruption through the illegal activities and actions 
requires motivation on the part of the corrupt official, motivation from the victim to pay the 
bribe and the absence of honesty on the part of the corrupt official. The author argues that all 
the three factors, (i.e. dishonest officials, willing victim to pay the bribe and motivation on 
behalf of the victim) increase the pervasiveness of corruption. All the three elements stated 
before are usually common in developing countries with weak economies, high poverty 
poverty, socio-economic problems, slow growth and high income inequality (Sung , 2002). 
Other factors that can affect the pervasiveness of corruption include poverty, a culture of an 
unaccountable government and a culture of the local population that facilitates corruption 
(Sung, 2002). In addition the author argued that corruption is more likely to occur in 
governments which lack a strong judiciary, free press and noted that in countries in which 
there is democracy, a strong judiciary and free media appear to have effective detterent 
factors against the incidence of corruption.  
Other authors have highlighted that the determinants of corruption in both the private and 
public sector are determined by the structure of the service delivery entity and the types of 
services being offered. Gerring & Thacker (2004) developed a framework linking political 
institutions in the government and political corruption and also assessed the impact of the 
different constitutional arrangements on the levels of corruption in the different nations and 
also explained the linkages between public institutions and corrupt  behavior by the public 
officials. The authors noted that the causes of corruption fall into three broad categories,  i.e. 
it can be caused by societal and historical factors, for example, the level of economic 
development of the country, the structure of the economy, geographical location, social 
heterogeneity, social capital, political environment, colonial legacy and inequality.    
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Mocan (2008), Mocan (2005) and Shaw (2009) indicated that corruption is also determined 
by individual and community level characteristics and these factors are important for 
analyzing differences in a househods’ corruption experiences.The individual and community 
level factors that determine the household’s probability to experience  corruption 
include:gender, income, education, marital status, profession, attitude and perception towards 
corruption, interaction with government officials, trust network, the city size etc.(Ibid). 
Socio-economic characteristics of a household play a key role in the corruption experiences 
and the role these factors play is dependent on the context i.e. these factors are country and 
culture specific and therefore strategies and reccomendations to control corruption should 
exclusively be area specific (Ibid). The authors warned that generalizations of findings about 
corruption and its control will not bring good results.  
Herrera et al. (2006), Torgler & Valev (2006), Hunt (2004), Swamy et al. (2000) and Mocan 
(2008) indicated that the income level of an individual is also a determinant of corruption and 
noted that the rich people, married and educated people in the society usually have a higher 
demand for services and therefore they are more likely to experience corruption while the 
poor individuals in society will miss out from obtaining the public service because they 
cannot afford the bribe.  
Svensson (2003) in his study on Uganda’s firms elaborated the reasons why some companies 
(firms) pay a bribe and others do not. The author argued that the firm’s probability of being 
exposed to bribery increases with its increasing interaction and business with the public 
sector. He noted that firms that have bureaucratic systems have a higher probability to pay a 
bribe and noted that the amount of the bribe paid by the firm depends on the ability to pay 
and its refusal power. 
Myint (2000) and Johnston (2005) noted that the motivation by public official to do their 
work is also a key determinant of corruption. The authors noted that low pay of public 
officials has negative impacts on the attitudes and performance of public employees. For 
instance, it contributes to reducing incentives, low morale, increased inefficiency, 
absenteeism from work, loss of self respect and due to loss of work morale where some 
employees become even rude and nasty to their clients. Johnston (2005) also noted that the 
lack of trust, social capital, democracy, all these favor bureaucratic corruption. Other 
determinants of corruption include higher education levels, urbanization, access to mass 
media which are associated to higher levels of development decrease the tolerance towards 
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corruption (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2007). The authors also noted that the context of war 
conflict raises the level of corruption. 
Boris (2005) noted that with more government regulation in the public service through 
creation of many bureaucratic structures, keeping other factors equal, will lead to higher 
levels of corruption.The author noted that bureaucratic structures with a number of 
complicated, unclear ambigious regulations by the government will create more entry points 
for bribery and rent seeking in order for a public service to be offered to the clients. 
Swamy et al. (2000)studied the relationship between corruption and gender. The results from 
his study in Georgia have shown that women are less involved in bribery than men and 
usually women are not easily likely to engage in illegal or dishonest behavior, this is because 
a very high percentage of the women surveyed said that illegal and dishonest behavior is not 
justifiable. These results are consistent with Alatas et al. (2012).Results from his study 
showed that women have a higher propensity to punish people engaged in corrupt behavior 
than their male counterparts. In terms of trust as a determinant of corrupt behavior, Alatas et 
al. (2012) argued that people with a trust network (social capital) usually pay fewer bribes 
and noted that a good trust network in society can work as a substitute for bribery. The author 
noted that through having a trust network in society people find other substitutes for bribery 
like quid pro quo and other ways instead of payment of bribes.  
Hunt (2004) also noted that the level of corruption in the society can also be determined by 
age and geographical factors. For example old people, people living in small cities  and 
people with lower geographical mobility are less likely to be exposed to bribery. The author 
notes that since it is easy for such people who live in small towns to have a high trust 
network, they have a lower probability of experiencing bribery and also people who have age 
mates in the same locality tend to have more trust network and less likely to experience 
corruption. 
2.4 Impacts of corruption on public service delivery 
Peter Eigen, Founder and Chairman Transparency International illustrated the challenge of 
corruption to public service delivery by the statement below: 
“Corruption is one of the greatest challenges of our age, a 
challenge that must and can be confronted. If it is allowed to 
continue to provoke irrational governance , driven by private 
greed rather than by the people´s needs, and to disrupt the 
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development of the private sector , corruption will deny even that 
most fundamental of human needs-hope “(Pope, 2000 pp. xv ). 
Empirical evidence indicates that countries with high levels of corruption always have poor 
service delivery and lack of social trust and inequality in the society e.g. inequality in income 
forms a vicious circle of corruption that is difficult to break. Uslaner  (2011) noted that 
corruption increases the levels of inequality in society, for example the people with high 
income can afford to pay a bribe in order to be able to get a faster public service, but the poor 
because they are not able to afford a bribe, they end up without the basic public services on 
which they do depend on. The author also noted that the levels of corruption are higher in 
those services the poor people most depend on for example health services, schools, police 
and agricultural extension advisory services. 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) also noted that corruption can affect both the quality and quantity of 
public services to the beneficiaries . He gave an example of the study in Zambia where 
results indicated that the poor people paid 17% of their incomes in bribes in the health sector  
while the richer middle class paid only 3%. Because of the search for bribes, public officials 
discriminate against the poor when they seek for a service because the poor people usually 
cannot pay more than what is officially set and in the end some users may be discouraged i.e. 
the poor choose not to ask for the services they need because of a higher price imposed, the 
so called “bribery tax” (Ibid). The author argues that the quality of government and quality of 
public institutions play a very important role in the access to the public services provided by 
the government to its citizens (Kaufmann et al., 2008). Kaufmann et al. ( 2008) noted that 
corruption penalizes the poor households two times, firstly corruption increases the costs of 
the public services and secondly also limits the access of the public services to the poor while 
the rich have capacity to spend much more money and therefore have even the capability to 
pay more bribes in order to get a public service. 
Kaufmann et al. (2008), Svensson (2003), Ware et al. (2007) and Anbarci et al. (2009) noted 
that corruption results from bad governance  and can also lead to those actions that lead to 
misallocation of resources, outright stealing of resources and poor accountability of 
government towards its citizens and such actions will raise the official cost of public services  
and limit the access of users of these public services especially with the poor people in the 
society who are basically more dependent on the public services for their survival.  Anbarci 
et al. (2009), Mbaku (2008), Olken (2012), Ware et al. (2007) and Birner et al. (2011) noted 
that another negative impact of corruption is that it negatively impacts on the efficiency of 
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the public procurement process through leakage of funds, poor quality goods and services 
and also thereby affecting the delivery of services in many cases even encouraging the supply 
of substandard goods and services. 
Recent empirical research which basically examined the negative impacts of corruption on 
the provision of public goods and services, indicated that the inefficiency of public projects 
due to corruption arises because the costs of these projects increases and the projects become 
no longer cost effective. This is because corruption acts as an additional cost to the overall 
planned cost of the project. Because of these additional costs due to corruption, some of the 
planned public projects have not been completed or even in many cases abandoned all 
together (Olken and Pande, 2012). Corruption also leads to distortions which cannot be 
detected by the program managers and results in  inefficiency which cannot be easily 
detected and rectified because these corrupt actions are usually hidden through convoluted 
procedures by the corrupt officials in order to extract rent.  
Sutton (1996) also argued that corruption is a potential source of transaction barriers in 
service delivery more so in the public service. For example citizens looking for a good or 
service can incur a higher cost than they would have paid in a market without such barriers in 
addition to the higher transaction costs involved because of corruption. Similarly Sutton 
(1996) and Boris (2005) notes that corruption as an illegal business system creates a lot of 
transaction costs, for example finalizing and getting a contract, monitoring the contract, 
getting information and enforcing the terms of reference in the contract. All these activities 
take a lot of time and costs ( high transaction costs) for the client and also takes a lot time 
from the public official which time the public official would have used to perform his/her 
official duties effectively.  
2.5 Corruption in procurement 
Acquiring the appropriate quality and quantity of goods and services at the right time through 
public procurement is a very important part of governmemt activities because no government 
can be able to acquire goods and services without undergoing the procurement process. 
Evidence from for instance Ware et al. (2007) and Thai (2008) indicates that corruption 
through procurement of goods and services is one of the most corrupt sectors in governments 
and should be targeted as one of the key sectors to use as an entry point to control corruption. 
Other authors, for example Carter (2000) and Ackerman (1998) noted that corruption in 
procurement of public goods and services has become a menace and that’s why it has 
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attracted a lot of attention from the governments, NGOs, civil society institutions and 
international bodies like the UN and  World bank. This is because corruption in procurement 
most especially hurts the poor since they cannot readily access the good quality and adequate 
public services on which they mainly depend. 
 Entry points for corruption in procurement of goods and services 2.5.1
Ware et. al. (2007) suggested detailed strategies and entry points for procurement corruption 
that can offer opportunities for controlling corruption in procurement and tailoring the 
control of corruption to specific contexts.  
Table 2.3: Procurement challenges 
Procurement Stage  Red Flags   
Poject and Design • Undue influence by politicians and elites in 
decision making. 
Advertising , Prequalification, Submission of Bids • Manipulation of bid documents (favouritism). 
• Collusion.  
• Leakage of bidding information. 
• Submission of very few bid documents. 
• Lack of widespread advertizing of bids to reduce 
competition. 
Bid Evaluation, Post-qualification and Award of 
Contract 
• Best bidder fails to win the tender award. 
• The price of delivery of goods and services 
is increased from the original price 
according to the tender terms of reference. 
• The quality and or quantity of the goods is 
decreased from the original Terms of 
Reference (TOR). 
Contract Performance , Administration and 
Supervision 
• Weak accounting systems. 
• Ghost names of beneficiaries and project 
personell. 
• Poor monitoring systems. 
• Lack of random spot checks to give 
opportunity to the contractor to disguise 
illegal activities. 
• Poor transparency and no 
implementation/contract information given 
to the beneficiaries. 
• Oversight of the physical works in 
collaboration with beneficiary 
representatives is absent. 
• The clients of the service are dissatisfied 
with completed facilities. 
• Delays in the delivery of goods and 
services. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Ware et. al. (2007) 
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 Control of corruption in public procurement 2.5.2
Corruption in public procurement presents one of the most important and serious  problems 
comfronting governments’ public service delivery because it weakens economies, creates 
lack of trust by the citizens in their governments and creates cynicism among civil society 
and in some cases can threaten the stability of the very governments that permit illegal 
procurement procedures to continue unabated.  
Field experiences show that procurement corruption is even more common in times of 
emergency or in post-conflict environment  because of the need to speed up funds to a region 
that is in dire emmediate need of assistance and a long procurement process may not be 
practicable because of the high vulnerabilities and emergency situations of the targeted 
individuals (Ware et al., 2007). For example, a very short procurement process is not able to 
close all the loopholes that may lead to mismanagement and leakage of funds. In post-
conflict situations a number of service providers for instance NGOs and international 
humanitarian organizations come into the area impacted by the war emergency or natural 
disaster in order to respond to the emergency. 
Fighting corruption in procurement and delivery of public services requires a number of 
approaches and with  integrated strategies.The interventions to control corruption can be 
classified into two broad categories: 
• Demand-side interventions 
Here the Demand-side interventions are those interventions on the side of the 
clients of the procurement of the goods and services designed to enable the 
beneficiaries demand for good quality goods and services by enabling the 
beneficiaries to be able to take part in monitoring of procurement contracts by 
looking at value for money and reporting the red flags to ensure  timely and good 
procurement products plus the ability of the beneficiaries to hold the service 
providers accountable for the goods and services offered. 
 
• Supply-side interventions  
These are measures/strategies the public procurement agency can adopt to 
improve the administrative procedures within the procurement process. The 
Supply-side deals with issues to do with staff capacity development and welfare.  
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2.5.2.1 Supply–side interventions 
Staff capacity development 
According to the Ware et al. (2007) one of the issues that is very critical in the control of 
procurement corruption but usually ignored by agencies responsible for procurement  both in 
the government and private sector is staff capacity development. Procurement corruption is 
usually common more especially where the staff involved in the procurement process lack 
the specific training and experience in procurement e.g. where staff lack skills in technical 
capacities like procurement law, auditing, accounting etc. Staff capacity development is 
important  in order to be able to close the entry points of corruption and also to avoid to be 
duped by the contractors and also be able to have capacity to identify suspicious patterns in 
the procurement process (Ware et al., 2007). 
With adequate training of staff  and well defined Terms of Reference (TOR) for 
procurement, this will ensure efficiency, transparency and therefore quality services. This is 
because it ensures that the whole procurement cycle is transparent. As a result  there  are 
minimal entry points for corruption because the whole procurement process is well layed out 
by the staff who have adequate technical capacity (Ware et al., 2007). 
E-procurement  
 Olken & Pande (2012) and Ware et al. (2007)  noted that one of the entry points of 
corruption in public procurement is lack of transparency during the bidding process. This is 
because different steps involve different procurement officials and a lot of discretion by the 
public officials involved in the process plus the high transaction costs especially on the side 
of the bidders. The authors argue that, with applying technology of using internet based E-
Platforms, it will have an advantage of streamlining the procurement process, for instance 
ensuring transparency during the bidding process because all the stakeholders can access the 
necessary information online. This strategy eliminates the unnecessary bureaucratic 
procedures and reduces the number of officials involved in the procurement process hence 
reducing the entry points for corruption. For example E-procurement experiences from Chile, 
Mexico and the Republic of Korea suggests that E-procurement can indeed lead to 
substancial savings (Ware et al., 2007). E-procurement can be an efficient strategy for 
reducing corruption but it must go hand in hand by the relevant  institutional reforms to be 
able to manage the process, for example setting up the relevant internet based services where 
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they do not exist, for instance the remote areas of the country and capacity development of 
staff who will  manage the procurement process (Ware et al., 2007).   
Forensic audits , sanctions and enforcement 
In order to avoid corruption in procurement, there must be procedures for on-spot checks and 
forensic audits to identify corruption incidences and to avoid selection of ghost companies. In 
addition there should be a system of investigations and punishing, blacklisting and 
prosecution of bidders and officials involved in corrupt practices (Ware et al., 2007).  
Voluntary disclosure programs 
The United Nations Convetion against corruption which entered into force in December 2005  
requires member states to implement voluntary disclosure programs that allow the potential 
contractors to report fraud in their operations. Ware et al. (2007) noted that these disclosure 
programs are even more important in post-conflict conditions because of the many entry 
points for procurement corruption due to the lack of corruption controls during the 
procurement process and contract implementation as a result of the emergency situations i.e. 
during such emergency situations all the procurement procedures are not usually followed.  
2.5.2.2 Demand-side interventions 
External monitoring 
This involves organizing a multidisciplinary team with a purpose of scrutinizing the 
procurement process step by step from the beginning to the end to close all the entry points 
for corruption. Effective external monitoring  also usually involves the effective participation 
of the community who are the clients /beneficiaries themselves or can also use other 
independent compliance monitors, for example civil society organizations who are already on 
the ground and familiar with the contract implementation context and have technical capacity 
in the procurement processes (Ware et al., 2007). In developing countries where public 
procurement corruption is pervasive, they have taken on strategies of using independent 
NGOs and or civil society monitors in order to improve transparency. Here the NGOs and 
civil society can be used as observers on public procurement committees (Ware et al., 2007).   
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Integrity pacts 
The integrity pact is a tool which was introduced by Transparency International (TI) in order 
to curb the rampant corruption in public procurement. This is a formal agreement between 
agencies or committees involved in public procurement and the prospective 
contractors/bidders with a promise that no one will offer or accept a bribe during the bidding 
and contract implementation and to make sure there is compliance (Ware et al., 2007). Here a 
third independent party is engaged to oversee the integrity pact usually  an NGO or civil 
society (Ware et al., 2007). 
Access to information and information sharing 
For efficient procurement process, there is need for access to information especially by the 
beneficiaries /citizens who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the procured goods and services. 
Information sharing between all the stakeholders is also important i.e. involvement of the 
private sector like NGOs who are already on the ground play a very important part in the 
dissemination of information to the stakeholders (Thai, 2008 , Ware et  al., 2007). 
Norms and conventions 
International norms and conventions are important in the control of corruption. For example 
apart from the UN Convention Against Corruption , there is the Corruption Vulnerability 
Assessment tool (CVA), which is comparable to the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) 
tool which deals with environmental issuess. The CVA is carried out before the beginning of 
the bidding process to detect any potential entry points for corruption before the bidding 
process and identifies the vulnerabilities in a specific country context that may put the aid 
funds at risk (Ware et al., 2007). The main importance of the CVA tool is to make sure that 
public funds are not put at risk of being swindled but are put to the intended use to benefit the 
intended beneficiaries. 
Citizens Driven Approaches (CDAs) 
Basheka (2012), Malena & Forster (2004), Philips, Caldwell and Callender, (2007), Myint 
(2000), Singh and Vutukuru( 2010) , Björkman & Svensson (2010) and Ware et al. (2007) 
noted that the CDAs are now a popular tool in the fight against procurement corruption 
because of the ineffectiveness of the existing institutions especially in developing countries 
to offer quality goods and services to their citizens. The authors argued that by involving the 
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citizens who are beneficiaries themselves in all the procurement processes, it can make it 
possible for them to demand accountability from the service providers and their elected 
leaders. This is also the case with the limited success of community procurement under 
NAADS and NUSAF programs in Uganda (Robinson, 2005, Parkinson, 2009). With CDAs, 
the beneficiaries are involved in the monitoring of public projects to ensure that contractors 
offer quality goods and services (Basheka et al., 2010). Examples of citizens initiatives 
include citizen report cards, social audits public expenditure tracking and citizen oversight 
committees etc. (Basheka et al., 2010). Mbaku (2008) noted that the local citizens who are 
the ultimate beneficiaries from the procurement process are on the ground have more time, 
have more information about the community conditions and are more familiar with their 
tastes and preferences than the bureaucrats at the center. 
2.6 Interventions to curb corruption in public service delivery 
 Supply-side strategies 2.6.1
Effective strategies to control corruption both at the national and international levels have 
been enhanced because empirical evidence indicates that control of corruption leads to 
improved social well being of the citizens especially the poor who basically depend on the 
public services for their survival (Anbarci et al., 2009). 
Access to information and monitoring 
Emperical studies on the levels and incidence of corruption is also recommended by Choo & 
Kukutschka ( 2012) and Boris (2005) , here the authors argue that without baseline 
information to give deeper understanding of the problem of corruption in a particular 
country, institution and context, it is very difficult to devise effective measures to control 
corruption. For example if the citizens in the particular country agree that the surveyed levels 
of corruption in a particular institution are high, this information will prompt for the 
immediate action on the part of government to act on the situation. 
 Ware et al. (2007), Olken & Pande (2012) recommend for transparency i.e. sharing of 
information as an effective tool in the control of corruption in governments’ public service 
delivery system. International organizations for example Transparency International (TI) in  
collaboration with civil society organizations have also played a key role in the fight against 
corruption, for example through TI’s Global Corruption report, which plays an important role 
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in the creation of awareness about corruption and its negative impacts and in the process 
forcing some of the countries to act more especially on the corruption red flags raised by the 
global corruption report.  According to Pope (2000), Choo & Kukutschka (2012) and 
Reinikka & Svensson (2005), they recommend governments to ensure free access to 
information and working closely with a free press and an active and independent civil society 
in the dissemination of information.     
The Uganda survey carried out by Reinnika and Svensson (2005) on access to information as 
a tool to to improve service delivery and avoid corruption in Ugandan schools, survey results 
showed that schools with access to information e.g. News Papers received an 8.68 % greater 
share of their entitlements than schools that did not have access to News Papers. These 
results show that information is a powerful detterent tool to the diversion of public funds at 
the local level and also results confirm that the improvement in the amount of money 
received by schools was due to access to information by the beneficiaries. 
However Olken and Pande (2012) noted that increasing monitoring by public officials alone 
in many cases may not reduce corrupt behavior because the same officials that are given the 
task of monitoring may be corrupt themselves and it may be difficult to enforce punishments. 
The authors noted that this type of monitoring can even simply increase transfers from low 
level officials to the auditors. Monitoring in order to be effective has to be complimented  by 
other corruption control strategies because corrupt officials most of the times hide corrupt 
behavior and even if audits are carried out it does not mean that auditors will find enough 
evidence to enforce sanctions and punishments (Olken, 2011; Olken, 2007). The study by 
Olken (2007) on  roads construction in Indonesia  demonstrates that the traditional economic 
approach of fighting corruption by increasing the expected cost of corruption, by increasing 
the probability of being caught can play an important role in reducing corruption even in a 
highly corrupt environment where those doing the monitoring are themselves potentially 
corruptible. 
Collaboration with civil society and NGOs 
Transparency International (TI) notes that the role of civil society is crucial in the fight 
against corruption. TI´s Global Corruption Report (GCR) has played an important role 
internationally in raising awareness about corruption and its negative social impacts, raising a 
red flag and in some cases forcing countries to act. Governments alone cannot contain 
corruption, therefore they need and must win the support and participation of an active but 
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independent civil society (Pope, 2000). Themudo (2009) and Themudo (2012) argue that the 
introduction of competition in public service provision and hence reduction in the monopoly 
of government and its officials in the provision of public services, will reduce the ability of 
government officials to extort the so called  “special fees” to offer services, which fees are a 
form of corruption. The author suggests that examples of how government monopoly can be 
reduced  is through engagement of the non-profit sector to fight corruption through 
competition with other private agencies to offer public services.  
Similarly Schleifer and Vishny (1993) also argue for increasing competition to decrease 
corruption. The authors argue that the government officials can extract a higher amount of 
bribe when some goods or services are only available with the government. Allowing 
competition through giving permission to some private companies to produce those goods or 
services may reduce government officials’ bribe extraction. Only implementing strong rules 
and regulations may not help in closed market situations where households do not have any 
exit option and officials have a monopoly over some services (Schleifer & Vishny, 1993). 
Here competition will be more effective in curbing corruption because an individual 
/household or company has the freedom to exit when asked for a bribe. Therefore before 
designing policy interventions, the probable effects of corruption should be studied and it is 
important to know causes and forms of corruption at all levels in order to design effective 
policies or strategies to combat corruption (Schleifer & Vishny, 1993). 
Themudo (2009) noted that donors have found the strategy of engaging NGOs especially on 
aid delivery as a more efficient system because engagement of the non-profit sector has 
managed to by pass the corrupt governments. Another role of NGOs is that they can act as a 
watch dog to government activities in order to ensure that public funds are used for their 
planned activities and the watch dog role of NGOs ensures that the government officials are 
accountable for their proper use of public funds and they do not use their government offices 
to carry out corrupt activities (Themudo, 2009).  
Themudo (2009) gives an example of the NGO-Debt Action Network in Uganda, a volunteer 
non-profit group that regularly monitors the uses of foreign aid and debt relief at the 
grassroots. By increasing transparency and making public both corrupt acts and actors, the 
non-profit sector increases the likelihood of sanctions against corrupt behavior. In addition 
NGOs may educate citizens and public officials about the negative impacts of corruption on 
public service delivery creating a political will by the governments to change for the better. 
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Staff welfare 
Improvement in renumeration and work motivation by staff has been indicated to reduce the 
levels of corruption. A number of studies carried out in different countries have indicated that 
in countries where public wages are higher there is relatively lower levels of corruption 
(Olken & Pande, 2012 ; Boris, 2005). However, other studies for example Rijckeghem & 
Weder (2001) which was carried out in poor countries indicated a minimal change in 
corruption levels after an increase in wages i.e. results showed that doubling of wages was 
associated with only 0.5 % point reduction in the ICRG corruption index measured on a scale 
from 0-6.  
In another study Niehaus and Sukhtanker (2012) examined the idea that the rents from 
keeping one’s job can deter corruption today in order to preserve tommorrow’s opportunities. 
The authors from their research noted that when opportunities for theft from daily wage 
projects increase, theft on piece rate projects goes down. Duflo et al. (2012) noted that in 
situations where the mecahnisms to monitor performance are tamper free, performance pay 
can reduce absenteeism e.g. in case of school teachers it has been proved to improve test 
scores. Olken and Pande (2012) noted that caution must be taken to design incentives well 
and to prevent them from being undermined. 
Olken and Pande (2012) suggests that tying incentives more closely to performance either 
through direct financial awards or through promotions, assignments etc. can be one of the 
methods to reduce corruption. Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991)argue  that in designing such 
incentive schemes it is critical to deal with the so called “multitasking” problems and ensure 
the true goals of government are achieved but not just the ones that are incentivized. 
Government institutional reforms  
This includes: political will, reduction in red tape, using technological innovations 
declaration of assets, sanctions and grievance redressal mechanisms. Strategies to control 
corruption in government are usually effective when there is a strong political will by the 
government to support the anti-corruption strategies i.e. the willingness of the government to 
fight corruption should always be followed by action through policy and institutional reforms 
followed by the relevant official lines of detection and control and control followed by 
sanctions through criminal prosecution of all the individuals implicated in the corrupt 
practices (Choo et al., 2012). Another way to control corruption is by using simple 
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administrative procedures in government institutions to be able to cut on the redtape to 
reduce on the various levels where corrupt practices can take place (Choo et al., 2012).  
Choo et al. (2012) argues that ordinary citizens (local people) have a lot of first hand 
experience with corruption and therefore are a good source of information  and their help is 
important in order to launch a successful anti–corruption campaign.There is need to provide 
the communities with information through publicity to create awareness on corruption. For 
example to initiate  public community programs to enable the citizens  express their views on 
corruption brings immediate outpouring of information, ideas and suggestions that will be 
very helpful (Mbaku, 2008 ; Choo et al., 2012). 
Declaration of assets by politicians and public officials prior to their appointment may work 
to curb corruption (World Bank, 2007). However sometimes this may not work because of 
overstatement of their assets and claims of family inheritance so that later enhancements can 
be discounted and concealed (Ware et al., 2007). 
Mbaku (2008) argues that one effective way of fighting corruption is the devolution of power 
in favor of local, regional, and or provincial political jurisdictions.The author argues that in 
order to fight corruption power should not be concentrated in the center (Mbaku, 2008). 
Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Olken (2007) noted that in order for the strategies to control 
corruption to be effective, the expected costs from corrupt behavior if the corrupt agent is 
detected should be greater than the expected gains and therefore because of this the corrupt 
agent will decide not to be corrupt. The author notes that for governments designing 
strategies to control corruption, they should ensure that  the strategies should be able to 
reduce the expected gains from corruption while increasing the probability of the corrupt 
agents caught and increasing the size of the punishment (sanction) if caught. Gary & Stigler 
(1974) suggested the right combination of monitoring and punishments in order to control 
corruption. 
 Boris (2005), Myint (2000) and Choo et al. (2012) argue that the strict rule of law, reducing 
the complexity of laws and improving the performance of the judicial system is one of the 
elements of an effective strategy to fight corruption. The authors also recommend for a 
reduction in bureaucracy by cutting back on red tape to reduce the discretion of public 
officials. Myint also recommends for the creation oversight bodies  e.g. independent 
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commissions against corruption for instance the creation of the Inspector General of 
Government  (IGG’s) office in Uganda. 
Another supply-side innovation to control corruption is through technological innovations by 
creating tools that make it very difficult for government officials to tamper with and to 
enhance communication through technological innovations which can provide reliable 
information to enable efficient monitoring (Olken and Pande, 2012). Olken and Pande (2012 
) argue that in the online procurement system  high quality contractors are more likely to win 
contracts and therefore can offer better quality services compared to other procurement 
methods whereby bribery is rampant  ending up hiring poor quality contractors who offer 
poor quality services. Similarly Choo et al. (2012) suggests that one solution to reduce 
corruption is to reduce contacts with public officials so as to minimize the opportunity for 
public officials to ask for a bribe, for example investing in E-government platforms can then 
serve as a good strategy since it reduces contact of public officials with the citizens and 
reduces the ability for public officials to exhibit rent seeking behaviors and to commit illegal 
acts such as bribery, extortion or any other type of malfeasance punishable by the law. 
Examples include digitalization of transactions, online payment tracking and audits. However 
the author cautions that this strategy will only be feasible and successful given that the 
country has adequate resources to implement it, able to carry out the required institutional 
reforms and the majority of the population are of a required level of competency and have 
access to the internet. 
Targeting 
It is economically efficient to allow the production and distribution of public goods to be 
undertaken at the local level where demand and supply conditions as well as changes in them 
can be determined with greater levels of accuracy. Local provision of services can enhance 
the ability of stakeholders to hold civil servants more accountable and hence minimize 
bureaucratic corruption (Mbaku, 2008). 
Grimes & Wangnerud (2010) noted that to control corruption in public service delivery is the 
use of conditional cash transfers to the local governments and the beneficiary government 
entities. Grimes & Wangnerud (2010 argue that,  the CCTs are designed in a way that funds 
pass through fewer hands and this eliminates bureaucracy in the implementation chain and 
also aims at increasing transparency in the process of selecting beneficiaries through 
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providing information about entitlements by the recipients i.e. the beneficiaries are aware of 
what they are entitled to. 
Mungiu-pippidi (2013a) and Persson et al. (2010) have criticized the control of corruption by 
thinking that when the boss is not corrupt but a lower cadre is the one who is corrupt this will 
force the lower cadre to change. The authors argue that good governance programs by 
international agencies to control corruption are usually misdirected i.e. towards ministries, 
control agencies  and anti-corruption bodies which are also corrupt but wrongly assumed that 
they are morally above corruption. This finding is also similar to Persson et al. (2010) who 
argued that the principle agent approach to control corruption cannot work because they 
argue that those officials at the top end of the public administration ladder have the most 
discretionary power and also the most opportunities to ask for bribes. The authors noted that 
officials e.g. legislators are in a better position to influence policies and legislation in favor of 
specific interest groups involved in corruption. There is need for collective action to control 
corruption through creation of effective checks on corrupt officials through enlightened 
citizens rather than simply dependent clients and dis-empowered individuals (Rothstein & 
Teorell, 2008 ; Persson et al., 2010). Here ordinary citizens who are the beneficiaries of the 
service should be able to play the role of principals and hence corruption can be controlled 
though collective means (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). 
 Demand-side strategies to control corruption 2.6.2
There has been a growing emphasis on the importance of enhancing accountability in public 
services by the government through social audits. Social audit is a process through which 
government expenditure details at the local level (usually at village level) are obtained and 
discussed in a public hearing attended by both the service providers and the people who have 
benefited from that particular government program (Singh and Vutukuru, 2010). 
Persson et al. (2010), Persson, Rothstein & Teorell (2010) and Mungiu- Pippidi (2013b), 
these authors argue for collective action to control corruption. Here they argue that in order 
to create effective checks on corrupt officials in order to create real accountability there must 
exist at the grassroots level an active and enlightened citizenry rather than simply dependent 
clients and dis-empowered individuals. They argue that ordinary citizens themselves should 
be able to play the role of principals and corruption can be controlled through collective 
means. Civil society associations, political participation and the media all serve to empower 
collective action on behalf of society, thus rendering it better equipped to solve common 
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problems for example corruption and in this case associations of every kind lower the cost of 
collective action for the average citizen (Mungui-Pippidi, 2013b). 
Olken and Pande (2012) present another approach to providing effective monitoring that does 
not involve a central auditor. This is grassroots monitoring where regular citizens are 
empowered to monitor their officials to prevent corruption. Olken`s previous study in 
Indonesia examined grassroots monitoring by randomly allocating villages to receive more 
intensive community monitoring. This was through two interventions with different 
purposes. The first intervention involved inviting hundreds of villagers to attend local 
accountability meetings to reduce elite control of which community members were involved 
in monitoring. The second intervention he used involved distributing hundreds of anonymous 
comment forms throughout the village in order to allow community members to voice 
concerns or complaints without fear of retaliation.  
Results from the study indicate that invitation intervention reduced theft of materials, but 
only for theft of wages, for example convincing the villagers to work for free but billing the 
project for their work. The benefits from detecting theft of materials would accrue to the 
village as a whole in the form of a better road, so the free rider problem may be more severe. 
Olken and Pande (2012) conclude that for community participation to work successfully, it is 
important to get the details right in terms of protecting people from retaliation, limiting the 
free rider problem and preventing elite capture. The authors argue that increasing community 
participation can influence governance through a number of channels, that is ; improvements 
in monitoring, improved information flow and exchange whereby leaders may learn more 
about villagers´ preferences and villagers in turn may learn more about outcomes especially 
when outcomes relate to service delivery but not necessarily corruption. 
An example of the above approach is a recent study in Uganda`s health service sector  
whereby Björkman and Svensson (2010) examined community monitoring intervention in 
Uganda in which local NGOs encouraged the communities to be more involved in the state 
of the health service provision. The interventions included meetings to discuss baseline 
information on the status of health service delivery relative to other providers and the 
government standard and encouraged the community members to develop a plan identifying 
key problems and steps the providers should take to improve health service provision. 
Results show that the intervention increased the quality and quantity of primary health care 
37 
 
service provision, however the design of the intervention suggests that the mechanisms could 
have included either or both better information flows and monitoring. 
Social audits provide an opportunity to the citizens, especially the poor to directly engage 
with service providers and provide continuous feedback on the implementation of large 
government programmes. Social audits are important because they also serve a purpose of 
exposing corruption in the implementation of government programmes (Myint, 2000). 
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3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
Ealier approaches to public administration assumed that the public service production and 
delivery was basically the sole responsibility of the government i.e. the Supply-side and 
ignored the role of the clients (Demand-side) of the service in the efficient delivery of public 
services. Many of the public sector reforms concentrated on improvement of the Supply-side 
through capacity development, bureaucratic reforms and staff welfare through financial 
incentives (ECA, 2003 ; Standing, 2004). Here the private sector and clients were basically 
ignored and government departments were considered the only available agencies in the 
provision of public services (ECA , 2003 ; World Bank , 2004). 
At service provider level, in extension for example, Supply–driven production packages were 
promoted in the past decade  and at the Demand-side often rather shallow needs assessments 
were carried out to make the system appear “ participatory” and “responsive”, while the 
overall effectiveness and efficiency remained poor (Hagmann et al., 2002). Standing (2004) 
noted that all this focus mainly on the Supply-side of public service delivery was as a result 
of ill informed policies by governments which were formulated through a top-down approach 
without involvement of the beneficiaries who would support implementation by giving 
feedback to the implementing government agencies. 
ECA (2003) and Hagmann et al. (2002) noted that such traditional approaches to delivery of 
public services have not proved effective because many countries more especially the 
developing countries have limited institutional capacity to offer the public services alone. 
Similarly ECA (2003) and Standing (2004) noted that the challenges of the traditional 
approach are the institutional and governance failures e.g. resource deficiencies, poor 
management, corruption, accountability issues, general hostility of the Demand-side to 
government etc. especially in the developing countries resulting in failure of programs to 
achieve their objectives. 
Approaches that ensure that the poor people have access to service delivery of recent have 
been given a high priority by governments and international agencies alike. The World 
Bank(2004) on improving service delivery to poor people particularly captures the emerging 
demand language of empowerment, voice and accountability (World Bank, 2004).The World 
Development Report (WDR) published by the World Bank in 2004 captures the emerging 
Demand side language of empowerment, voice and accountability through its model of the 
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three central service provision relationships of user-provider –planner. In this model (see 
figure 3.1), empowered citizens/consumers use voice to hold providers/policy makers to 
account for fulfilling their contract to deliver competent responsive services.  
The accountability triangle indicated in figure 3.1 which is adopted from the World Bank 
(2003a) indicates that the users of the service have two potential routes of accountability for 
securing essential public services; a long route via the policy makers and a short route 
directly to the producers as shown in figure 3.1. Where a short route to accountability is 
effective, clients can help tailor the package of services to their own needs and monitor the 
producers leading to effective and efficient  services (World Bank,  2003a). However for the 
short route to accountability (social audits) to be effective, producers must be responsive to 
information on local preferences and have sufficient discretion to respond to local needs and 
this can also serve as a good feedback effect on demand. By monitoring government 
performance, demanding and enhancing transparency and exposing government failures and 
misdeeds social accountability mechanisms are also powerful tools against corruption and it 
addresses also the Demand-side aspects of public service delivery, monitoring and 
accountability (Malena et al., 2004).  
 
Figure 3.1: The accountability triangle 
The new paradigm shift through the New Public Management (NPM) approach believed that 
apart from the public sector, the private sector if well organized can also play a role in the 
delivery of public services (World Bank, 2003a ; Standing, 2004 ; ECA, 2003 ; WDR ,2004 
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&Birner, 2007). Here the private sector service providers can be formal/informal and civil 
society organizations.  
Through the NPM approach, the private sector has been given an active role in public service 
delivery and also has emphasized that citizens have an active role to play in the delivery of 
services rather than being just on the receiving end of whatever public goods /services are 
offered to them i.e. NPM addresses the beneficiaries of the public services much like 
customers and shareholders but not just as obedient subjects (Birner, 2007, Pollitt, 2003). 
According to Matheson & Kwon (2003), Birner (2007) and Birner et al. (2009) the 
characteristics of NPM include decentralization of the delivery of public services to lower 
levels, contracting out of some of the public services to the private sector, competition within 
government, client involvement and management by objectives. 
Hagmann et al. (2002) noted that matching the Supply-side with the Demand-side should also 
be matched by improved capacity and governance of the organization i.e. good policies, 
adequate financial capacity, mandate etc. and any forgotten aspect of the service delivery 
system will hinder the success of the overall intervention. Similarly Birner (2007) argued that 
only improving the Supply-side of public service delivery will not guarantee efficient service 
delivery.  
3.2 Description of the conceptual framework 
 Overview 3.2.1
The Conceptual Framework underlying this study is the service delivery framework modified 
from Hagmann et al. (2002), framework for analyzing pluralistic advisory services worldwide 
by Birner et al. (2006) and framework for improving governance, Demand and Supply side 
approaches by Birner (2007). This Conceptual Framework describes the concepts guiding the 
study, how they relate to each other and how they affect project performance. 
This framework describes the various Demand-side and Supply-side factors that affect 
program performance. Here performance is defined as the ability of an organization to meet 
its goals and achieve its overall mission (Birner et al., 2006). For effective program 
performance, there is need for the Demand-side itself (the rural populations/the beneficiaries) 
to be supported in organizing themselves and have a formalized voice in the service 
(Hagmann et al., 2002). Hagmann et al. (2002) concludes that any forgotten aspect in the 
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service system can turn to be a blockage hindering the success of the other and of the overall 
program intervention and hence poor program/project performance. 
According to Birner et al. (2006) and Birner et al. (2011), the ability of the agricultural 
service organization to achieve its objectives is influenced by its capacity both technical and 
financial, its internal environment and the context in which it operates. Birner et al. (2006) 
and Birner et al. (2011) identified four indicators of program performance i.e. relevance of 
the agricultural advisory service, technical and financial capacity, efficiency and 
effectiveness. Additionally, Blum (2008) noted that other indicators of program performance 
includes the characteristics of the agricultural extension system plus the system actors, 
coordination of advisory services with other partners, beneficiary involvement, financial 
capabilities and human resource capacity of the organization. 
Birner et al. (2006) describes two types of variables that influence program performance i.e. 
the choice variables and frame conditions. The choice variables are described as those 
variables that policy makers and advisory program managers can influence directly, for 
instance the characteristics of the agricultural extension services, management and advisory 
methods, governance structures of the extension services and the capacity of the organization 
offering the advisory services. The choice variables are displayed in boxes I, J,K,L and M in 
figure 3.2. Birner et al. (2006) defined the frame conditions as those factors that the policy 
makers and agricultural service managers can influence only in an indirect way because they 
are beyond their control and influence. These are displayed in boxes A, B,C, D, E, F, G and 
H in figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual framework 
Source: Author’s compilation  based on Hagmann et al. (2002), Birner et al. (2006), Birner et 
al. (2011) and World Bank (2003a).  
 
 
 
43 
 
 The Supply-side of public service delivery 3.2.2
(See Boxes  I, J,K, L and M in figure 3.2) 
In this Conceptual Framework, the Supply-side refers to the production and delivery of public 
services through the involvement of multiple governance actors (Standing, 2004, Hagmann et 
al., 2002). Looking at rural extension services the Supply-side consists of the service 
providers and in addition to the organizations of the service providers and their institutional 
arrangements (Hagmann et al., 2002). Supply-side of public service delivery refers to the 
production and delivery of public services through the involvement of multiple governance 
actors that include public agencies, private enterprises, CSOs, NGOs, CBOs, and the 
communities (Hagmann et al., 2002). 
The Supply-side of service delivery is influenced by the organization capacity i.e. the 
resources, knowledge and processes employed by the organization. It includes; staffing, 
infrastructure, technology and financial resources, strategic leadership, program and process 
management, networks and linkages with other organizations and groups (Horton et al., 
2003). Service providers need to have the capacity to interpret the demand and to identify the 
type of services which is appropriate to support the different clients (Hagmann et al., 2002). 
The internal environment refers to the internal factors that influence the direction of the 
organization and the energy displayed in its activities. It includes; incentive and rewards 
systems, the organization climate or culture, leadership and management style, the history 
and traditions of the organization, clarity and acceptance of the organization’s mission, extent 
and shared norms and values promoting teamwork and pursuit of organization goals and 
organizational structure (Hagmann et al., 2002; Birner et al. 2006). 
Financial management 
(See Box J in figure 3.2) 
This involves fiscal and administrative decentralization of public agencies and creating an 
enabling environment for the involvement of non-state actors that include NGOs, CBOs and 
the private sector in the provision of public services. This strategy is aimed at improving the 
capacities of autonomous service delivery of public agencies and local governments. 
However Birner (2007) argued that this approach can only be successful if there is a 
willingness and commitment by the central/state governments to ensure effective 
administrative and fiscal decentralization. 
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In terms of financial management for effective project performance adequate funds should be 
allocated and finance services need to be enabling for service providers to perform well and 
this calls for effective financial governance (budgeting and accounting mechanisms).  It 
should be noted that allocating adequate financial resources is not a guarantee for effective 
service delivery, therefore for efficient project performance strong accounting and monitoring 
systems should be in place to ensure that resources are allocated equitably so that the diverse 
needs of the targeted beneficiaries are fulfilled.  End of year financial statements and budget 
execution reports should be available to the public so that the monitoring mechanisms can 
achieve the desired outputs. Financial management should go hand in hand with 
accountability, which is an institutional relationship with three features i.e. delegation, 
financial performance and enforceability. It should be noted that accountability is at the heart 
of effective and efficient public service delivery coupled with improved external as well as 
internal communication channels which enhance transparency and accountability (Hagmann 
et al., 2002). 
Capacity and management of the organization 
( See Boxes I and K in figure 3.2) 
Efforts to provide better services and improve project performance depend on whether the 
service providers have the capacity to respond to the demand and deliver better services to 
the communities. Here capacity refers to the   number of service providers, their training 
levels, attitudes, motivation, aspirations of the staff members’ of the advisory service, their 
incentives, mission orientation, professional ethics and organizational culture (Birner et al., 
2006 , Birner et al., 2010). If any of these factors are in short supply it will affect project 
performance negatively (Birner et al., 2010). Competence development is a central aspect to 
reach organizational capacity and this is not perceived as a conventional training but 
integrally incorporated learning with the organizational development process (Hagmann et 
al., 2002). Manning and Parison (2004) have noted that staff recruitment should be on merit 
in order to ensure that qualified staff are carrying out the job effectively. 
Design features of the program 
( See Box L in figure 3.2) 
Agricultural livelihood programs will have limited impact on the beneficiaries if the advisory 
methods applied are inappropriate (considering the context), the training level of the advisory 
services agents was too low and if the system was not managed well. Examples of strategies 
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to improve capacity and performance include training to improve technical and practical 
skills, on the job promotions, work delegation, merit based recruitment, and work motivation 
e.g. through creating incentives, and the adjustment of payment structures (Birner et al., 
2006). 
 According to Batley (2006) the second approach of improving Supply-side of public service 
delivery aims at creating an enabling environment for non-state providers (NGOs, CBOs, 
CSOs, user organizations etc.) to engage in activities that increase and improve service 
provision to the poor people. There are a number of institutional arrangements through which 
non-state actors take part in the production and delivery of public services and the most 
common ones for example include: privatization, contracting out for example the NAADS in 
Uganda where the provision of agricultural advisory services is contracted to individual 
consultants, private sector enterprises  and NGOs on a competitive basis, service cooperatives  
and devolving management authority to user groups  e.g. water user committees (Birner, 
2007; Birner et al., 2006 ; Batley, 2006; Awortwi, 2012). 
 The Demand-side of public service delivery 3.2.3
( See Boxes F, G and H in figure 3.2) 
In this Conceptual Framework, the Demand-side refers to the community members and their 
organizational capacities to aggregate and articulate demand towards service providers with 
the objective of influencing the availability, access, quality and timeliness of services 
provided as well as to claim accountability of providers to their clients (Standing, 2004, 
Hagmann et al., 2002). Looking at rural extension services, the Demand-side are the rural 
communities and their organizations (i.e. the beneficiaries of the services) (Hagmann et al., 
2002). 
The Demand-side capacity of public service delivery refers to the community members and 
their organizational capacities to aggregate and articulate demand towards service providers 
with the objective of influencing the quality, quantity and timeliness of services provided as 
well as to claim accountability of providers to the clients (Hagmann et al., 2002). Similarly 
the Demand-side of public service delivery therefore focuses on the voice, regulation, 
transparency and accountability and financial management dimensions of governance ( 
Birner, 2007; Rouse, 2007). Citizens need to have voice and the government should be able 
to provide avenues so that they can express it effectively. There is need to provide open and 
responsive avenues for the consumers to exercise their voice through well laid out procedures 
46 
 
and complaint mechanisms (Birner, 2007; Rouse, 2007). Standing (2004) gives examples of 
factors  on the Demand-side to include: cultural, intra-household resource allocation, labor, 
income level, skills in monitoring, education levels (formal or informal), planning, designing, 
management and monitoring of service delivery and gender issues. 
Birner (2007), Birner et al. (2006) and Hagmann et al. (2002) argued that aggregation of 
demand is critical in public service delivery because demands for better service can only be 
responded to in an effective manner if a critical mass of people shares the same problem/need 
and be able to organize their demands. The authors note that the degree of assertiveness of 
citizen’s demand is influenced by the level and type of information they have about their 
entitlements, rights, regulations, financial resources and resource allocation procedures and 
mechanisms.  In order to strengthen the Demand-side, there is need to strengthen the capacity 
of citizens in general and more especially the poor people and vulnerable groups to demand 
for better services and creating institutional arrangements and complaints mechanisms that 
can help them channel their demands to public agencies and hold them accountable. 
One of the Demand-side factors considers the community characteristics as important factors 
that affect project performance. The community factors include: educational level, human 
capital, household income, social capital, pre-conflict agriculture expertise, local 
organization’s capacity and culture, gender issues, availability of markets, farming style and 
practices (Birner et al., 2006). 
For example the education level of the communities matters for the project to achieve its 
objectives. Education impacts on how the demand needs are managed and the articulation of 
the demand towards service providers and the ability of the clients to claim accountability 
from the service providers (Hagmann et al., 2002). Schultz (2002) noted that every additional 
year of schooling increases a person’s productivity and increases earnings. Communities with 
higher education are able to articulate high quality demand which is created by ability of the 
farmers to have deep analysis of causes of problems or issues based on a thorough exposure 
and assessment of options to address their problems and the understanding of what the 
service providers can contribute at solving their problems (Hagmann et al., 2002).  
Low educated or illiterate communities usually have shallow so called “wish lists” of needs 
or wants which cannot enable the programs to effectively solve their very important needs in 
the communities (Hagmann et al., 2006). Evidence from rural India also suggests that higher 
levels of education and literacy correlate with lower corruption, more accountability, better 
targeting and less political capture (Plummer & Cross, 2007). If the society is not sufficiently 
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educated and informed about their rights and access to government information and cultural 
and social dynamics keep away people from demanding information to hold public officials 
and institutions accountable (Byrne et al., 2010). Education level can impact on the farm 
households/clients to exercise voice and formulate demand. Birner et al. (2006) and empirical 
research shows that educated households are less prone to experience corruption (Shaw, 
2009). 
For instance, complex community based programs which are transaction and document 
intensive e.g. NUSAF and NAADS are difficult to implement if the average education levels 
of the community are low. Education inequity may also contribute to elite capture by the 
more educated members of the community (Birner et al., 2011). It has also been observed that 
educated people can easily adapt to new technologies. The level of agricultural expertise from 
the pre-conflict time may also determine how well the beneficiaries are able to utilize the 
agricultural expertise provided by the program (Birner et al., 2011). Social capital is the most 
important factor in determing the nature and effectiveness of protective strategies. Mungiu-
pippidi (2013a), Mungiu-pippidi (2013b) and Putnam (1993) refers to social capital as a 
widespread habit of engaging in formal or informal collective action around shared interests, 
purposes and values and notes that collective action is a public good. Group approaches to 
advisory services can be effective when communities have high levels of social cohesion. 
If the program is being implemented in post-conflict situations where the social capital has 
been eroded, implementation should begin with programs that aim at strengthening the social 
capital within the communities. Hagmann et al. (2002) argues that a well-organized 
community (stronger social capital) can lead to a stronger Demand-side. A stronger Demand- 
side can be able to hold service providers accountable and mass publics can make extension 
services more cost effective (Birner et al., 2006 ; Hagmann et al., 2002). For political reasons, 
for example insecurity caused by war, participation in local groups may be discouraged this is 
because the knowledge and social networks of farmers can be highly fragmented leading to 
absence of common set of values.  
A study by Narayan & Pritchett (1997) has shown that social networks are important in 
overcoming coordination problems and reducing transaction costs. Miguel & Gugerty (2004) 
argues that ethnically diverse communities (limited social networks) are less able to ensure 
enough social pressure for sustaining school contributions, a case of rural western Kenya. 
The author concludes that higher ethnic diversity is associated with lower community 
participation in school meetings. Reinikka & Svensson (2004) conclude that investment in 
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social capital through nation building policies can be an important explanation for the 
observed difference in local capture as it determines communities’ ability to produce local 
public goods , raise funds and cooperate on policies to improve on the communities’ welfare.  
Once cooperation and a habit of association exist in a society, it becomes easier to use the 
social capital i.e. cooperation and association for any collective action(Mungiu-pippidi, 
2013a/b). The author argues that, a society capable of collective action is capable of 
controlling its most violent or selfish tendencies for example extreme individualism, 
divisiveness where there is very little trust and each person acts on his own behalf and against 
anyone who stands in his way. The capacity for collective action is a public good that derives 
from extensive interaction. Evidence shows that households with more limited social network 
have greater difficulty accessing resources such as land and employment opportunities. It 
should be noted that social cohesion is the foundation of collective identity and customary 
laws and as such is a factor for mitigating tensions and conflict in society (Mccormac & 
Benjamin, 2008).   
Labor availability (Human capital) is a variable also affecting farmers´ decision about the 
adoption of new agricultural practices or inputs. Some technologies are relatively labor 
saving and others are labor using. Ox-Cultivation is labor saving and its adoption may be 
encouraged by labor shortage ( Birner et al., 2006). Technologies that increase demand for 
labor in peak seasons, adoption is less attractive for those with limited family labor. If the 
technology is not easy to adopt due to limited human capital, then this will negatively impact 
on program performance. 
Land availability and tenure security determine whether the farmers can utilize the 
technologies provided by the program. Technologies which require large tracts of land may 
not well be utilized by small land owners or the landless e.g. women and this will impact on 
the adoption of these technologies. If the project is promoting technologies which require big 
chunks of land where land is scarce, land issues will have a negative impact on the project 
performance. Where there is no secure land tenure, technologies which take a long time like 
tree planting will not be easily adopted by the targeted communities. 
Socially determined gender roles in the community influence the strategies that advisory 
services systems need to apply in order to reach women farmers ( Birner et al., 2006). Byrne 
et al. (2010) has argued that cultural and social dynamics in the society keep people away 
from demanding information to hold public institutions accountable. In relatively more 
patriarchal societies where women do not play as active role in the public domain, women`s 
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views on social issues may be influenced to a greater extent by men´s views and hence in 
such societies one would expect to see less of a gender difference in behavior towards 
corruption in comparison to societies where women feel more comfortable in voicing their 
own opinions (Alatas et al., 2008).  
The level of agricultural expertise before the beginning of the war conflict may also 
determine how well the targeted beneficiaries are able to internalize and utilize the 
agricultural technologies provided by the program. If the beneficiaries had prior knowledge 
on the technologies being promoted before the war, it is likely easier for the extension 
workers to deliver the message effectively than when the farmers had no prior knowledge. 
With prior knowledge of the technologies before the war conflict there is improved program 
performance because it will take more little time and resources to let the beneficiaries adopt 
the new technologies. 
Contextual factors 
The contextual factors are represented by Boxes A, B, C, D and E in figure 3.2. These factors 
include location, indicators accounting for season, occurrence of conflict, perceptions of 
safety in the neighborhood, level of poverty, security situation and policy environment, 
general corruption level and level of reconciliation.   
In addition Hagmann et al. (2002) and Birner et al. (2006) argued that strategies to improve 
the Supply-side of public service delivery will be more effective when they consider the 
context  in which the public service delivery is taking place  i.e. not to consider a one size fits 
all but to tailor the strategies to the specific problems that the clients and the public agencies 
face. For example, post conflict settings are characterized by the breakdown of social 
structures, the exertion of political power and control over other communities, ethnic 
differences and socio-economic discrimination. Such characteristics are among the major 
threats to men’s and women’s livelihoods and have a negative impact on project 
performance. For instance the conflict in Northern Uganda has deeply traumatized the 
populations and shattered traditions and social cohesion, destabilizing the old and new 
generations, shifting social values and profoundly affecting the psycho-social wellbeing of 
Northern Ugandans (McCormac & Benjamin, 2008). Engagement with the community 
decreased as a survivalist mentality increased and these are often replaced with a tendency for 
people to adopt an ‘’each person for themselves’’ attitude (McCormac &Benjamin , 2008). 
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4 STUDY AREA AND PROGRAMS 
4.1 Background on Uganda 
Uganda is a landlocked country located in Eastern Africa which borders South Sudan, Kenya, 
Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Tanzania. The country has a 
population of about 33,796,000 and the country has more than 40 different ethnic groups 
(UBOS, 2010). UBOS statistics of 2010 show that the population of Uganda is growing at a 
very fast rate  and currently it is growing at 3.2 % per annum , which is making Uganda one 
of the countries with the highest population growth rates in the World. The implications of 
high population growth rates is that it reduces the real gross domestic product  (GDP) per 
capita (UNOCHA(b), 2011).  
Uganda has been widely recognized as one of the most successful countries in Africa in terms 
of sustained economic growth and reduced poverty levels (Kjaer and Joughin, 2010). The 
authors note that, inspite of this sustained growth  recent analyses point to the fact that there 
has been no real structural transformation of the economy in terms of a genuine change from 
predominantly susbsistence to an economy with a commercial agricultural sector and 
increasing manufacture. For the last 2 decades, the economic growth in Uganda generally has 
been robust averaging 7% per annum over the period (World Bank, 2010). According to 
MoFPED (2010) report, the share of people living in households below the poverty line 
dropped from 56% in 1992/93 to 31% in 2005/2006, income inequality as measured by the 
Gini Coefficient increased from 0.365 in 1992/93 to 0.428 in 2005/2006. 
Though Uganda has gained sustained growth over the years, Joughin and Kjaer (2010) noted 
that this growth has not shown real impacts in as far as changing the mainly subsistence 
agricultural economy to commercial agriculture.Though there has been some growth, there 
are still structural constraints that government development policies so far have not been 
adequately addressed and these constraints include unequal access to land, long marketing 
chains and high transaction costs due to among other things , poor rural infrastructure 
(Joughin and Kjaer, 2010). The other challenge facing Uganda is that it has a highly 
dependent population i.e. more than half the population is under the age of 15 whereas the 
life expectancy of working individuals is 50.4 years. While Uganda has substantial natural 
resources, 35% of the population lives below the poverty line and the country is dependent on 
foreign aid , with net official direct assistance  (ODA) of $ 54.6 per capita (IMF, 2010). 
However when you consider the regional levels , the indicators for Northern Uganda are even 
considerably worse i.e. 35% poverty levels at national levels and 41.7% for Northern 
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Uganda. Emperical research shows that this poor performance of the Northern region 
compared to other regions is due to the negative impacts of the LRA war conflict (UNDP, 
2005). 
Land is the most important asset in Uganda where the majority of the population is deriving a 
large part of their income directly from working the land (ZevenBergen et al., 2012). This 
holds even more for Northern Uganda which after prolonged conflict of over 20 years is just 
now currently returning to normality. It should be noted that land related conflicts and 
perception of tenure security determine whether investments in improving production and 
productivity take place (Zevenbergen et al., 2012). It is important to note that agriculture has 
for a longtime been the core sector of the Uganda’s economy providing the basis for growth 
in other sectors and significantly contributing to GDP for ensuring food security.  
Agriculture contributes up to nearly 20% of GDP, accounts for 48% of exports and provides a 
large proportion of the raw materials for industry.  According to the MAAIF (2013) report, 
food processing alone accounts for 40% of the total manufacturing. MAAIF (2013) indicated 
that the country’s efforts to reduce poverty depend on agriculture because it employs 73% of 
the population and it is dominated by the subsistence smallholder farmers who depend on 
agriculture for food security and income. However evidence indicates that the food security 
situation in Uganda is not that good. According to the World Food Programme report of 2006 
, about 45% of the population in Uganda is potentially food insecure throughout the year, 
26% highly vulnerable and 15% moderately vulnerable with variations both geographically 
and amongst livelihhod groups. For example real growth rate in agricultural output declined 
from 7.9 % in 2000/01 to 1.3 percent in 2012/13 financial years ((MAAIF, 2010a ; MFPED, 
2014a). Regions in Uganda that are affected with food insecurity, it is mainly as a result of 
disruption of farming by war conflict in Northern Uganda and bad climatic conditions for 
instance inadequate rainfall like in the Karamoja sub-region.The Northern Region of Uganda 
has good rainfall and fertile soils but the food security situation is not good because of the 
negative impacts of the war (Birner et al., 2011). 
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Figure 4.1: Map of Uganda showing  the Northern sub-regions 
Recent research  indicates that some succesess have been achieved, but food insecurity gaps 
still exist especially in conflict affected areas with implications for more concerted 
investments in a multiplicity of community assets to achieve better results (Sseguya, 2009; 
Sseguya et al., 2013). In terms of advisory services, demand for extension services in Uganda 
is still low, despite 71% and 43.2% of farmers demanding for extension services in crop and 
animal husbandry respectively, only 17% of crop and 21% were served by the extension 
services (ZevenBergen et al., 2012).It should however be noted that economic growth and 
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poverty reduction have also been uneven throughout  the country especially in areas affected 
by protracted conflict and insecurity notably the  Northern region of Uganda (Levine, 2009 ; 
UBOS, 2010 & Jones, 2009).This situation is true particularly for those people living in the 
Northern parts of Uganda where poverty levels remain double those experienced elsewhere in 
the country (Nandy, 2008). Even with peace returning to the Northern parts of Uganda over 
the past few years, living conditions in the North compare unfavorably with those in most 
other parts of the country and this is well recognized by independent researchers and the 
government alike (Nandy,2008). 
 Agricultural extension reform in Uganda over the years 4.1.1
The agricultural extension system in Uganda has undergone a lot of changes since the 
beginning of the century, for example between 1920-1956 most of the extension services 
were provided by chiefs, for example it was the chiefs who had responsibity to visit the 
homesteads to offer extension advise. Between the years of 1956 to 1963 agricultural 
advisory services were provided by progressive farmers. Progressive farmers were those 
farmers who had been trained in the area of crop and animal production and were willing to 
share this knowledge with other farmers. From 1964 to 1972, extension work was carried out 
by trained personnel who were deployed at sub-counties. However between 1972 and 1980 
extension services collapsed because of the political turmoil in the country. 
In addition, significant agricultural extension reforms took place in the 1990s (Lukwago, 
2010). In 1990, a program funded by the World Bank to improve extension services in the 
country was set up. After the study, it recommended the merging of agriculture related 
sections into MAAIF (Lukwago, 2010). Here the major challenge was however that the 
extension services were still centralized. It should be noted that when decentralization came 
into force in 1995, extension services were decentralized alongside other services.This 
strategy emphasized farmer to farmer extension than before and here the challenges faced 
were that the districts were poorly staffed and poorly funded to effectively handle this huge 
program. 
At the beginning of year 2000 the NAADS program was launched as a result of the failure of 
the existing top down agricultural extension system which was accused of not being able to 
effectively offer extension services to the farmers at the grassroot levels. Under the NAADS 
program the government increased funding to the agriculture sector to around 6% of GDP in 
2002 to kick start NAADS activities (Bukenya, 2010). A case in point is that at least half of 
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the 4.5% of the annual budget for agriculture goes to NAADS and extension services. One of 
the major objectives of the NAADS program was bringing extension services nearer to the 
farmers. Here the NAADS programme adopted a farmer centered extension approach with 
model farmers selected from among the community. NAADS was aimed at overcoming 
institutional constraints that were perceived to be undermining farmers’ access to quality 
knowledge and productivity enhancing technologies. The main aim was transformation of 
public delivery system of agricultural extension services into largely private sector led 
delivery system under a client or farmer controlled arrangement (Bukenya, 2010). The first 
phase of NAADS financial year 2001/2002 to 2007/2008 cost US dollars 108 million with 
80% of this from donors and the 20% from government and the farmers. The second phase 
from 2010/11 financial year was to cost 120 billion Uganda shillings with 77% of this figure 
from the government and 23% from donors.  
 The Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) 4.1.2
In order to address the problems of poverty and food insecurity in Uganda, the GoU layed out 
a Master Plan through the PEAP whose main objective was the transformation of Ugandan 
agriculture from the mainly subsistence production to commercial farming (MAAIF & 
MFPED, 2000). The PMA was started in the year 2000 and it is also one of the main pillars 
of the PEAP with the aim of increasing the ability of the poor to improve their incomes and to 
promote rapid and sustainable development. The vision of the PMA is to increase the 
incomes of the poor and at the same reduce poverty through promotion of profitable and 
sustainable production and the promotion/growth of the agro-industrial sector in the country 
(Kidd, 2001 , Bahiigwa et al., 2005). The mission of the PMA is to transform the subsistence 
agriculture to commercial agriculture. The PMA is implemented through the local 
government decentralized structures in both the technical and political framework  of Uganda 
i.e. it is the responsibility of the districts and the sub-counties at the lower levels to 
implement the PMA (Kidd, 2001 , Bahiigwa et al., 2005). In the PMA agricultural advisory 
services have been prioritized and advisory services are mainly implemented through the 
highly funded NAADS program (MAAIF & MFPED, 2000). 
According to MAAIF and MFPED (2000) the PMA notes that transforming the country’s 
subsistence agriculture requires addressing two types of constraints, namely production 
related and governance related constraints. The productivity related constraints range from 
lack of sufficient food, lack of land, soil infertility, insecure land tenure rights, lack of 
agricultural skills and knowledge, limited access to technical advice, low use of improved 
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inputs, lack of capital and access to credit, poor roads, poor transport networks and poor 
marketing infrastructure. It is recognized by the government and various stakeholders that 
due to conflict, insecurity and under development, the poverty targets for the rest of the 
country are not at the moment realistic for Northern Uganda and that’s why in addition to the 
PEAP and PMA, Northern Uganda also has adopted the Peace, Recovery and Development  
Plan (PRDP). However it should be noted that the PRDP is not a separate project but it is a 
coordination framework for all programs and projects in the North setting out certain 
objectives and targets for Northern Uganda (OPM, 2011). 
 The Northern region of Uganda 4.1.3
The people of Northern Uganda and their economic activities  
Northern Uganda refers to the sub-regions of Acholi, Lango, and Teso and to some degree 
West Nile. However the Acholi sub-region of Northern Uganda was the worst affected by the 
over two decades of the LRA insurgency. The Acholi and other ethnic groups of Northern 
Uganda are organized in Chiefdoms and clans and oriented towards patrilineal descent. A 
chief called Rwot heads each Chiefdom.   
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Figure 4.2: Map of northern Uganda showing the study areas 
Societies in Northern Uganda mainly depend on agriculture for both food security and 
income. As a rural agrarian community, the most important resource for the communities in 
the North is land  and one of the crucial factors shaping IDPs return decisions is therefore 
access to land (Refugee Law project, 2006 ; OXFAM, 2007). Northern Uganda is  gifted with 
fertile soils and a conducive climate for agriculture and at the  time before the LRA and 
government war conflict, the area produced surpluses for domestic and foreign markets and 
thats why it was commonly called the bread basket of Uganda (Birner et al., 2011). Northern 
Uganda is a bimodal seasonal area where the first season starts with land preparation and 
sowing in January and harvest in June and July. The second season begins in August with the 
second season harvest going well into the new year (UNDP, 2007). 
Most people in the Northern region rely on sustenance (subsistence agriculture) and apart 
from income on land cultivation and herding, additional livelihood strategies are also 
undertaken which include petty trade, brewing etc. (Abuka et al., 2007). As a rural agrarian 
community, the most important resource for Northern Ugandans is land (Refugee 
LawProject, 2006). One of the crucial factors shaping return decisions of IDPs to their 
villages is therefore access to land (OXFAM, 2007). Most land in Northern Uganda is held 
under customary tenure and in this region land is usually allocated and managed by elders 
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who have responsibility to allocate land. Men control the land but women also have some 
user rights. A woman has rights to use the parent’s land prior to marriage and her husband’s 
land after marriage. Cross border trade between Northern Uganda and South Sudan is 
increasing and as trade has increased so too has the number of banks and businesses 
expanding in Northern Uganda in addition private sector investment is also increasing in the 
entire North (Carrington, 2009 ; International Alert, 2008). 
The Northern Uganda region’s socio-economic indicators 
The Northern region of Uganda is home of about 20% of the total population of the country 
with an average household size of 5.2 persons. The population in the region comprises of 
high proportion of inactive working age population (UBOS, 2006a). The 2002 Census 
indicates that the population of Northern Uganda is youthful and becoming even younger 
overtime. Children  less than 18 years constituted 49% while the elderly, more than 60 + 
years of age are made up 4%. The majority of the population in Northern Uganda is now 
young with little memory of living outside of the IDP camps and many live in households 
headed by females (SLC, 2014).      
The Northern region of Uganda records the worst figures across all dimensions of poverty 
compared to other regions in the country. Conflict affected Northern Uganda has benefitted 
little from Uganda’s development initiatives and the region has benefitted little from 
Uganda’s impressive rates of both economic growth and poverty reduction over the past 2 
decades. Research findings by Robinson (2005) show that there are also significant variations 
in poverty levels, social indicators and economic conditions in the Northern region with those 
districts bordering Southern Sudan and Congo with more insecurity worse off i.e. with poor 
infrastructure and with more governance challenges at local government levels such as, 
limited capacity, very low revenue base and restricted levels of service provision. However 
government recognizes that the human security situation has been a key factor here. The 
conflict between the LRA and the Uganda army for the last 2 decades has been a major factor 
in determining the level and character of deprivation in Northern Uganda. Annan et al.  
(2007) estimated that in the heavily affected sub-region of Acholi, the LRA abducted 1/3 of 
male adolescents and 1/6 of female adolescents. 
Even with the onset of peace in Northern Uganda over the past few years, living conditions in 
this war ravaged Northern region compare unfavorably with those in most other parts of the 
country as evidenced by a number of studies  (Nandy, 2008 ; UBOS, 2010). Seven and half 
million Ugandans still live in absolute poverty and poverty rates in the North (at over 50%) of 
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the population are double those in the rest of Uganda (Smith, 2012).  The Multidimensional 
Poverty Index (MPI) which seeks to measure acute poverty and complements income based 
poverty measures by measuring indicators for health, education and living standards to 
investigate the multiple deprivations people face at the same time, the Northern Uganda MPI 
is at a staggering 87% is higher (i.e. greater prevalence of acute poverty) than any other 
region in the country (Smith, 2012). 
For example at 66% Poverty levels in Northern Uganda remain double those experienced 
elsewhere in the country (UBOS, 2005/2006). The National Household Survey (NHS) of the 
year 2005/2006 reveals that despite a small reduction in poverty, the Northern Uganda region 
has the largest portion of people living in poverty estimated at 66 percent almost twice the 
national poverty level of 31 percent. Examining regional poverty rates, Eastern and Northern 
Uganda have the highest reduction in poverty rates of 21.7 and 16.8 percentage points 
respectively compared to an 11.1 % decline in Western Uganda (UBOS, 2010). According to 
UBOS (2010), overall more people in Northern Uganda live below the poverty line (64.8 %) 
followed by Eastern region at 38.4 %, Central Uganda has 19.6% while Western has 19.3 % 
poor people. In addition Northern Uganda had the lowest score of any region on the Human 
Development Index with a rating of 0.418 for the year 2003 and 0.499 for the year 2006 
compared to the Central region with 0.547 and 0.637 for Western region respectively (UNDP, 
2007). And again, the North had the highest Human Poverty Index ( HPI)  of 30.7% as 
compared with the Central, Western and Eastern regions’ percentages of 20.19, 20.56 and 
27.11 respectively (UNDP, 2007). Furthermore, while the annual income per capita is 
estimated at 570,000 Uganda Shillings the figure for the Northern region stands at a paltry 
153,000 Shillings which is about 27% of the national average (UNDP, 2007).  
The abductions by the LRA rebels during the war and the conditions in the IDP camps made 
it difficult for the children and the youth to attend school and get life skills. For instance the 
literacy rate in Northern Uganda is about 54% which is lower than the national average of 
68% (UBOS, 2006a). Current primary education graduation rates in Northern Uganda are at 
47% and access to secondary school in Northern Uganda remains extremely low only 15% of 
villages in the North (SLRC, 2014). Annan et al. (2011) describes the tremendous cost of lost 
education and other livelihood opportunities owing to conflict and displacement as perhaps 
the single largest impact of the war in the North. Households with a household head that only 
had some primary schooling (53.5 % of sample) whether female or male headed, were 
significantly more likely to have less food security and those households with a household 
head with O-level or above had greater wealth, the  higher the level of education, the better 
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off the household (SLRC, 2014). Livelihoods analyses indicate that the vast majority of 
households do not have the education level or primary livelihood occupation that will pull 
them out of the lowest levels of society, improve their wealth and assets and improve their 
food security (SLRC, 2014). 
The infant mortality rate is 20% higher than the national average (UBOS, 2006b). While 
Uganda’s national infant mortality rate stands at 76 per 1000 live births, the average rate for 
the North is a hefty 106 per 1000 live births (UBOS, 2003).The residents of IDP camps 
suffered from malnutrition, high mortality rates, low life expectancies, high primary school 
dropout rates, and early pregnancies and marriages (SLRC, 2014). According to the WHO 
2005 report on IDPs in Northern Uganda, mortality rates in Northern Uganda were the 
highest of any emergency situation in the World at that time standing at 1.54 per 10,000 
people per day and 3.18 per 10,000 children under the age of five.  ACTED (2010) noted that 
the agricultural sector in Northern Uganda is currently underdeveloped compared to other 
regions of Uganda, with an annual growth rate of only 1.9 % compared to 6-10% annual 
growth rates in other regions of the country (e.g. Western, Southern and Central) resulting 
into challenges of household food insecurity and poverty. 
In terms of technical capacity in the local governments, conditions are also not good, for 
instance the local administration staffing gap in the Acholi sub-region is at 63.2 % with a 
wage bill gap of 54.4% and the creation of a number of new districts in 2006 only added to 
the severe challenges faced ( International Alert, 2008).  
Impacts of the LRA war conflict on the people of Northern Uganda  
World Bank (2011) noted that the violent conflicts have been a pervasive feature of the recent 
global landscape especially in countries and regions that are poor and have weak institutions 
and low levels of human development. Evidence shows that once wars begin, they lead to 
further increases in poverty (World Bank, 2011 ;  Buvinic et al., 2012).  Wars destroy 
physical and human capital, disrupt service delivery, divert public expenditures to the 
military, disrupt the efficient functioning of markets and lead to lack of savings, capital flight 
and the departure of skilled workers from the conflict affected areas, reduction of both social 
and human capital and reduction in household income and consumption (OECD, 2008 ; 
Collier, 2007 ; Buvinic et al., 2012; World Bank, 2011; Blattman, 2009 ; DANIDA, 2005;  
OHCHR, 2007; OHCHR & UHRC, 2011)).  
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The above picture is not different from the war affected Northern Uganda. It is evident from 
numerous empirical studies that the long running conflict in Northern Uganda has led to 
major violations of rights against civilians, destruction of the physical and social 
infrastructure and has severely paralyzed economic activity in the region. Poverty, 
subsistence agriculture, loss of social capital, political/elite capture, corruption, land disputes, 
hostility against government by the populace and market failure have been reported in 
various empirical studies as serious challenges affecting people in the post-conflict Northern 
Uganda (Robinson, 2005; Claussen et al., 2008 ; International Alert, 2010 ; Martin, 2010; 
Hickey, 2003). In Northern Uganda mass displacement destroyed the social fabric of the 
family and community and war led also to displacement from family and social networks 
(Baines & Gauvin, 2014). For instance, before the war, the Acholi Clan system for managing 
land and other natural resources was inclusive and its traditional institutions, customs and 
social conventions ensured access to and use of land for the whole clan including women and 
girls. But after the war these institutions were weakened and are currently not working 
effectively (Baines & Gauvin, 2014).   
The loss of income and productive assets by over 80% of the households during the war also 
complicated efforts to restore livelihoods (Pham et al., 2007; Bozzoli & Muhumuza, 2011). 
This situation has also been highlighted by other studies for example the Northern Uganda 
Livelihoods study (NLS) and UNDP (2007), Northern Uganda Internally Displaced Persons’ 
Profiling Study (NUIPS) (2005) and the Lira District Early Recovery Needs Assessment 
(LDERNA) (2006). These studies found that the internally displaced population in Northern 
Uganda has very few resources and livelihood options. While the proportion of the 
population living in poverty in the South and West is now roughly 27%, the percentage in the 
North is 63% while in the East it is 46% and other indicators of wellbeing show a similar 
disparity (OPM, 2007).  
The conflict in Northern Uganda has severely affected the region’s economic productivity. In 
some of the affected districts, more than 90% of the population were displaced and have not 
been able to engage in meaningful economic and agricultural activities for several years 
(UNDP, 2007). Because of the war conflict, a population that previously provided the rest of 
Uganda with basic foodstuffs and which was it self-reliant became dependent on food aid ( 
Birner et al. 2011 ; Tusiime et al., 2013). 
Birner et al. (2011) and Tusiime et al. (2013)observed a number of limitations to increased 
agriculture production and household income made worse by the war and these included lack 
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of capital, skills and degradation of the environment especially charcoal burning. In addition, 
in Northern Uganda alternative livelihood options to agricultural production are still limited 
i.e. people have limited access to capital, knowledge, technologies, other farm inputs and 
linkages to the private sector are insufficient compared to other regions of Uganda that have 
not been affected by the war conflict. 
Death and destruction due to conflict altered the structure and dynamics of households  
including their demographic profiles and traditional gender roles. For instance in Northern 
Uganda the conflict created households mainly headed  by widows who can especially be 
vulnerable to intergenerational poverty (Buvinic et al. 2012 ; NULS, 2007; Bozzoli et al., 
2011; Hertz et al., 2007). The Northern Uganda Livelihoods Study-NULS (2007) revealed 
that 23% of the households heads are female headed and moreover that 18% of women 
between the ages of 30-49 are widows which is double the rate in the rest of Uganda. 
The abductions of civilians by the LRA rebels during the war  made it difficult for the 
children and the youth to attend school to get life skills and this led to loss of chances for 
them to get productive employment and hence  loss of productive labor in the region. 
Evidence indicates that the majority of the current youth population in Acholi sub-region 
were born in IDP camps and had no access to quality healthcare, education, skills and social 
development. In the IDP camps, the communities depended on handouts and this 
strengthened the dependency syndrome and therefore they do not want to engage in labor 
intensive activities like agricultural production. With the destruction of schools, looting of 
supplies and shortage of teachers, education in Northern Uganda has been severely affected 
by conflict hence limited access to quality education denied their basic human right and 
restricted their future involvement in mainstream economic and social life and also 
compromised the overall development prospects of the region and country at large 
(Nannyonjo, 2005). 
In conclusion, it should be noted that in Northern Uganda as anywhere else, the conditions of 
life do not affect every one equally. There may be a shared vulnerability among the 
population in Northern Uganda, but some are more vulnerable than others and policy makers 
need to be aware of these hierarchies of vulnerabilities i.e. the women, youths, widows etc. 
are more vulnerable (Zevenbergen et al., 2012). 
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 Agricultural livelihoods reconstruction in Northern Uganda 4.1.4
High levels of displacement and restrictions on mobility caused by war and insecurity have 
caused major disruption to peoples’ agricultural livelihoods in northern Uganda and in turn 
this has affected farming systems and reduced agricultural production in the area which is the 
main source of food security and income (UNDP, 2007). In Northern Uganda, which is 
agriculture and agrarian skills based economy production is closely tied to productive 
agriculture assets and the ability of individuals to use them well. Physical capital such as 
farming tools and storage facilities in addition to availability of land are very important for an 
agriculture based society (UNDP, 2007). The withdrawal of the LRA in Northern Uganda has 
improved security significantly and enabled the return of over a million people to their homes 
and helped spur the rebuilding of lives and livelihoods (SLRC, 2014). Supporting livelihoods 
is key when building resilience to the threat of renewed violent conflict.  
As peace continues to return to Northern Uganda and as people return to their villages, so 
availability of food to the returnees will be a critical factor for the regional and national 
stability.Before the war conflict Northern Uganda was a blossoming region with high levels 
of agriculture production, booming education sector, thriving tourism and was destined to be 
a very important market hinterland for the neighboring Sudan, DR Congo, however due to the 
negative impacts  of the war the once thriving economy of Northern Uganda came to a near 
halt and stand still as agricultural production was curtailed (Birner et al., 2011 ; SLRC, 2014).    
Early recovery seeks to support the economic and social reintegration of IDPs to restart 
productive lives, rebuild their livelihoods so that they can also become stakeholders in peace. 
Livelihoods therefore take a central place in development and peace making. At the time of 
the field survey and writing this thesis, the conditions in Northern Uganda are far better than 
they have been for the many years. Since the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement 
on the 26th August 2006, peace has prevailed in Northern Uganda and this has clearly 
improved the humanitarian situation.There are a number of initiatives/interventions to 
improve livelihoods in the Northern region and these include;  
Examples 1: NGO/CBO led interventions 
One of the largest interventions to support post-conflict development in Northern Uganda 
was the UNDP –Transition to recovery program (TRP) which was aimed at strengthening 
crisis prevention and recovery through training and support for income generating projects, 
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building government capacity to handle internal displacement at the central and local 
government level and re-integration of ex-combatants in their communities (SLRC, 2014). 
Other initiatives underway in Northern Uganda includes: increasing seed availability through 
seed fairs and seed multiplication programs, provision of in-kind grants for seeds, inputs and 
farm implements, vouchers for work programs where people are given opportunities to work 
on community projects and paid with vouchers which they exchange for agricultural inputs 
and implements, in-kind grants for oxen to support agricultural land use (opening of land) 
and farmer trainings. In Northern Uganda also efforts to re-stock livestock which was lost 
during the insurgency are being undertaken through grants of animals, vouchers for work 
programs, animal fairs, animal traction and training of community animal health workers. 
During the survey it was observed that some agencies are also promoting small scale 
businesses by supporting informal financial mechanisms such as Voluntary Savings and Loan 
Associations (VSLAs), promoting micro-credit, training in income generating activities as 
well as cash grants for extremely vulnerable groups and compensation of the livestock lost 
and stole during the conflict which is being spearheaded by the Ministry of justice. Some 
SACCOS (cooperative financial schemes) are also being spearheaded by the microfinance 
support center. Examples of the key stakeholders involved in this recovery include, 
DANIDA, World Vision, FAO, WFP, CARE, Ox-farm etc. 
Example 2: Government led livelihoods recovery interventions 
Government recognizes the unique challenges facing the post conflict Northern region of 
Uganda and a number of several efforts have been undertaken to tackle problems of poverty, 
food insecurity and conflict. The current National Development Plan (NDP) 2010/11-2010/45 
explicitly recognizes the need to integrate Northern Uganda into mainstream development of 
the country. A series of big agricultural recovery programs are being run e.g. NAADS, 
NUSAF and ALREP. 
It should be noted that both NUSAF and ALREP are tailor made programs for conflict 
affected regions, whereas NAADS covers the whole country. The Agricultural Livelihoods 
Rehabilitation Program (ALREP) is the continuation of the Northern Uganda Reconstruction 
Program (NUREP) which was supporting livelihoods in the LRA affected regions under the 
Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) with support of the European Union (EU). ALREP for 
example includes provision of improved tools and equipment for opening land to increase 
yields, promote efficiency in farming and training and transfer of agricultural practices to 
increase production.  
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However a recent study by SLRC in 2012 in Northern Uganda noted that for many of these 
programs i.e. NAADS and NUSAF, the targeting emphasis is moving from vulnerable 
populations towards ‘’viable’’ groups, for NAADS they are termed as the ‘’Active Poor’’- 
The “Active” poor are those individuals  who have the production assets and can even take 
advantage of the opportunities to produce a surplus for the market. The challenge with this 
approach is that it leaves behind many people who, for one reason or another are unable to 
take advantage of these opportunities (SLRC, 2014). Another challenge is that these 
livelihoods programs are run and targeted with a lack of understanding of the effects of 
serious crimes, violations suffered and conflict induced trauma (SLRC, 2014). Another 
challenge which has not been given serious attention is the inability of the populations and 
especially young men to engage in agricultural livelihood recovery partly as a result of “relief 
dependency” leading to male idleness. The SLRC 2014 report concludes that, while there are 
many livelihoods interventions in Northern Uganda few have been the subject of rigorous 
impact assessment. 
4.2 The NAADS program 
 NAADS within a broader policy context 4.2.1
NAADS is a 25 year program with a mission to increase farmer access to information 
,knowledge and technology through effective, efficient, sustainable and decentralized 
extension with increasing the private sector involvement in line with Government policy in 
particular decentralization, privatization of service delivery, participation and gender 
mainstreaming in governance and development interventions (NAADS, 2000). The NAADS 
program started in 2001 with a few trailblaizing sub-counties and by 2009 the program had 
reached national coverage. 
In order to address the persistent poverty the Government of Uganda initiated a Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1995 as a component of the country’s comprehensive 
development framework (World Bank, 2002). In the PEAP of the year 2000 the PMA is 
formulated to provide guidelines for the transformation of agriculture. 
The PMA proposes that modernizing agriculture will contribute to increasing the incomes of 
the poor by raising farm productivity increasing the share of agricultural production 
marketed, creating opportunities for employment (both farm and off-farm) while at the same 
time lowering food  prices (Kidd, 2001 ;  Bukenya 2010 ; Bahigwa et al., 2005). The NAADS 
is one of the strongest pillars of the PMA. According to MAAIF and MFPED (2000) the 
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PMA notes that transforming the country’s subsistence agriculture requires addressing two 
types of constraints, namely production related and governance related constraints. The 
productivity related constraints range from lack of sufficient food, lack of land, soil 
infertility, insecure land tenure rights, lack of agricultural skills and knowledge, limited 
access to technical advice, low use of improved inputs, lack of capital and access to credit 
,poor roads, poor transport networks and poor marketing infrastructure.The governance 
constraints that NAADS is to address include insecurity of persons and property, corruption, 
lack of accountability, inefficient beneficiary targeting and transparency, poor delivery of 
basic public services, weak local leadership and lack of a voice among the majority of the 
rural poor farmers. It should be noted that the second pillar of the PEAP that is good 
governance and security are important pre -conditions for agricultural modernization 
(MAAIF, 2000). 
The PMA interventions of which NAADS is a major component,  are anchored in the Uganda 
Government’s policies of decentralization, liberalization , privatization, empowerment of 
people in decision making for development process  and increasing public sector coordination 
and accountability (MAAIF & MFPED, 2000 ; MAAIF , 2000). The NAADS program is one 
of the major pillars for the PMA to address the agricultural advisory services. All these are in 
line with the National Agriculture Policy and the over-arching National Development Plan. 
Agricultural extension services have been mentioned in the five year National Development 
Plan (NDP)  2010/11 – 2014/2015 as well as in the Development Strategy and Investment 
Plan (DSIP) 2010/11 -2014/15 financial years as among the interventions needed for 
agricultural development and transformation. NDP and DSIP specifically mention NAADS 
among the key institutions to undertake actions as necessary for enhancing agricultural 
production and productivity. 
Additionally, the program of NAADS was specifically initiated because of the perceived 
failure by its predecessor, the Agricultural Extension Program (AEP) which critics say that it 
had a supply driven top-down character. The Mid-term evaluation report (MAAIF, 1998a) 
and the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) of AEP indicated that the AEP followed a 
highly mechanistic approach of the Training and Visit system (T&V) and seemed to ignore 
the importance of empowering farmers and to create a sense of ownership of the program 
among the beneficiaries.     
The failure of previous interventions has been attributed to shortcomings and or constraints in 
the earlier extension approach, such as weak research-extension farmer linkages, externally 
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driven, uncoordinated and non-participatory service provision, high levels of bureaucracy in 
service provision, low responsiveness to farmers’ needs and lack of financial and 
performance accountability. NAADS was set up as a new approach to address the identified 
institutional constraints undermining farmers access to knowledge and productivity  
enhancing technologies and to incorporate best practice features to make extension deliver 
more efficiently and effectively (MAAIF , 2000 ; NAADS, 2001). NAADS was designed in 
accordance with the overall government policies of agricultural modernization, poverty, 
eradication, decentralization, liberalization, privatization, empowerment of people in decision 
making for development process and increasing public sector coordination and accountability 
(MAAIF , 2000 ; Nahdy, 2004). The fundamental aim of the NAADS program is to develop a 
demand driven, client oriented and farmer led agricultural service delivery system 
particularly targeting the poor and women (MAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001) 
Nahdy (2004) noted that client oriented extension and governance mechanisms are seen as a 
possible means to address the power relations that generate poverty and hence the 
decentralized service delivery approach adopted by NAADS. The main task of NAADS is 
providing advisory services that respond to farmer needs and accountable to the target 
farmers through the local contracting of private sector service providers (Garforth et al., 
2003). Bahiigwa et al. (2005) noted that NAADS implies a two way exchange between the 
farmer and the service provider and hence the change of the name from agricultural extension 
program to Agricultural Advisory Services in reference to NAADS. NAADS is supposed to 
contribute to poverty eradication vision of the PMA by specifically addressing one of the 
underlying factors of poverty in Uganda, which is poor access to agricultural information, 
knowledge and technology (MAAIF, 2000). 
 NAADS structure and functioning 4.2.2
NAADS is a semi-autonomous public agency within MAAIF created by the Act of 
Parliament in  2001. The NAADS program is implemented  under the decentralized local 
government system (see table 4.2 and Appendix 3). At the National level, MAAIF has the 
national oversight of NAADS. NAADS has a Board of Directors which is charged with 
coordination and guiding program policy and strategy. The  NAADS secretariat is 
responsible for the day to day management of NAADS business providing policy guidance 
and operational support to the lower levels. At the operational level, the program 
administrative and coordination functions and structures are integrated into the local 
government system in accordance with the decentralization system of local government and 
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service delivery in Uganda (see appendix 3). The respective local government councils at the 
district and sub-county level i.e. LC5 and LC 3 respectively have the political oversight and 
responsibility for the NAADS program (MAAIF, 2000 ; Nahdy, 2004).  
Public finance in NAADS is used to contract privately delivered advisory services while 
there is a share of public financing of farm advisory costs and farmers’ cash and labor 
contributions. In order to benefit from NAADS services, farmer groups are required to make 
matching grant contributions of 2% of the total NAADS budget and local governments 5% 
towards the total NAADS budget. Here contributing to the cost of services is popularly 
referred to as co-funding and this aims at stimulating farmer and local ownership of the 
NAADS program. From the technical and administrative point of view the overall 
responsibility for program management and coordination in the district falls under the Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO) and Sub-county Administrative Officer (SAO). The day to day 
NAADS program coordination and management is the responsibility of the District NAADS 
Coordinator (DNC) at the district level and at the sub-county level the sub-county NAADS 
Coordinator (SNC)  (Nahdy, 2004). The farmer forum which represent farmer groups at the 
sub-county, district and national levels hold the most power as stipulated in the NAADS Act. 
The farmer’s forum is supposed to elect a chairperson and two committees, namely the 
Executive Committee (EC) and the Procurement Committee (PC). The sub-county is the local 
government where most of the NAADS activities take place. The NAADS annual work plans 
and budgets are approved by the sub-county council.  
In targeting, NAADS is to benefit the economically ‘’Active Poor’’ i.e. poor farmers who 
have some limited assets, skills and knowledge to create a livelihood and this is the category 
of farmers generally described as subsistence farmers and these constitute the majority of 
country’s largely rural based farmers. 
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National 
Average Poverty Level-31% 
Economically Active Farmers 
Nucleus Farmers 
Lead Farmers 
Model Farmers 
Demonstration Farmers 
 
 
Northern Uganda 
Average Poverty Level-61% 
Commercial Farmers 
 
 IDPs in Camps 
Widows 
Widowers 
Orphans 
PLWAs 
Ex-combatants  
Former abductees 
Female headed 
Households 
Unskilled and Unemployed Youth 
Elderly 
Labor surplus poor 
Child headed households 
Persons with disability 
Landmine victims 
Table 4.1: Comparison of beneficiary targeting in NAADS and NUSAF programs 
Source: Adopted from NUSAF operational guidelines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economically Active Farmers 
Not 
Economically 
Active 
Farmers 
Graduation Process 
  to Being 
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Level Personell/Institution Roles/Responsibilities 
National Board of Directors • Policy setting and guidelines. 
NAADS Secretariat • Technical guidance. 
• Programme coordination and 
supervision. 
District NAADS Coordinator 
 
• Technical guidance. 
• Program coordination and 
supervision in the district. 
District Farmer Forum (FF) 
 (Composed of chairpersons of the Sub-
county farmer forum, secretary for 
production LC V, District NAADS 
Coordinator)  
• Decision making on all NAADS 
matters in the district. 
Subcounty  
(LC III ) 
NAADS Coordinator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Compiles the subcounty NAADS 
budget. 
• Gives technical guidance to the 
procurement committee in the 
choice of service providers. 
• Supervises, monitors and 
evaluates service providers. 
• Collection of farmer contributions 
for NAADS activities. 
• Countersigns sub-county chief and 
sub-accountant on NAADS bank 
account. 
Subcounty Farmer forum 
 
 
 
• Takes decisions on behalf of the 
subcounty farmers. 
• Selects the subcounty NAADS 
enterprises. 
Contracts Committee • Approves the short list for service 
providers. 
Parish 
( LC II) 
Parish Development Committees 
(PDCs) 
• Help farmers to identify their 
enterprise priorities. 
Village 
(LC I) 
Farmer Groups • Participate in priority 
identification and group 
enterprises. 
Table 4.2: Summary of the  structure of NAADS and actor responsibilities 
Source: Adapted from (DENIVA, 2005) 
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Source: NAADS implementation manual 2001. 
Figure 4.3: NAADS organogram 
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 Provisions in NAADS design to address the governance challenges 4.2.3
In its implementation manual of 2001, NAADS program has included innovative design 
features that aim at overcoming the anticipated implementation challenges. There have been 
constant efforts to adjust the implementation procedures to resolve the challenges, evidenced 
by the numerous changes in the NAADS implementation guidelines over the years.  
Program design features to overcome the governance challenges include: 
• NAADS is implemented in a decentralized manner which includes accountability and 
monitoring mechanisms, that is oversight and social accountability mechanism 
through committees and Barazas. The social accountability committees are 
responsible to assure value for money of the services, technologies and inputs. The 
Barazas are public fora where the residents discuss the issues concerning programme 
implementation. In NAADS a Baraza is a one day forum chaired by the Resident 
District Commissioner (RDC) who is a representative of the President in the area. 
NAADS also participates in Citizens Manifestos which is a community dialogue to 
discuss the programme implementation. The citizens manifesto is a community 
accountability tool.  
•  Monitoring of the programs through the District Internal Security Officers (DISOs) 
and Sub-county Security Officers (GISOs). These are intelligence security 
organizations that represent the President’s office to ensure effective implementation 
of the NAADS program.  
•  NAADS implementation guidelines seek to set up an efficient monitoring and 
management information system (MIS) to ensure transparency and accountability. 
• NAADS launched the NAADS Governance and Anti-corruption Strategy and is 
working with the Inspector General of Government (IGG), Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) of parliament and the Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP) to 
deal with corrupt officials. To fight corruption and abuse of the NAADS programme, 
new NAADS guidelines recommended setting up a 24 hour toll free telephone call 
center at the NAADS secretariat for the stakeholders to report any incidences of 
corrupt practices in the NAADS program. 
• In order to promote good governance and social accountability NAADS guidelines 
recommend the formation of the Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation 
System (CBMES). The aim here is to contribute to government accountability by 
fostering active participation of the citizens and enhance access of poor communities 
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to NAADS services. The CBMES enhances the capacity of the citizens to hold 
government accountable for the NAADS services offered. NAADS Secretariat has 
introduced the rewards and sanctions strategy that is meant to reward good 
performing districts while taking sanctions on those performing badly.  This rewards 
and sanctions will be instituted at the various levels of project implementation. 
Rewards will include for instance; issuing of certificates of recognition for good 
performance and recognizing good performance on public media e.g. On TV, FM 
radios, News Papers etc.  
• In order to aggressively address the misuse of NAADS funds that has plagued the 
programme and hampered its success, the NAADS program has set up a complaints 
handling system, under the Agricultural Technology and Agri-business Advisory 
services project (ATAAS) to handle all the complaints regarding the implementation 
of NAADS. 
• In order to fight the misuse of NAADS funds, the President of Uganda himself has set 
up a NAADS monitoring team based at the State House and has appointed a special 
Presidential NAADS assistant to monitor the activities and report back directly to the 
president.  
 NAADS implementation in reality-insights from literature 4.2.4
Judged by NAADS mandates and evidence from numerous project evaluations of the 
program and empirical studies, NAADS can be said to have gone some way in improving 
access by farmers to knowledge on improved agricultural production and technologies ( 
Bukenya, 2010 ; Ekwamu & Brown (2005); Nkonya et al., 2007 ; Benin et al., 2011; ITAD, 
2008). Nonetheless, by and large empirical evidence shows that the program still faces a 
number of governance challenges and various authors argue that the failure to address these 
types of implementation problems (governance challenges) has the potential to derail the 
projects’ objectives by inducing frustration among communities who have joined the farmer 
groups and identified appropriate projects/ enterprises but are unable to access funds and 
project services ( Bukenya, 2010 ; Parkinson, 2009; Rwamigisa, 2013). It should be noted 
that, despite its shortcomings, NAADS is still a major channel for huge amounts of funds 
from the central government to reach the improverished subsistence farmers in the rural areas 
of Uganda. 
During the past decade of NAADS implementation there have been public concerns about the 
NAADS impact on the livelihood of the beneficiaries, its effectiveness in increasing output 
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and incomes of the beneficiaries and efficiency in its implementation has been indicated to 
still be wanting. Further more under NAADS, while farmers participate in local decision 
making processes through their groups and associations and have accessed increased 
knowledge on farming and practice enterprise diversification, this has not necessarily 
translated into substancial increases in agricultural productivity (Muwonge, 2007 ; Sseguya, 
2009). Opendo (2005), in his studies of NAADS implementation in Kabale district in 
Western Uganda indicated that the farmers’ representatives on the farmers’ forum also 
engaged in illegal activities during the NAADS implementation and many became 
illegitimate in view of the farmers. For example allocating the technology trials on their own 
fields, being pre-occupied with demanding high sitting allowances for the voluntary NAADS 
activities and asking for kickbacks from contractors by promising them supply contracts.  
In the NAADS performance evaluation, various studies described the program as successful 
and the researchers found clear positive impacts on adoption of improved  technologies, 
productivity and per capita incomes (Bukenya, 2010 ; Nkonya et al., 2007 ; Benin et al., 2011 
). The findings showed that, between 2004 and 2007, NAADS was associated with an 
average of 42-53% greater increase in the per capita agricultural income of the program’s 
direct participants compared to their non-participant counterparts. The results also showed 
that significantly larger proportions of NAADS participants than non-participants perceived 
their standard of living had improved compared to what it was in 2000. In addition basing on 
differences across the NAADS and non-NAADS sub-counties , it was noted that the NAADS 
program is having substancial positive impacts on the vailability and quality of advisory 
services provided to farmers, promoting adoption of new crop and livestock enterprises as 
well as improving adoption and use of modern agricultural production technologies and 
practices (Benin et al., 2007). 
 Issues of corruption and other financial irregularities in the implementation of the NAADS 
program are a common place in the media in Uganda and in numerous project audits and 
evaluations. For example the Auditor General’s report of 2008 reveals that only 37.1 percent 
of the total money spent on NAADS is considered as useful expenditure.  NAADS has been 
criticized by different stakeholders as an elite franchise, with its fancy sign posts and 
demonstration gardens, they say that the program is riddled with corruption and political 
capture with its elite patrons who collude with service providers to steal money from the 
program’s so called huge budget (Bukenya, 2010 ; Parkinson, 2009 ; Birner er al. 2011; 
Musemakweri, 2007; Rwamigisa, 2012). In early 2009 , a report by Uganda’s Auditor 
General indicated that 63% of the money allocated to NAADS program activities was wasted 
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because the farmers disliked the classroom style training administered to them by the 
contracted private agricultural advisory services providers.  
After more than 10 years of NAADS implementation many governance challenges persisted 
as evidenced by various studies on NAADS for example, Agona, 2005; Mutimba, 2007 ; 
Byekwaso, 2004;  CEED, 2004;  GoU, 2007; Mutimba et al., 2007 and other studies 
following quantitative approaches such as Benin et al. (2007) and qualitative approaches such 
as OPM (2005)and Scanagri (2005)  have attempted to provide insights into the impact of the 
NAADS program. The researchers observed that weaknesses in NAADS  implementation 
include: late disbursement of funds, very low counterpart funding by the local government 
and the farmers and poor monitoring and evaluation of the program. In addition NAADS 
program faces implementation weaknesses such as nepotism that affects the selection 
(targeting) of beneficiaries. In particular the study by Benin et al. (2007) shows that the high 
imputed cost of inputs provided by NAADS to farmers makes the intervention less cost 
effective. The authors found out that while NAADS had promoted the use of the improved 
production technologies and high yielding crop varieties, only a few farmers were using them 
and as a result there was no difference in yield growth between NAADS sub-counties and 
those without its assistance.  
NAADS program faces implementation weaknesses such as nepotism that affects the 
selection of beneficiaries and nepotism too has affected enterprise selection process to the 
extent that some farmers are apathetic about the success or failure of NAADS program 
(Mutimba et al., 2007).  Evidence shows that NAADS has been implementing a bureaucratic 
and top down system for a larger degree, for instance sending implementation guidelines and 
budgets from the secretariat to the sub-county levels, some of which are even complicated for 
both the beneficiaries and the implementers (ITAD, 2008).   
Other authors noted that there are challenges of targeting in NAADS. For example Bahiigwa 
et al. (2005 ) noted that the categorization of the poor in projects was not clearly defined and 
this was also reflected even in the NAADS workplans of most sub-counties where the 
beneficiaries are simply stated as communities or just farmers but not even stating their 
poverty status. Bahiigwa et al. (2005) noted that the NAADS Master Document do not 
disaggregate far on poverty grounds because it only states that the largest group of farmers 
that is 80% are subsistence farmers. 
The program has been suspended twice on the President of Uganda’s orders and restructured 
to address some of the governance challenges. Evidence from previous program evaluations 
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by technocrats and politicians suggests that these challenges were rooted in the conceptual 
design and the legal framework that defined the structural arrangements for implementation 
of the program i.e. the arrangements set the NAADS program outside the technical control of 
MAAIF and excluded key institutional actors whose input was critical for the reform program 
to succeed (Bahiigwa et al.,2005; Rwamigisa, 2010; Rwamigisa, 2013). 
The NAADS program took other roles for example beyond its mandate for which 
management was not adequately prepared to assume. Key among the roles was input 
distribution that is largely a private sector function. This resulted into misrepresentation of 
NAADS roles that in a way caused institutional distortions, inefficiencies and governance 
related problems/challenges (Rwamigisa, 2010). Other issues associated with NAADS 
include its lack of ownership by the different key stakeholders. Kjær & Joughin (2012) noted 
that, key stakeholders notably politicians and officials in the MAAIF were shut out from the 
original program and this threatened its viability.The authors argue that although there was a 
long process of program formulation in which all stakeholders were heard, ownership of the 
programme was not as encompassing as it first appeared. In essence, the agricultural reform 
program represented market oriented values that were not echoed in large parts of the 
Ugandan polity (Kjaer et al., 2012). 
Joughin et al. (2010) argued that the reversal of the NAADS program should be seen as a 
result of a mix of electoral and patronage politics, coupled with impatience to see results as 
well as the re-emergence of pro-interventionist ideological stance.The NAADS program was 
restructured in 2007 resulting in the introduction of Prosperity For All (PFA) because the 
original institutional design of NAADS had left out the elected officials (Joughin et al., 
2010). But with the introduction of PFA, elected officials in local governments such as 
chairpersons of ruling party and representatives of internal security organs became part of the 
NAADS institutional arrangements at district and sub-county levels. Funding for the first 
phase of NAADS came to an end in 2008 and the design of the second phase started in the 
same year. The PMA secretariat was responsible for coordinating the PFA program while 
NAADS was responsible for implementation. 
The NAADS 2 new program design proposed new institutional arrangements that included 
among others, linkages with the National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO), 
expanding the national secretariat, an integrated Monitoring and Evaluation system (M&E) 
with NARO and MAAIF, governance and anticorruption committee and establishing regional 
offices in line with the NARO zonal research institutes. The NAADS Secretariat human 
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resource structure was expanded to over 90 personnel to be able to accommodate the new 
challenges the NAADS program was slated to confront. 
Kjaer and Joughin (2012) , noted that the political elite were dissatified with the limited range 
of clientelist opportunities NAADS programme offered and after the 2006 elections a new 
structure for the Prosperity For All (PFA) was established under the President’s Office 
running in parallel with the secretariats of NAADS and PMA under MAAIF. In this change a 
number of officers from MAAIF were directed to undertake PFA work although not much of 
this is visible on the ground. Joughin et al. (2010) noted that the fact that this parallel 
structure of PFA exists, it means that the rules, procedures and ethos of public spirit built up 
in the civil service over some years are confused and undermined. 
In November 2010 MAAIF instituted a probe committee to investigate the mismanagement 
of NAADS program. The committee established that in spite of the program being well 
financed, there were glaring governance challenges that had resulted into inefficiency, poor 
accountability and corruption particularly in the procurement of goods and services. The 
committee recommended that NAADS should reduce their involvement in procurement of 
inputs /technologies, MAAIF should assume its role to supervise, guide, monitor and evaluate 
NAADS and NAADS secretariat should set up better accountability, reporting systems and 
efficient management of public /private partnerships. The Probe Committee noted that the 
existing institutional arrangements are parallel and in conflict and thus complicating the 
delivery of extension services at local government level and therefore in this case technical 
supervision of NAADS by MAAIF and local governments is challenged by the legal 
framework. The Committee recommended the review of the NAADS Act 2001 with the aim 
of removing bottlenecks in the existing institutional arrangements and to set up structures 
with clear mandates to deliver agricultural extension services to majority of Ugandan small 
holder farmers who constitute about 90% of the farming community.  
The lessons and experiences learnt from phase one of the implementation of the NAADS 
program from 2001 to 2007 through evaluations of the program formed the basis for the 
design of the successor NAADS phase two program that is currently being implemented 
under the Agricultural Technology and Agri-business advisory Services (ATAAS) project. 
The experiences of NAADS implementation in the first phase revealed that there were some 
gaps in the monitoring and evaluation framework (M&E) of NAADS at implementation level 
and therefore the NAADS phase two provided for the establishment of a strong participatory 
mechanism to address these gaps. ATAAS also emphasizes the need for the NAADS phase 
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two in planning and resource disbursement to specifically addressing issues of active 
participation of various stakeholders at all levels of program implementation with special 
emphasis of farmer participation through their farmer institutions, for instance the farmer  
fora and farmer groups.  
4.3 The NUSAF program 
 NUSAF within a broader policy context 4.3.1
Besides developing a decentralized approach to tackling poverty, Government of Uganda 
(GoU) adopted the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) as its strategy for economic 
development and poverty reduction. NUSAF is consistent with the PEAP and it works to 
fulfill the objectives of the PEAP namely: rapid and sustainable economic growth and 
structural transformation, good governance and security, increased ability of the poor to raise 
their incomes and enhanced quality of life of the poor. With peace returning in Northern 
Uganda, the government has developed the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) 
to provide a framework for post-conflict reconstruction of Northern Uganda (OPM, 2007). 
The PRDP was created as a framework for bringing together different stakeholders and 
agents of change to discuss and forge a way forward for the development of the post-conflict 
areas of Uganda (OPM, 2007). 
The PRDP is a commitment by the government to stabilize and recover Northern Uganda in 
the next three years through a set of coherent programs in one organized framework i.e. the 
PRDP is a three year framework that would direct all development activities in the region.  
NUSAF two program is part of the PRDP which gained full implementation in 2009. The 
PRDP is in line with PEAP, which has been transformed into the National Development Plan 
(NDP) which seeks to strengthen coordination, supervision and monitoring of all 
development programs in Northern Uganda to achieve better results.  The overall goal of the 
PRDP is stabilization and economic development of the Northern region in order to regain 
and consolidate peace and lay the foundations for recovery and development in Northern 
Uganda. The PRDP was designed with four strategic objectives: consolidation of state 
authority, rebuilding and empowering communities, revitalization of the economy, peace 
building and reconciliation. Part of the PRDP is implemented through on budget support to 
“special projects”  which are managed by the government for example NUSAF phase two 
which is funded by a loan from the World Bank and a grant from DFID , and KALIP/ 
ALREP which is funded by the European Union.   
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To build on the achievements and drawing from lessons learnt in the implementation of the 
first phase of NUSAF (NUSAF 1), the Government of Uganda has designed the second 
Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF 2) to be implemented under the PRDP 
framework focusing mainly on the PRDP strategic objective of rebuilding and empowering 
communities. The NUSAF 2 is a Community Development, Demand Driven multi-sectoral 
project aligned with the Uganda Joint Assistance strategy (UJAS) and the National 
Development Plan (NDP).  The vision of the NDP is  “a transformed Ugandan society from a 
peasant to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years”. The NDP interventions aim at 
creating employment, raising per capita income levels distribution in line with sectoral GDP 
shares, raising country human development and gender equality indicators and improving the 
country’s  competitiveness to levels associated with middle income countries (GoU, 2010) 
and also address the structural bottlenecks in the economy in order to accelerate socio-
economic transformation for prosperity (NDP- GoU, 2010). 
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 The rationale for the NUSAF program 4.3.2
NUSAF  is a project initiated by the government of Uganda and its development partners to 
target the Northern region after realizing that despite significant gains in reducing poverty 
recorded throughout Uganda, the North has continued to lag behind other areas in 
development and has indeed fallen further into poverty (see sections 4.1.2.2 and 4.1.2.3 for 
details). Welfare indices for Northern Uganda have not improved at the same pace as the rest 
of the country. For instance, income, poverty remains significantly high, literacy rates are low 
and access to basic services is poor (UNDP, 2007 ; Nandy 2008). It has been observed by 
previous studies that the prolonged conflict in the North for over 20 years is the most 
important factor explaining the poor living conditions of the communities in Northern 
Uganda and at the same time the major bottleneck to increasing growth in the region 
(Nanyonjo, 2007 ; UNDP 2007). 
Jointly funded by the GoU and the World Bank, NUSAF seeks to close the development gap 
between the Northern region and the rest of the country through handing control of 
development processes and resources directly to local community groups. NUSAF was 
initiated in mid- 2002. The first phase of NUSAF was a considerable budget of $ 133.5 
million project funded by an IDA loan contribution of 100 million, together with a 
government commitment of 13.5 million and local contributions of $20 million. 
The project development objective of NUSAF is to improve access of beneficiary households 
in Northern Uganda to income earning opportunities and better socio-economic services and 
to increase assets available to local people particularly those negatively affected by the war 
conflict ( NUSAF project operational manual, 2010). The overall objective of NUSAF in 
post-conflict Northern Uganda is to empower communities to enhance their capacity to 
systematically identify, prioritize and plan for their needs and implement sustainable 
development initiatives that improve socio-economic services and opportunities there by 
contributing to improved livelihoods by placing money in the hands of the local communities. 
In so doing, NUSAF will contribute to improved livelihoods by placing money and its 
management in the hands of the communities (World Bank, 2002a). 
Given the fact that people in the Northern region depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, 
NUSAF provides agricultural training and inputs to increase agricultural production and food 
security. Through its community approach (Community Driven Development approach) , 
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NUSAF mobilizes communities to undertake agricultural projects of their choice to improve 
their livelihoods. Examples of projects undertaken in NUSAF affiliated farmer  groups 
include crop production, pig rearing and poultry production. NUSAF is targeting the most 
vulnerable groups in the North particularly IDP returnees, returned abductees, female headed 
households/widows, orphans, people with disabilities and people living with HIV/AIDS and 
former combatants. It was expected that improved livelihoods and economic security derived 
through sub-projects funded by NUSAF will offset the opportunity cost of giving up arms.   
In addition NUSAF will provide livelihood opportunities to former combatants in the 
Northern Uganda post-conflict region. Community reconciliation and re-integration of former 
combatants component of NUSAF is aimed at bringing additional benefits in terms of 
improved respect for the human rights of people in the region by reducing the prevalence of 
conflict. NUSAF  also has a component of post arrival assistance of IDPs on arrival in their 
villages and an estimated 70% of IDPs have been provided with return kits  (containing food 
and household items) worth to each family Uganda shillings 627,000 to enable them settle in 
their return areas. Livelihood support will be provided on a needs basis as outlined in the 
community recovery program. And in addition the program has supported return IDP 
population through community farming groups with farming inputs e.g. seeds and hoes to 
help them to rejuvenate their farming livelihoods. 
The specific objectives of this approach are to stimulate community action, leadership 
development and resource mobilization, strengthen ongoing reconciliation processes and 
enable communities to articulate and prioritize their needs and to manage processes and 
outcomes and improve governance (NUSAF Operational Manual, 2010). NUSAF is a 
transitory tool, a funding mechanism that allows communities that are left behind in the 
ongoing development efforts in the country to “catch up” with the rest of the country. 
NUSAF was a response to perceived failure of the top-down approach of its immediate 
predecessor, the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program (NURP 1) and an effort to 
emulate the perceived success of the more bottom up Community Action Program which was 
being implemented in the West Nile Region of Uganda (Robinson, 2005). NURP 1 was a 
large, top-down supply driven program that built physical infrastructure e.g. roads, schools, 
clinics and bore wells across the Northern region with very little community involvement and 
this project had little success in the eyes of the beneficiaries. While NURP 1 achieved many 
of its physical objectives, a large proportion of the investments were not sustainable, many 
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were of low quality and its contribution to institutional development was negligible ( 
Robinson, 2005).  
 NUSAF structure and functioning 4.3.3
NUSAF is a Community Driven Development project (CDD project) and in this project the 
vulnerable groups are mobilized to join mainstream development processes based on 
community accountability and improved governance. It is assumed that, the process of over-
coming underdevelopment through community action, leadership development and resource 
mobilization will strengthen the ongoing peace processes in the region.   
In NUSAF participation of the beneficiary community should take place in all the phases of 
the project cycle i.e. from problem identification and definition, prioritization, intervention 
design, planning, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation. Here, meaningful 
community participation is a backbone for effective decentralization, planning and 
implementation of demand-driven projects. Community participation will be a continuous 
process, which is from the community needs assessment study throughout implementation 
and management, there will be need to put in place a system that ensures this within the 
decentralization strategy. Under NUSAF operational guidelines the community is “need 
defined” that is the community refers to a voluntary group of persons that have common 
socio-economic needs and have agreed to work together in pursuit of solutions to these needs.  
The implementation of NUSAF involves institutions at the center and local government 
levels (district and sub-county). The most important agency in the implementation of NUSAF 
at the center is the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) which also hosts the NUSAF 
Secretariat. The NUSAF Secretariat is mandated through the NUSAF national office to 
prepare annual reports on the implementation of the program and submit these reports to 
Parlianment. The Permanent secretary (OPM) is responsible for the overall monitoring and 
supervision of the project, sector ministries, NGOs/CSOs and relevant government 
institutions and agencies will support OPM in the national level supervision, monitoring and 
evaluation. Meanwhile at the district level, overall technical supervision, monitoring and 
evaluation is the responsibility of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). He /she will be 
supported by the district technical team including the sub-county staff. The sub-county chief 
on the other hand will be responsible for monitoring and supervision of project activities in 
his or her sub-county with the support of the sub-county technical team.   
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At the community level, gender equity is taken on board by ensuring at least 30% female 
membership in the Community Project Management Committees (CPMCs). CPMCs 
comprise of individuals elected democratically from the community by their fellow 
community members to plan, implement and monitor the activity for the duration of the sub-
project cycle, the premise here is that communities are best placed to identify their perceived 
needs (NUSAF Operational Manual, 2010). The sub-project cycle is the primary tool for 
managing interactions between communities and outside agencies including OPM, NGOs, 
and CBOs, CSOs, interfaith agencies, local governments and private sector.  
The core of NUSAF implementation includes an elaborate sub-project approval process 
which calls for the full participation of the communities. Under the CDI and VGS 
components of NUSAF which aim to improve households’ livelihoods, communities are 
encouraged to come together in groups, identify their community needs, prioritize those 
needs with the help of privately hired facilitators (individuals and local organizations). 
According to the guidelines, the communities are free to appoint facilitators using resources 
available from the project funds to help them in the proposal preparation process. NUSAF 
implementation guidelines recommend up to 2 % of the project budget to be paid to the 
community facilitators. Provisions recommend that these facilitators can be local educated 
youths, community members or membership organizations (NGOs/ CBOs). 
After completion of the proposals, they are submitted to the sub-county Community 
Development Officer (CDO)  who is the  NUSAF technical person where they are approved 
and forwarded to the district through the district NUSAF technical officer (see appendix 7for 
details on the sub-project cycle). The community facilitators are also supposed to assist those 
beneficiary groups putting into consideration the capacities of the sub-project groups, for 
example where the members could neither read nor write, they are given additional attention 
and assistance to help them come up with feasible proposals for funding. 
NUSAF implementation guidelines require that District Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) are 
also invited to check the proposals from the district before approval to guarantee financial 
and technical feasibility and also to determine how the sub-projects complement district 
planning priorities and budgetary allocations. A sub-project appraisal report should clearly 
indicate the contribution to be provided by the community. The community should be willing 
to provide such contribution in a timely manner.The size of community contribution will be  
5% for the vulnerable support component which is aimed at improving livelihoods. The 
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financing agreement to be signed with the community will specify the community 
contribution proportion.  
The sub-project groups through their leaders prepare the documentation to open a bank 
account in the nearest bank.  After the proposals are approved at the district, grants are given 
directly to the groups on their already opened bank accounts and it’s the groups through their 
leaders (CPMC) and procurement committee (PC) which then took on the responsibility for 
managing the funds within their community level institutions and groups. 
Once the appraisal of the sub-project proposals is complete, the applications are submitted to 
elected councilors in the District Executive Committee (DEC) for ratification which forms a 
basis for a recommendation to NUMU for release of funds into the community sub-project 
bank account.  
 
Figure 4.4: : Institutional structures and linkages for the implementation of NUSAF 
  
Source: NUSAF implementation manual 2010 
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 Provisions in NUSAF to addresss the anticipated governance challenges 4.3.4
The design process of NUSAF resulted in the preparation of a series of manuals to guide 
project implementation including a comprehensive operational manual in order to provide the 
staff of the implementing agencies of the program consistency to implementation procedures. 
The ability to control corruption in NUSAF at the technical level has been well documented 
in the implementation manuals and guidelines. Various risks and governance challenges are 
addressed in the NUSAF project design, for example the key financial management risks 
addressed include staff adequacy, usage and approval of project funds, reliability of financial 
information, adequacy of co-funding (counterpart funds) at the various levels, ignorance of 
rules and procedures by the technocrats and other stakeholders, identification of needs by the 
community and service delivery systems. In addition this has been guided by the existence of 
a monitoring mechanism which includes availability of adequate monitoring capacity and 
enforcement mechanisms. In order to ensure effective implementation of NUSAF, the 
implementation guidelines includes provisions for: transparency, accountability, social 
auditing, monitoring and grievance redressal. In addition incentive schemes for the technical 
staff are also provided for in the provision that increase the incentives for regular and reliable 
verifications/certifications plus monitoring and evaluation  of the sub-projects. 
The NUSAF implementation guidelines consist of the institutional development component 
which is intended to improve the technical, administrative and managerial capacity of the key 
implementers of the project and in addition NUSAF has set up the Transparency, 
Accountability and Anti-Corruption (TAAC) program component. This program seeks to 
strengthen transparency, accountability and anti-corruption at various levels of project 
implementation. Some of the measures include collaboration with anti-corruption agencies, 
instituting social accountability committees at the community level and strengthening 
Information, Education and Communication (IEC) component of NUSAF. NUSAF 
guidelines recommend for supervision, monitoring and evaluation of sub-projects at 
community, district and national levels.There are also provisions for setting up an appropriate 
Management Information System (MIS) to ensure timely availability of information for 
decision making and reporting at the various levels of projectimplementation. The TAAC 
component empowers the beneficiaries to demand for explanations on areas where they are 
not satisfied. 
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The TAAC will also promote gender mainstreaming in all project activities in order to ensure 
independence. The implementation of the sub-component will be spearheaded by the 
Inspectorate of Government (IG) headed by the Inspector General of Government (IGG). 
TAAC focuses on gendered social accountability that responds to the project’s core pro- poor 
community driven approach and gender equity strategy. The gender focused social 
accountability in TAAC will ensure that ordinary women/men participate directly or 
indirectly in exerting demand for value for money and accountability to ensure that 
government development programs reach and benefit the intended target groups.  
The TAAC monitoring matrix tool will form an integral part of the OPM financial control 
and monitoring systems. The tool brings together performance indicators on financial, 
procurement, regulatory and reporting compliance, social and gender accountabilities and the 
number of grievances handled. TAAC will include a grievance handling arrangement i.e. 
grievance handling will be at the grassroots level and will be anchored in Social 
Accountability Committees (SAC) and ultimately linked to the Inspectorate of government 
(IG) headed by the IGG at national level. Social accountability according to the NUSAF 
provisions will involve the principles of solidarity (pro-poor action for common good), 
subsidiary decisions and dispute resolution are taken as closely as possible to the citizen 
responsibility. NUSAF provisions indicate that the introduction of SAC will enable the 
communities to be exposed to the operations of NUSAF and therefore enhance the ability of 
the community members to act collectively for mutual gain.  
 
Transparency at the community level according to the NUSAF implementation guidelines is 
through the Social Accountability Committee (SAC) of the community sub-project 
management committee. The SAC reports to the Community Development Officer (CDO) 
and will form part of the M&E system of the project. The SAC will respond to grievances 
and according to the provisions will be based on prevention, detection and consequence. The 
SAC shall meet at least once every month and shall submit its reports to the sub-county CDO 
and their respective beneficiary communities on monthly basis and the SAC will act as first 
point of call for resolving or reference of grievances e.g. nepotism, collusion, corruption, 
bribery and gender exclusion. In addition, participatory monitoring tools including the 
Community Score Cards (CSC) and the Citizens Record Cards (CRC) will be used as part of 
the approaches towards promoting social accountability, transparency and anti-corruption 
under NUSAF phase two project implementation. This will ensure active involvement of all 
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stakeholders in monitoring of project activities and outputs to secure commitment and build 
the capacity of communities to be able to analyze, reflect and take collective action. It was 
noted that such community level institutions promote democratic values and improve 
household internal welfare. The NUSAF project has a component of transparency and 
accountability (TAAC) that empowers the beneficiaries to demand for explanations on areas 
where they are not satisfied during the sub-project implementation process. The TAAC 
support program as an anti-corruption measure and good governance was set up in light of 
the linkage between fragility of state institutions, poor credibility and high incidences of 
corruption in post-conflict regions.  
The IGG will be involved in monitoring the NUSAF project at all levels of the 
implementation process i.e. national, local government and community levels, investigate 
allegations of corruption and if there is a criminal offence prosecute the suspects. The IGG 
will liaise with the PS/OPM , CAOs , sub-county chiefs and sub-project committees to ensure 
effective implementation of the TAAC Program at national , district and sub-county levels 
respectively. Under this arrangement, the IGG will submit six monthly reports to OPM, 
MoFPED , Parliament and the World Bank. To maintain the independence of the IGG there 
will be under the TAAC support program an arrangement under which the IGG will receive 
financial support directly from MoFPED in order to avoid undue influence from the OPM. 
This project will follow guidelines as laid down under the Local Government Good 
Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy 2008/2013 and other measures aimed at fighting 
corruption. 
To ensure accountability and transparency in program implementation, provisions in NUSAF 
recommend for rewards and sanctions. Here mechanisms for rewards and sanctions at various 
levels of project implementation will be instituted. To this end specific investigative arms of 
government will be supported to carry out investigations of reported cases of corruption, poor 
accountability, lack of value for money or abuse of office during the project implementation. 
Guidelines recommend that sanctions will be applied as per government standing orders for 
civil servants and in line with nationally accepted corrective practices of charges and 
committing suspects to prison in case of proven corrupt practices.  Here rewards include: 
issuing certificates of recognition for good performance, recognizing good performance on 
public media e.g. Newspapers, FM radios, Televisions, and giving gifts , certificates and cash 
rewards on national occasions , for example independence day celebrations , farmers’ shows, 
exhibitions and women’s day celebrations.   
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Another provision to ensure accountability of NUSAF resources is that signing of the visitors 
books at the districts, sub county headquarters and the sub-project sites on each monitoring 
visit is mandatory for all monitoring teams. Provisions require that monitoring reports shall 
be prepared by all persons participating in each monitoring exercise to inform subsequent 
interventions and as part of accountability for the project resources in the exercises. 
Guidelines also include provisions for political monitoring i.e. Ministry of State for Northern 
Uganda and at district level by the District Executive committee (DEC) and LC 3 councillors 
and their executive members at the sub-county levels. 
In a shift from NUSAF phase one, the NUSAF phase two funds will be channeled through 
groups instead of individuals. This is because it was discovered that some individuals who 
got NUSAF 1 funding did not use the money on the poverty alleviation projects they claimed 
they would invest in. For example previous research reported that it was common for 
individual beneficiaries in NUSAF 1 to use the money for their own personal benefit, for 
example engaging in luxurious life styles like alcoholism and marrying other women. 
To ensure effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) provisions provide that the 
Undersecretary Planning and Development in the OPM supported by the project coordinator 
and the M&E specialist will be responsible for ensuring effective monitoring and evaluation 
under NUSAF 2. The district planner and the sub-county community development officer 
will coordinate M&E activities at the district and sub-county levels respectively. Provisions 
also call for the set up of an appropriate Management Information System (MIS) to ensure 
timely availability of information for decision making and reporting at the various levels of 
project implementation. 
Implementation guidelines recommend that a computerized accounting system will be 
established at national and district levels to capture and track transactions. In addition a paper 
based system will be used to track the inflows and outflows at community and other 
implementing agency levels.  Finally, there will be use of Rapid Results Initiatives (RRI) as 
results focused management tool to be used by the implementers of NUSAF to adapt and 
refine implementation strategies while creating the self determination to own the problems 
and find solutions to them. The aim of RRI is to strengthen accountability and commitment 
for results. 
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 NUSAF implementation in reality-insights from the literature 4.3.5
It should be noted that NUSAF program offers an excellent case study that poor communities 
in a post-conflict environment can develop the capacity to identify, plan and monitor social 
investment projects with appropriate guidance and facilitation. Though the program has made 
significant gains in terms of physical infrastructure, gains in terms of improvement of 
livelihoods of the people of Northern Uganda are still modest. During the implementation of 
NUSAF numerous governance challenges have been realized which have made the 
realization of NUSAF objectives rather modest (World Bank, 2006). NUSAF 2 was launched 
and it followed the first phase which was riddled with cases of embezzlement, corruption and 
mismanagement (Robinson, 2005).  
There is widespread evidence from project evaluations and empirical research for example, 
World Bank (2006), Golooba- Mutebi and Hickey (2010), Robinson (2005) and various 
media and News Paper reports  that NUSAF funds and sub-project assets  have been subject 
to large scale mismanagement by project officials, local leaders, private suppliers, private 
service providers as well as recipients. Of particular reference this has been widely reported 
in the News Papers and also highlighted by numerous anti-corruption NGOs for example the 
Anti-corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU) and the Uganda Debt Network (UDN). For 
example a number of NUSAF staff have been arrested and some of them imprisoned over 
concerns regarding the mismanagement of funds. Because of these reasons, his Excellence 
the President of Uganda gave serious consideration to shutting the project down in September 
of 2007. 
Similarly reports of corruption by NUSAF program officials are also commonly reported in 
Newspapers in Uganda for instance the Redpepper online Newspaper in Uganda on 24th 
April 2012 reported the sacking of NUSAF district boss of corruption and incompetence. 
This is a result of failing to implement NUSAF 2 activities in Nwoya and Amuru districts. He 
is also accused of failing to account for 63 million shillings he received for the mobilization 
of the communities. Also a story from the Uganda Radio Network on 23rd April 2012 
indicates that three members of NUSAF community procurement committee in Moyo district 
in Northern Uganda have been handed over to police and Inspectorate of Government (IG) 
after mismanaging over nine million shillings given to the community. According to the 
Newsletter of the Guardian.com of Monday 11th January 2010 NUSAF's public image was 
tainted by allegations of corruption whereby government officials and service providers have 
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been accused of embezzlement and of doing sub-standard/shoddy work or no work at all and 
some reports have put the number of NUSAF related court cases at more than 100 in number 
(the guardian.com 2010).Therefore mis-managing of projects in NUSAF is an issue which 
calls for serious concern.   
A study by Blattman et al. (2011) indicates that the NUSAF projects were not well 
researched, funds were mismanaged and intra-group conflicts were common. The authors 
argued that it is unrealistic to expect poor people to be responsible for their own recovery and 
indicated that the NUSAF program actually had dis-empowering effects. Whereas the first 
phase of NUSAF was semi-autonomous the current phase has been somehow more integrated 
in the structures of local governments, for example more responsibilities have been given to 
the local governments in the implementation of NUSAF 2 compared to NUSAF 1. 
The World Bank completion report of NUSAF phase one in 2009, ratings were as follows: 
outcomes were satisfactory, the risk of development outcome was moderate and government 
performance was moderately satisfactory and some lessons learned was that transparency and 
accountability can be a challenge in post-conflict areas. NUSAF project having a demand 
driven approach it was highly expected that it would help improve the capacity of the local 
people to participate fully and also be able to hold the implementers accountable, however 
various studies e.g. Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010) and various News Paper reports 
shows that NUSAF has tended to fall short of its ambitious aims of improving livelihoods in 
the North.   
Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010) noted that although NUSAF is a community driven 
project many of the beneficiaries interviewed expressed a deepened sense of resignation that 
their views and demands were not being listened to or acted upon. Here the authors argue that 
because of the high rate of project failure in NUSAF, they add a voice of support to other 
elites that still question the capacity of the poor to manage development resources effectively 
(Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010 ; Robinson, 2005). In their study the authors also noted 
that the NUSAF components that provided especially sub-projects for livestock and 
community infrastructure often the beneficiaries did not manage the funding well (Golooba-
Mutebi & Hickey, 2010 ; Robinson, 2005). Other challenges faced by the NUSAF project 
included inadequate resources, inefficient use of resources, elite capture, corruption and 
capacity constraints at point of delivery of services (GoU, 2011 ; OPM,  2011 ; Isis-WICCE, 
2011). 
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The previous study by Martin, Petty and Acidri (2008) on Northern Uganda indicates that 
there are a number of negative perceptions about government interventions in the region. The 
study observed that there are widespread perceptions of favoritism and exclusion by 
programs like NUSAF. Programs like NUSAF set very tough conditions for the communities  
to qualify for funding which the poor of the poor war victims  could not afford. For example 
planting of trees and for animal enterprises contribution of materials apart from labor (Petty 
and Acidri, 2008). NUSAF ignored the stark inequalities which are existing in the Northern 
region (Martin , Petty and Acidri, 2008).  
During the implementation of NUSAF there were also claims that some groups received 
funding faster than others after submitting their proposals and that they did so because they 
had agreed to pay off some of the people involved in decisions related for vetting proposals, 
approving them and deciding which ones got funded quickly and which ones were kept 
waiting (Golooba and Hickey, 2009). Also some applications which were judged to have the 
potential to receive approval for funding were allocated to other groups by corrupt politically 
motivated or nepotistic officials involved in the appraisal process (Beyond Juba Project, 
2008).  
A briefing note, by Beyond Juba Project (2008) on PRDP in Northern Uganda indicates that 
in some cases the information in the NUSAF sub-project files was deliberately being 
tampered with, for instance when a project has been approved some scrupulous individuals at 
the district local governments tear out the pages which have the names of the community 
members and then they insert the names of their own henchmen. This tampering of files and 
the collusion has created what they call “Ghost Communities” in NUSAF and this problem 
totally undermined NUSAF because people who did not intend to implement the project but 
just needed to steal money were the eventual beneficiaries (Golooba and Hickey, 2009). 
Despite Uganda’s success at mainstreaming the poverty agenda in National Policy processes 
via the PEAP and its relatively extensive system of decentralized governance, NUSAF was 
not integrated into either with line ministries and the institutions of local government were 
rejected by the NUSAF project designers as the main channel for the project (Robinson, 
2005). The decision to use parallel structures in the implementation of NUSAF and adopt a 
demand driven approach effectively excluded and alienated the state from the process and 
thus further embedding the popular idea in Northern Uganda that the state was absent from 
their lives (communities) for a long time and disinterested in their needs (Jones, 2009). This 
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is in line as observed by Lange (2008 ), that the danger of using non-state actors to deliver 
development is that it may have a very negative effect on people’s interest in politics, 
increase cynicism about government, retard peace building and finally even weaken the 
democratic process. 
Due to the parallel structures to the local decentralized system employed by NUSAF much of 
the work done on the projects is of poor quality because they did not involve the local 
government in their design, supervision and monitoring (Robinson, 2005 ; Golooba-Mutebi 
& Hickey,2008). This is also indicated by instances where the skilled specialized readily 
available local government technical manpower shunned the projects (Robinson, 2005; 
Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2008). Previous research by Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2008) 
indicates that the fuller involvement and participation of local government technical experts 
working in collaboration with beneficiaries would have likely improved the quality of the 
NUSAF project outputs, helped ensure greater sustainability and lower the costs of 
maintenance. Moreover Brett (2003) recommends that, for local development efforts in 
Uganda to be both efficient and empowering, it will require an appropriate blend of different 
institutional actors both public and private something which has been overlooked in NUSAF 
implementation. 
In addition, research findings by Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2008) in Northern Uganda 
indicate that the discretionary and parallel project structures to the local governments 
associated with NUSAF, not only render such an intervention prone to elite capture and open 
to abuse and corruption but also tend to undermine the role and accountability of the state. 
Failure to engage with local structures of power (local councils and traditional leaders) has 
been a big challenge to the community based approach of NUSAF (Golooba-Mutebi & 
Hickey, 2008).  
Martin (2010), Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010), Bailey et al. (2009) argue that although 
the social fund approach taken by the NUSAF program has the advantage of devolving 
responsibility to the community and limiting the influence of politicians on the project 
implementation, the availability of large sums of money for development purposes by 
NUSAF has been an attractive source of political patronage in a region that has been long 
deprived of such resources. This is because many politicians have used the program to 
advance their political ambitions by looking at the political feasibility of NUSAF rather than 
prioritizing the needs of the most vulnerable groups (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey,  2010).  
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5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
This research adopts a comparative case study of  two large agricultural livelihoods 
programs, that is NAADS and NUSAF. The study investigates, uncovers and explains the 
governance challenges that are facing the two programs i.e. (NAADS and NUSAF) in a post- 
conflict situation of Northern Uganda. The study also explores various strategies that have 
been developed to address the governance problems of implementing the two agricultural 
livelihoods enhancement programs. Given the fact that most households depend on 
agriculture as a source of livelihood it was imperative to target the two large agricultural 
livelihoods programs in Northern Uganda that is: NAADS and NUSAF which are being 
implemented in the region to improve on the livelihoods of the farmers. 
In this study I used both qualitative and quantitative research methods and  the case was used 
as a method of data collection and as a unit of analysis and it offered a comparative analysis 
of the two programs (NAADS and NUSAF) with different implementation mechanisms and 
derives implications for policy and future research. Salminen & Lautamo (2006) noted that a 
case study approach to research is advantageous because the researcher is able to explore a 
phenomenon within its real life context. As observed by Mason (2002) and Kanbur (2001) 
qualitative research has an advantage that we can explore a wide range of dimensions in the 
communities and households, for example understanding the way social processes and 
institutions work and the significance of the meanings they generate and how this behavior in 
the communities affects program implementation. 
The case study was conducted in four districts of Northern Uganda i.e. Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo 
and Pader (see Figure 4.2). The field study was the interview based qualitative and 
quantitative approach and was conducted over a period of 7 months on both NAADS 1 and 2 
and also NUSAF 1 and 2 between June 2012 to November 2012 and the quantitative data 
collection took place from May 2014 to August 2014. The case study is based on 4 districts 
chosen within the post -conflict Northern region of Uganda that is Gulu,Kitgum, Lamwo and 
Pader.  
Selection of sub-counties was conducted to allow for a comparative approach i.e. differences 
between well performing and non-performing areas and selection of sub-counties on the 
border of two districts to study the influence of the local government district administration 
and services. In this case two sub-counties were purposely selected e.g. One being better 
developed than the other and the closeness of the sub-county to the district headquarters. 
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5.1 Data sources and methods 
The study used a multi-method approach of data collection with key informant interviews, 
focus group interviews, observations of the environment and homesteads, attitudes and 
practices of the community.The study includes both primary and secondary data. The primary 
data was obtained using the Process Net-Map, participant observation, key informant 
interview methods and self-assessment. Other data collection methods included participant 
observations, unstructured interviewing and document analysis and review  which also 
involved collection of grey data from reports. The Process Net-Map and literature review 
provided useful insights into the implementation process of NAADS and NUSAF and the 
context in which the implementation process took place. 
 Primary data sources 5.1.1
There were two components of data collection, that is the qualitative component and the 
quantitative component. Thetools used to collect data included: key informant interview 
checklist, focus group discussion guide, literature review guide, questionnaire by personal 
interview for household survey and the Process Net-Map tool. 
Qualitative data collection 
The participants who were involved in the qualitative survey were purposively selected in 
order to ensure that they had credible knowledge about the implementation of NAADS and 
NUSAF programs. 
• Net-Map activities 
The Process Net-Map was used as one of the main methods of data collection to answer the 
research questions ( for details of Process Net-Map process see  Schiffer and Waale, 2008).  
The process Influence Net-Map was carried out in three phases namely; 
1. In phase one participants who included the technical staff, farmers who are affiliated 
to both NAADS and NUSAF, relevant stakeholders and members of the general 
farming community in the area were mobilized to take part in the Process Net-Map 
activity. The researcher asked the respondents to describe the target program 
(NAADS or NUSAF) procurement implementation process step by step and to 
identify the actors involved in each step. During the process interviewees were asked 
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in three stages about the steps that are taken to provide inputs or advisory services to 
the beneficiaries. The relevant actors were identified by the participants and then the 
actors were written on stickers with different colors and placed on a larger poster  
( flip chart). Then the implementation processes were drawn as arrows between the 
actor cards i.e. the arrows were used to describe the actions that are needed for 
providing advisory services or inputs. Here the arrows were marked with numbers  
and the respective implementation step corresponding to each number was noted 
down at the border of the paper. 
 
Picture 5.1: Step 1 of the Process Net-MapSource: Author  
2. In phase two of the process Net-Map respondents were asked to rate the influence of 
different actors on the final outcome of the entire process (quantity, quality and 
timeliness of assets distributed to intended beneficiaries). The question which was 
asked is that how much influence this actor has on the final outcome. The rating was 
done on a scale from 0 to 6 and it was visualized by using checker or chess pieces or 
towers of carom game pieces. 
 
Picture 5.2: Final step of Process Net- Map 
Source: Author 
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In addition while performing the exercise, the respondents were asked to identify and give 
reasons why different actors have the influence level that is given (ascribed) to them. At this 
stage it was emphasized to the interviewees (participants in the Net-Map process) that the 
level of influence was not about “authority” but about the importance of actors for the 
implementation of NAADS/NUSAF as described in the process influence mapping exercise. 
In addition the participants in the Process Net-Map explained (defined) the different factors 
that contribute to the actors’ influence. Finally in phase three of the Process Net-Map, the 
respondents were asked to identify where in the implementation process possible problems / 
governance challenges for example leakages, elite capture, corruption, political influence  
may occur. Here the aim was to identify possible and potential entry points for problems that 
are linked to the different implementation mechanisms used in the target programs of the 
field study.  
• Observations  
Participant observation is a useful method for measuring concepts, testing hypothesis and 
also constructing causal explanations (Douglas 1976). In this survey, observation was 
important because it allowed the observing of the environment i.e. the quality of life for 
example shelter, food, health and nutrition, diet, access to services, food availability storages 
(presence of homestead granaries), the crops in the fields in order to assess the general food 
production. And in addition, informal talks were carried out with other people in the area to 
substantiate or validate the information gathered from key informants. During the field 
research, the researcher also attended some NAADS and NUSAF related activities. For 
example meetings like farmer forum, participatory planning exercises, farm inputs 
distribution meetings and some training meetings usually held at the district and sub-county 
level to obtain more insights into the implementation of NAADS and NUSAF. The researcher 
also engaged in informal discussions with key NUSAF and NAADS implementers at  sub-
county, district level  and at the central level. Such informal discussions provided a good 
chance for the researcher to collect additional information and also a chance to clarifying the 
different field research impressions and cross-checking the information and possible 
preliminary conclusions from the study. 
• Key informant interviews 
For this study, key informant interviews formed a substantial part of this qualitative and 
quantitative comparative study. Unstructured interviews as recommended by Benard (1988) 
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have an advantage because these interviews put the respondents at ease to tell their stories to 
the researcher. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with NAADS and NUSAF affiliated 
beneficiary farmers and their institutions e.g. committees were carried out to get deeper 
insights into the implementation of the programs. The research method of FGDs takes the 
advantage of the interaction between small groups of people. Participants respond to and 
build on what others in the group have said. Ideally FGDs are a synergetic approach that 
helps in generating insightful information and encourages the participants to give sincere 
answers. Here the groups were formed comprising of men, women, elderly and the youths. 
 
Picture 5.3: Focus group discussion session in progress 
Source: Author 
It should be noted that focus group discussions and semi structured interviews were based on 
an interview guideline designed on the basis of the research theme and the research questions.  
• Interviews on NAADS 
Interviewees included leaders and members of the sub-county farmer fora, leaders of 
NAADS affiliated farmer groups, community mobilizers, farmer group facilitators and other 
community members with responsibilities related to NAADS for example farmers hosting the 
technology development sites and demonstrations, NAADS coordinators, NAADS service 
providers, relevant sub-county technical staff, sub-county local council officials and 
community leaders (civic, traditional and political) and staff of NGOs participating in 
NAADS activities e.g. District NGO forums of the different districts and other participating 
NGOs in capacity development. 
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• Interviews on NUSAF 
Interviews were held with the following types of respondents; 
 Top administration and political leaders of the four sample districts as well as relevant 
(key) civil servants involved in the implementation of NUSAF e.g. NUSAF technical 
team in the office of the prime minister and at the district levels. 
 Top administrative and political leaders in the selected sub-counties in each district. 
 Sub-county civil servants responsible for NUSAF. 
 Staff of NGOs involved in implementation of NUSAF. 
 Private sector i.e. suppliers, contractors and facilitators in NUSAF. 
 Beneficiary farmers and their affiliated groups ( see farmer interview questionnaire in 
used in  Appendix 1).  
 Local traditional leaders. 
 
Quantitative data  
 
• Sampling and Sample size 
The quantitative data for this study was collected through a household survey involving a 
random sample of respondents. The household survey targeted two categories of farmers 
namely those farmers who are affiliated to a NAADS farmer group and those farmers who 
are affiliated to the NUSAF farmer group. 
The selection of the respondents for the household survey was a multiplestage process. First 
the list of the registered farmer groups for both NAADS and NUSAF in each sub-county 
targeted in the particular district were obtained at the district or sub-county levels. Then in 
each sub-county 2 parishes were randomly selected and in these 2 parishes 13 groups of 
NAADS affiliated farmers and 13 groups NUSAF affiliated farmers were selected randomly 
using a lottery method. After selection of the groups, the lists of members were obtained, the 
names written down and the respondent to interview was selected by lottery method of 
sampling.  
Given that for the household survey four districts were targeted and in each district two sub -
counties were selected this means that in each district 13 respondents were interviewed for 
NAADS affiliated respondents and 13 respondents for NUSAF affiliated farmer groups. 
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Therefore for each district 26 total number of respondents was interviewed. Given that the 
study targeted four districts in the Northern region, the total number of respondents 
interviewed was 26 times four (26x4) which gives the total number of respondents of 104 
interviewed for the household survey. 
• Quantitative data collection 
This was collected using a pre-tested individual structured questionnaire for which it 
was applied for both NAADS and NUSAF farmer group affiliated individuals. The 
household survey questionnaire contained both, fixed choice, closed and open ended 
questions. The farmers selected were interviewed  at their households and used the 
personal interview method because many of them are either illiterate or semi-illiterate 
so they could not fill the questionnaires personally. The main contents of the 
household survey questionnaire included: questions on the expectations from NAADS 
and NUSAF by the affiliated farmers, the levels of trust by the group affiliated 
farmers towards the technical personnel and local government politicians towards 
program implementation, satisfaction and perception of the respondents towards the 
programs, farmers’ willingness to work together in groups, perceptions about  their 
own farmer institutions and what the respondents think can be done differently to 
improve the programs performance ( see appendix 1 for details). 
• Data analysis 
The household survey data was analyzed using the statistical package for social 
scientists (SPSS) and the data were also analyzed using descriptive statistics which 
also involved deriving frequencies, percentages and average values. The data was 
presented using tables and bar graphs. 
 Secondary data sources 5.1.2
Secondary data was collected through the review of relevant published academic literature 
such as journal articles, books, periodicals and unpublished literature (grey literature) for 
example policy papers and evaluation reports and internal communications related to the 
programs implementation process, implementation manuals, program evaluation documents, 
monitoring reports implementation reports both at the central level, in the NGOs and local 
government level .   
The review of documents included; 
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• Government documents consulted included mainly those published by MFPED, MAAIF 
and Prime Minister’s Office (OPM) which is the implementing ministry for NUSAF. 
• Workshop reports-for NUSAF and NAADS related activities. 
• Those documents related to PMA and the PEAP. 
• Those documents related to NAADS and NUSAF as a project e.g. Project appraisal 
documents, implementation manuals, annual reports, monitoring reports and 
review/evaluation reports.  
• Other sources included academic literature, Newspaper and journal articles, relevant 
government documents and information published through the internet. 
• Work plans, progress reports, financial reports, payment vouchers, monitoring and 
evaluation reports.  
5.2 Data quality assurance 
In order to ensure the credibility of the results obtained, a number of methods were used to 
check for the accuracy of the results obtained. Triangulation was carried out through using 
multiple sources of data to get a more comprehensive views on the subjects studied. For 
example beneficiaries, program implementers and relevant stakeholders were interviewed to 
get comprehensive views on the particular topic.   
 
Before the qualitative survey serious efforts were taken to identify and select appropriate 
participants purposely who were knowledgeable about the implementation of NAADS and 
NUSAF to provide credible responses asked about the programs. 
 
To avoid biased answers during the household survey there were serious efforts to select the 
research assistants that are not directly involved in the implementation of NAADS program 
or NUSAF. This is because such research assistants were likely to influence the results of the 
negative criticisms about the programs’ implementers. Also the respondents during the 
household survey were interviewed alone without the presence of the program implementers 
or the local leaders to enable them give sincere answers during the interviews. Also sensitive 
topics in the implementation of the program were mainly addressed during individual 
interviews rather than during focus group discussions. 
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 Another way to ensure that credible data was obtained was that, during the study in the 
evening the author usually had informal discussions with the project coordinators and other 
stakeholders and such meetings provided important information in cross-checking and 
clarifying the research findings. Also information from the field was re-enforced by the 
personal observations by the researcher during farmer meetings and field observation. In 
addition, at the end of the working day of the research there were debriefing meetings 
between the author and the research assistants to resolving contentious findings from the 
team members during the data collection.For the quantitative data collection random 
sampling was carried out in the selection of participants to ensure that the results are not 
biased and also ensure the generalizability of the results. 
 
 Gulu 
District 
Kitgum 
District 
Pader 
District 
Lamwo  
District 
Total 
Focus Group Discussions ( FGDs) 3 3 3 3 12 
Process Net-Map Interviews 4 4 4 4 16 
Local Government  
(Political) 
5 5 5 5 20 
Local Government  
(Administrative) 
4 4 5 4 21 
Civil Society (NGO/CBO) 3 2 2 2 9 
Private Sector Organizations  1 1 1 1 4 
Opinion/Traditional Leaders 1 1 1 1 4 
Private sector/suppliers 1 1 1 1 4 
NAADS and NUSAF  
Group Member (Household survey) 
Quantitative Interviews 
26 26 26 26 104 
Table 5.1: Summary of data collection 
 
5.3 Data management and analysis 
First, pre-test of the research instruments was made to ensure clarity required for information 
collection and necessary adjustments were made thereafter. Data from interviews was 
organized categorically according to the different emerging themes identified during the 
study and also in line with the Conceptual Framework. Qualitative analysis then entailed 
sorting and organizing the material into common response categories i.e. focusing on certain 
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themes and or sub-themes. Basically this resulted into manageable and more relevant data 
sets. In describing the data, the researcher illustrated and substantiated the presentation 
through use of direct quotations from the respondents. 
Quantitative data was reduced to frequencies and has been presented in the form of tables and 
bar graphs.Quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS data analysis program.  
5.4 Ethical issues 
Ethical issues were carefully taken care of during the study. All information received from 
the respondents was treated in confidence and steps were taken to ensure anonymity of the 
respondents, study district and source of such sensitive information. There was oral consent 
and all relevant agencies were the research took place were aware of the aim of the survey, 
for example the central government departments and the local governments were contacted 
with an introduction letter from Hohenheim University hence the study was conducted with 
the approval of the relevant authorities. All the informants that took part in this study were 
fully informed about the purpose of the study and freely agreed to participate. 
All the interviewees were informed of the purpose of the study, as well as their rights to 
voluntarily participate (or not) in the study and ask questions at any time, refuse to answer 
any questions and to input information into the study they thought was necessary but which 
the interviewer had not solicited.The participants were assured of anonymity of the 
information.  
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6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
6.1 Overview 
This section deals with  the implementation processes and practices of NAADS and NUSAF 
programs in the Northern region of Uganda. It includes the discussion on how the NAADS 
and NUSAF implementation took place in practice in the rural communities in the North. 
Here the emphasis has been put on the processual aspects of NAADS and NUSAF, such as 
implementation procedures and the institutional arrangements for delivery of extension 
services.  
Section 6.1 and 6.2 presents the results of the Process Net-Map , individual interviews and 
focus group discussions with both NAADS and NUSAF service providers and the actors 
respectively that are involved in the implementation of the programs and at the same time 
discusses the implications of the results. I supplement the results from the Process Net-Map 
exercise with insights from  observations, interviews, focus group discussions in which the 
process Net-Map  exercise was not applied. For comparison with procurement for NAADS 
and procurement for advisory services see the Net-Map in appendix 4.   
6.2 NAADS implementation process in practice 
 The implementation process of NAADS using the Process-Influence Mapping 6.2.1
procedure 
The description of the NAADS pocedures in the implementation of the procurement process  
in this section is based on the process Net-Map procedure with different stakeholders i.e. 
district technical officers, NAADS coordinators, farmer forum representatives and 
beneficiaries. It should be noted  here that the implementation process is explained as 
perceived by the interviewees from their practical experiences in the implementation of 
NAADS and therefore may deviate from the official NAADS  Implementation Guidelines. 
Figure 6.1 Shows the steps involved in the implementation process. Here the first step (step 
1) involved the sensitization of all the stakeholders at the district level i.e. both on the 
political wing and the technical wing including leaders of the sub-counties i.e. sub-county 
NAADS Coordinators and farmer forum chairmen. In the second step (step 2) , the already 
sensitized local leaders and sub-county NAADS Coordinators are equipped with tools to go 
to the lower levels to sensitize the farmers in their parishes and also facilitate the election of 
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the procurement committee (Step 3). Here mobilization of the farmers is carried out basically 
by the Community Based Facilitators (CBFs). Other actors who are involved in the 
sensitization are members of the farmers’ forum (F.F). The main actors in the sensitization of 
farmers about the activities to take place in the NAADS sensitization include the chairman 
Local Council 3, the sub-county chief and the sub-county NAADS Coordinator. After the 
sensitization the next step is the selection of farming enterprises to be undertaken by the sub-
county and then in step 9 of the Process Net- Map, the information is sent to the sub-county 
NAADS Coordinator who delivers the information to the sub-county chief and then the sub-
county chief forwards the information to the district NAADS Coordinator (step 10). At this 
step, the copies of the enterprises selected are also forwarded to CAO, Chief Finance Officer 
(CFO) and secretary for production. 
After the enterprises are selected, the sub-county chief invites the procurement committee 
(PC) at the sub-county for a meeting (the PC is constituted from the farmers’ forum). At this 
meeting (steps 14 and 15), after agreeing on the terms of reference by the sub-county 
technical committee and the PC,  the PC notifies the sub-county chief through the sub-county 
NAADS Coordinator to advertise for the bids for the supply of specific farm 
inputs/technologies , for example seeds/ fertilizers and livestock. After advertisement at the 
district and sub-county notice boards and in national News Papers jointly with other sub-
counties in the district. After advertisement, the interested suppliers pick the bid forms from 
the office of the sub-county NAADS coordinator and then submit all the required documents 
and information according to the terms of reference (TOR).  
 At steps 17 and 18 of the process Net-Map, the sub-county technical team sits and choses the 
pre-qualified firms. The information is then displayed at district and sub-county notice boards 
and also sometimes announcements on radio are made. Then the sub-county chief calls a 
meeting which is attended by the subject matter specialists (SMS) (Agriculture and 
Veterinary) and the secretary for production and the secretary to the meeting who is the 
NAADS coordinator to participate in the evaluation and selection of the best bidder. 
At steps 19 and 20 the selected firm or firms are invited for negotiations at the sub-county on 
prices and other issues concerning the supply contract and the actors at this step include the 
sub-county chief, NAADs Coordinator and Procurement Committee (PC). The aim of the 
negotiations is to have a win-win position between the farmers and the suppliers. During 
negotiation there is potential for reduction of prices to favor the negotiators on behalf of the 
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beneficiaries and in most cases the results of the negotiations are not revealed to the wider 
public because there is usually no written records. After this process of negotiations is 
concluded, the sub-county chief through the sub-accountant prepares a local purchase order 
(LPO) for the supplier to deliver the inputs. 
At step 23, the procurement committee tells the suppliers to supply the inputs at a specific 
date so that the farmers are prepared to receive them. At step 24 the subject matter specialist 
(SMS) either at the sub-county or district, depending at which level the inputs first arrive 
checks the quality and quantity of inputs delivered in the presence of the procurement 
committee and some members of the farmer forum executive in accordance with the terms of 
reference and at this level the inputs are either approved or rejected. At step 24 if the inputs 
are approved they are handed over to the sub-county chief / NAADS Coordinator and the 
farmers’ forum (FF) who are in charge of distribution of the inputs to the final beneficiaries ( 
the farmers). At step 26 after the inputs are received and approved, the sub-county chief 
instructs the sub-accountant to prepare a cheque for the payment and then handed to the 
supplier usually by sub-county NAADS Coordinator but in some instances this process can 
be hijacked by the powerful sub-county chiefs and sub-accountant.  
1
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 Level of  influence of the different actors on the quality of inputs delivered to 6.2.2
the beneficiaries 
Figure 6.2 shows the perceived level of influence that the different actors have on the 
outcome of the procurement process i.e. on the quality of inputs received by the final 
beneficiaries (farmers). In this process, the respondents were asked to rank the influence of 
the different actors on the outcome (quality) on a scale from 0-6. The final good outcome is 
that the inputs delivered are of high quality, required quantity and delivered in time as 
required by the farmer beneficiaries.   
 
Figure 6.2: Perceived levels of influence of the different actors 
In figure 6.2 above, the farmers rated themselves as the highest i.e. 6 because they said that 
during community procurement they can be able to procure inputs for themselves and 
therefore can of course ensure high quality inputs for themselves. The sub-county chief also 
gets 5 and the LC 3 chairman because they come to the villages and ensure that quality inputs 
have been purchased. The supplier gets 4 because they just care about profit, so if they are 
not warned about quality issue by the implementers they can bring the cheapest product but 
even of very low quality delivered.  
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Figure 6.3: The mean influence level 
When the mean values were taken for the different Net Maps (figure 6.3) , the supplier got 
the highest . This could be a perception in all areas that the supplier care for only profit but 
not good quality. Respondents said that they are usually at the mercy of suppliers and can 
wait for just what the supplier brings. The beneficiaries said that they just want to see things 
happening i.e. to receive the inputs because any delay for them they think may not get 
anything at all according to their previous experiences on NAADS input supply. However the 
technocrats were also given high scores, this could be because they are more involved in 
NAADS 2 procurement than in NAADS 1. 
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Figure 6.4: NAADS implementation challenges 
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Procurement Stage  Red Flags   
Poject and Design • Political influence from LC 5 and LC 3 executives in enterprise selection. 
• Undue influence by politicians and elites in decision making. 
Advertising , 
Prequalification, 
Submission of Bids 
• No tender advetisements at the lower levels eg. Parish. 
• Very few companies are pre-qualified. 
• No official location (office) of the bidding company/ firms. 
• Manipulation of bid documents (favouritism). 
• Collusion.  
• Leakage of bidding information. 
• Submission of very few bid documents. 
• Lack of widespread advertizing of bids to reduce competition. 
Bid Evaluation, Post-
qualification and Award 
of Contract 
• One company always winning the contracts in the area. 
• Company that wins contract does not have official location in the district. 
• Very short procurement process. 
• Delivery of inputs beyond official working hours or delivery on weekends. 
• Single sourcing undertaken as procurement option. 
• Best bidder fails to win the tender award. 
• The price of delivery of goods and services is increased from the original. 
price according to the tender terms of reference. 
• The quality and or quantity of the goods is decreased from the original 
TOR. 
• The price of inputs to be delivered is inflated compared to the prevailing 
market prices.  
Contract Performance , 
Administration and 
Supervision 
• All payments made before contract is completed. 
• Delayed payments to suppliers. 
• Very expensive project sign posts. 
• Weak accounting systems. 
• Ghost names of beneficiaries and project personell. 
• Poor monitoring systems. 
• Lack of random spot checks to give opportunity to the contractor to 
disguise illegal activities. 
• Poor transparency and no implementation/contract information given to the 
beneficiaries. 
• Oversight of the physical works in collaboration with beneficiary 
representatives is absent. 
• The clients of the service are dissatisfied with completed facilities. 
• Delays in the delivery of goods and services. 
Table 6.1: Entry points for corruption in procurement of goods and services in NAADS- 
insights from the study 
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 Governance challenges in NAADS implementation 6.2.3
This section is discussed according to the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3 which 
considers both the Supply-side and Demand-side factors that affect program performance. 
The Supply-side factors refer to boxes I,J,K,L and M while the Demand-side factors refer to 
boxes F, G and H in the Conceptual Framework (Refer to figure 3.2 section 3).    
Supply-side challenges 
1. Human resource management 
• Local government human resource capacity 
The NAADS implementation guidelines emphasize the need for retooling (capacity 
strengthening) and technical backstopping by the Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) at the 
local government level to improve their knowledge and the skills. However evidence from 
the interaction of the various technical staff during the study shows that the available training 
support is not adequate to deal with the NAADS current challenging participatory planning 
and administrative tasks  and the challenges posed by the ever evolving NAADS program. 
Outsourcing or hiring of technical tasks to private contractors for example hiring planning 
tasks under NAADS to NGOs under the institutional development component proved too 
costly and unsustainable. For instance, as  observed there are problems of quality assurance 
of services as some of the NGOs hired lack capacity and in some instances employed or sub-
contracted unqualified staff who are cheap to pay i.e. hired staff who don’t ask for higher 
wages. 
The rushed NAADS programme roll out to the districts led to a number of technical capacity  
challenges in NAADS. Evidence shows that many technocrats say that NAADS is “thin” on 
the ground because its impact is very small. During the design of the NAADS programme it 
was assumed that many of the service providers would be qualified and experienced 
agricultural extension officers delayered (moved out of local government/ retired from local 
government) in each district and sub-county, but this was not realized because most of them 
still remain employed under the local governments and therefore could not provide services 
to NAADS as private extension providers. Findings indicate that the present arrangement of 
only one staff member as a NAADS Coordinator in each district and one NAADS 
Cooordinator at sub-county level working alongside other technical staff in the local 
government and private advisory service providers  is insufficient in the management of 
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NAADS. The lack of adequate technical capacity at the local government levels is implied by 
the statements below; 
“Decentralizing of agricultural extension services under NAADS is 
good but it has its own complications; in Northern Uganda in most 
instances districts lack the capacity to offer agricultural extension 
services and also the capacity to develop their staff and provision of 
facilitation to carry out their duties. In addition lack of  incentives at 
work and the low salaries have resulted in loss  of staff morale to 
visit the farmers and that’s why many of the extension workers are 
spending more time doing work on their private gardens and farms” 
(Retired District Agricultural Officer (DAO).  
An  elderly farmer interviewed said that:  
“Iam appalled at the lack of proper extension services. Here it is 
surprising that farmers are still even getting bumper harvests because 
they practice agriculture like a person walking a dark tunnel, he 
laments. He continues to explain that after independence of Uganda in 
1962 extension workers were heavily involved in the agriculture 
sector and he grew up seeing them’’.  He said that they used to come 
to visit his father’s farm often, but he does not see them these days. 
He blames the failure of transferring research findings to his farm on 
the absence of extension knowledge/services from the government 
extension workers’’.  
Another local technical capacity challenge relates  to step 24 of the Process Net-Map which 
involves certification of inputs by technical officers (Agriculture and Veterinary SMS) before 
they are distributed to the beneficiaries. Findings indicate that this activity is hardly done. 
The NAADS procurement guidelines mandates the district Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) 
(i.e. Veterinary and Agriculture) to verify the quality and quantity of goods supplied as per 
the terms of reference (TOR) in the supply contract/bidding documents. One important 
reason for the certification challenges is the lack of adequate trained technical  staff in the 
Production and Extension services departments, especially at the sub-county levels where 
program implementation takes place. Man power constraints predominantly concern the 
absence of Agricultural and Veterinary officers and hence the absence of such staff limits the 
access of the farmers to technical services such as inspection, monitoring, and quality 
assurance. Addtionally this makes quality assurance and value for money a challenge and this 
offers a substantial scope for supply of substandard inputs, fraud and misappropriation of 
funds during NAADS implementation. Key informants said that the cause of the staff 
shortage is partly due to the government of Uganda Policy of not allowing district local 
governments to hire  new district/ sub-county extension staff.  In the surveyed districts many 
113 
 
vacancies at both districts and sub-counties are not permanently filled. Another challenge is 
that at the inception of NAADS many of the agricultural officers left government to serve as 
private service providers. For instance in many of the sub-counties, due to staff shortages the 
CDO can be assigned several posts, for example as a NAADS Coordinator, acting sub-county 
chief etc. Due to these additional responsibilities the officer cannot pay the required attention 
to the highly demanding NAADS programme in order to effectively monitor or administer 
the implementation of NAADS programme. 
To illustrate the negative impact of staff shortage, as per the NAADS procurement  
provisions, the supplier is supposed to communicate a day before that he/she going to deliver 
the goods to the district to be verified/certified. Due to the capacity challenges, the subject 
matter specialist (SMS) cannot respond in time. This was particularly challenging for 
livestock which have to be fed and susceptible to disease outbreak. Evidence shows that this 
problem was worse for the poultry enterprise, for example at one of the sub-county surveyed 
over 30% of the local poultry died at the sub-county headquarters  before delivery to the final 
beneficiaries. 
One supplier complained that: 
“So you are forced to keep for a longtime at the district 
headquarters and it is expensive and not part of the 
costs.’’ Death and body emaciation  of animals can occur 
within this time leading to  loss on my part and 
complaints from the farmers who are supposed to receive 
the animals/livestock that Iam supplying them with poor 
quality livestock’’. 
In one incident in district C, local chicken in a sub-county stayed for two weeks before 
verification/certification by the district Subject Matter Specialist (SMS). Key informants at 
the district local government said that, for the Veterinary Doctor who is available at the 
district headquarters even lacks facilitation in form of fuel to go to the lower levels to assure 
the quality of animals  and  this led to problems of compromising the quality of animals and a 
good entry point for the supply of poor quality animals.This inadequacy in staffing levels is 
confirmed by evidence from this survey where the records show that staffing gap in the 
Production and Extension departments was just about 50%. 
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Private sector capacity  
The NAADS programme being a private sector led delivery of agricultural advisory service 
the technical capacity of the hired private agricultural extension workers to deliver quality 
advisory services is crucial for the success of the program. Evidence from key informant 
interviews and the farmer beneficiaries confirm that the private sector organizations and the 
field staff hired by the programme do not have adequate numbers of professional to deliver 
quality services to their target group. Interviewed local government staff  indicated that, this 
situation has been made worse because many of those who would be private service providers 
are still employed by the local governments.  
According to GoU 2006/ 2007, when NAADS was being designed provisions indicated that 
the local government workers would be delayered out of government to fill the private sector 
technical gap within the second year of the NAADS inception phase. In addition evidence 
shows that the long planned programme for building capacity (retooling) of local government 
employees  has not been carried out by NAADS. The technical staff interviewed reported that 
apart from the war conflict, another cause of the manpower problems is government of 
Uganda Policy of creation of  new districts in Northern Uganda from time to time which has  
made the constraint of technical capacity in the region even worse. Recent NAADS 
implementation guidelines call for the legal registration of all potential individual private 
service providers with the aim of preventing contracting out the agricultural advisory work to 
unqualified individuals i.e. the individual who wins the contract is the one to provide the 
services.The challenge with this arrangement is that an individual may not be qualified in all 
fields, a multidisciplinary team is adequately equipped to respond to a range of agricultural 
advisory service needs than an individual service provider. 
Findings indicated that many private agricultural advisory service provider companies used 
qualified staff just for bidding purposes and in the field employed/contracted unqualified staff 
whom they can be able to pay lower salaries in order to maximize profits for themselves. 
Some respondents even complained that some of these trainers were using class based 
training dominated by English words which many of the farmers could not understand. 
Trainers were also giving the farmers note books and pens in a dominantly class based 
training to take notes as if they were school going children, respondents complained.  
Evidence indicates that, in the case of Northern Uganda where there are only a limited 
number of service providers, there is less competition in the bidding process which results in 
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the selection of less qualified personell who will provide substandard advisory service. One 
of the district extension staff interviewed indicated that in some cases there was a complete 
lack of private service providers for certain new enterprises/technologies which are not very 
common in the area (for example mushroom growing and Apiculture).  
Another issue identified is that service providers were usually not available in remote sub- 
counties of the Northern Uganda districts because of lack of incentives and high transaction 
costs for service providers. As a result, there is complete lack of efficiency in the provision of 
advisory services in remote areas. It was evident from the process Net-Map that many of the 
service providers who get NAADS contracts are committed to other areas i.e. their companies 
are working in other areas with limited manpower. This has resulted in few service providers 
available in Northern Uganda. Similarly many companies have hired poorly qualified service 
providers leading to shoddy work. With the NAADS advisory services this is a serious issue 
in as far as efficiency and qualified technical capacity is concerned. There was evidence from 
the Process Net-Map interviews that even the same staff could form several firms leading to 
lack of concentration and efficiency. This finding resonates with even other findings from 
other parts of the country whereby the capacity of the private agricultural extension service 
providers is still wanting. For example, the Uganda Development Network of Indigenous 
Voluntary Associations (DENIVA) also conducted an independent study entitled: the 
effectiveness of farmer groups as institutions for farmer empowernment and poverty 
eradication under the NAADS program in Kabale, Tororo and Arua districts ( DENIVA, 
2005). Their assessment at that time also indicated that among others, service provision was 
constrained by poor skills of the contracted service providers dominated by classroom based 
training. 
Key informants reported that many of the service providers companies do not have enough 
working capital and there is shortage of credit facilities for the service providers to be able to 
buy equipment to carry out demonstrations and training. Findings indicate that the majority of 
private advisory service providers are not adequately equipped, for instance in terms of 
farmer training aides, transport, demonstration kits and drugs to offer the services. In addition 
there are other problems in regards to privately delivered extension services under NAADS 
more especially in the livestock sector, a case in point is the acute shortage of Veterinary 
Doctors e.g.  In one of the districts surveyed there was only one Veterinary doctor in the 
entire district. These results support past studies by Benin et al. (2007) which shows that in 
Uganda , technologies and information are more available for crops than for livestock. 
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Another finding was that, due to the limited budgets to the private service providers, the 
money budgeted for is mainly for training and demonstration and there is no allocation in the 
private service provider budgets for funds for the monitoring and evaluation. This finding of 
the lack of the monitoring budget, shows that there is no opportunity for the service providers 
to carry out monitoring in the areas in which they have finished training and therefore they 
cannot provide feedback on the effects of their work with the farmers. 
Other evidence points to the challenge of the private service providers being given very short 
term contracts, for instace many available contracts are between 3 to 6 months. Many client 
stakeholders interviewed indicated that depending on the nature of the enterprise to be 
supported by the agricultural extension advisor ,  the usual short 3-6 month contracts did not 
provide sufficient time for capacity to be built and the skills to be learnt in the farmer groups 
for the enterprises and technology being covered, for instance long-term enterprises like 
livestock breeding, improvement and management activities a very short 3-6 month period of 
contract does not suffice. Bahiigwa et al. (2005) and Bukenya (2010) noted that agricultural 
extension is not an event, but a process which takes a while before a farmer can adopt the 
technology.   
NAADS guidelines provide for targeting through farmer groups, therefore farmer 
institutional development is key to the success of the program because strong farmer 
institutions depict the farmer ownership of the programme, high levels of farmer 
empowerment and group cohesion. In terms of the NGOs which carried out Institutional 
development in the study area, for the larger part of the NAADS program, findings from 
NAADS implementers at the local government level and beneficiaries alike indicate that 
many of  these NGOs lacked the technical capacity to conduct the institutional development 
of farmer groups. Other challenges the NGOs faced was lack of knowledge of the area, short 
time period of contracts and poor budgetary allocations for institutional development leading 
to the delivery of shoddy work as reported by respondents in many sub-counties. Another 
challenge is that the NGOs were given very short contracts (3 to 6 months contracts)  which 
time was not enough for preparing the farmer groups well and in some cases a single NGO 
was given contracts to operate in more than one sub-county thus putting a strain on its 
technical capacity in other areas.  
On the issue of capacity building of service providers, given the wide scope of the role of the 
private service provider, compared to the individual traditional local government agricultural 
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extension worker, capacity building of service providers has been identified as a critical 
factor will enable NAADS to achieve its objectives.The NAADS programme component 
number 4 which provides for capacity building of  private service providers has not been 
addressed/implemented. From this survey, there is no evidence that NAADS has conducted a 
training needs assessment for the private agricultural advisory providers and capacity 
building/training. Because of this evidence I conclude that the capacity building of private 
service providers was actually minimal and in some areas totally non-existent and or if 
present was  just from other agencies e.g. NGOs in the area but not from NAADS program.  
Staff welfare 
According to the technical staff interviewed at both the districts and sub-county levels, they 
indicated that since the inception of the NAADS program in 2002 many of the local 
government workers’ morale to work has declined. Many of the government extension 
workers interviewed are uncertain of their future in the local government system.The 
retooling program as envisaged in the NAADS operational guidelines of 2001 is not 
forthcoming. Evidence from key informants indicates that the parallel system of human 
resource management under NAADS undermine the incentives of the local government staff 
not employed under NAADS.There is also some resentment of the programme by the existing 
local government staff because of the disparity in remuneration of the District NAADS 
Coordinators and Subcounty NAADS Coordinators and the local government staff just 
because the NAADS staff  are better paid and facilitated. As a result, evidence indicates that 
this has created potentially unhealthy relationships among professional staff at the local 
government  level and the NAADS coordinators. In addition this has brought in an 
underlying resentment by the local government staff especially at the district level that the 
NAADS programme does not fully involve them or the programme does not sufficiently 
draw on their experise and experiences in the area of agricultural advisory services. 
Some local government staff are disappointed because they have not been offered specialized 
training from NAADS secretariat, yet they face challenges in the field because farmers’ 
information needs are changing all the time. The local government technical staff also 
complained that they are poorly facilitated in terms of training materials. Findings indicate 
that delays in funding and payment of private service providers were common place and this 
meant that the service provision was often carried out at the wrong time of the year resulting 
in reduced effectiveness. 
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Findings indicate that the problem of staffing levels is more pronounced  at the sub-county 
levels where a number of vacancies e.g extension workers are occupied by persons in acting 
capacity and not usually having the required qualifications for the job, for instance many jobs 
which are supposed to be occupied by Degree holders are now occupied by Diploma holders.  
It should be noted that not much has changed now in terms of staffing levels because of the 
government ban on recruitment of agricultural extension workers. Key informants also cited 
the problem of the ever increasing number of districts created by the government as one of 
the factors that has led to staff shortage and in  addition  lack of facilities like office 
infrastructure is a disincentive in attracting new staff to these local governments.  
The staff welfare challenge is implied by the following statement: 
“when the security situation remains volatile and people still 
feel insecure, people from the North who are well educated  
have usually gone to places where it is peaceful to seek 
employment opportunities leading to ‘’brain drain’’ in the 
Northern Uganda districts’’( CAO). 
Other challenges also relate to the lack of interest of the local government agricultural 
extension work in their work and their poor  performance, for example it arose from the focus 
group discussions that the beneficiary communities perceive the NAADS Coordinators and 
local Government agricultural extension staff at the local government and more especially 
those at sub-county levels not performing their duties as expected. This challenge was 
exemplified by the usual and regular  absence of the sub-county NAADS Coordinators and 
agricultural extension staff from their duty stations as witnessed by the researcher and 
inadequate supervision of the private service providers. Findings indicate that the 
communities are not sensitized on the process of channeling of complaints for investigation 
and the actions on such absentee staff. 
Another challenge identified is that the available officers lack the support of the infrastructure 
for example computers, printers, electricity and internet that would be needed for the efficient 
implementation of the program. In one of the districts surveyed during the study, there was 
only one Veterinary doctor in the whole district. Related to the above challenge is that 
officers who are involved in NAADS activities, for example sub-accountants  are not paid 
any money for their services, whereas NAADS is a document intensive and transaction 
intensive program that requires their input and presence for most of the time. Lack of 
motivation of the NAADS support  officers in the local governments leads to delays in 
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preparation of documents, financial reports, payment of service providers/suppliers and 
delays in preparation of accountabilities. 
2. Conflicts of interest 
 There was alleged corruption and collusion in awarding contracts by the respondents in the 
focus group discussions. Respondents mentioned local government officails and farmer 
leaders as one of the culprits.The reason given by some of the private agricultural advisory 
providers is that they fear they may lose chances to obtain contracts in other sub-counties and 
districts because in the Northern region the local government staff know each other because 
most of these were one district but just split up into new ones and therefore can take 
collective action or blacklist such a private service provider who pins their colleague not to 
get a contract in their areas. 
Respondents in the focus group discussions reported problems of poor supervision of the 
procurement committees by the district technical team and the involvement of elected 
officials directly in procurement processes and elected officials involved in supply of inputs 
themselves through their private firms leading to numerous cases of abuse of the procurement 
process as well as demonstrated impunity on the part of the district and sub county officials in 
instances where such cases of bad practices were reported to them. This leads to conflict of 
interest because the persons supposed to supervise the suppliers and assure value for money 
are themselves the suppliers. So in case of poor quality supplies can they criticize and 
penalize their own supply companies?respondents wondered . 
Field research experiences indicated that there is a capacity gap at the sub-county levels 
because even the NGOs/CBOs working in the study districts still contract the services of the 
few local government staff to carry out their work. But the local government staff are the 
ones supposed to assure that the NGO offers quality services, so how can the local 
government staff criticize the NGO which has offered them employment? Respondents 
wondered. This has brought in problems of staff management at the local government levels 
because the local government staff are dedicating less and less time to local government work 
of which they are paid for by the government and offering most of their time to work with 
NGOs which offer better payments and allowances that’s why you always find empty offices 
during working days more especially at the sub-county level. 
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Respondents reported some cases where the NAADS Coordinator is acting on behalf of the 
the farmer beneficiaries i.e. parish procurement committee to issue and receive the interest 
forms for community suppliers which is not recommended in the official Community 
Procurement Guidelines. Here there is a big challenge on the powers of the community 
procurement committee who are the farmer beneficiary representatives being overtaken by 
the sub-county NAADS coordinator. 
3. Financial management 
NAADS budgeting , funding and internal accountability 
According to the Operational Guidelines of NAADS, operational funds are supposed to be 
released from the NAADS Secretariat  in  March of the financial year and reach at the district  
in the same  month  and then released to the sub-county in April ( for more information see 
the funds flow chart in appendix5). However it was evidenced from the discussions during 
the research that this was not the case on the ground. There is late release of funds and this 
has seriously negatively impacted on the implementation of the NAADS activities and 
programs. Respondents also reported that the late release of funds affects the absorption of 
funds  by the sub-counties because it delays the seasonal implementation of field activities 
and the overall  implementation process.  
In addition the communities in the focus group discussions expressed the view that they have 
limited decision making powers particularly over the resource allocation  and they indicated 
that their involvement in the NAADS planning and budgeting process is non-existent. The 
main perception here was that the intended beneficiaries are merely recipients of the planning 
and budgeting decisions which are made at the NAADS Secretariat and the districts. 
Respondents here recommended that NAADS planning and budgeting should follow a 
bottom up approach which is fully participatory and inclusive involving beneficiaries, 
implementers, civil society and other relevant stakeholders. 
There is evidence that sub-counties usually receive the funds late, usually one to five weeks 
before the end of the quarter of the financial year. Because of this late disbursement of funds, 
issues of late implementation (poor absorption of funds) and timely accountability 
preparation arise. Here the level of absorption of funds is  the percentage of the accomplished 
activities of the total planned activities in the quarterly or yearly reporting period. The key 
stakeholders mentioned that there is a serious challenge of retrieval of unallocated funds by 
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MFPED as a Financial Management Policy which has to be done at every end of the financial 
year, therefore it is difficult for the sub-counties to use all the funds before the end of the 
financial year because of the late releases. 
It was mentioned by the participant technical officers that some funds are even released 
towards the end of the quarter and the end of the financial year making it difficult to utilize 
the funds in time and this forces the sub-counties  to send the much needed unspent funds at 
the district as per the Local Government and NAADS operational guidelines. In addition the 
underutilization of funds also reflects the non-compliance of the sub-counties especially with 
explicit NAADS funding guidelines that prevail at the NAADS Secretariat. For example to 
ensure timely accountability and effective implementation of the NAADS programme, the 
NAADS implementation guidelines includes provisions  for maintaining  of proper records 
i.e. reports and timely submission of proper accountability reports to the authorities before 
the next batch of finances is released. 
Other evidence from the field indicates that the delayed release of funds, more especially at 
the implementation levels of the sub-county negatively affects the NAADS programme 
implementation, yet funds are supposed to be released at the beginning of the quarter. Delays 
in the release of funds have in turn delayed the procurement process and therefore farmers 
have not been able to get the required inputs in optimum time for the planting season. When 
funds are released late and off season this complicates the implementation of crop component 
of the NAADS programme which is dependent on climatic conditions to deliver. To obtain 
good yields the crops must be planted at the optimal time otherwise poor yields demonstrate a 
bad image and the inefficient use of resources by the NAADS advisory service providers and 
implementers alike. Key informant interviews indicate that delays in the release of funds are 
more pronounced at the beginning of the financial year because there are issues of approvals 
at the center i.e. Parliament budget approvals always delay.  
Re-allocations of funds and variations by the amounts received was a key concern by the key 
informants and respondents in the focus group discussions alike. There were also incidences 
where funds were re-allocated to other enterprises and activities that were not planned for. 
NAADS Coordinators said that this happens usually from being pressurized by politicians to 
fund their district/council activities which are not even budgeted for in the NAADS budget. 
Another challenge reported by the NAADS implementers in the local governments visited 
during the survey is the top-down system of budgeting by the NAADS Secretariat, where by 
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indicative block figures for the different components of the program are just sent to the lower 
levels as a final guideline for budgeting purposes. Participants in the focus groups indicated 
the dissatisfaction with the formats of displayed budget releases at the sub-county level. The 
challenge with the displayed information is the presentation of block figures by the NAADS 
Secretariat, while the communities prefer a detailed breakdown of the block figures alongside 
with the planned activities. There was no evidence of this easy to understand (simplified) 
budgetary information at the lower levels, for example the parish levels.To illustrate this 
point, in all the sub-counties visited the budgets are displayed on the sub-county notice 
boards but nothing at the lower levels e.g. parish, market centers, churches etc. therefore 
farmers who cannot go to the  sub-counties are not able to look at the NAADS budgets for 
their areas in order to know how much they are entitled to.  
According to the NAADS Funding Guidelines (2000) sections 4.6 and 5.6, the Central 
Government and International Donors were expected to contribute 93 percent of the total 
NAADS budget whereas the local government (District and sub-county) as matching funds 
for NAADS activities and the farmers were expected to contribute 5 % (sub-county local 
government) and two percent (farmers). However evidence from the process Net-Map 
interviews and key informant interviews with the NAADS technical staff showed that the 
central government and the donors were able to fulfill their commitments yet the sub-county 
local governments and the farmers in all the sub-counties visited were not able to fulfill their 
co-funding obligations i.e. the sub-counties visited in the last  financial years 2009/2010, 
2010/2011, 2011/2012, were not able to contribute financial resources in proportions that the 
NAADS Guidelines recommended. This is clear evidence that the returnees (former IDPs) 
could not afford to abide by their co-funding obligations. Another challenge mentioned by 
farmers in the focus groups is that the sub-counties do not provide them with the 
accountability for their co-funding obligations i.e. they lack a grip on the co-funding funds 
control and accountability and this gave a wide scope for misuse of funds by the sub-county 
chief and NAADS Coordinator. Even the collected 2% funds for co-funding just appear on 
the bank statements but its use is only known to the NAADS local government officials at the 
sub-county.  
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The lack of adequate revenue at the sub-county and town councils and failure to 
pay co-funding ( 2 % matching funds) is implied by the statement below: 
“Revenue collection is low. The low level of revenue 
collection is partly blamed on the insurgence that ravaged 
Northern Uganda rendering most people economically 
unproductive. We are still in the recovery process, not many 
people are earning enough to pay taxes’’(Town Clerk). 
Reasons given by other interviewees in the focus group discussions  for this low co-funding 
contribution include; sub-county local governments are unable to raise adequate local 
revenue and the abolishment of graduated tax by the government which was an important 
source of local revenue, there is limited interest of the local council authorities to commit the 
little funds to support NAADS activities, poverty among the beneficiary farmers, and the lack 
of effort on the part of the technical staff responsible for NAADS to adhere to and enforce the 
guidelines  of the NAADS  program plus the wrong attitude of the farmers towards their co-
funding obligations. The impact of low co-funding by the local governments is that it leads to 
the NAADS Secretariat penalizing the local governments by releasing less amounts of cash 
for their activities.  
Procurement process and mechanism 
Evidence from sub-county records on funds disbursement and procurement of goods and 
services indicate  that beneficiary farmers for NAADS inputs receive inputs almost in a  
month’s time after funds are disbursed to the sub-county. The very long and document 
intensive procurement process plus the delay in the release  of funds to the sub-county and 
hence the inputs  and technical advise to reach the beneficiaries. Here to illustrate this, when 
funds are disbursed to the sub-county for instance towards the end of the quarter in the 
financial year, there is less time to absorb (use) the money for the planned activities within 
the quarter because the procurement process is transaction intensive. Evidence shows that in 
many cases the procurement process has been rushed through and this need to absorb the 
large sums of money in a very short time remaining to the end of the quarter or financial year, 
in many instances leads to the officials to overlook the implementation procedures and it is an 
entry point for corruption and leakage of funds.  
Ultimately because of this rushed procurement process, it brings in problems in the 
compromise of the quality and quantity of the goods and services received by the 
beneficiaries. Similarly in some cases where sometimes the procurement process is hurriedly 
124 
 
done, it may take a few days for the beneficiaries  to receive the inputs when NAADS funds 
have been received at  the sub-county, but the challenge is that the NAADS implemeters use 
single sourcing procurement which compromises the quality and quantity of inputs provided 
to the farmers. 
Evidence also indicates that because of this bureaucratic  procurement process and delays, 
inputs especially seeds and fertilizers are given to farmers late when the rainy season has 
already began, it is difficult for them to use the inputs in order to get good yields. To illustrate 
the bureaucratic procurement mechanism in NAADS, according to the Procurement 
Guidelines of 2009, the NAADS procurement cycle has 8 stages, it starts with the 
procurement plan, advertisement of the expression of interest and eventually the evaluation of 
bids and finally the award of contract. Respondents in the focus group and Process Net-Map 
also pointed out issues in delayed contracting because of the many steps involved.To 
illustrate this point, respondents indicated that in 2009/2010 farmers in some of the surveyed 
sub-counties in the Northern region were supplied with inputs i.e.  Beans, maize seed and 
cassava cuttings when the dry season had already started leading to the high incidences of 
crop failure witnessed during the survey. 
 Steps 19, 20 ,21 , 22 and 23 of the process Net-Map indicate that there is too much technical 
responsibility of the procurement committee and the challenge is that the process is 
transaction intensive in terms of paperwork, technical capacity, cost and time. For instance, 
the procurement committee is responsible for procurement planning,adverts, negotiation and 
selection of the best bidders. However respondents expressed evidence that this is a challenge 
due to the fact that many of the members are illiterate or semi-illiterate and cannot cope with 
the responsibilities of the technical capacity required for their duties. Members of the 
Procurement Committee also mentioned that NAADS program activities take a lot of their 
productive time. Many of the respondents interviewed expressed the need to spend more time 
on their farms rather than spending it on the NAADS administrative issues which are 
voluntary without pay or facilitation. 
Other governance challenges were identified at various steps of the procurement process for 
example; evaluation of bids (step 18 of the Process Net-Map) for instance guidelines 
recommend for more than one private supplier to bid for the supply of goods and services. 
But in reality on the ground it was found that in some of the suspicious cases, only 2 or one 
supply company would submit the application, be selected  by the technical committee and 
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given a go ahead to supply the goods. It was also revealed that there were problems even in 
cases where more than one company submitted the bids at times these companies are owned 
by the same individual/ bidder.  
Here one respondent reported that: 
“These sub-county officials are given a lot of 
powers. In many instances these official basically 
determine who to supply the inputs according to 
their vested interest, overlooking the stipulated 
guidelines”. 
Another senior politician stated that: 
‘’NAADS funds have been misused through flouted 
procurement procedures, inflated costs of purchase of inputs 
and repairs of vehicles and motorcycles and unaccounted for 
funds for workshops, meetings and travels which didn’t even 
take place’’. 
 Another challenge mentioned by the respondents is at the step of supply of goods and 
payment of the contractors (Step 24, 25 and 26 of Process Net-Map figure6.1). After award of 
the supply contract, guidelines recommend that a verification (certification) committee 
composed of five officials i.e. the knowledge specialist, farmer forum chairperson, sub-
county chief and sub-county NAADS Coordinator is supposed to check the farm inputs to see 
if they are of good quality according to the Terms of Reference (TOR) before the goods are 
given to the beneficiaries and payment authorized. Howevere evidence from the influence 
Process Net-Map points to major irregularities at this step, as reported in many cases the 
contract conditions (TOR) are not fulfilled and yet payment was done already leading to lack 
of value for money on the part of the NAADS program.  
In some cases it was only one individual who was assigned to receive the goods at the sub- 
county headquarters and in some cases these goods either arrived in the evening after official 
working hours, at night or on weekends. In some cases during the study we came across 
suspicious transactions where the procurement process took only four days in which it was 
impossible to follow all the procurement steps effectively and this short duration was coupled 
with the by-passing of the very important procedure for verification/certification of farm 
inputs to ascertain good quality standards. Evidence shows that this rushed procurement 
process was an entry point for compromising the quality of inputs and entry point for 
corruption, bribery and rent seeking. In some cases identified during the study, genuine 
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suppliers were not intentionally paid their money in time because of the search to coarse 
suppliers for kickbacks by some corrupt local government officials. This delayed payment of 
suppliers led to slow service delivery to farmers in the district and frustrations to the  genuine 
and reliable suppliers. 
Another challenge identified in the study regards the highly recommended community 
procurement mechanism in the NAADS procurement provisions. The challenge of inadequate 
availability of certified high quality planting materials in the villages and lack of technical 
capacity of the community procurement committee makes the community procurement 
method not a viable option in the context of the post-conflict Northern region of Uganda 
where farmers lost virtually all the agricultural productive assets during the war.  
Leakages and corruption 
“When you ask the NAADS  Officials why NAADS programme 
is not felt on the ground, NAADS officials at the Center 
(NAADS Secretariat) refer you to structural problems and 
corruption at the lower extension levels” (Author). 
Experiences with procurement in step 16 of the Process Net-Map, suggests that some 
members of the procurement committee can impose an unofficial fee in order for the potential 
suppliers to access the supply contracts’ documents and inside secret information and also 
they can ask for “kickbacks” in order to provide information on the reserve prices prepared 
by the procurement committee, which information is supposed to be private and not supposed 
to be exposed according to the NAADS procurement provisions. In addition this corrupt 
practice of asking for kickbacks increases the opportunity costs of the local procurement 
application because it may deter potential suppliers from accessing the contracts to 
unqualified suppliers and hence compromising the quality of inputs supplied to the 
beneficiaries. 
Step 9 of the Process Net-Map figure (6.1) shows that there was leakage of funds collected 
for co-funding, as some of the funds sent to the sub-county from the farmer groups to the sub-
county show no evidence of accountability at the sub-county level. Respondents reported that 
at this step 16, 17 and 18 there is potential for leakage of bidding information to suppliers and 
potential for bribery and kickbacks. Some contractors/suppliers interviewed indicated that 
kickbacks nowadays are an accepted norm in bidding for government contracts, but stated 
that corruption in bidding for NGO contracts is much less of a problem in Northern Uganda. 
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The contractors/suppliers interviewed  stated that corruption in NGOs is perceived as an 
unacceptable practice who dismiss staff involved in it. The view that was expressed here is 
that the tendering process under NAADS was not transparent and that it is influenced by 
people in senior positions, so that those service providers who were ‘’agents ‘’ of technical 
staff were awarded agricultural in put supply contracts even when they were not best 
qualified for the job. In the sub-counties visited, some private service providers also claimed 
that there is a lack of transparency in awarding contracts and a high demand for “kickbacks” 
with officials withholding payments until these were provided with “something”.  
Corruption in procurement under NAADS is implied by the following statements: 
“The procurement committee gives contract to the person who 
can talks well and give something.The contractor canvases 
because he knows who is on the committee and the most 
influential members of the committee.The contractor promises 
10 percent even if not asked for the money’’(NAADS 
beneficiary). 
 “Who can refuse money in such a situation of dire poverty and 
income insecurity, even those who already have are stealing so 
what should a poor person like us do”?.(NAADS beneficiary). 
In terms of payments from the sub-accountant to the suppliers in step 26 of the Process Net- 
Map (Figure 6.1), here respondents reported that the sub-county officials that is, the sub-
county chief and sub-accountant have a lot of leeway for soliciting for kickbacks from 
suppliers i.e. The first contact is when the sub-county chief invites the suppliers to the sub- 
county headquarters with the chairman farmers’ forum and chairperson procurement 
committee to sign the input supply agreement. The second contact where interview responses 
point to the existence of soliciting for kickbacks is when the supplier picks the cheque 
payment for goods supplied from the  sub-county chief’s office. The sub-county chief usually 
through the sub-accountant asks for a bribe for quick processing of payments. If the suppliers 
don’t comply they are usually delayed to be given their cheque and in order for the non-
compliant suppliers to the giving of bribes to be punished, these non corrupt suppliers make a 
number of costly trips in terms of transport to the sub-counties leading to increasing the 
supplier’s opportunity costs to supply. 
Evidence from the Process Net-Map suggests that at step 14 and 15 there is leakage and 
misuse of NAADS funds. A case is the non-refundable fee, usually (50,000 shillings) paid 
during the bidding process to the sub-county chief. NAADS Operational Guidelines 
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recommend that this money should be added on the operational fund for NAADS activities, 
however available evidence at the sub-counties visited during the survey shows that this 
money is not usually used for the approved purposes, it is either diverted by the sub-county 
chief and sub- accountant or misused to contribute to the co-funding of NAADS activities by 
the sub-county chief. 
The procurement process being transaction intensive in terms of paper work, technical 
capacity, time and financial costs, there was evidence that the procurement committee does 
not have an office for proper storage of secret information and its paper work so the 
documents are safely kept with the NAADS Coordinator’s office. It was reported by 
participants in the Process Net-Map that in some cases information about the procurement 
process is leaked by the sub-county NAADS coordinator, for example the reserve prices of 
inputs are leaked to potential suppliers for a fee as kick back (money) so that they can win a 
contract and also some sensitive documents are kept with the NAADS Coordinator, as 
observed in some of the sub-counties visited during the survey. 
In addition it was noted that the prices of inputs provided by the private suppliers under 
NAADS are well above the market prices, in some cases 50% of inflated costs, some of this 
money is used to “reward the NAADS technocrats” who approve and process the payments 
for suppliers and such behavior was common with the supply of new technologies which are 
not relatively available in the area and where there is little information for example on prices 
and quality, for example exotic cattle, improved poultry breeds, Apiary (bee keeping), 
fertilizers and improved orange and mango seeds. 
A lead farmer in one of the districts surveyed stated that: 
“NAADS is like an “Eating Club” for a few people. For example 
while a Boer goat costs 250,000 Shillings on the open market , it is 
priced at over  600,000 Shillings under the NAADS  programme. A 
walking tractor that costs about 8 million Shillings is sold at 18 
million Shillings under NAADS program. The Lead farmer 
continues to say that under NAADS the price of everything is tripled 
because somebody has to have a “Cut”. He stated that at the end of 
the day farmers cannot pay back their financial obligations to 
NAADS and farmers groups cannot co-fund the programme he adds. 
The lead farmer continues to add that the NAADS programme is 
good, but it lacks transparency’’.  
In addition one Member of Parliament in the area noted 
that: 
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“You see a beautiful sign post  indicating a wonderful farm 
or a demonstration site supported by NAADS, but when you 
go to learn from it , you are met by overgrown bushes. An 
Indication that all the money for this demonstration was 
eaten”.  
However when the NAADS officials in the area were asked about this allegation 
of empty demonstration gardens full of bushes, they claimed that the beneficiaries 
had harvested the crops and the sign posts remained. 
It was mentioned by the respondents that in other cases of corruption, the private sector 
(supplier) negotiates with procurement committee usually with some kickbacks (bribe) as 
they by-pass the Subject Matter Specialists (SMS), for example the Veterinary Doctor and 
Agricultural Officer who is supposed to certify the quality and quantity of Livestock/ inputs 
before they are distributed to the beneficiaries. This is because the suppliers know that they 
are not supplying the right quality of animals and if they don’t bypass the Veterinary Doctor 
who is supposed to verify/certify the animals he can reject their poor quality supply. 
Other leakages and embezzlement of funds as indicated by the key informants concerned the 
hiring of private firms or individuals for advisory services. NAADS guidelines recommend 
the payment of 30% advance to the service providers at the inception phase of the work. Key 
informants at the sub-county levels reported that some firms/individuals after collecting the 
advanced payments, some service providers partially or completely abandoned the work. 
There are some incidences reported where service providers collected 30% advance in many 
sub-counties and run away with the money without completing the contracted job. 
4. Project management 
Information dissemination and mobilization strategy 
The mobilization strategy of NAADS also has challenges. NAADS Implementation 
Guidelines recommend the full involvement of local politicians in active mobilization of the 
communities whereas evidence on the ground shows that the numbers of people attending 
NAADS trainings and activities is drastically dwindling. NAADS being a demand driven 
program, this suggests that there is still a wide gap between the actual demand for NAADS 
services and the delivery. Absence of good social mobilization strategy creates a challenge of 
the rural poor being unable to articulate their demand for advisory services effectively 
because their voices cannot be heard. NAADS program being largely demand driven, it 
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creates a fundamental challenge of mobilization of the communities and giving them the 
necessary information to articulate their demand. 
Findings indicate that the initial mobilization strategy of NAADS had a number of challenges 
and giving conflicting messages to the war conflict affected farmers. Evidence shows that in 
Northern Uganda there are still clear differences in appreciation levels of understanding and 
perspectives on the NAADS programme between politicians and technical officers. During 
this survey there was overwhelming evidence that the interests of the politicians and their 
aims for mobilization for NAADS are shaped by their desire to deliver quick and tangible 
results to their constituents as they prepare for the next local government council elections. 
However, on the other hand the NAADS technical officers are committed to follow the 
NAADS implementation guidelines which involve processes like institutional development 
(group formation and development) which take a long time and produce less visible and less 
tangible results, which disappoints the politicians. 
The issue of inadequate flow of information at all levels in the implementation process  from 
implementers, beneficiaries and elected officials on NAADS implementation performance, 
NAADS multiplier effect, pay back management of technologies , list of technologies, list of 
beneficiary groups as well as well-prepared accountability by NAADS staff is evidence that 
there is no well-functioning Management Information System (MIS) in NAADS that contains 
timely and adequate data and information on performance and implementation at all stages of 
the program implementation cycle. Evidence shows that the existing so called information 
system is based on paperwork in terms of which cannot be readily accessed by the public to 
encourage social audits of the program. Here issues of transparency exist as mentioned by the 
respondents in the Process Net-Map. Due to challenges of transparency, it was evident that 
the implementation of the NAADS programme is usually done in an environment conducive 
to various malpractices, for example  elite capture, corruption and mis-appropriation of funds. 
Steps 1 and 2 of the Process Net-Map (Figure 6.1) of the NAADS sensitization and 
information flow uncovered other more serious challenges. The Process Net-Map uncovered 
the challenge of low participation rates in the NAADS activities, such as training and 
participatory planning activities. The low participation rates in the NAADS training and 
planning activities reflect the unawareness of the rural poor regarding the provisions in the 
NAADS programme, poor mobilization and how they can best benefit from the programme 
to improve their livelihoods. The high level of unawareness was also witnessed by the low 
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numbers attending the NAADS training activities, for instance evidence from attendance lists 
of various trainings by the private service providers shows that less than 50% of the NAADS 
affiliated farmers attended. 
At Step 2 and step 24 of the Process Net-Map there are challenges of who gets the 
information i.e. the information that the inputs have arrived passes through the local council 
(LC1) at the lower levels. Respondents reported that in some cases the LCs who are the 
political wing of the government could delay to give information to the potential beneficiaries 
because of political differences. For instance, those usually on the opposing ends of the 
political divide are not given priority in accessing information during mobilization by the 
local council 1 chairmen. Another challenge on the issue of mobilization for NAADS 
activities by the local councils is lack of facilitation. The politicians ask for some allowances 
whereas NAADS mobilization is a voluntary activity and on the contraly activities for other 
NGOs and political mobilization these politicians receive allowances for such work. 
Therefore for this reason, the politicians at the lower levels in the community i.e. sub-county, 
parish and village level have been very reluctant to engage in mobilization activities of 
NAADS. 
At step 23 in the Process Net-Map (figure6.1) of the procurement process, respondents 
indicated that there is a challenge of information flow from the community, sub-county, 
supplier and the Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) for example the District Agricultural 
Officer (DAO), Veterinary Doctor, Engineer to verify and ensure quality assurance of the 
inputs before they are distributed to the beneficiaries. This poor flow of information leads to 
higher transaction costs on the side of suppliers and the beneficiaries hence delaying the 
completion of the procurement process and the reduction in value for the inputs supplied to 
the farmers. Therefore ignoring this step in the implementation of the procurement process 
has resulted into the compromise in the quality and quantity of inputs delivered to the 
beneficiaries. Participants in the Process  Net-Map confirmed that poor quality inputs have 
been delivered to them and also lower quantities of inputs than expected have been delivered 
and this quantity problem was mainly with divisible inputs e.g. maize seeds, beans and other 
cereals where the weighing scales have been adjusted to dupe the beneficiaries. 
At steps 24 and 25 in the Process Net- Map which links to the final beneficiaries of the inputs 
had serious challenges, for instance many potential beneficiaries did not have access to the 
inputs and those who got some even got less. This is due to lack of information because some 
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participants reported that they did not even know when the inputs will arrive and how much 
they are entitled to.There were also problems in regard to the inputs for rotation (beneficiaries 
have to pay back a fraction of the yields) where initial recipients failed to pass on subsequent 
generation of seed or inputs to other members of the NAADS affiliated group as required in 
the implementation guidelines for rotation of NAADS benefits. 
Monitoring and evaluation  
NAADS guidelines mention Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) as a very important 
component to ensure effective implementation and provides critical management information 
for reviewing the performance of the program. Here the Management Information System 
(MIS) in the NAADS Implementation Manual of 2004 illustrates the whole process from 
planning to implementation of the M&E both at the districts and sub-county levels. Here the 
Implementation Guidelines provide sample forms for monitoring and a fund is budgeted for 
to cover this component each financial year. However evidence from interviews with key 
stakeholders revealed major weaknesses in the M&E system.  Findings from this survey 
indicate that there is lack of up to date documentation on the overall M&E system and no 
evidence of an evaluation framework was found that can be used as a point of reference. 
Similarly technocrats and politicians at all levels of local government complained that there is 
a constant change in the NAADS implementation guidelines from time to time and this is 
causing serious confusion among the implementers and stakeholders alike. Key informant 
respondents at the local government level complained that many times the NAADS 
Secretariat has sent new implementation guidelines/circulars  to the local governments 
without clear explanations.  
The NAADS Implementation Guidelines (2007) emphasizes the need for participatory 
planning at the local government levels and also recommend for the formation of a good 
Management Information System (MIS) and a monitoring system with well laid out 
indicators. However available evidence indicates that the districts and more especially the 
sub-county levels suffers from shortages of technical support staff  and thus  lacks technical 
personell who can participate in the planning , monitoring , screening of technical proposals 
from service providers for their technical feasibility and cost efficiency. This limited staff 
capacity at the local governments also limits the processes of monitoring , that’s why many 
critics of NAADS say that it is “thin” on the ground because its impacts and presence of 
extension officers on the ground is not seen.  
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It was also reported by the respondents that there were constraints of monitoring the NAADS 
programme at the farmer level (farmer forum monitoring). To illustrate the point, NAADS 
provisions call for the establishment of the monitoring and evaluation teams comprising of 
farmer representatives. However findings from this survey and the available sub-county 
documents indicated that the frequency of farmer representatives’ monitoring is irregular 
because it is determined by the availability of resources from the sub-county chief. Some of 
the members of the NAADS farmers’ forum indicated that they cannot monitor far away 
areas because of lack of transport. Members of the farmers’ forum interviewed said that they 
are basically dependent on reports from the villages by the Parish Coordination Committees 
(PCC’s) which in many cases are usually shallow and unreliable to adequately address the 
NAADS ongoing implementation issues and challenges.    
According to the NAADS provisions, the main aim of Monitoring and Evaluation ( M&E) 
within the NAADS programme is to inform decisions at all levels but most importantly at the 
sub-county which is the level where the NAADS operations and management of the 
extension services are concentrated. The M&E activities at the district level according to the 
implementation guidelines include; participatory M&E by beneficiaries, annual process 
assessment, quarterly progress assessment, quarterly technical audit, semi-annual and annual 
reviews, annual impact assessment and thematic assessments at National level. However in 
reality findings indicate that some of the components, for example impact assessments are not 
being routinely followed.This finding confirms ITAD (2008) performance evaluation of 
NAADS i.e. while they observed (ITAD) that the NAADS programme is carrying out a 
number of potentially relevant M&E tasks, they are not part of a well-defined M&E 
framework and program objectives , the relevant indicators at impact, outcome, output, result 
and activity level are not clearly set out.  
Provisions recommend that at the sub-county level, there is supposed to be a monitoring and 
evaluation team of  five people i.e. the Sub-county Chief, Community Development Officer 
(CDO), Sub-county NAADS Coordinator, one subject matter specialist (SMS) and one 
member of the farmers’ forum.  Findings from the sub-counties visited indicated that there 
was pre-occupation with monitoring activities any time when funds are available and if the 
reports are available they involved simple progress reporting with no information given on 
measuring the program achievements e.g. enterprise adoption and changes in production to 
provide a baseline for future comparisons. Farmers’ representatives reported that the M&E 
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participatory monitoring forms given to the CBFs, FF, PC etc. are too complicated for them 
and evidence shows that they are not being applied during the monitoring process. 
At the sub-county levels there was scanty information in as far as availability of detailed 
monitoring reports are concerned, indicating that the monitoring committee is not doing its 
designated work effectively. The available reports were mainly quantitative with little 
qualitative information on the progress of the NAADS program. Some members of the 
monitoring committee at the sub-county who were interviewed indicated that they are usually 
invited to monitor NAADS activities and technologies when they are expecting some 
technical officials and politicians from the top i.e. district ,  NAADS Secretariat and MAAIF, 
therefore this is clear evidence that NAADS monitoring is on an ad-hoc basis rather than 
systematic. Again from my field observations it appears that NAADS is implementing an 
‘’Implementation Monitoring Approach’’, whereas the M&E NAADS guidelines recommend 
for the setting up of a results monitoring system to measure the impacts of the 
implementation of the programme.  
Another challenge is that the farmers in their committees, for example community based 
facilitators and farmer forum executives are supposed to do some monitoring, but their 
capacity has not been built to carry out effective monitoring and be able to present reports 
with good qualitative and quantitative information to support the program evaluation. 
Another challenge identified is that individual farmers rarely keep records that can facilitate 
the monitoring and evaluation process. Respondents across all the districts and sub-counties 
surveyed complained that the  Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation form provided by the 
NAADS Secretariat is too complicated and too long, over 10 pages. So this form is very 
difficult to fill and in addition the NAADS implementers at the sub-counties perceive the tool 
as a NAADS Secretariat tool but not their tool clearly indicating lack of ownership because it 
was  not designed in consultation with the clients at the lower levels. 
Similarly, results from key informant interviews reveal that data for  planning purposes is 
scanty and not well organized. All the districts surveyed lacked easily accessible, accurate, 
well collated information and up to date data. Data needed for strategic agricultural planning, 
which this study noted that it was not available at sub-county levels include data on; crops, 
livestock and yields. The problem is even more pronounced when it comes to the availability 
of time series data. Time series data on agriculture is sparsely available and that which is 
available in some of the districts surveyed it is not current and not organized to easy access 
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and use. This would not permit the planners to be able to forecast and also be able to carry 
out trend analysis, predicting or forecasting the future. It should be noted that lack of such 
data and information is where problems of agricultural planning anchor.  
Another challenge identified during the study at the districts levels is the lack technical 
capacity to process even the little data so collected, this is confirmed by the finding that in the 
districts surveyed the available data is in raw form on data sheets on files and in dis- 
aggregated form and in most cases not accessible to the outside users, because during the 
study it was witnessed that government officials hide information by giving excuses that it is 
secret government information. This is more so with information to do with financial 
information i.e. funds and expenditures.  
In addition it was observed that the linkages at the different levels in the bottom up planning 
process are not functioning well i.e. the linkages are weak. From  the levels of local council 1 
and local council 3, there is lack of capacity and an equipped unit to handle information flow, 
dissemination and documentation. During the study there were complaints from the sub-
county NAADS Coordinator that the M&E exercise carried out by the sub-county councilors 
is more driven by their need to be facilitated with getting facilitation in terms of allowances 
and not actual checkup on the performance of the NAADS program.  
One NAADS Coordinator Complained that: 
“Councilors during the monitoring exercises at the 
grassroots just go to supervise but not monitor the NAADS 
program and they do not prepare any monitoring reports. If 
you are hard on them they threaten you that they will not 
pass the NAADS budget in the next year’s sub-county 
council’’.  
On the issue of program monitoring, key informant interviews from technical staff and other 
stakeholders show that physical performance monitoring of the NAADS program in 
conjuction with NAADS Secretariat and the local governments  is not as intense as stipulated 
in the NAADS monitoring guidelines. Evidence shows that physical performance monitoring 
is not adequate and if  it is carried out it is  usually done on pre-selected well performing 
project sites to appease the program monitors from the central government (MAAIF) and the 
NAADS Secretariat that the implementation on the ground is going on well. 
There were also challenges in frequency and intensity of programme monitoring to ensure 
effective implementation.  A case in point is that in reality the office of the sub-county chief 
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only facilitates quarterly monitoring, however operational guidelines recommend that 
monitoring of the NAADS programme activities should be ongoing and also monitoring 
should depend on the need but not on the availability of allowances and facilitation as 
evidence shows. Findings also indicate problems concerning the implementation of the ISFG 
(Integrated Support to Farmer Groups) component which is a revolving farmer technology 
fund. NAADS guidelines, provisions and procedures seek to provide detailed monitoring 
procedures of the beneficiary farmers under the revolving fund component of NAADS. There 
is poor monitoring of the fund and on the ground the monitoring of the ISFG component is 
left primarily to the farmer groups themselves. It was noted that farmers have tried to track 
the first round of repayment for ISFG, but the systems to track how ISFG revolves in the 
subsequent years is poor and the ISFG performance has not done well beyond the first year in 
terms of repayments. Many of the farmers involved in ISFG do not have a good 
understanding of how the ISFG revolving credit works, but were just encouraged to sign for 
the fund without the real understanding of their responsibilities and obligations and the 
commitment they are entering into with the NAADS secretariat and the implementers of the 
programme. Summary evidence as to why serious monitoring was not carried out in all the 
sub-county local governments surveyed points to a number of reasons; 
• Lack of facilitation allowances and fuel for field staff. 
• Lack of proper and updated records for example no proper documentation on the 
revolving fund, for example number of farmers, recovery rates etc. 
It was also reported that the funds for M&E of the program activities are not adequate for all 
the various stakeholders (technocrats and politicians). Another reason is that, because of 
political pressure to the sub-county chiefs by the political head of the sub-county (local 
council 3 Chairmen) and councilors, some of the funds for technical monitoring are awarded 
for councilors for their council meetings in order to appease them that they are getting 
something from NAADS. Another issue of monitoring is that politicians lack the technical 
capacity to lead the  M&E process (i.e. many of them cannot interprete the indicators to 
measure the program achievements) and therefore have to be guided by the technical staff as 
a team. Evidence shows that the politicians basically carry out “supervision” of NAADS 
implementation instead of monitoring to help the program achieve its objectives. 
Participants in the Process Net-Map mentioned only two review meetings at district and sub-
county levels in a year i.e. semi-annual and annual reviews. Evidence indicates that the 
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procurement committee, parish coordination committee and leaders of farmer groups only 
carry out quarterly monitoring but even no reports are written for follow-up. In addition it 
was observed that during review meetings  no reports are available for discussions from the 
parish and village levels, which is contrary to the NAADS monitoring guidelines which 
recommend preparation of written reports after a monitoring exercise. It should be noted that 
the NAADS provisions recommend for continuous monitoring of NAADS activities as need 
arises.   
Regarding monitoring again, there is strong evidence that the NAADS Coordinator, Parish 
Coordination Committee (PCC), farmer fora (FF) and local council did not monitor as 
required in the NAADS implementation guidelines.The monitoring process is complicated by 
the inadequate funding for monitoring activities. Sometimes even if the committees for 
monitoring NAADS activities e.g. PCC, farmer forum exist, evidence shows that this is often 
only on paper but the committees are not active in as far as NAADS implementation is 
concerned. In some cases some committees e.g. PCC committee members, though they exist 
on paper as members, they are not really aware of their duties and many of the committees in 
NAADS, members are unaware of the objectives of the committees and their duties.  
Another monitoring challenge is that monitoring of the implementation of NAADS activities 
by the sub-county stakeholders was made difficult because of lack up to date information  on 
the relevant parameters  of NAADS performance at the grassroots levels. For example farmer 
contributions, number of beneficiaries, income levels, number of functioning groups etc. In 
addition NAADS operational guidelines provides for monitoring checklists and guidelines, 
however there were no monitoring guidelines at the sub-counties surveyed and the 
monitoring committee members interviewed  at the lower levels did not know that even these 
monitoring checklists exist. 
Other evidence from the Process  Net-Map tool suggests that there is evidence of monitoring 
problems even at higher levels that is, the national level and the NAADS Secretariat and 
district levels (step 1 and 2 of the Process Net-Map). For instance respondents reported that 
technical officers at district level e.g. Veterinary, agriculture and the Community 
Development Officers (CDO) are paid allowances for monitoring and technical backstopping 
to go to the lower levels but after pocketing the allowances they do not go for the monitoring 
activities. Evidence shows that in some cases in order for these officers to account for the 
monitoring funds and because recommendations in the NAADS guidelines for accountability 
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require that these officers sign the visitors books at the offices at the sub counties, so in order 
to go around this accountability problem  it was reported that some technical officers at the 
district level ask the sub-county staff they trust to bring the visitors books from the sub-
county to the district headqurters and then sign the visitors books from the district. Evidence 
shows that this was done in order to dupe the NAADS programme auditors that they really 
reached the sub-counties and carried out the NAADS monitoring activity at the grassroots.  
Another challenge is that in the NAADS 2012/2013 financial year budget, the budget for 
stakeholders monitoring has been removed and hence there are no funds for the stakeholders 
monitoring of NAADS activities.There was little evidence of NAADS Secretariat field 
monitoring at the lower beneficiary levels. The NAADS Secretariat usually carries out 
financial audits but little or no field monitoring. Technical staff interviewed indicated that the 
few staff at the NAADS Secretariat are overwhelmed by the very many districts that have 
been created in the country that’s why in the majority of the areas visited it was basically the 
internal audit teams that managed to visit the sub-counties. In many cases it was reported that 
the audit teams have invited the NAADS Coordinators and Sub-accountants to take the books 
of accounts at the districts for the NAADS audits instead of them going on the ground to 
carry out the value for money audits with the beneficiaries themselves to clearly understand 
what is exactly happening on the ground. 
5. Design features of the program 
Advisory methods 
The key issue raised with the service providers is that delivery of training of farmers in their 
management and handling of technologies and modern farming operations was reported as 
either never having been done or conducted in just part of the parishes in the sub-counties 
surveyed even after the inputs had been delivered to the beneficiaries. Also most of the 
training was more of theoretical but not practically based. The recommendation here is that 
the ATAAS provisions on supporting and promoting the establishment of public private 
partnership for technology, agri-business and market development are expedited. 
Additionally there is need for the service providers to always conduct training on 
management and handling of new technologies in more practical terms. 
Another challenge reported was the poor farmer mobilization by the service providers.The 
respondents in the focus group discussions also complained of basically a class based training 
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i.e. they said that the training from the private service providers was too theoretical with 
limited demonstrations, therefore many of their colleagues lost interest in the class based 
training sessions. 
Step 4 of the Process Net-Map (Figure 6.1) shows that this link is still weak in terms of 
farmer participation in participatory planning activities (low number of farmers attending the 
training). In addition if the majority of farmers are not involved in the enterprise selection and 
participatory planning process, this has resulted into challenges of the NAADS plans being 
passed that do not include the priorities and needs of the communities. Similarly, respondents 
reported that the low participation rates are sometimes due to the local communities’ 
(returnees) lack of interest in advisory services but prefer provision of farm inputs and 
advisory services to go hand in hand.  
Evidence shows that too much class based farmer trainings have caused what is commonly 
known as ‘’farmer fatigue’’. This is made even worse  because of the many agricultural 
programs from NGOs targeting the Northern region that  have similar programs and trainings 
leading to farmers getting tired of the monotonous trainings (farmer fatique). In addition 
evidence from numerous respondents indicates that the returnees are interested in farm inputs 
than advisory services which NAADS mainly promotes (see Chapter 8 on the results of the 
household survey). Here NGOs have a comparative advantage because they are giving out 
inputs to the farmers for free, while NAADS requires farmers to pay co-funding before they 
receive inputs. Therefore farmers preferred to attend NGO activities where they can gain 
allowances and free inputs. Respondents reported that NAADS promises take a longtime to 
be realized whereas in their situation they prefer immediate benefits like those from NGOs. 
Field evidence indicates that in the response to the rural credit and micro-finance challenge, 
NAADS Secretariat tried to fill this gap by initiating a new programme component, the 
Integrated support to farmers’ groups (ISFG) which was a revolving fund given to the 
NAADS affiliated farmers and ISFG was also identified as a component under the Ministry 
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) in the Rural Development 
Scheme (RDS). But findings from this study indicate that the ISFG component of NAADS 
was seriously abused. This is because many beneficiary farmers did not pay back to the fund 
and key informants indicated that there was serious issues to do with effective supervision 
and monitoring of the project. These findings are in line with a full evaluation of the PMA 
conducted in 2006 funded by DANIDA and carried out by OPM consultants of the UK where 
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they indicated that the monitoring and supervision structures and capacity of  NAADS from 
the NAADS Secretariat and lower levels is still inadequate.   
During the study, there were complaints by the local government officials that the NGOs 
contracted were not able to carry out institutional development effectively especially at the 
beginning of the programme where it was necessary to build a strong foundation for farmer 
empowerment through institutional development. Another related challenge mentioned by 
some of the NAADS technical personnel is that the areas of coverage are wide for the small 
NGOs and the Community Development Officers (CDOs). These big areas to cover require a 
number of expertise which may not be readily available among the local NGOs and CDOs. 
Findings indicate that there was no standardized training manual for institutional 
development to act as a guide to ensure effectiveness. Similarly findings indicate that the 
component of NAADS for building farmer institutions just contracted NGOs for institutional 
development but did not offer any trainings to build their capacity. Similarly evidence shows 
that, because of lack of capacity building the private sector was not able to adequately handle 
new emerging training needs from the farmers i.e. the required training had to be specific to 
handle the new emerging farmers’ post-conflict challenges. 
There was also reported challenges in the content for training by the privatized or contract 
type service providers i.e. there were numerous incidences of repetition of training topics by 
the new service providers contracted as a result of the short term contracts of between three to 
six months awarded by NAADS program. The challenge here is that different service 
providers were contracted from time to time so there was lack of continuity. Evidence shows 
that because of competition for the advisory service provision job contracts within the sub-
counties, some service providers were unwilling to share information with new service 
providers as an entry point to new areas. It should be noted here that information sharing is 
very important for continuity of the training programmes and to avoid repetitions of the 
already covered topics.  
Targeting mechanism 
One of the criticisms of the NAADS programme by the key respondents interviewed is the 
poor coherence of the NAADS programme targeting and implementation approaches with 
other programmes a case in point is that the NAADS approach that tends to focus on the “ 
active poor’’ or “progressive farmers’’ as their target group. Findings from key informants 
indicated that this approach of targeting in NAADS contradicts other NGOs/CSOs and 
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government programmes that target the extremely vulnerable persons in the post-conflict 
North like widows, women headed families, the poor of the poor, orphans and elderly and 
there are complaints already from many stakeholders that this NAADS approach and more 
specifically in the conflict affected region denies services to the extremely poor the majority 
of whom are women and the conflict affected individuals since they cannot pass the criteria 
of being ‘’active poor’’ farmers. This challenge of poor targeting in NAADS also resonates 
with the ealier study of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) conducted in 2012 in 
Northern Uganda through its Foreign Student Leadership Project (FSLP), whose findings 
similarly showed that there are many extremely vulnerable individuals in the communities in 
Northern Uganda and there has not been a strong focus by the government programs for 
example NAADS to specifically channel support to them. It is important to target the 
extremely vulnerable individuals e.g. elderly, the very poor widows , war wounded etc. 
because even in many cases they are far from the service points e.g. sub-county headquarters 
where many of the program activities are concentrated leave alone the the many inaccessible 
areas with impassable roads for motorcycles and vehicles. In case of programs like NAADS 
which use self targeting, such very vulnerable individuals cannot access services and assets 
due to problems resulting from mobility e.g. high transport costs which they cannot afford to 
go to the service points, for instance to move to district and sub-county headquarters.  
Field evidence shows that  inputs provide by NAADS  have tended to benefit a few farmers 
and usually those who have benefitted are the well to do who can pay the co-fundig/ 
matching funds for the inputs and those who have political connections at the sub-county 
levels. During the focus group discussions there were numerous concerns and complaints by 
respondents in the selection of farmers. For instance; demonstration farmers, model farmers, 
nucleus farmers, lead farmers who are meant to train other farmers. Interviewees complained 
that the selection of such farmers was not transparent. Problems have been exacerbated by the 
failure of NAADS to provide appropriate and effective complaints mechanisms. Evidence 
shows that the system of vetting complaints is just on paper but it is not working. 
According to the NAADS provisions, the design of NAADS main aim was to be effective in 
its targeting of the beneficiaries, that is the active poor farmers and the women and youth. 
According to MAAIF, (2000) NAADS Master Document of the Program Task Force and 
Joint Donor Group, NAADS indicates a relationship between poverty and the gender. 
However evidence obtained from interviews and focus group discussions indicated important 
challenges to participation especially the problem of well to do stakeholders and community 
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using participation to their own advantages by capturing the NAADS resources leaving out 
the vulnerable members of the communities. This finding confirms the observations from 
earlier studies for example, Byekwaso et al. (2004), Bukenya, (2010) and Tinsley (2004) that 
highlighted the challenge of targeting the poor with advisory services. They argued that the 
main reason why small holder farmers may not adopt technologies is not because of an 
absence of such technologies per se but because many farmers have limited resources to 
operate with and this has also affected their participation in the progarmme activities. 
Parkinson (2008) in a paper that focused on the lessons emerging from NAADS 
implementation observed that the NAADS implementers had to deal with a delicate situation 
of trying to balance the principles of farmer empowerment, ownership and inclusion with its 
other principles and with the overall policy strategy of commercializing farming in Uganda.  
In addition these results support the findings of past studies on NAADS by Benin et al. 
(2007) which indicated that shortage of capital and credit facilities was often cited by farmers 
as a critical constraint facing them in addition to scarcity of agricultural inputs and lack of 
adequate farmland. Benin et al. (2007) is in line with my findings where they argue that due 
to low levels of resources by the individual members of the groups, they are unable to raise 
the desired amount of capital from membership contributions to adequately support their 
activities. 
With targeting there was evidence from the focus group discussions more especially in the 
first phase of NAADS that a group could include relatives, wife, children and also recruit 
non-existent people in groups commonly known as “Ghost members’’. NAADS provisions 
recommend for one beneficiary per household but there was evidence that this has not 
worked because respondents reported than many of their colleagues belonged to at least more 
than one NAADS affiliated farmer group in order to take advantage of the different farming 
enterprises. However the 2007 revised NAADS implementation guidelines, in order to fight 
the challenge of double beneficiaries, recommended dealing with individual beneficiaries 
through their own groups i.e. beneficiaries of the technologies to be elected by individual 
group members. However evidence shows that this administrative change has not solved this 
targeting challenge.  
Other evidence from the Process Net- Map interviews indicate that there was a challenge of 
targeting because people had divergent interests for joining the farmer groups but for the sake 
of getting farm inputs from the NAADS program could come together. There is evidence that 
after getting the inputs they could sell the inputs or eat some of them for example edibles like 
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g/nuts and maize because agriculture is not really their interest at that time. Also in the 
absence of livelihoods due to the war, people are not interested in long-term returns but they 
just care for the day to day survival. This is the challenge of NAADS dealing in private goods 
of which beneficiaries can sell the inputs even at much lower prices than in the market prices. 
Another challenge that complicates the group targeting in NAADS is the issue of the low 
level of mobilization of the communities for the NAADS program. This is evidenced by the 
low turn up of farmers for meetings and therefore many of the farmers cannot get the required 
information and are not active in their groups. 
In addition NAADS guidelines provide for a revolving fund where one farmer who benefits 
from the inputs is supposed to return part of the outputs (yields) to other farmers so that they 
can also benefit from the NAADS program. From the Process Net-Map and interviews with 
extension staff there is incredible evidence that this fund has been seriously abused by the 
respondents. During the survey, there were reports that farmers have abused this component 
of the NAADS program. For example beneficiaries selling or taking the young animals away 
or selling the outputs for instance cereals for example maize and then they report to the 
NAADS officials that they got very poor harvests. Here the NAADS officials find it difficult 
to prove the facts because the officials are constrained with monitoring funds and have not 
monitored the projects to the end. It is not evident that farmers are willing to return the little 
they have. Here farmers say that they are just recovering from the hard times of conflict with 
which they have very limited production assets. The case study evidence also points to little 
or very low recovery in the NAADS revolving fund component (ISFG component). The 
ISFG in NAADS is a form of payback , for example if a demonstration garden of cassava is 
set up, once the crops mature the farmers are required to give back to other other group 
members so that they can also benefit. This kind of pay back under ISFG component of 
NAADS applies also to livestock enterprieses like goats , cows, pigs etc.  
Evidence shows that very few of the beneficiaries if any are returning some outputs in a 
revolving form to other farmers. Another challenge here is that the NAADS Secretariat 
assumes that there is recovery and other additional farmers benefitting and that is the reason 
the NAADS budget is dwindling every year. Interviewees perceive that the revolving fund 
component of NAADS is hardly working because the farmers are not willing to pay back so 
that other group members can benefit. Key informant respondents mentioned that the failure 
of the revolving fund component of NAADS is partly due to “returnees” (former IDP 
residents) perceptions about being given everything for free i.e. the dependency syndrome in 
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Northern Uganda because of the so many humanitarian agencies giving free goods and 
inputs. Because of this people think that anything from government should be free and should 
not be paid back. Some of the respondents mentioned that they expected NAADS to use the 
NUSAF approach which supported individuals/groups directly with cash resources to buy for 
themselves what they want. 
This “dependence syndrome” is implied by the statement 
below from a respondent: 
“Just a small NGO is giving us free inputs and for you the 
whole government you want us to pay back/ what type of 
government is this asked the respondent’’?. 
  
Other farmers also complained about the NAADS targeting, for 
example a farmer noted that: 
“The problem with the NAADS program is that it targets 
very few farmers, because it does not benefit the whole 
village but only farmer groups and not all members of the 
farmer group can benefit at once, but only a few members. 
Other members of the group can sometimes wait for almost 
one year without getting the NAADS support”.  
Collaboration with NGOs/CBOs 
Findings indicate that formal institutional agreements and mechanisms for cooperation are 
lacking with insufficient coordination of different agencies involved in agricultural advisory 
services e.g. NUSAF, ALREP etc. Evidence indicates that this challenge is particularly 
important where the policies and the approaches, for example regarding incentives given to 
the farmers e.g. cash, food fertilizers and seeds etc. are different from those provided by 
NAADS and this has resulted in some confusion, duplication, and inefficient use of the scarce 
resources. To illustrate the point, you find that in Northern Uganda, because of the post-
conflict situation a range of agencies are providing agricultural advisory services and inputs 
in addition to the NAADS program. These agencies include NGOs, Government programs, 
and projects, district farmer associations, CBOs and private companies in addition other 
NGOs are involved in humanitarian relief work as well as development. However evidence 
from key informants and employees of these agencies interviewed shows that the extent of 
coordination between agencies providing farm inputs and agricultural advisory services is 
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generally lacking. For instance it was noted that the majority of the districts visited just have 
lists of NGOs operating in their districts but have so failed to coordinate NGO activities with 
Government agencies and many of them are left to work where they either chose to work or 
in response to political influence. Even some of the district and sub-county political 
leadership interviewed in this case study showed concern about the lack of proper 
coordination of the work of NGOs in their respective districts and sub-counties.  
Another finding was that each implementing agency has its own policies and approaches and 
due to limited coordination between the different agencies there is little synchronization and 
harmonization in the field operations of programs.  
This challenge is implied by a complaint from a technical staff that: 
“Most of these small NGOs rarely report to the sub-counties with 
their work plans, so it is difficult to harmonize their activities with 
their counterparts or be able to measure their combined impact’’ and 
here the problem of poor coordination is not only limited to NGOs 
but even big government funded programs for instance NAADS, 
ALREP and NUSAF”. 
Findings and field observations indicate that those NGOs that have particularly targeted the 
conflict and post-conflict region of Northern Uganda generally provide inputs without charge 
(no co-funding obligation required) and in addition many of them provide transport 
allowances or  facilitation and lunch for participants that attend training sessions and 
meetings. The challenge here is that this has created a serious dependency attitude amongst 
farmers. With the result that many of them are now reluctant to attend the training sessions by 
NAADS and this has been witnessed by the very low numbers of farmers attending training 
sessions conducted by the NAADS service providers, whereas NGO activities are well 
attended. My personal observations confirmed that farmers are very enthusiastic about 
attending NGO activities. A key informant interviewee indicated to the researcher that many 
farmers in the post-conflict Northern Uganda are not interested in the long-term strategic 
approach of NAADS but more interested on how to survive today because they are not sure 
of what will happen tomorrow. 
Institutional arrangements and governance structures 
It should be noted that, the aims of the NAADS governance structures according to the 
implementation provisions is largely to ensure that the program is guided within the National 
Planning and Implementation Framework and that there is adequate harmonization with other 
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governmemt livelihoods programs with the aim of reducing the duplication of services. 
Although NAADS has tried to streamline its activities with the existing central and local 
government structures, there are still a number of governance challenges. 
In terms of governance and management of NAADS, field findings from this study resonates 
with the evaluation of NAADS undertaken by an independent UK management consultancy 
ITAD limited  during October to December 2007 in which one of their key findings was the 
lack of resources to fully implement all the PMA pillars which has affected the 
implementation of NAADS effectively. For instance it was envisaged that the micro-credit 
pillar of the PMA, the value addition (agro-processing) and market linkages pillars would go 
hand in hand with the advisory services of NAADS. But evidence shows that this has not 
taken off to the frustration of NAADS affiliated groups and the NAADS implementers alike.   
Another challenge identified from the key informant interviews is the lack of coordination 
and creation of parallel structures within the NAADS program and other government 
agencies providing agricultural advisory services. To illustrate the point here, there are a 
number of agricultural programs in Northern Uganda funded by the government e.g. NUSAF 
and ALREP, but using different implementation mechanisms and sometimes using 
contradictory approaches to the same target group. As a result of this there is poor 
coordination and lack of drawing and feeding lessons into each other. Such kinds of 
approaches have even led to “farmer fatigue”.  
In addition the introduction of the Government’s Prosperity for All (PFA) “Bonna 
Baggaggawale’’ scheme (initiative) under the Rural Development Strategy (RDS) of 
government to operate outside the design of PMA and NAADS brought in additional 
challenges to NAADS. Evidence shows that some policy makers did not fully support 
NAADS and PMA as a vehicle for the income prosperity of the rural poor farmers. Some of 
the NAADS technical staff interviewed complained that the PFA is disorganizing the 
implementation of the NAADS program by making conflicting statements and financial 
promises to the farmers. 
The above challenges are implied by these statements from a 
respondent:  
“there was also duplication of work, that is to say each district 
and sub-county has a NAADS officer and extension workers who 
have the same roles”.Why should we have new extension officers 
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recruited under NAADS program when local governments have 
similar extension workers she wondered!’’. She said that, this is 
why President Museveni at one point vowed to stop the 
recruitment of NAADS officials in local governments so that 
NAADS uses the local government workers who are not paid 
handsomely like the NAADS workers so that the money saved 
goes directly to the farmers’’. 
According to the NAADS implementation provisions, the key governance bodies include the 
NAADS parent Ministry (MAAIF) which has overall responsibility and oversight of the 
program but the challenge from key informant interviewees is that MAAIF is not actively 
engaged in the implementation and monitoring of the NAADS program. Here there is 
overwhelming evidence of lack of effective communication channels between the Ministry 
and NAADS. Evidence from key informants at the central and local government levels shows 
that there is already tension between the MAAIF and NAADS Secretariat. Incredible 
evidence was witnessed from statements made more especially from MAAIF officials 
interviewed for this study. This finding confirms earlier work by Rwamigisa (2011), Bukenya 
(2010), and ITAD (2008) who noted that there is a serious missing link and uncoordinated 
agricultural extension information and  projects between NAADS and MAAIF. 
Key informant interviewees indicated that, there are weaknesses regarding ownership of the 
NAADS program because of its centralized and top-down approach. For instance all program 
regulations for example those on budgeting, accountability of funds are made at the NAADS 
Secretariat without inputs from the farmers who own the program. In addition, NAADS 
Secretariat as the entity providing funding has set its own  administrative structures and 
program regulations on how funds are accounted for and progress reports should be made 
which is different from the local governments where the program is being implemented.  
Another staff member at the district NGO forum (which is an 
association of all NGOs working in the district) argued that:  
“such top-down regulations are made to give 
control of the program by the implementers 
while giving less power to the beneficiaries who 
are just waiting for whatever the NAADS 
Secretariat offers and this is a fundamental 
weakness to the farmer ownership of the 
NAADS program”.   
In terms of the governance structures of NAADS, another governance challenge identified 
during the study is that NAADS is one of the seven pillars of the PMA but the PMA 
148 
 
Secretariat does not sit on the NAADS Board of Directors (PMA Secretariat is not 
represented on the NAADS Board) indicating a clear gap in the management and oversight of 
the NAADS activities in order to ensure effectiveness, transparency and accountability i.e. 
the NAADS Board is the governing body of NAADS and is answerable to the MAAIF, with 
the NAADS Executive Director being the Secretary to the Board. But evidence from key 
informants shows that there is inadequate flow of information from NAADS Secretariat to 
MAAIF. 
Demand-side challenges 
1. Household level 
Education level 
Education is undoubtedly a key factor in ensuring higher participation in the NAADS 
affiliated groups. In this study the main shortcoming of respondents with no or low education 
was that they cannot take up roles beyond ordinary membership probably due to the feelings 
of inadequacy. Findings from the survey indicate that the factors that affect general 
participation in groups leadership were mainly education level and age. 
The NAADS implementers interviewed at the sub-county level indicated that there is 
inadequate technical capacity and experience with the new  farmer groups to prepare an 
acceptable group constitution as recommended in the NAADS provisions. A 2007 report by 
the UN found that out of the four regions of the country ( East, West and South) , Northern 
Uganda had the lowest adult literacy rate at only 56% which is 12 percentage points lower 
than the national average. Findings indicate that it was difficult in filling positions of 
responsibility within the NAADS farmer groups. This challenge according to the 
interviewees became apparent during the formation of the  sub-county farmer fora (SFF) and 
more specifically the committees for example, procurement committee where NAADS 
provisions required the committee members to have atleast ordinary level education.  
Respondents  indicated that it was really difficult to get the required group member  who had 
all necessary education level to fill all the positions on the NAADS committees more 
especially the women’s slots where NAADS implementation guidelines require at least 1/3 of 
the procurement committee members to be women (for details see section 5.1.3.1 on NAADS 
Structure and Functioning in the NAADS implementation guidelines, 2001). 
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Research findings indicate that the bureaucratic requirements for joining farmer groups posed 
a serious challenge to the farmers. Participants in the Process Net-Map indicated that, the 
requirements of a standard group constitution and matching fund contribution (co-funding) 
were among the most important constraints to farmers joining the NAADS affiliated groups 
especially for the vulnerable groups, for example the women and the youths who were mainly 
poor, illiterate or semi illiterate. 
Another challenge was that apart from the transaction costs involved in preparing the 
documentation for the farmer groups to fully register at the sub-county, all this required a 
particular level of education to prepare and meeting financial obligations including a group 
registration fee. Focus group discussions indicate that the NAADS group constitutions were 
not easy to write for the illiterate and semi illiterate members of the communities who are the 
majority in the Northern region of Uganda. 
Respondents indicated that their group constitutions were rejected a number of times in some 
cases more than two times. Interviewees indicated that the bureaucratic formal document 
intensive requirements and the co-funding plus registration fees to be paid by NAADS 
affiliated farmers groups were a general constraint and a cause for concern among farmers 
and the local politicians alike.  Findings also indicate that the groups were required to comply 
with payment of a two percent matching grant of the total NAADS budget in the sub-county 
(co-funding) which is always cynically referred to by the NAADS affiliated farmers  as “two 
percent”. This “two percent” was very difficult to raise by the farmers in the NAADS farmer 
affiliated groups. 
Human capital 
Findings indicate that Northern Uganda war led to many deaths, injuries and even migration 
of people to other peaceful areas.The quantitative survey carried out in this study indicates 
that 11.54% of NUSAF respondents and 7.69% of the NAADS respondents are widows and 
the overall percentage of widows according to the quantitative survey results is almost 10% 
(i.e. 9.62), for more details see subsection  8.1 in section 8 of this thesis. This effect of the 
war has resulted into lack of adequate labor for farming which is common in households 
especially those with widows, injured persons/disabled, very small households as a result of 
deaths or migration. Evidence shows that the absence of adequate labor in many of the 
households in the North has greatly decreased the self sufficiency of households and 
individuals and has greatly affected the agricultural production and impacted negatively on 
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the household food security situation. Another challenge to the availability of labor is the 
returnees’ attitude towards farming. Originally when they were in the IDP camps most of 
them were idle and depending on handouts, for example food from humanitarian  agencies 
and developed a “dependency syndrome”. Evidence from the villages indicates that , 
returnees now  see farming as very labor intensive and they do not want to work and this is 
even worse for the youths who basically grew up in IDP camps. A recent study by the World 
Bank indicates that the percentage of unemployed youth stands at more than 62% and in 
addition more than 400,000 Ugandan youths join the search for jobs every year. Evidence 
shows that youth unemployment in Northern Uganda is the highest because many of the 
present youths did not get education because they grew up in the IDP camps where it was 
difficult to access the educational facilities.  
Another related challenge indicated by the key informant interviews in the districts surveyed 
is the problem of human resource deficiencies in the whole Northern region because of the 
presence of very many unskilled and unemployed youth as a result of the two decades of the 
LRA war. Evidence indicates that many of the youth in Northern Uganda have grown up in 
IDP camps without formal education , literacy, work experiences  or other proficiencies to be 
able to obtain meaningful employment. 
This is why in the implementation of NAADS and NUSAF youth require special attention 
and must be helped. To illustrate this point, field evidence shows that very few youths have 
joined the NAADS groups and according to the provisions cannot benefit from such a 
livelihood program and moreover the main income generating opportunity in the region is 
agriculture. Evidence shows that programs like NAADS which could make the youth more 
employable are not well structured to specifically target the youth and also make them 
appreciate the program. This is why the majority of the unemployed youth in Northern 
Uganda are pre-occupied in the informal sector e.g. Motorcycle transport business (Boda 
Boda) and many suffer low levels of formal skills and poor attitude to government and 
agriculture. An elderly respondent interviewed decried the rise in the number of youth 
involved in gambling. 
The problems of the youths’ active  participation in the NAADS 
program activities are implied by the following statement from the 
Mayor in one of the town councils: 
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“Most of the youth in this area spend all their time loitering 
around, playing cards and drafts games for money instead of doing 
productive work. The land here is very fertile, yet they lament of 
poverty and yet they are sitting on gold. He said that there are also 
fears that the youths might become criminals if they don’t change 
or something is done”. 
 
Household income 
Key informant interviewees indicated that many of the poor farmers had issues with 
understanding their obligations towards the NAADS programme due to their attitude towards 
the NAADS program. For example evidence shows problems in accepting of their co-funding 
obligations towards the NAADS budget. NAADS implementation guidelines require that 
community members contribute a proportion of funds (co-funding) before they can access 
NAADS benefits. People thought that membership in NAADS was free. Findings indicate 
that the farmers’ mobilizers (the CBFs-community based facilitators) were usually faced with 
challenges for example convicing the farmers to pay for co-funding from the communities 
and changing their attitudes so that they can accept the co-funding obligation as part and 
parcial of the NAADS program. Findings from this survey indicate co-funding was a serious 
dis/incentive to join groups in a post-conflict Northern region, which is a region with chronic 
poverty mainly as a result of more than two decades of war conflict. This challenge of the 
failure of the farmers to meet their co-funding obligations in post-conflict Northern Uganda is 
not surprising given the fact that even in areas where people have not been impacted by the 
war co-funding is still a problem. For example Muwonge (2007) discovered that in Kabale 
district, Western Uganda which has enjoyed constant peace throughout the recent history of  
Uganda, many members of the NAADS affiliated farmer groups were not confortable with 
the NAADS co-funding contribution. 
Process Net-Map interviewees and participants in the focus group discussions indicated that it 
was predominantly poor women farmer groups who went through more difficulties in raising 
their co-funding obligations in their groups and also difficulties in meeting other 
requirements for registration of the groups at the sub-county level due to the transaction costs 
involved. The financial obligation was a constraint to the participation of the women and the 
youth as a vulnerable category of farmers. This finding about problems of who is included or 
excluded  in NAADS confirms earlier work for example, failure of targeting a group among 
the poorest  by NAADS program, which was also documented in recent studies by Bukenya 
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(2010) on the study of NAADS in Mukono District in Central Uganda and NAADS project 
evaluations (GoU, 2007).  
2. Community level 
Social cohesion /social capital 
Respondents indicated that the impact of war led to breakdown of social relations in the 
communities. Respondents gave examples where neighbors and (or) relatives became 
enemies because of accusations of killings or belonging to different political camps i.e. either 
supporting the LRA or the government. Former combatants, former wifes of LRA soldiers 
were not liked in the communities because they were regarded as killers. All these factors led 
to the break down of social relations which were very strong before the war conflict. 
Respondents indicated that the traditional ways of working collectively for example 
collective land preparing, weeding and planting were common before the war but now after 
the war these collective forms are now virtually non-existent because everybody now cares 
for his/her household survival and uncertain of even the security situation now or in the 
future. Respondents indicated that before the war, the farmers after working together even 
organized harvest festivals where they could cook together, eat ,drink and dance together to 
celebrate the end of a good harvest season.This collective labor enabled the residents to plant 
more acreage of  land and have bigger  harvests while the sharing of harvests through these 
community networks helped to reduce the risks and adverse conditions that lead to crop 
failure in the individual households. Respondents indicated that this collective action also 
allowed villagers to increase their food security because they could be able to prepare more 
land for planting crops before the onset of the rainy season. These findings are consistent 
with McCormac and Benjamin (2008) where they noted that because of the war conflict in 
Northern Uganda, engagement with the community decreased, a survivalist mentality 
increased and these are often replaced with a tendency for people to adopt an “each person 
for themselves’’attitude.  
Another challenge identified was the personal and social differences among farmers in the 
North at the lower levels i.e. parish and village and these also contribute to the low 
acceptance of extension services for example in one of the villages visited during the survey, 
the lead farmer under NAADS had political differences with some other villagers  i.e. in this 
case some farmers refused to visit his farm to learn from it. One farmer said that the project 
(NAADS) is for the National Resistance Movement (NRM) members popularly refferedto as 
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Government supporters. Such is the dilemma NAADS has to deal with, a politically polarized 
society in Northern Uganda in order to improve its performance. 
Findings indicate that there were also serious problems of mistrust in formation of groups and 
problems associated with free-riding i.e. evidence shows that in many NAADS affiliated 
groups, the commitment of the members to group activities and their unity is still wanting. 
Respondents attributed previous activities to group land preparation, planting and harvesting. 
However a number of respondents interviewed mention the challenge of increasing 
individualism in the communities because they say that in the IDP camps the question was 
“How do I survive today?”. Other respondents again mentioned differences often associated 
with politics in Northern Uganda, which is one of the regions which is seriously politically 
“Polarized” like Kibaale district in Western Uganda leading to decline in social networks and 
social capital. The majority of the farmers said that they preferred to work alone but not in 
groups because in groups they cannot get the choice of the enterprises they want but have to 
go with the majority decisions of the members. There is a sense of reduced trust among the 
farmer communities and households as reported by the interviewees and also witnessed by 
the various conflicts in the communities reported to the police stations in the area. 
An elderly respondent complained that: 
“Here in Northern Uganda, before being herded into 
IDP camps our farmers were very active in communal 
or group activities for example communal digging and 
harvest festivals, but this tradition has been lost for 
over the past 20 years. I would say this has been as a 
result of mistrust between friends, neighbors, and 
relatives as a result of past war experiences, because in 
some cases even neighbors became enemies and after 
the war many are hesitant to engage in group related 
activities with this mistrust on their minds”. 
Another challenge identified is that there were feelings of jealousy among those farmers’ 
groups and individuals who did host the technology development sites while other member 
groups were hosts of the technologies. Here feelings of jealousy arose because those who 
would be beneficiaries did not get anything because of the usual budget cuts in NAADS 
(reductions in cash disbursements to the local governments) and they felt alienated from the 
NAADS program which originally during the sensitization they were told that everybody will 
benefit from the programme. 
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Farmers’ needs and priorities 
Findings indicate that in post-conflict, there was lack of focusing on the community’s priority 
enterprises and also failure in  chosing enterprises that suit the post-conflict conditions with a 
major focus on the vulnerable groups impacted by the war. Key informant interviews 
revealed that the major challenge NAADS programme has found in Northern Uganda is 
meeting the farmers’ enormous expectations from the programme. Key informants revealed 
that although the funds from NAADS is mainly for agricultural advisory services, many 
farmers thought that the program will give them cash to invest and when the farmers realized 
that money was not forthcoming they lost interest. 
Discussions with farmers affiliated to the NAADS program in the focus groups revealed their 
frustrations that little material support in form of inputs  has been made available by NAADS 
far less than they had originally hoped and even the little is going on dwindling from year to 
year. Key informant interviewees reported that the idea of demanding for farm inputs by the 
farmers was especially re-enforced in the North, by the presence of many humanitarian 
organizations and NGOs whose activities involved giving out farm inputs and technologies to 
farmers. Key informant interviews revealed that the widespread expectation of material 
inputs and cash is related to the nature of the initial mobilization of farmers at the inception 
of the program where a number of promises were made more especially by the political elite 
coupled with widespread poverty in the Northern region and to the history of previous 
interventions from humanitarian agencies, NGOs and government characterized by the 
dependency of the communities (e.g.  IDPs and returnees) on external support in the form of 
handouts. This demand for inputs as a motivation to join groups is not a new phenomenon, 
for example Datta (2005) on his study of the sustainability of community based organizations 
of the rural poor in Bangladesh , found out that accessing material benefits by farmers from 
the development program was vital for the sustainability of the farmer groups and those 
groups where farmers thought that they were not receiving sufficient benefits compared to the 
amount of time invested to ensure that the groups ran smoothly membership declined and 
other groups disbanded all together. Findings from this study also agree with Behera & Engel 
(2006) and Uphoff & Wijayaratna (2000) who also noted that the motivation of farmers to 
join and also stay in groups is the achievement of benefits from participation mainly in terms 
of material benefits as a reward for the participant’s efforts and farmers weigh in on the 
opportunity costs in group activities given their voluntary nature.  
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This motivation for material inputs is implied by a statement from a 
NAADS affiliated group leader who said that: 
“When people don’t see the material support they 
lose hope and the majority of the farmers don’t 
see mere advise as real support”. 
The key informant interviews revealed that, there was still lack of integration of the program 
with other crucial of PMA components like credit and micro-finance services. Evidence 
shows that because of lack of input technologies and credit services the poor farmers 
encounter constraints to acquire technologies in order to apply the knowledge they have 
obtained from the advisory component of NAADS.  
In a key informant Interview with the Chairman LC 3 in 
one of the sub-counties and a prominent farmer, he 
explained that: 
“There is ever increasing decline in attendance at NAADS 
trainings. Overtime the farmers have become less 
enthusiastic about NAADS training activities. There is a 
growing apprehension about the classroom based advisory 
services without inputs. There is training fatique with the 
farmers. In some cases attendance for trainings on 
advisory services has even dropped to 1/10 of the number 
of farmers expected for the training”. 
Several key informants cited the same reasons that the response to the trainings depended on 
peoples’ expectations for material assistance more specifically in the post-conflict situations 
and if these expectations are not met, for example like other NGOs which give material 
assistance hence response and attendance will be low. During the Interviews many politicians 
complained that without substantial tangible inputs, they believed that the farmers were not 
getting much support from the NAADS finances sent to their sub-counties which are reported 
by the local leaders to be quite substantial in the beginning but dwindling at the moment.  
Decline in interest of NAADS activities is implied in the statement below: 
 “during the first years of NAADS 2001/2002 there was rapid 
formation of farmer groups while the other groups were formed 
opportunistically just to capture the NAADS resources but without 
even standard requirements as per the NAADS provisions. He gave 
an example of some cases where even a dormant group, which was 
not active at all, re-awakens in order to capture the NAADS farmer 
inputs and resources. He also explained that another challenge of 
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sustainability of groups is that there were also cases of dubious 
farmer groups formed to just benefit from the NAADS assets”. 
(retired (DAO) / former NAADS Coordinator). 
The DAO’s comments echoes earlier findings by Bukenya (2011) in Mukono district, 
Uganda and similar patterns that can be found in previous studies e.g. Mutimba and Luzobe 
(2004) on farmer organizations in Uganda and Zimbabwe where there was formation of 
‘’opportunistic farmer groups’’ and on how groups form in response to artificial interests 
which is usually stimulated by the NGOs in the area which usually provide material 
incentives to be able to obtain quick results and therefore creating a culture of dependency in 
rural areas as a result of external NGOs. This finding of the need for material inputs from the 
improverished war affected communities of Northern Uganda is not seriously disputed given 
the fact that it is also the order of the day in other regions of Uganda which have not been 
affected by war conflict. For example Bukenya (2010) on his study of NAADS in Mukono 
district, central Uganda region noted that farmers exhibited a dependency syndrome derived 
from previous government programs like the Agricultural Extension Programs (AEP) which 
had a top-down approach and external humanitarian agencies which could give out handouts 
and whereby farmers were willing to accept anything of benefit to them even if it is of poor 
quality if they know they can use it for something.    
Other findings indicate that in the very beginning of the NAADS in 2001 in Northern Uganda 
, the local leaders and communities during the on-going war  interpreted NAADS as a 
program for government direct assistance to farmers and communities affected by war 
conflict and therefore participation and enthusiasm for NAADS program was high. In this 
study participation was reflected in regard to attendance of farmers in NAADS training 
activities and also participation in their farmer groups. Evidence shows that women showed 
more enthusiasm in terms of belonging to the NAADS groups because the men are more 
interested in material inputs and cash rewards.  
In addition information from key informants indicated that men were enthusiastic about 
NAADS because of the inputs and technologies provided, but were less inclined in joining 
farmer groups and participating in group activities regularly. Similarly the general view from 
the focus group discussions and personal observations in the community NAADS meetings in 
all the sub-counties visited during the study was that the youths were less involved in 
NAADS related activities especially in terms of membership in the NAADS farmer groups 
compared to the women and men. 
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NAADS implementation provisions provide for a comprehensive, participatory process to 
provide a means for farmers to articulate their enterprise preferences (i.e. NAADS strategy of 
farmer empowerment) starting at the lower levels of farmer groups and resulting in each 
subcounty identifying three priority enterprises. In the focus group discussions it was 
indicated that this provision was not adhered to. To illustrate this point, concerns were raised 
by the farmers that their decisions were sometimes influenced and in some cases overridden 
by the politicians in the process of enterprise selection. Farmers complained that there were 
instances where the technical staff influenced the process of identifying the enterprises 
indicating that the process was more of “top-down” and not a demand led process that was 
intended in the NAADS enterprise selection provisions.  
In addition the issue of mixed cropping specifically for food security for the poor farmers was 
not given due consideration, for instance with a limit of only three enterprises many farmers 
found their preferred enterprises were not included and seriously affected the resource poor 
farmers in particular. Because of this challenge, findings indicate that there were incidences 
where some farmers opted out of the NAADS program.These observations particularly the 
influence of politicians and technocrats on farmers’ needs and priorities have undermined the 
NAADS provisions and demoralized the farmers whose priorities were rejected.   
One local politician commented that: 
“The new “Enterprise Mix” approach being 
promoted by NAADS in the post-conflict 
regions is just in theory but cannot work 
because the people of the North have unique 
challenges like household food security 
which need to be addressed first and 
foremost’’.  
Note: The enterprise mix is an approach in which different combinations of commercial and 
food security activities are available, taking into account of the agro-ecological zone and the 
size of the land holdings. 
According to the NAADS implementation guidelines (2009), the selection of farmer 
enterprises under NAADS affiliated groups is supposed to be demand driven and provisions 
recommend that the selection process for enterprises should be bottom up approach to ensure 
active participation of all the beneficiaries. During the study, many farmers expressed 
reservations about a limited number of enterprises (only three enterprises) to be prioritized by 
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farmers as per the NAADS enterprise selection guidelines. It was a common feeling during 
the focus group discussions that the enterprise selection method recommended by the 
NAADS implementation guidelines tended to favor commercial enterprises that require high 
capital inputs and large pieces of land and capital, therefore putting the vulnerable groups i.e. 
the poor of the poor, IDP returnees, women and youths at a disadvantage.  
Following the focus group discussions, it was noted that during enterprise selection the 
guidelines are not critically followed. A key informant at the sub-county indicated that, in 
reality the usual practice is that the process is a rather centralized top-bottom process because 
the final decisions are made at the sub-county and district levels respectively  usually with the 
advice of the NAADS Secretariat, because NAADS is also interested in its overall strategy of 
zoning. Zoning is whereby a specific crop (s) is grown in one zone in order to promote bulk 
marketing. Similarly, there were also complaints that enterprise selection decisions made by 
farmer groups in the sub-counties were reversed at the district level allegedly by some district 
NAADS coordinators and district political heads for their own selfish interests. 
The challenges that arise from this top-bottom approach of enterprise selection is the low 
sense of ownership of the enterprises and this is witnessed by the neglect of enterprises 
supported by NAADS as seen in some of the areas during this survey. Evidence from the 
field study shows that in some cases the beneficiaries are not taking good care of the 
technologies and in many instances the beneficiaries sold off the inputs because such 
technologies were not their first priority after all . Evidence shows a number  of goats and 
pigs sold in a few days or a few weeks after NAADS has provided them to the beneficiaries is 
common in the area.  
Evidence also shows that there is limited involvement of the youths in NAADS activities 
because their needs and priorities have not been addressed by the NAADS program. Findings 
from the study indicate that the main disincentives and constraints for the youth full 
involvement in NAADS activities include; bad attitude towards farming, limited capital to 
apply knowledge received from the trainings and technologies resulting in failure by the 
youths to get material support from NAADS and as a result the youths preferred to prioritize 
other fast rewarding activities for example Boda Boda (motor cycle) transport business, retail 
trading i.e. buying and selling produce, brick making and some artisan activities.   
Another challenge for the active involvement of the youths is the negative attitude to farming, 
many of the youths were said to prefer handouts since the majority grew up in IDP camps 
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where handouts of food and other basic materials were the order of the day and comparison 
with farming which they say involves hard labor and does not offer quick returns. Many of 
the youths the researcher interacted with said that they would rather prefer other enterprises 
like brick making, charcoal burning and retail trade which are favourable for the day to day 
survival. 
The above concerns and challenges to participation of the youth in agricultural development 
programs for example NAADS resonates with earlier work by Nuwagaba (2006) and 
Parkinson (2008) where they observed that the negative attitudes towards agricultural work 
among the general population of the youths in Uganda was one of the constraints to poverty 
alleviation in the country and it is a worse scenario in post conflict northern Uganda where 
basically the majority of the youths grew up in camps for two decades depending basically on 
handouts from humanitarian agencies and government.    
The above challenges are implied by a complaint 
below from a local leader:  
“During sensitization and information on radios about 
NAADS, it was always emphasized that the largest 
percentage of the NAADS funds is to benefit us 
directly the farmers, but most of the NAADS funds 
was being paid to the trainers (advisory service 
providers).Here farmers perceive that the NAADS 
program was more concerned to benefit the advisory 
service providers who are being paid handsomely for 
their ‘lip services’ than to address our needs of material 
technology inputs i.e. improved seeds and livestock”. 
There was also disappointment by farmers in the focus group discussions who showed 
concern that the privately hired agricultural advisory service providers were at many times 
paid to provide monotonous training  which have been conducted a number of times by the 
NAADS advisory service providers and also trainings by agricultural based NGOs and CBOs 
in the area. The interviewees singled out trainings on banana production, organic manure 
making and cereal production as trainings that have become monotonous and class based  
where it was even common for the farmers to be provided with pen and exercise books to 
take notes with limited practical training if any.  
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Local organization capacity and culture 
According to the NAADS Act enacted in 2001, the implementation of NAADS is through 
farmer empowerment. The PEAP 2004/2005 – 2007/2008 defines empowerment in Uganda’s 
context as “all those processes where women and men take control and ownership of their 
lives”. In NAADS empowerment implies that the NAADS affiliated groups should be pro-
active, be able to demand what is due to them and not just accepting what is provided, being 
able to challenge whoever is accountable and their ability to network amongst themselves to 
build bigger capacity for effective participation and presenting their demands. Here a major 
principal of empowerment and ownership in such situations is that the voices of the majority 
of the farmers should be heard in decision making and accountability at local and central 
levels government levels. Findings from this survey show that this is still missing to a large 
extent in the NAADS implementation.  
In order to achieve the objectives of the NAADS program, a number of farmer level 
institutions have been formed for the effective implementation of the program, for example 
the Farmers’ Forum (FF), Procurement Committees (PC), Parish Coordination Committees 
(PCCs), Farmer Forum Executive Committee (EC), Implementation Committee and 
Technical Committee. Various studies, for example Bukenya (2010), Benin et al. (2007) and 
Hussein (2001) have shown that strong farmer groups and other institutions with collective 
action are very important for effective agricultural extension delivery because they can help 
the farmers achieve the economies of scale. This is because these collective institutions can 
be able to lower the transaction costs by pooling the resources of the poor farmers together. 
However, evidence from this survey shows that on the ground there are various 
disincentives/constraints that have continued to be major reasons for a relatively low response 
by the farmers and their institutions to NAADS activities more especially at the sub-county 
level.  
The growing dissatification about the NAADS implementation among a good number of 
farmers and farmer groups during the study was indicated  in the numerous complaints about 
NAADS in the communities, including numerous complaints of corruption by the NAADS 
technical personnel at sub-county levels and influential politicians, especially at district 
levels. Another challenge identified from key informants is that  the promoters of NAADS 
emphasized that the program was part of a wider package where the need for production 
capital and market for agricultural produce would be assured and this as a result was 
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misunderstood especially with the politicians who were supposed to mobilize the 
communities and hence through their sensitization about NAADS, this heightened farmers 
expectations because they told the farmers that through NAADS they were assured of inputs 
and credit to improve their agricultural production.  
Findings from the focus group discussions and interviews indicate that the number of active 
farmer groups affiliated to the NAADS program is going on dwindling from year to year. 
This has even been witnessed by the low attendance of trainings and NAADS group activities 
by farmers. Findings indicate that in many cases as low as less than 10% of the expected 
participants attending the trainings. Findings indicate that at the beginning of the NAADS 
programme, there were high level of enthusiasm generated among the farmers and the local 
communities at large. This high attendance resulted in the formation of very many of 
NAADS affiliated groups.  
Findings indicate that this was due to the expectations of the farmers in the beginning that 
NAADS would give them material and financial support. Therefore as time passed,  farmers 
realized that what they expected was not forthcoming and found out that the main objective 
of NAADS is to offer agricultural advisory services and hence many group members 
especially the youths lost their initial high interest in NAADS. Similarly, findings indicate 
that  in the beginning of the NAADS programme in Northern Uganda there was  enthusiasm 
in the program and eventually with time many NAADS affiliated groups collapsed or 
declined in activity.This dissappoitment  is shown  in the views of the farmers in the focus 
groups discussions where they argued that, the issue they face is not a lack of agricultural 
knowledge per se  but it is the  lack of financial assistance to acquire the technologies by the 
farmers to apply the knowledge which they say they already have. A key informant indicated 
that, considering the range of constraints farmers faced in the conflict and post-conflict 
conditions, farmers saw technology development activities (seeds and livestock) offering 
more immediate benefits for their food security and survival than advisory (extension) 
services predominantly offered by NAADS.  
According to the NAADS implementation guidelines, it was evident that NAADS affiliated 
farmers’ groups have rules, regulations and constitutions in place governing them, but it was 
noted that these are usually on paper because the members’ adherence to these regulations 
governing their groups is ineffective. To illustrate this point, is that many of the farmer 
groups did not have evidence of minutes for regular meetings showing a weakness of the 
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farmer institutions. It was noted that some farmer groups have adopted constitutions just as a 
condition to satisfy the requirements for group registration under the NAADS program in 
order to be able to get support from the program. There was evidence that some of these 
groups disband after opportunistically getting the support in terms of farm inputs and 
technologies. In addition it was noted that there were problems of some farmers joining 
several groups to maximize the support and denying other members from benefitting from the 
program. In addition this leads to divided royalties in terms of time and support given to 
particular groups and this inevitably causes weaknesses in groups because a member cannot 
effectively handle all these responsibilities required from the groups. The survey also found 
out that leadership in farmers’ institutions is mainly dominated by the rural elite i.e. those 
who are mostly secondary school drop outs. 
It was noted that there was still low capacity among farmer structures such as village farmers 
forum executives and procurement committees especially in record keeping, NAADS 
monitoring and its impact. Evidence indicates that no capacity building was organized for the 
sub-county farmer forum to monitor the programs i.e. in the sub-counties surveyed there was 
no evidence of any capacity building for the farmer forum in M&E of NAADS activities. 
Evidence also indicates that there is lack of information by farmers on their entitlements, for 
example how much farm inputs they are entitled to or the number of trainings by the private 
service providers. It should be noted that for the farmers to take the program as their own and 
demand accountability from the providers they need easy to understand information, however 
findings indicate that farmers as clients of the NAADS service are not given information on 
what they are entitled to.  
The success of the NAADS program is hinged on the capacity of the various structures to 
effectively perform their roles and duties. Therefore there is need for continuous capacity 
building and sensitization of their roles and responsibilities especially on the concepts and 
importance of monitoring and evaluation. Findings indicate that many of the procurement 
committee members lack the required technical capacity to handle the procurement process 
for example how to evaluate farm input supply bids effectively.This challenge undermines 
the effeciency of the procurement committee as a very important farmer committee which 
ensures that good quality inputs are provided to the beneficiaries. 
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Land availability and tenure security 
Field evidence indicates that if land issues in Northern Uganda are not dealt with they are 
bound to negatively affect the implementation of NAADS since all the activities implemented 
need the access of land by the communities in order to take place. The over 19 year gruesome 
war led by the LRA displaced many individuals breaking up families and friends.The 
eventual government resettlement program as the war receded saw the return of people to 
their villages. This process of return however, translated into a big challenge to the land 
tenure system for the local communities, households, youths born in the camps and the elders 
alike.  
Evidence during this survey shows that these land based conflicts have emerged in the 
Northern region of Uganda. Boundary demarcation challenges, border disputes between 
clans, individuals and villages, land grabbing by the investors, trespass, human–animal 
conflict on the land has been the norm according to the respondents interviewed.  
Conflicts over land in Northern Uganda affects food security because a field of land which is 
contested may not be used for productive purposes because of the high risk of investment. 
Findings indicate that land belonging to the indigenous people in some areas has been 
illegally obtained by some government officials, local and foreign investors and many 
attempts to safeguard such land , according to the key informants has met stiff resistance  
resulting into deaths and injuries. For instance many animals under re-stocking program of 
NAADS have been killed on the disputed lands. Evidence shows that the weak dispute 
resolution traditional structures caused by the war, coupled with the general lack of 
information on the existing land laws and policies and other enabling instruments are a very 
big  threat to the lives and the volatile peace and a major obstacle to the implementation of 
agricultural recovery programs like NAADS and NUSAF in the post-conflict region of 
Northern Uganda.  
In Northern Uganda it is the men who control the land but women also have some rights to 
use the land. The majority of women don’t own the land and all decisions on investment on 
land are made by the men. This lack of control of the productive resources by the women has 
also affected their effective participation and decision making in the NAADS affiliated 
farmer groups. This finding corroborates with findings by Weinberger & Jütting (2001) who 
noted that one of the favourable conditions for women’s participation in local organizations is 
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the availability of productive resources to them, for example land, level of income and the 
education level of the NAADS programme beneficiaries. 
Gender issues 
The NAADS operational guidelines mandate the gender inclusiveness in the NAADS 
program with special emphasis on women. However many of the interviewees perceive that 
this is usually on paper but rarely done. Field evidence on implementation of NAADS in 
Northern Uganda has shown that women have not been empowered according to the 
program’s implementation provisions. It has been noted that in many cases even women have 
been marginalized in as far decision making in groups is concerned, for example in decisions 
concerning procurement, leadership positions etc. Given the challenge of sustaining farmer 
groups in NAADS, it is easier for women groups to use group solidarity approach than men 
and women in the same village can easily organize together.This has been shown by the 
regular attendance of NAADS activities by women more than men according to information 
on attendance by women in NAADS activities obtained from the sub-counties. 
Other evidence from this study has shown that women have also proved better keepers of 
money and other assets  in NAADS affiliated groups than their male counterparts and women 
also play an important part in as far as good nutrition and household food security is 
concerned. This finding is also confirmed by other studies , for example in Bangladesh , 
where it was noted that women can take good care of household savings and farmer group 
savings and also play an important role in household food security (Birner et al., 2010). 
It should be noted that women in Northern Uganda are key in the households because they 
ensure food security and moreover in the post-conflict Northern Uganda women face unique 
challenges because many of their husbands were killed during the war and as widows they 
are the head of their families (for more details refer to section 8 on the household survey). It 
has been noted during this field study in Northern Uganda that it is the women who work 
longer hours in the farm fields in order to feed their families while many men are in towns 
looking for casual work. This finding is corroborated by the study of Najjingo & Sseguya 
(2004) on their study of gender dimensions of rural producers’ organizations in Central 
Uganda. They found that though the women farmers dominated the groups in terms of 
numbers , their participation in group decision making was limited.  
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Available statistics at the national level, for example UBOS (2010) shows that 90% of the 
rural women in Uganda work in the agricultural sector compared to 53% of rural men, 
however women own only 17% of productive land. This means men own 83% of the 
agricultural land. Unfortunately another challenge that has impacted negatively on the 
implementation of NAADS is that in Northern Uganda rural women are often denied access 
to land and property from which they could derive livelihoods to ensure food security for the 
household. It should be noted that Article 26 of the Constitution of Uganda provides that 
women have the same right as men to have property that they can keep alone or share with 
other people and no one should deprive them of their property. This has been witnessed by a 
number of conflicts concerning livestock inputs and access to land in NAADS affiliated 
groups.  
Other findings from the NAADS affiliated farmer groups indicated that the leadership of the 
lower level farmer institutions e.g.  Farmer Forum (FF), Procurement Committtee (PC), 
Parish Coordination Committee (PCC) is predominantly composed of men, while evidence 
shows that women are the higher number of members in the majority of the farmer groups 
surveyed.This finding indicates the problems of exclusion because in terms of decision 
making processes the women are not equal participants. One of the reasons given for this is 
the education requirement for participation on the procurement committee (at least secondary 
level), of which many of the women do not have this qualification. These findings agree with 
earlier work by Mwaka (2009) on the needs assessment study of PRDP in Northern Uganda 
on the participation of the women in planning, design and implementation of programs where 
the study revealed that majority of women (54.2%) said that they rarely participate and only a 
very small percentage of 7.2% said they participate fully in PRDP and the major observation 
here is that involvement of women is done for accountability purposes to donors and aiming 
at achieving gender targets in terms of numbers. I agree with the author that such 
involvement of women can only show results at output but not at outcome levels.   
In addition, findings indicate that at monitoring level of NAADS activities, this activity is 
carried out by purely technical people and political leaders of which very few of them are 
women. This finding indicates that women in the rural areas of Northern Uganda are mainly 
only engaged as respondents and not active participants and this limits the ownership of the 
program. Similarly lack of active involvement of women in NAADS implementation  
prevents the demand for accountability from the private agricultural service providers by the 
majority of the service beneficiaries who are the women. I argue that the majority of the 
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NAADS beneficiaries are women because evidence from the survey of NAADS affiliated 
farmer groups in Northern Uganda indicated that the majority of members in the groups are 
women. 
3. Local government level and central level 
Political interference 
Evidence shows that there was a challenge of different expectations of the beneficiaries, 
politicians and NAADS implementers alike from the NAADS program. Findings indicate that 
there is still a growing uneasiness with politicians especially the LC 3s (sub-county political 
leaders) and the Sub-county NAADS Coordinators in as far as NAADS implementation is 
concerned. The LC 3 politicians up to now still expressed concern why NAADS is more 
concerned about the advisory services while dedicating just a very small budget on the 
provision of agricultural assets and inputs. During the study there was incredible evidence in 
the differences in perceptions between the political leadership more especially LC 3s who 
clearly favored offering more material supplies, for example inputs like improved seeds, 
fertilizers and agricultural assets while the NAADS implementers and administrators 
supported giving priority to agricultural advisory services to farmers. Findings indicate that 
the political leadership at the sub-county (LC 3) where  the NAADS implementation 
activities take place have interfered in the NAADS implementation whereby they want 
almost all the NAADS budget at the sub-county to provide inputs and technologies to 
farmers. 
The Sub-county NAADS Coordinators interviewed indicated that these two opposing 
opinions about NAADS between the technical and political divide have created tension 
between these two stakeholder groups i.e. the political and technical wing and has made the 
implementation of the NAADS program very difficult for the NAADS Coordinators without 
the much needed political support in the mobilization of the farmers. One of the sub-county 
NAADS Coordinator interviewed cited a case where a local politician mobilized the farmers 
against attending the trainings offered by the private agricultural service providers and 
advised them to first make demands for material agricultural inputs and technologies.  
Evidence from the sub-county NAADS Coordinators interviewed indicated that another cause 
of this strained relationship between the technical wing and the politicians was also as a result 
of the NAADS implementation guidelines of 2001 banning politicians to be involved in 
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NAADS implementation activities, so the politicians felt alienated from decision making in 
as far as NAADS implementation was concerned. It should be noted that this ban was  aimed 
at avoiding conflict of interest problems more especially with the political elite during the 
implementation of the NAADS program (NAADS Act, 2001). Respondents indicated that in 
some cases politicians expected to receive a direct share of the benefits (farm inputs e.g. 
seeds and fertilizers) without necessarily having to follow the set official NAADS 
implementation guidelines. 
This perception by politicians that they have to directly benefit from government 
development programs is also echoed by (Moncrieffe, 2004) who noted that:  
“political competition has been a major driver of 
corruption in Uganda, this is because elections are very 
expensive,time intensive to contest and many 
candidates have become severely indebted and 
therefore when they join office they resort to 
corruption to recover the lost funds lost during the 
campaigns” (pp.17).  
Findings indicate that there were also cases of interference by politicians more especially at 
the lower sub-county levels, i.e. campaigning against the co-funding policy of the NAADS 
programme. Findings indicate that this behavior by some of the politicians was generally 
caused by the nationwide perception that NAADS has substantial financial resources from the 
government directed to all farmers. This perception resulted in the politicians suggesting to 
farmers that NAADS implementers should not put pressure or demands on them to pay a co-
funding contribution as already the government gives NAADS large sums of money meant 
for farmers. 
One of the sub-county NAADS Coordinators interviewed also complained of the challenge 
he is facing while implementing the NAADS program. He said that he has faced the 
challenge of handling the politicians. He indicated that the NAADS program is facing 
unrealistic expectations and demands from local politicians, for example the politicians 
always want to show their power and many feel that they and all their constituents should 
benefit from the NAADS program in form of farm input provision. He gave an example that 
his LC 3 Chairman is his political boss and can report him directly to the District political 
boss (LC 5 chairman), so it is very difficult for a mere civil servant like him to resist the 
wishes of the political boss and hence he faces a serious challenge of striking the balance 
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between technical implementation of NAADS according to the official guidelines and 
politics. 
The process influence Process Net-Map (figure 6.1) uncovers the challenge of political 
capture and elite capture. The NAADS guidelines recommend that the chairperson of the 
Parish Procurement Committee is the chairperson local council 1, however by law the 
chairperson local council 1 is a member of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
party and this has led to the challenge of ownership of the parish procurement committee 
because there is evidence that many members of other political parties do not own this 
committee. 
As one respondent mentioned: 
“This is an NRM committee (Parish Procurement 
Committee composed of only members of NRM), if you 
do not support them you will not get any benefit from 
NAADS so there is no need to join their groups’’. 
Political patronage was also evident as a result of involvement of local council 1s in the 
villages and local council 2 in the parishes where the politicians call a meeting per village on 
the formation of procurement committees at the village and parish level. In NAADS phase 2 
the Parish Coordination Committees chairmen are also chairmen of the local council 2. 
According to the new NAADS operational guidelines 2007, it was thought that involvement 
of local council 2 as chairmen of Parish Coordination Committees could result into 
transparency but instead it caused bias especially in farm input procurement. The chairman 
LC 2 is also a member of the parish coordination committee, so he has a lot of influence on 
who is mobilized to benefit from the program. This political influence is implied by the 
statements below: 
“The local councils are in their own thing in as far as 
NAADS implementation is concerned because they are 
the voices of the NRM ruling party”( Respondent).  
Another respondent said: 
“Who can challenge the chairmen of the sub-counties? 
.These chairmen call themselves the Presidents of the 
sub-county and they always brag that if it is not due to 
their political influence we would not have benefitted 
from the NAADS program’’. 
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Respondents indicated that because of this so called political power and popularity, these 
political powers at the higher level always over-ride the decisions of the lower NAADS 
farmers’ committees (for example PC, FF, and EC). Respondents indicated that the 
politicians, for example LC 3 can influence the Community Procurement Committee to offer 
input supply contracts to their political henchmen or family members. 
Evidence from the Process Net-Map (figure 6.1) indicated that the political influence and 
capture was also evident when a local council 1 chairperson or local council member comes 
to the beneficiaries and claim credit for having provided the inputs to the farmers. This is 
because the local council 1 chairman is a powerful member of the Procurement Committee. 
Respondents indicated that they cannot even reject poor quality inputs because they are afraid 
of the influential politicians and they are scared that if they reject the inputs they will not 
have another opportunity to receive them again. If they reject the poor quality inputs they are 
branded by the NRM Government supporting politicians as being anti-government 
development programs. This observation is confirmed by the farmers in the focus group 
discussions who reported that they have little influence on the quality of inputs i.e. the 
farmers just receive the inputs and believe other stakeholders involved in the procurement 
process have played their part. 
Conflict of interest 
Findings from the focus group discussions indicated that many of the local politicians more 
especially the LC 3s  chairmen and district councilors who are supposed to monitor the 
quality of work of NAADS are at the same time suppliers of NAADS inputs and 
technologies. Respondents indicated that these politicians have private companies but they 
hide in other people to disguise ownership. So when beneficiaries try to complain about the 
quality of services and assets offered by NAADS, the politicians shut them down because 
these are their own people. Findings indicate that even local government extension workers 
formed their own private companies and this was more so with advisory services where they 
took advantage of lack of competetion in Northern Uganda due to lack of adequate private 
advisory service providers in order “to share on the NAADS cake” as commonly said in 
NAADS private service provision community.  
Other conflict of interest issues is when the representatives of the farmers, for example the 
members of the Farmer Forum are involved in the private supply of agricultural inputs to the 
NAADS program and distribution of technologies and demonstration gardens to their own 
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farms, relatives or croonies.These findings agree with Opendo (2005) on his study of the 
implementation of the NAADS program in Kabale district Western Uganda where he  noted 
that the beneficiaries in the district complained of their farmer representaives i.e. farmer 
forum members of poor leadership because they were engaged in illegitimate activities for 
example locating the agricultural technology trials on their own fields, being pre-occupied 
with demanding high sitting allowances for services which are voluntary and demanding for 
kickbacks from contractors with a promise of awarding them contracts.   
6.3 NUSAF implementation process in practice 
 Implementation process of NUSAF using the process Influence-Mapping 6.3.1
procedure 
Here the description of the NUSAF implementation of the procurement process is based on 
Process Net-Map interviews with the stakeholders who take part in the procurement process 
of agricultural assets and inputs. 
 
Figure 6.5: NUSAF procurement process Net-Map 
The first step (Step 1) in figure 6.5 is that the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) provides 
guidelines to the relevant districts for the sensitization, dissemination and implementation 
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guidelines of NUSAF. The NUSAF District Technical Officer (NDTO) carries out 
sensitization at the district level with NUSAF officials from OPM. In order to ensure 
effective implementation at least one member from the NDTO goes with the district team to 
the sub-county for technical backstopping during sensitization (steps 1 , 2 and 3 ). During the 
sensitization at the sub-county the implementation guidelines are distributed to the lower 
local leaders who sensitize the lower levels and also hand over basic information about 
NUSAF implementation. It is the duty of the sub-county Community Development Officer 
(CDO), sub-county technical team and facilitators to sensitize the farmers at parish and 
village levels about NUSAF implementation.The local leaders at the lowest level of parish 
and village level help in the mobilization of the communities. 
In NUSAF 1 it was the NUSAF Monitoring Unit (NUMU), the NDTO through the district 
leadership who were responsible for recruiting the NUSAF facilitators whose role was to help 
the communities to come up with fundable proposals for NUSAF sub-projects. After the 
facilitators were recruited and trained they go to the communities in the sub-county to 
facilitate the sub-project groups to generate project proposals. After the preparation of the 
sub-project proposals, the facilitator submits the generated sub-project files to the sub-county 
Community Development officer (CDO), who is the sub-county NUSAF technical officer to 
verify the files to see whether the projects comply with the provisions of NUSAF for funding. 
At this point the CDO is assisted by the sub-county technical team for both technical and 
field appraisal of the sub-project proposals (see Steps 7 and 8 of the Process Net-Map figure 
6.5). After the appraisal process at the technical level, the Sub-county Chief invites the LC 3 
executives to look at the sub-project proposals to ascertain whether they meet the 
specifications and they endorse (put a stamp) on the proposals to be sent at higher level ( 
district). At this point findings indicate that  in reality the LC 3 executives do not go through 
the projects files but just stamp and approve the projects. 
After the proposals are approved by the political wing of the sub-county ( step 9 of fig. 6.5), 
they are sent by the sub-county CDO to the NUSAF technical officer at the district  who 
sends the sub-project files to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) for the technical 
approval of the projects and at this point the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), NDTO and 
District Technical Planning Committee (DTPC) sit and approve the qualified projects, which 
are later endorsed by the District Executive Committee and the LC 5 Chairman stamps on the 
approved projects (step 12). After this step, the project files are sent to the OPM for approval. 
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Findings however indicate that here at step 13 and 14 in reality the project files are not sent 
physically to OPM in Kampala but what happens is that  a technical person from OPM comes 
to the districts to look at the proposals and approve them. Here the list of approved proposals 
is approved by NUMU through their representative. After the projects are approved, the 
information is displayed at the district and sub-county notice boards of the approved projects. 
Announcements of the approved projects are also made on the local radio stations. 
Through the district NUSAF technical officer, the information is sent to the facilitators to 
guide the sub-project groups leaders to open bank accounts in order to be able to access the 
sub-project funds. Immidiately the accounts are opened, the OPM then clarifies with the 
CAO and then funds are released to the sub-project accounts. After the funds are released, the 
beneficiaries decide on the procurement modality through their committees i.e. the Project 
Management Committee  (PMC) and the Procurement Committee (PC) (step 19 of fig.6.5).  
The procurement method can either be the community procurement method involving a 
supplier to purchase  agricultural inputs or another option is that the beneficiaries themselves 
through their relevant committees could purchase the inputs or assets themselves. For the 
purchase of Oxen for plowing their fields the farmers preffered to purchase the animals 
themselves. For this purchase to happen, three leaders of the farmers group i.e.the chairman, 
the treasurer plus the secretary (who are signatories) to the bank account are the ones who are 
supposed to withdraw funds from the sub-project’s bank account.But they also need a letter 
of reccomendation from the parish to confirm that they are the signatories. This letter is 
presented to the bank (in this case DFCU Bank) in order to withdraw funds.In NUSAF 1 the 
funds were usually withdrawn from Stambic bank , whereas in NUSAF 2 this was changed to 
DFCU bank after a lot of corruption and collusion to siphon off NUSAF funds was reported 
in Stambic Bank.  
After the money is withdrawn, the selected members of the CPMC and in some occasions 
accompanied by the facilitator go to the nearby market to purchase the animals of their 
choice. After the completion of the transactions a stamped receipt is supposed to be provided 
by the supplier of animals at the market for accountability purposes.  But in many cases the 
suppliers of these animals can only access cash sale receits from nearby retail shops which 
are not accepted by NUSAF for accountability of large amounts of money. So what happens 
in reality is that members of the Procurement Committee (PC) looks for the receits and put on 
the amount of money they see it duly fit and then keep the ‘’difference’’ for themselves.The 
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transport of the livestock was paid from the money that was  withdrawn from the sub-project 
group but some of the beneficiaries interviewed said that this was usually inflated by the PC. 
When it came to the distribution of animals, the sub-project group members used the lottery 
method as the method to fairly distribute the animals to the group members but findings 
indicate that in a number of cases this method was not used and as a result this led to some 
influential members of the group to be able to get animals of their choice. Finally, all the 
expenses in the form of receits for accountability are handed over to the CDO (NUSAF 
technical officer) at the sub-county. Each family within the group received a pair of Oxen and 
Ox-plough. The group as per the implementation guidelines was also supposed to receive  
additional follow-up support for buying assets like barbed wire and for the veterinary care but 
field evidence shows that at the end of the day challenges arose on the side of the livestock 
beneficiaries because these steps in the procurement implementation process were not 
effectively implemented. 
 Levels of influence by the different actors in NUSAF implementation 6.3.2
Figure 6.6  below shows the influence levels of the different actors involved in NUSAF 
implementation, for the procurement of community assets as perceived by the interviewed 
sub-project beneficiaries that received livestock, in this case Oxen under the NUSAF 
programme. Here the respondents rated the level of influence of the different  actors on the 
on the quality of inputs procured on a scale of 0-6  and in this case a good procurement 
outcome was described as the delivery of the community inputs,assets,technologies and in 
this case the assets were Oxen which were expected to be of good quality, right quantity and 
delivered in time to the intended beneficiaries.  
In NUSAF 2 the contractor (supplier) gets the maximum score of 6 indicating that they have 
the highest influence on the quality of agricultural assets provided to the beneficiaries. The 
reasons given to this ascribed level of influence is that the supplier since he is the one who 
buys the animals he can chose whatever quality of animal and the farmers just receive.  
The NUSAF facilitator gets a high score of 5 on the scale of 0-6. The reason given by the 
participants in the Process Net-Map is that usually the facilitator knows the suppliers and can 
also negotiate on the prices on behalf of the sub-project groups because the farmers believe 
that he knows more than they do. Respondents mentioned cases in which the facilitators 
collude with suppliers to bring them poor quality animals and inputs.The procurement 
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committee gets a score of 4. Respondents said that some of the members have a say on the 
prices of animals and in some cases they can go to the market and procure by themselves. 
The NUSAF district technical officer and contractor and technical staff at the district and sub- 
county get a score of 3. The reason given is that, during contracting the district technical 
officer can influence the procurement process by recommending certain supply companies 
where she/he has influence to the CPMC or procurement committees. The technical officers 
in some cases verify the quality of supplies. Respondents mentioned that the politicians, some 
of them have their supply companies can influence the selection of certain individuals who in 
many cases do not have the ability to supply quality inputs. 
The District Veterinary Officer (Veterinary Doctor) gets a score of 3 on a scale of from 0-6. 
The Veterinary officer has an influence on the quality especially for the livestock re-stocking 
project (cattle, Oxen, Goat). This is because before the livestock is distributed to the 
beneficiaries he has to verify that they are of good quality in terms of health and size. Since 
all the sub-counties visited during the do not have veterinary Doctors, it is the District 
Veterinary officer responsible for the certification of the livestock. The Veterinary Doctor 
can reject the poor quality animals. He/she also compares the size of the animals with the 
price to ensure value for money because the auditor responsible for this activity is not usually 
readily available. The respondents gave themselves a score of 2. They said they do not have 
much say, it is the technical officers who decide for them. They just wait and receive the 
animals and even if they complain things just end there. Local councils were given a score of 
1. Respondents said that local politicians just make noise about the poor quality of inputs but 
usually take no serious action. 
The OPM, local Bank, Radio and NGOs are ascribed an influence of zero (0) and therefore 
they do not have any influence on the quality. The reasons given by the participants in the 
Process Net-Map is that these actors are not involved in the procurement process directly. 
They just facilitate the release of funds (OPM and Bank) and the radio just facilitates the 
dissemination of information. 
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Figure 6.6: Levels of influence of actors 
Mean influence levels for NUSAF 2 procurement process 
Here the mean influence levels were calculated for the 6 Influence Net-Maps conducted 
during the survey. The diagram below (Figure 6.7) shows the results. Here the farmers groups 
get a maximum of 6, followed by the technical team and the facilitators. The politicians get 
the lowest influence level on the quality of inputs. The reason why the farmer groups get the 
highest mean score could be that through collective action they can be able to demand quality 
goods from the suppliers. The supplier also in this case gets a score above average, meaning 
that the supplier still has a far big influence than the politicians on the quality of service. This 
observation has implications for input supply, this is because it shows that politicians who are 
supposed to monitor and ensure that good quality inputs are supplied, the supplier has more 
influence over them. 
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Figure 6.7: NUSAF mean influence level of actors 
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Figure 6.8: NUSAF implementation challenges 
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Table 6.2: Entry points for corruption in procurement of goods and services in NUSAF 
Procurement Stage  Red Flags   
Poject and Design • Concetration of projects around towns or urban centres. 
• Only one enterprise ie. Livestock taking a big chank of the funds. 
• Undue influence by politicians and elites in decision making. 
• Very short sub-project approval process. 
• Re-allocation of funds for other activities without official approval. 
Advertising , 
Prequalification, 
Submission of Bids 
• • Manipulation of bid documents (favouritism). 
• Collusion.  
• Leakage of bidding information. 
• Submission of very few bid documents (few firms submitting bid documents). 
• Lack of widespread advertizing of bids to reduce competition. 
Bid Evaluation, Post-
qualification and 
Award of Contract 
• Best bidder fails to win the tender award. 
• The price of delivery of goods and services is increased from the original 
price according to the tender terms of reference. 
• Very short procurement process. 
• The quality and or quantity of the goods is decreased from the original TOR. 
Contract Performance 
,Administration and 
Supervision 
• Weak accounting systems. 
• No certication reports of inputs from Subject Matter Specialist (SMS). 
• No monitoring books at project sites. 
• Ghost names of beneficiaries and project personell. 
• Poor monitoring systems. 
• Lack of random spot checks to give opportunity to the contractor to disguise 
illegal activities. 
• Poor transparency and no implementation/contract information given to the 
beneficiaries. 
• Oversight of the physical works in collaboration with beneficiary 
representatives is absent. 
• The clients of the service are dissatisfied with completed facilities. 
• Delays in the delivery of goods and services. 
• Delayed payments to the suppliers. 
• Lack of project completion reports and certication eg. from engineer etc. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on procurement  process Net-Map  
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 Governance challenges in NUSAF implementation 6.3.3
The discussion of results here is based on the Conceptual Framework which discusses both 
the Demand and Supply-side factors which affect program performance ( see section 3 and 
figure 3.2 for more details). 
Supply–side factors 
1. Human resource management 
Local government human resource capacity 
Findings indicate that in Northern Uganda there is the lack of capacity by the local 
governments to lead the recovery process after the war as evidence indicates low levels of 
capacity to plan, monitor and mobilize resources for the recovery process. For instance all the 
districts visited during this study operate below the required staffing levels and have 
problems of retaining the recruited staff because of the poor post conflict working conditions 
which lead to poor staff motivation. Evidence shows that the situation is even worse in the 
newly created districts where there is limited capacity of the technical staff both in numbers 
and in areas of specific skills in agriculture and other livelihood projects implementation 
skills. 
Key informant interviews at the central level indicated that the first phase (NUSAF 1) there 
were delays in the recruitment of NUSAF staff at the center (OPM) and this impacted 
negatively on  the most important initial phase of sensitizing the local government staff and 
the communities. This is because a small NUSAF team available at the OPM could not 
manage to sensitize all the 18 districts and this caused significant delays in implementation 
and as a result no significant fund releases were made to sub-projects for almost after two 
years, that is until 2004 when the NUSAF1 project started in 2002. Evidence indicates that 
this challenge of delays in funds release therefore had negative impacts on the funds 
absorption by the local governments. 
The private facilitators interviewed said that they were given the work but cannot get any 
assistance from their respective local governments. However, findings from key informant 
interviews indicate that even if the local governments wanted to assist  the facilitators, the 
few local government staff in the production department at the district and sub-county levels 
are too overstretched in terms of available skilled  manpower to perform an effective 
facilitating and  monitoring role for all the many individual sub-projects in their areas of 
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jurisdiction. Key informants indicated that NUSAF programme did not strengthen the district 
and sub-county veterinary extension services which are in a dire lack of technical personell to 
respond to the beneficiaries’ enormous demands and given the fact that over 60% of the 
livelihoods budget under NUSAF was allocated to the purchase of animals (livestock).  
Another challenge identified during this study is that the districts do not have enough 
Engineers, Veterinary Doctors and Agricultural Officers to supervise all the NUSAF projects. 
Some of the projects are as far as 40 kilometers from the district headquarters, so even where 
the technocrats visit the projects their supervision is limited to a few trips throughout the 
entire project period due to logistical constraints. This finding is in line with a mid-term 
review report of the PRDP-NUSAF 2 by the Isis Women’s International Cross Cultural 
Exchange (Isis-WICCE) in 2011 which revealed that most of the staffing levels in the 
departments in the districts covered under PRDP/NUSAF 2 are below those recommended by 
the Ministry of Public Service and Ministry of Local Government restructuring exercise and 
as a result local governments in Northern region have persistently and consistently 
underperformed in terms of effective delivery of public services.  
Private sector capacity 
The NUSAF operational guidelines emphasize the need for the recruitment of technically 
qualified, privately hired and resident in the area facilitators to guide the communities 
through the sub-project proposal preparation up to the final approval. Here it is important to 
note that skilled community facilitators are critical for the success of NUSAF because they 
are able to effectively assist the poor farmers and other vulnerable groups who are usually 
illiterate and semi-illiterate and often lack planning and organizational skills. Provisions also 
indicate that the choice of the facilitator and private contractors is left to the community 
discretion. Guidelines recommend for hiring of facilitators who are from the area and who 
have adequate capacity to provide guidance and oversight in sub-project proposal preparation 
and procurement process such that the scope of corruption and sub-standard work is 
minimized. 
Interviewees reported that many of the facilitators were chosen mainly at district headquarters 
and a few at sub-county levels and sent directly to the groups.  This shows that district and 
sub-county authorities did not comply with this implementation guideline. Field evidence 
shows that many of the facilitators as evidenced from problems in trainings were unfamiliar 
with local conditions and community requirements, challenges and needs.  
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The challenges encountered in recruitment of facilitators under the NUSAF project is implied 
by the statement below: 
“Facilitators originating from outside the district have little 
knowledge of the local conditions and these outsiders have 
enormous scope for corruption and because they are not born 
from the area they have little reason to offer value for money 
for the work done on the ground” (Community Development 
Officer, district C). 
In recruitment of the NUSAF facilitators who are private sector technical people to help the 
NUSAF sub-project groups to come up with fundable project proposals, the Process Net-Map 
uncovered major challenges. First of all, most of the facilitators were recruited at the district 
level mostly with political influence by the elites and then deployed anywhere in the district. 
Evidence shows that facilitators who did not originate in the project areas had little 
knowledge of the locality and little knowledge of the unique challenges affecting their target 
communities and therefore they could not perform the NUSAF duties as reported by some the 
local government officials and the beneficiaries. In addition, regarding the qualifications of 
the facilitators there is strong evidence that most of the facilitators hired lacked the 
prerequisite qualifications to carry out their duties effectively. Similarly, a survey about the 
facilitators in the study area showed that the facilitators lacked the social sciences and 
agricultural extension knowledge and skills. To illustrate this point, in one of the districts 
surveyed (District A) a facilitator with a diploma in mechanical engineering was recruited to 
guide the farmers through an agricultural sub-project cycle.  
The challenges faced by the facilitators to cover large areas and so many sub-projects is 
implied by the statement below:  
“only one facilitator in the whole sub-county cannot 
effectively assist the communities because there are 
many sub-projects to handle which involve numerous 
paper work and document interpretation”.( 
Community Development Officer).   
Additionally, there is overwhelming evidence that the majority of the facilitators from the 
areas surveyed were not seconded by the communities as recommended in the NUSAF 
provisions and all the community facilitators have not received the required training on the 
Demand Driven Development (CDD) approach of NUSAF. Evidence from the focus group 
discussions shows that many community facilitators instead of helping communities to 
translate their priorities into feasible projects have acted more as “brokers” between the 
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suppliers of inputs and Community Project Management Committees (CPMCs) and 
Procurement Committees than facilitators, because in this way they can get more money from 
kickbacks than the little official payment for their work as community based  NUSAF 
facilitators . 
Findings from key informant interviews show that there were problems of favoritism in the 
recruitment process of facilitators, a case in point is where the relatives of politicians, 
political allies of farm families, technocrats were favored in the interview process. This 
favoritism in the recruitment of facilitators reflects the non-compliance with the provisions of 
the NUSAF recruitment Implementation Guidelines and in many incidences resulted into 
recruitment of unqualified (unskilled facilitators). Another related challenge to these 
problems is the recruitment of NUSAF technical officers at the districts. Findings from 
interviews with key informant respondents point to the recruitment of key district NUSAF 
personnel with political influence from the district top brass.  Complaints about favors from 
the political elite and the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) in the recruitment of NUSAF 
district technical officer. A case in point was that in district C surveyed the NUSAF technical 
officer was the district Chief Personnel Officer and in district A it was the District 
Information Officer who was the one in charge of NUSAF. The challenge here is that these 
NUSAF district technical officers lack the technical skills in as far as agricultural enterprises 
and extension are concerned which dominate the NUSAF livelihoods component geared to 
help the predominantly poor farmers in the Northern region to move out of poverty. The 
above challenges reflected the administrative failure of NUSAF because of its general failure 
to recruit key qualified personnel who are key for the successful implementation of the 
programme.  
2. Staff welfare 
Interviewees also indicated the poor motivation and staff commitment of the local 
government workers who are supposed to assist the private NUSAF facilitators in their work. 
Key informant interviews indicated that involving NUSAF facilitators who are not well paid 
and are involved in activities where they have substantial control over which sub-group 
benefits from NUSAF assets has caused serious problems and governance challenges in the 
programme. Evidence indicates that if the NUSAF facilitators are not usually paid in time 
and not well paid, this practice also at many times resulted in these NUSAF facilitators 
seeking compensation for their services in the form of asking for money or kick backs from 
183 
 
contractors (suppliers) and farmers. Evidence also shows that other facilitators abandoned the 
work completely because their expectations from the NUSAF project were not adequately 
addressed. 
3. Conflicts of interest 
A key informant complained that in his home town there is already bad feelings between the 
local businessmen and civil servants due to local businessmen allegations of corruption 
within the local government system for instance local government officials giving input 
supply contracts (tenders) to their firms by setting up their own companies and thus denying 
the local business men the input supply business. This has been a major constraint to local 
business men in urban and semi-urban areas cited by the businessmen because they cannot be 
able to tap into the business opportunities provided by the local government under the 
NUSAF project. Evidence also shows that it was difficult for both politicians and local 
government staff who are involved in supply contracts under NUSAF to assure value for 
money. This is because they always defended their private firms even if they offered shoddy 
work to the communities. 
4. Financial management 
NUSAF budgeting, funding and internal accountability 
Funds release 
Sadly for NUSAF program, annual reports indicate that very few social infrastructures and 
individual projects were successfully implemented as compared to the community population 
were approved for funding due to little resources and therefore resulting into negligible 
impact on poverty reduction. A number of sub-projects coming from the improverished 
communities of Northern Uganda were not funded mainly due to the limited resource 
envelope, compared to the high expectations from the project during the sensitization and 
inception phase. 
In order to ensure effective utilization of funds, provisions in the NUSAF guidelines provide 
for a timeline on the release of funds from the OPM, district and sub-county and finally to the 
beneficiaries’ sub-project accounts (see step 16 Appendix 6 of the Process Net-Map). 
However the Process Net-Map suggests challenges in the release of funds more at all levels 
of the implementation process. There is overwhelming evidence that there is delay in the 
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release of funds to the sub-project beneficiaries’ bank accounts. This has in turn led to delays 
in the implementation of the sub-project activities and this caused more problems with crop 
related enterprises which had to be carried out according to the rainy seasons. 
According to the NUSAF financial disbursement provisions, funds transfers are meant to take 
24 hours to reach the group sub-project accounts , but there are long delays from sub-project 
approval and funds disbursements which in many cases takes several weeks. Some of the 
sub-counties surveyed reported that many sub-projects approved for instance in for example 
June of the financial year did not receive their first disbursements until one month later. 
Findings from the focus group discussions also indicated complaints and frustrations in the 
communities and as a result inevitably contributed to financial management problems as a 
result of bribery, asking for kickbacks from the desperate beneficiaries and in delayed 
implementation. In some instances the delay in the release of funds reflects the non-
compliance with the explicit NUSAF funding guidelines on the side of the beneficiaries 
which call for timely submission of well-prepared accountabilities to the different levels of 
project implementation. Findings show that part of the problem was that the community 
leaders i.e. the Procurement Committee (PC) and the Project Management Committee (PMC) 
lacked the necessary technical capacity to handle accountability issues.  
Internal accountability 
Financial management 
Implementation procedures, financial management procedures and guidelines concerning 
accountability state that satisfactory accountabilities and reports from sub-project should be 
submitted at the various levels i.e. sub-county, district and Office of the Prime Minister 
(OPM)  before new funds are released (step 16 in the figure 6.5 of the Process Net-Map). 
Provisions recommend that money is given in bits (partial releases) after presenting the 
accountability of the previous financial funds releases to the districts through the sub-
county’s NUSAF technical officials.   
The Process Net-Map interview evidence shows that the sub-counties surveyed in the study 
area have failed to adhere to the accountability provisions in the guidelines. In all the areas 
visited, a lot of money was not accounted for and this was more pronounced in the first phase 
of NUSAF as indicated by the respondents. Participants in the Process Net-Map gave the 
reasons of the accountability problems as; 
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 Lack of technical capacity at the community level in handling accountability and 
paperwork involved leading to the delay in release of funds from the center as a 
result of delayed submission of accountability to the authorities i.e. from the 
community sub-project leaders. Here research findings indicate that many of the 
group leaders were either illiterate or semi-illiterate so had problems to handle 
accountability issues.  
 Another related challenge is of the poor technical capacity of the procurement 
committee in preparation of accountabilities was a cause for concern. This 
challenge results from the fact that NUSAF involves a document intensive 
procurement process. In some instances interviewees reported that the 
procurement committee could hire a technical person, the so called 
‘’accountability expert’’ to ‘’FORGE’’ acceptable accountability to the 
authorities. Participants in the Process Net-Map activity mentioned that another 
problem with accountabilities is the delay by the suppliers to bring in their 
accountability after being paid the money and this delays the compilation of the 
final accountabilities by the NUSAF technical officer at district level and hence 
delays the disbursement of funds from the OPM (Step 16). 
 Findings also indicate that members of groups struggled to hold their usually 
better educated group leaders accountable to the funds. Better educated leaders 
usually dominated the whole implementation process especially in procurement. 
Since the group leaders were usually considered as superior members of society, 
(secondary school leavers) it was rather difficult for other members to hold them 
accountable and demand from them to submit the accountabilities in a timely 
manner.  Even the illiterate group members could not manage to understand the 
accountabilities even if it was shown to them. 
 According to the financial management guidelines, issues to do with 
accountability of sub-project funds is done through the finance sub-committee, 
but findings show that many of the members of this committee lack the basic 
mathematical and literacy skills and this has proved to be a challenge in the 
accountability of funds. Findings show that some communities have engaged the 
services of local government staff privately at a fee to assist them in financial 
management and preparation of accountabilities but there was a case in a district 
surveyed where the communities were conned of their sub-project funds. 
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 To ensure transparency and to control corruption, NUSAF guidelines call for the 
organization of Social Audits (SA) commonly known as Barazas within the 
beneficiary communities to ensure transparency and accountability in program 
implementation. The aim of the Barazas is to create a collective strategy aimed at 
enhancing public accountability. Evidence from respondents indicates that 
Barazas faced a number of governance challenges which prevented their effective 
implementation.Although on paper Barazas had good intentions and clear 
objectives, on the ground the experience points to a different picture.  
Findings do not support that these social audits (Barazas) took place in all the areas under this 
study because of lack of written reports and I did not also find support for the existence of 
active vigilance and monitoring committees as provided for in the NUSAF implementation 
guidelines. Another finding from this survey was that the majority of the respondents 
interviewed did not have a clear understanding of the Baraza initiative and its benefits and 
moreover they did not understand the concept. This evidence points to the challenge of poor 
sensitization on the side of NUSAF implementers. Reasons why this provision was not 
implemented effectively is that there was insufficient mobilization of rural households by the 
political wing to participate in the social accountability meetings. Evidence shows that the 
technocrats could not encourage the organization of the Barazas because they know the 
communities can somehow pin them down on the implementation issues and also technocrats 
look at these Barazas as ways of the politicians to witch hunt them. Another reason given by 
the respondents is lack of knowledge of their role as beneficiaries in the social audit (Baraza) 
process and evidence also indicates that the communities are not aware of their entitlements 
because of limited information about NUSAF implementation availed to the communities. 
Those members of the committees (farmer institutions) that existed, when interviewed could 
not mention their responsibility in the implementation social audits strategy under NUSAF. 
This finding could be indicative why the communities did not demand for the social audits 
and therefore the project beneficiaries missed out on having a platform to demand for 
accountability from the implementers of the program.  
In one district surveyed where the Baraza took place, respondents complained that the time 
given for the activity is very limited to exhaust all the implementation issues of a big program 
like NUSAF with so many livelihoods components. To illustrate this point, on the day of the 
Baraza, the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) who is the representative of the President 
in the area  convenes the Baraza at the sub-county or district level, then the local government 
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technical staff in charge of NAADS, NUSAF, Health, Works , Education etc. make 
presentations at the Baraza which are then followed by reactions from members of the 
community, who raise questions and other concerns at the Baraza, basically focusing on the 
community (dis)satification with service delivery in the period under review. All this activity 
takes place in only one day which is a clear time constraint for the community members to 
give comments and come up with a way forward and moreover the communities are not 
equipped with progress reports before the day of the Baraza for verification of the 
information contained in the NUSAF reports.   
5. Leakage of funds and corruption 
The evidence from the Process Net-Map Mapping exercise suggests that misuse of funds and 
corruption exist at the program administration level too. For example officials concerned with 
payments to the private sector for example the suppliers and facilitators have been found to 
be corrupt. Evidence from the Process Net-Map has identified channels through which funds 
are misused, for example outright embezzlement of funds, diversion of funds to unplanned 
activities, distribution of assets to illegitimate beneficiaries etc. Evidence shows that these 
kinds of problems occur because of the absence of adequate supervision and monitoring 
mechanisms. For example in some cases the District NUSAF technical officer (in district B 
surveyed) has turned a blind eye on the lower officials e.g. accountants and sub-county chiefs 
who collude with the suppliers and in the end are siphoning off NUSAF funds.  
Other evidence on the access of funds by the sub-project beneficiaries indicates that the 
politicians i.e. local council 1s are supposed to recommend the groups to open up a bank 
account and in this it has been reported that some local council 1 leaders  can impose an 
unofficial cash fee before the recommendation letter is written. Focus group discussions also 
uncovered other charges which related to corrupt facilitators asking for more payments than 
the money they are supposed to be paid or sometimes the facilitators asking for advance 
payment for their services before completion of the sub-project preparation and approval 
process. 
In the focus group discussions there were claims of corruption relating to some NUSAF 
officials dealing with suppliers to increase the prices of livestock and other farm inputs and 
technologies. For instance in District A, there was an incident where by goats were bought at 
200,000 Shs. each by a beneficiary group 3 times the cost of livestock compared to the local 
market price. 
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 A key informant reported that to avoid delays in delivery of inputs which is an additional 
cost to the suppliers, the private sector (suppliers) negotiates with the Procurement 
Committee with some kickback (money exchanges hands) and they bypass the Veterinary 
Doctor who is supposed to certify the quality of animals and then the suppliers quickly take 
the livestock directly to the beneficiaries. Evidence from the Process Net-Map indicates that 
corruption exists at the level of project approvals of infrastructural projects. A case in point 
are the sub-project enterprises where infrastructure like buildings for livestock and poultry 
are required before the project can kick off. Here the engineers can include some 
‘’difference’’ which is a cost above the normal market value with the intention that this 
money will be shared with their henchmen (collaborators). The focus group respondents in 
district A said that the NUSAF District Technical Officer is one of the most corrupt agents in 
the costing process of NUSAF building infrastructure and in the contracting process. 
Evidence shows that some elites in the community who wanted to benefit from NUSAF made 
lists of members or convinced them to sign their names after promising them something 
‘’money’’ and then these lists were used to access NUSAF funds. This is clear evidence of 
the existence of ‘’ghost projects’’ and ‘’ghost beneficiaries’’. Here big expensive sign posts 
for projects are seen but no or little activity at the sites and no value for money to show for 
the projects. Here the researcher confirmed this finding because he saw for himself some big 
NUSAF sign posts that were alleged to have cost to the tune of 200,000 Shs. in some cases 
which is almost 5% of the total project costs but with no evidence of value for money at the 
sites. 
Evidence from interviewees showed that, in some instances there was duplication of sub-
project files and creation of non-existent projects, the so called ‘’ghost projects’’ and “ghost 
beneficiaries” names of non-existent persons in the sub-counties. When the ghost project is 
funded the money is shared by the technical people and farmer leaders, that is all those 
people involved in the preparation of the ‘’fake paper work’’ share the money.  Finally, the 
tampering with files and the collusion to form ‘’ghost sub-projects’’ totally prevented 
NUSAF from achieving its objectives. 
6. Procurement process and mechanism 
In order to ensure effective and timely implementation of the procurement process in 
NUSAF, implementation guidelines  includes provisions for transparency, monitoring, 
grievance redressal, auditing, and social public auditing (Barazas). However, there were 
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challenges identified at the various steps during the procurement process as a result of by-
passing the procurement provisions. At the sub-county levels in all the districts visited, there 
was no evidence in form of reports for any social audit or Baraza to have taken place. 
In procurement by the community (community procurement) which was recommended in the 
provisions of NUSAF 2 for purposes of ensuring transparency and value for money, there 
were numerous problems uncovered. First, the problem with local purchase is that it delays in 
the supply of new technologies e.g. animals (goats, cows, sheep etc.) because many of the 
local suppliers did not have the capacity to supply the inputs. Sometimes the lack of local  
input supplies was caused by competition in the area from many different suppliers in the 
same market looking for the same technologies for instance big projects like NAADS, 
ALREP in their program activities are mostly re-stocking programs like NUSAF competing 
for the same suppliers.  
At steps 17 and 23 of  figure 16 , here at this point problems arise when the communities 
through the procurement committee can withdraw money from the bank and procure in puts 
on behalf of other members. Findings show that this very important responsibility was 
seriously misused. Evidence from the Process Net-Map interview suggests that poor quality 
inputs bought at cheaper prices in order for the procurement committee leaders to get a’’ 
difference’’ i.e. the difference between the actual quoted price and the negotiated cheaper 
price was usually shared by the members of the committee and in some recorded worst cases 
all the money was embezzled by some members and they relocated or ran away from their 
communities to other areas where they could not be traced. This challenge was exacerbated 
by the fact that the NUSAF project is dealing with a relatively ‘’mobile’’ return IDP 
population i.e. the people are not yet settled down very well in their villages and many of 
them are still on the move within and outside the post conflict zone, therefore it is very 
challenging in some cases to trace the culprits of the corrupt practices.   
However getting a supplier with the guidance of the district NUSAF technical officer was not 
a preferred option. Here the procurement process was not followed according to the 
procurement provisions. Findings show problems of favoritism, for instance facilitators could 
recommend to the procurement committee suppliers of their own choice and interests where 
they could possibly get a kickback. Interview evidence points to the leakage of the secret 
bidding information to the potential suppliers. To illustrate this point, there was evidence that 
the community facilitators mediated with suppliers and beneficiaries on behalf of suppliers 
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for a “kick back’’ as a reward for the service. This usually happened because the NUSAF 
community facilitators have inside information about the project. Secret information for 
example the reserve prices was revealed and in addition since the facilitators have worked 
with the procurement committee, they already know the person who is more influential on the 
committee and thus can be contacted by the supplier for “un-official negotiations’’.  
Similarly there were reports of the private sector exploiting the project members, for example 
buying low quality inputs that are not money worth. Another related challenge reported in the 
focus group discussions that has hampered community procurement is that there are usually 
no certified planting materials in the villages especially for the new technologies and for this 
reason usually the sub-county procurement committee takes over from the village and parish 
procurement committee and this disempowers the lower committees. This challenge is 
confirmed by findings from some members of the procurement committee who reported that 
they have not carried out any responsibilities or activities for the last six months.  
Interviewees on procurement committees complained that they are given powers but they 
cannot exercise them. Another procurement challenge reported by the key informant 
interviewees is that in the first phase of NUSAF (NUSAF 1) there was a directive that the 
private sector takes the lead in the procurement process. As a consequence this limited the 
powers of the project management committee and the procurement committee to handle the 
contracting process because OPM thought that the communities steal the money and run 
away to other areas.The poor working relationship between members of the CPMC and CPC 
is illustrated by this statement below from a member of the PC: 
  “Sometimes the contractor just delivers the animals to the 
CPMC and CPC        without even the knowledge of facilitators 
and SMS because they don’t live in our villages. The 
communities are eager to receive their inputs and they are not 
interested in delays. The communities just want to see things 
happening”( PC member).       
Participants in the Process Net-Map interviews considered the district technical team to be 
the most corrupt agents in the implementation because this is where final sub-project 
approvals take place (Step 11). NUSAF provisions recommend for the direct provision of 
cash and  inputs directly to local groups in order to ensure community empowerment and 
sustainability of sub-projects, however key informant interviews with the technical staff in 
the districts indicate that the project gave the local poor people to manage big amounts of 
cash. The funds were so big and excitement was so high for the people in post-conflict to 
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handle. Some projects with 10 members could be given about 15 million shillings with a 
member earning less than 200,000 shillings in a year being responsible for handling inputs 
and cash worth over 1 million in a few months. Evidence shows that some sub-project groups 
members conspired and sold the inputs and get cash to begin a business or motorcycle 
(locally called-Boda Boda) or retail business where they thought they can easily get daily 
income.  
The problem identified here in addition is that NUSAF did not mentor the communities 
adequately in terms of expected responsibilities, obligations on financial management, 
expected sanctions of misuse of funds and accountability. There was poor monitoring and 
many of the groups were left on their own because of the inadequate capacity of the NUSAF 
facilitators and CDOs to monitor and technical backstopping of the many sub-projects 
emanating from their areas of jurisdiction. All these findings from the Process Net-Map tool, 
focus group discussions and interviews indicate that NUSAF implementation of the 
procurement process was generally engulfed in corruption of different manifestations 
resulting from questionable procurement procedures, weak control mechanisms in the 
procurement process, poor on site supervision of NUSAF assets (technologies) and 
inadequate monitoring arrangements of the sub-projects. There were no monitoring program 
and reports that were found at the sub-counties visited during the study indicating that most 
of the monitoring was just carried out on an adhoc basis when visitors from the center (OPM) 
are expected to visit the areas. According to the NUSAF procurement guidelines, all supplied 
inputs must be certified for quality by the district relevant personnel before they are given to 
the beneficiaries. Findings show that certification of inputs before they are distributed to the 
beneficiaries does not usually take place and this is confirmed by lack of documents for 
example certification letters and reports at the sub-counties visited during the survey.   
This procedure of certification is again complicated by staff shortages at both the district and 
more so at the sub-counties. Related to this constraint is that the Veterinary doctor or the 
District Agricultural Officer (DAO) if available they lack adequate facilitation in terms of 
fuel from the NUSAF budget to carry out this activity and also to move at the lower levels of 
the district to ensure quality assurance. In case of supply of animals a movement permit from 
the Veterinary doctor at the source of the animals is required but field evidence shows that 
this stage is usually bypassed hence sick or stolen animals can be brought to the area.  
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7. Sub-project selection and approval 
According to the NUSAF provisions, the sub-project approval process requires 2 months to 
be complete (see appendix 7 and 8 for table of sub-project cycle/process). But evidence 
indicates that in some of the cases surveyed the sub-project process was too fast for the 
communities to cope with. Focus group discussions showed that the communities were not 
given enough time to participate effectively in the project selection, project preparation and 
since NUSAF is a Community Demand Driven project (CDD) this was contrary to the 
implementation guidelines. 
Findings indicate that the rushed sub-project identification and approval process led to the 
approval of unviable projects and respondents reported that this was one of the key reasons 
underlying the failure of many of the sub-projects. To illustrate this point, this rushed process 
made the projects not to be well researched for example some groups went into rearing goats, 
cows, improved poultry, piggery etc. without having the interest, financial ability and 
technical capacity to look after these enterprises for maximum benefit. Evidence in 2 of the 
sub-counties visited shows that some of the NUSAF sub-project group members showed 
considerable disregard for the livestock re-stocking NUSAF investments because this was not 
their first priority. Many saw little fast tangible benefit because livestock take long to bring 
benefits and as a result the cattle were mishandled. Evidence showed many cows emaciated 
as a result poor feeding and dire health conditions and with wounds as a result of canes.   
Interviewees in the Process Net- Map indicated that one of the reasons why this sub-project 
process was rushed through is that the districts wanted to use the money as fast as possible to 
avoid serious circumstances where money can be taken back to the center (Ministry of 
Finance) if it is not spent at the end of the reporting financial year. As a result the 
communities were forced to take up projects they did not really want and projects which were 
not their priority at the time.  
Evidence shows that in the Northern region people are predominantly crop farmers but were 
convinced to take up re-stocking program (cattle keeping) as the main project activity in 
NUSAF. Respondents indicated that in post-conflict conditions people are mainly interested 
in food security in the short term rather than keeping cattle which many considered a labor 
intensive and long-term venture and expensive in terms of food supplements, veterinary 
drugs and care.  This evidence shows that implementation of NUSAF fell short of the ability 
to mentor groups and guide them properly in project selection. The beneficiaries even after 
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delivering the NUSAF assets and technologies were generally left on their own ignoring the 
fact that such projects need a lot of additional financial input in terms of health care 
(veterinary services) and feeds and plus follow up support in terms veterinary services to 
control disease vectors. 
Participants in the focus groups indicated that the names of some projects were altered when 
they reached the district local government level for approval and vetting.  Evidence shows 
that there were incidences in which  the information in the sub-project files was tampered 
with, for example if the project has been approved some crafty NUSAF technical officers tear 
out the paper with the names and signatures of the of the beneficiaries and then they insert the 
names of their own people i.e. family, friends or political allies whom they can easily collude 
with to share the NUSAF funds and assets. Other evidence indicates that there was no 
feedback why some farmers who applied did not benefit from NUSAF i.e. there was poor 
feedback from districts about the project approval process.  
Evidence from the Process Net-Map shows that contrary to the implementation guidelines 
whereby the project files are supposed to pass through the sub-county (step 7 in figure 6.5) 
but in reality  many files for subprojects left the community and went directly to the district 
chairman (district boss LC 5 office) who hands the files to the district NUSAF technical 
officer to accelerate the sub-project approval process for his “people” or ‘’henchmen”. Other 
evidence points to problems of lack of minutes for the technical evaluation of the bid 
documents contrary to the procurement guidelines. In addition, even these documents cannot 
be accessed easily in some of the areas visited showing that there is something being hidden. 
Some sub-county technical officers interviewed complained that district administrators 
dominate and sometimes hijack the sub-project appraisal process. Findings indicate that the 
failure to involve local governments at this sub-county level by NUSAF had serious negative 
impacts because the most important man power for monitoring of NUSAF projects to ensure 
sustainability had to come from the sub-county level because this is the level at which 
implementation of activities takes place. 
In steps 11 and 12 of the Process Net-Map there was a challenge of inadequate flow of 
information. Some of the interviewees complained that there was no feedback to the 
communities to give reasons why their projects were rejected. Project files were not taken 
back to the communities to show gaps in their sub-projects therefore the beneficiary 
communities were not supported and they were left demoralized. Participants in the focus 
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group discussions also indicated that there was no written feedback given to them to explain 
why their projects were rejected.  
Sub-project approval issues are implied by the statement below: 
“The sub-project approval process had a“syndicate 
approach’’ and problems of lack of transparency. District 
leaders could avoid dialogue and just announce on radio 
and notice board at district the successful projects and they 
don’t even give reasons for rejection of other projects” 
(Community leader). 
Closely related to the above challenge, Process Net-Map interviews point to the challenges of 
malice and trickery in the sub-project approval process. Here some groups looked for their 
files at district for unsuccessful projects but on reaching the district, surprisingly they found 
out that the files were non-existent at the district. Evidence shows that some sub-project files 
were removed during the approval process to reduce competition for the limited funds or to 
deny some people NUSAF benefits because of political intrigue and outright malice. 
Interviewees also complained that even tracing of the project files was very difficult, time 
consuming and costly for the rural poor farmers in terms of transport costs to and from the 
district back to their villages. For instance some places could be more than 40 kms from the 
district and with no reliable transport services it was difficult to access the district 
headquarters. Similarly respondents indicated that some of sub-project file names were 
changed to other projects names by unscrupulous individuals, usually the technical personnel 
at the district who had access to the NUSAF offices. To illustrate this point,  a local poultry 
file can be changed to an animal re-stocking file with some changes, so tracing the file under 
a changed sub-project name proved to be  impossible. 
These problems highlighted above are also reflected in the problems of sustainability of 
NUSAF sub-projects witnessed by the researcher where there was minimal activity on a 
number of sub-project sites visited. This indicates that the NUSAF implementation guidelines 
which require an in-depth participatory approach which entails the involvement of all 
stakeholders were not adhered to. This governance challenge in NUSAF  is also reflected in 
the low rates of sustainability of many of the NUSAF sub-projects and low rates of utilization 
and maintenance of the community infrastructure e.g. bore wells, dug wells and communal 
cattle crushes to control ticks in livestock (goats, sheep and cows). 
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8. Project management 
Information dissemination and NUSAF mobilization strategy 
Process Net-Map, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and written records 
indicate that politicians were to a large extent the first mobilizers for NUSAF sub-project in 
the communities.To illustrate this point, all the LC 5 and LC 3 chairmen and politicians 
interviewed for this study showed considerable knowledge and active interest in NUSAF and 
its potential benefits to their constituencies. Because of these reasons I explored further this 
issue and found evidence of politicians, more especially local council 5 and 3 chairmen and 
councilors deriving political capital out of the NUSAF project and district level politicians 
and councilors commandeering the NUSAF resources to their constituencies. Respondents 
indicated that community participation was high at the selection phase of sub-projects but 
community participation fell considerably at the implementation and monitoring phase. 
In all the four districts surveyed for the study findings indicate that political mobilization has 
led to elite capture and local capture of the financial and agricultural assets of the program by 
the politicians. There was evidence of political involvement in the NUSAF program’s 
mobilization of communities, for example use of LC 1 for publicity and mobilization of 
communities. In addition information on NUSAF projects usually flows through political 
lines i.e. from the very lower levels, that is village level (LC1) and parish level (LC 2) and 
eventually to the higher levels that is sub-county, district and central levels. Interviewees 
argued that the involvement of LC1 has caused problems. To illustrate this point, information 
that the agricultural inputs and assets have arrived at the lower council (village level) is 
through the chairmen of LC 1, politicians who are by law NRM supporters (Government 
Ruling Party supporters). Therefore a name of somebody who is not a political ally can be 
removed at the last moment and give the inputs to their political henchmen. A respondent 
said that in some cases information may not even be passed to the one who would be a 
beneficiary that the inputs have been delivered to the area. 
  As one respondent said: 
“I don’t trust this process of beneficiary selection and 
distribution of inputs. If you are not a NRM (government 
supporter) with your own people in the implementation 
process your name can easily be removed from the list of 
the beneficiaries or be given lower quality 
livestock’’(NUSAF beneficiary). 
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The mobilization strategy for NUSAF of involving politicians has serious problems. Being a 
Community Demand Driven (CDD) project, absence of a good mobilization strategy creates 
the challenge of those not close to the political elite being unable to have a platform to 
articulate their demand for NUSAF services. Evidence from respondents confirms that the 
NUSAF project still remains dominated by the local elites and this still remains a 
fundamental challenge of the implementation of the program in Northern Uganda. 
Respondents reported that politics at lower levels plays a role in selecting which  project 
will be funded. So findings indicate that in a number of cases how politically feasible the 
sub-project is in terms of votes replaced the recommended technical feasibility in the sub-
project approval.  
Interviews point to the challenge of poor communications between the central level and the 
local governments i.e. NUSAF Management Unit (NUMU) and more especially with the 
rural sub-counties where the activities for project implementation take place. Findings 
indicate that the rural sub-counties surveyed lacked internet access and computers for data 
management and for general NUSAF operations and this deficiency constrains the process 
of timely approval of sub-projects which in many cases frustrates the needy communities 
who are eager to receive the NUSAF long awaited benefits. Another challenge is that the 
NUSAF Operation Manual does not provide for sufficient facilitation for the sub-county 
Community Development Officers and the parish facilitators which as a result, greatly 
affected mobilization and sensitization of the community about the NUSAF operations. 
Project monitoring and evaluation 
NUSAF operational guidelines required that certain designated officers carry out regular field 
visits so as to provide technical support and guidance to the beneficiaries, review and report 
on progress to ensure that the sub-projects’ objectives are achieved. Key informant 
interviewees indicated that local governments at the district and sub-county level are 
supposed to engage actively in the monitoring and supervision of NUSAF sub-projects but 
due to shortage and lack of logistical, technical and human resources most projects are not 
supervised in time, regularly and completely. 
Evidence from the focus group discussions showed the problems of inadequate flow of 
information at all the stages of the implementation of the NUSAF sub-project process. This 
evidence shows that there is no well-functioning Management Information System  (MIS)  
that contains adequate flow of information and feedback at all stages of the implementation 
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which was highly recommended in the NUSAF implementation guidelines. A case in point is 
the NUSAF re-stocking project in one of the sub-counties visited. For example there were no 
advert lists available and monitoring reports plus a file of exhaustive  progress reports of 
projects. Interviewees said that local leaders, CDOs and the politicians were left out in the 
procurement process so it was difficult to monitor the projects because they did not know the 
terms of reference in the procurement process. The CDOs were not fully utilized considering 
their strategic positioning at the sub-county level especially in the management of the 
community development work. This finding confirms that NUSAF project was implemented 
mainly in isolation from other ongoing government programs such as NAADS which already 
has community institutions in place like extension workers and community based facilitators 
(CBFs) plus the farmers’ fora. 
The Process Net-Map suggests that there was a total breakdown in monitoring of NUSAF 
activities for instance respondents mentioned that the parish development committee and the 
sub-county officials were not involved in monitoring. Whereas provisions in the guidelines 
allocate 8% of the budget for administrative and monitoring activities, evidence in all the 
districts surveyed shows that the monitoring funds at the sub-county levels were misused 
because there were no comprehensive monitoring reports or in some cases two or one report 
could be found at the sub-county levels surveyed, which could not help in addressing issues 
affecting the NUSAF implementation. Evidence shows that the NUSAF desk officers were 
spread thin on the ground and their technical field visits were hampered by limited facilitation 
ie. reports show that the 10% budget allocated to monitoring was already exhausted at the 
initial stages of the financial year.  
Respondents also reported that the already existing parish farmer institutions for monitoring, 
for example the Parish Development Committee which is under the sub-county local 
government structures were left out of the NUSAF implementation process. The statement 
below describies the situation: 
 
                One member of the Parish Development Committee (PDC) said: 
“What does the Parish Development Committee do if 
you can leave them out of the NUSAF 
implementation process. Here the information gap 
between us the PDC and NUSAF officials at the sub-
county is big. They do not even inform us about their 
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activities and we also do not know what exactly they 
are doing in our communities”. 
Another challenge faced by the communities is the ability to digest the quantitative 
information reported by the districts and sub-counties. Findings indicate that there is no 
detailed qualitative information reported on the sub-projects. The majority of reports usually 
just come up with numbers and the amount of money spent and status of implementation 
whether the project is ongoing or finished.   
As one local leader commented: 
“The projects completed are reported 
as numbers i.e. so and so many 
projects completed but what about 
their quality? Here the implementers  
are interested in just telling us the 
number of projects completed’’. 
9. Design features of the program 
Advisory methods 
Participants in the focus group discussions said that NUSAF did not take advisory services to 
farmers seriously but concentrated on the distribution of assets to beneficiaries. For example 
this statement from one of the NUSAF livestock beneficiaries illustrates the point: 
“ NUSAF phase 2 in the first place did not even train 
us on basic animal management practices,for example 
feeding , treatment of diseases and even gave us no 
support for input provision for example building 
shelters for the animals” (NUSAF beneficiary).  
NUSAF has not provided additional inputs to assist farmers, for example the 
pumps and other additional equipments for spraying. There is no adequate 
support to the farmers after delivery of animals.  Even monitoring of animals by 
the technical persons is a challenge. 
The inadequacy of advisory methods in NUSAF is illustrated by these 
statements below: 
“Technical assistance to us beneficiaries by NUSAF 
technical personell was not there.That is why diseases have 
killed many of our animals. We could not also manage the 
high costs involved in animal treatment. Some funds for 
199 
 
treatment of animals were included on the budget but these 
were not adequate”. ( NUSAF livestock beneficiary). 
“NUSAF  did not develop complementary projects that can benefit 
from each  other. They developed ''Stand alone projects’’(District 
technical officer). 
Project coverage and targeting mechanism  
Findings indicate that the rushed program rollout of NUSAF to the communities more 
especially at the beginning of the program brought in serious governance challenges. Here the 
rushed rollout of NUSAF in the communities prevented group processes from emerging more 
organically ( failure to create groups with strong bonds). Findings indicate that in the 
majority of cases the groups had not received effective institutional development training and 
quickly rushed to sub-project proposal preparation. Another finding is that the quality of 
services of the NUSAF group facilitators also negatively affected group cohesion, which 
resulted from poor mobilization and rushed trainings plus lack of technical capacity.   
According to the implementation guidelines, NUSAF took a Community Driven Approach 
and it was believed that the requirement by NUSAF for groups to work cooperatively in 
groups (group targeting) will improve rates of farmers’ participation and thus promote higher 
levels of social cohesion, but evidence shows that in many sub-project groups this was not the 
case. Evidence shows that many groups have collapsed as a result of conflicts between the 
group leaders and other group members themselves. Respondents also complained that unfair 
distribution of assets in NUSAF led to community conflicts and intra-group conflicts in some 
cases. Findings show that these conflicts regularly happened where livestock distribution took 
place and where those members with more influence (power and authority) manipulated the 
distribution process and information when the animals would be distributed in order to 
manipulate those members absent on the day of distribution. Cases of conflict led to sub-
project failure in most cases because project members could not work and support each other 
as a group for the sustainability of the projects. Findings indicate that problems of  enmity are 
partly due to corruption within their ranks (farmers) for example it could be members of the 
community who have not benefitted from NUSAF when they had applied for support or some 
members of the groups who are not happy with the quality of animals they have received. 
Findings indicate that in some cases some beneficiaries were walking off or fled their homes 
with animals without the prior knowledge of fellow members of the group and in other cases 
group leaders defrauded their members of the sub-project funds and assets.   
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One local key informant commented about NUSAF targeting 
approach: 
“With NUSAF project, too much money was involved with the 
very needy people and some group members were not trustworthy 
and others moved from one village to another in order to maximize 
the benefits. People have fought each other and some families have 
broken up because of wrangles over NUSAF money”. 
In terms of social cohesion, focus group findings confirm findings from interviews that the 
distribution of inputs within the NUSAF affiliated sub-project groups was not well organized 
and considered unfair and resulted in the outbreak of conflicts which turned violent in some 
cases even leading to family breakdown with even fatal injuries on some farmers as a result 
of the conflicts. Interviewees reported problems of malice for example, farmers who did not 
get the animals became jealousy and could kill the neighbor’s animals and this was reported 
to be common especially when the animals stray away and go into somebody else’s garden. 
Here respondents reported that this problem is caused by unfair distribution of animals 
leading to poor group spirit and some people applied to get the NUSAF group assets but feel 
that they were unfairly denied a chance to benefit from the project.  
In reality the Process Net-Map identified deficiencies in the selection and targeting of 
beneficiaries to benefit from the NUSAF programs. One of the major deficiencies of concern 
is the selection of who is to benefit from the NUSAF program. In order to ensure effective 
implementation of NUSAF and to make sure the services reach the vulnerable communities, 
implementation guidelines in NUSAF includes provisions for targeting. The idea for NUSAF 
was to empower vulnerable people, however evidence from the case study indicates that these 
provisions are rarely adhered to. Many people applied for NUSAF 1 and 2 but for some 
reasons did not get anything, but sometimes projects are given to those who can offer 
something (ie.money) respondents reported.  
The study  noted that the poor and marginalized people are not always in groups and probably 
some vulnerable individuals might have been left out by NUSAF because of the stringent 
conditions of joining groups in order to receive NUSAF assets. The war wounded , widows, 
as well as those who experienced multiple serious crimes remain among the most impacted 
and impoverished with worse food security and these people are not even able to access basic 
services like health but were not given due consideration in NUSAF targeting. These research 
findings which indicate the failure of NUSAF to target the very poor members of the society 
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is also corroborated by earlier research in Northern Uganda by Martin,Petty and Acidri 
(2009) on Northern Uganda which noted that NUSAF set very tough conditions for the 
beneficiaries to qualify for funding which the poor of the poor could not afford e.g. co-
funding, ability to afford medical care for livestock, home sanitation and planting trees as 
conditions for accessing NUSAF funds. 
Even in some cases the beneficiaries for a sub-project could be from the same family, for 
instance members of one family could apply for a project because the restrictions in the 
guidelines about who should benefit from NUSAF were not implemented i.e. that each 
household should have one beneficiary for a sub-project. As a result many members of the 
communities were left out due to poor targeting. In addition there was evidence that 
beneficiaries from the same family and household could easily misallocate the money for 
other purposes or distribute the money among themselves for other personal gain.  
Respondents indicated that it was common to select well to do people because of their 
influence power (authority) and the patronage opportunities offered by the loopholes in the 
NUSAF targeting provisions. To illustrate this in NUSAF, evidence shows that many 
politicians, businessmen and some civil servants benefitted from the sub-projects at the 
expense of the targeted rural poor who according to the NUSAF implementation guidelines 
are the intended beneficiaries.  Interviewees indicated that some elite groups with influential 
members pay kickbacks to the technical people to make the approval process of projects 
move faster and this is usually done by the rich and influential people. Respondents reported 
that those groups that had well connected people received the technical and administrative 
approvals faster. There were incidences of groups who got funding faster  and findings 
indicate that those who got approvals faster did so because they were ready to pay kickbacks 
to the officials who had powers to take final decisions concerning the vetting process of 
proposals, approvals and deciding which ones got funded at that time  and also those projects 
that were kept on the waiting list for the next phase of funding and those that were thrown 
into the ‘’dust bin’’. 
Another challenge was political capture and local capture of the subprojects. Interviewees 
complained about the involvement of political elite in the area in the distribution of sub-
projects in the communities. There were cases where some politicians especially at the 
district level wanted to ensure a balanced spread of the projects in all their constituencies 
(sub-county and parishes) which undermines NUSAF’s targeting guidelines of prioritizing 
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the most vulnerable groups but not areas. A case in point is in district A and B where it was 
observed during the survey that there was excessive concentration of projects around town 
centers.  
Another challenge is that NUSAF technocrats faced a serious governance challenge of 
gaining political commitment from politicians in the implementation of NUSAF when their 
views on sub-project distribution in their constituents  have not been considered by the 
NUSAF technical wing , for instance during the study some of the politicians interviewed at 
all the local government levels complained about the failure of NUSAF technocrats to listen 
to their suggestions and advice in as far as targeting is concerned. 
10. Collaboration with  NGOs and CBOs in NUSAF implementation 
According to the NUSAF implementation guidelines, it is recommended to involve the local 
NGOs in the area in the various aspects concerning NUSAF implementation in order to 
provide the required bridge between the communities and local governments and also to 
assist the local governments in strengthening the capacities of the community institutions e.g. 
PC and PMCs to manage the project funds responsibly. It was envisaged in the 
implementation provisions that there will be active involvement of NGOs in NUSAF 
activities this is because it was believed that NGOs have the capacity for performing a 
complimentary monitoring role in the programme implementation. However, the framework 
for integration of NUSAF into other government programs and NGOs is missing in its 
operational manual. 
Findings indicate that limited coordination of government programs with other humanitarian 
organization has constrained the effectivenesss on the current humanitarian and livelihoods 
improvement response in the North. The main problem here is the duplication of resources. 
Key informants indicated that aid projects by NGOs have not been mainstreamed with similar 
government programs and no clear exit strategies in good time especially for targeted 
vulnerable groups. This is important so that the farmers are not left  in a vaccumm once the 
assistance from development partners  is phased out. 
The Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were also supposed to have a bigger role to play in 
the implementation of NUSAF. In the beggining the CSOs were brought on board but when 
the activities of NUSAF started on the ground the CSOs were ignored. For example in Pader 
District, the Resident District Commisioner (RDC) invited the CSOs and even stated their 
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roles, that is to train members of the funded project. Pader district is an example of the 
success story in this respect because in NUSAF 2 the CSOs are on the ground and directly 
attached to the community and therefore play a very important role in monitoring therefore 
implementers of NUSAF should endeavor to bring the NGOs and CSOs on board . NUSAF 1 
completely ignored the role of CSOs and NGOs. In NAADS 1 however some members of 
CSOs in Pader were involved in training farmers as a business. When there is a gap NAADS 
continues inviting CSOs.  
Findings indicate that NGOs and Civil Society Organizations are making a big contribution 
to the recovery program in the Northern region, but it is hard to ascertain their contribution in 
the absence of shared work plans with the district local governments. For instance, many of 
the NGOs in the North do not coordinate with the district authorities in the implementation of 
their PRDP ( NUSAF project is part of the PRDP framework) related work. As a result it is 
also difficult for districts to supervise such projects or know how many projects they are in 
the district. One of the technical staff interviewed at the district level noted that, most NGOs 
think that they only have a financial obligation to their donors who give them money. This 
lack of accountability to the local governments by NGOs and CSOs makes it difficult to 
measure and appreciate the contribution of the donors through the various NGOs and CSOs 
in the district. 
An Assistant Chief Administrative Officer ( ACAO)  commented:  
“There is insufficient funding in the districts and in addition 
failure of the NGOs to declare what they have done. We want 
NGOs to coordinate with the districts local government to 
avoid duplication of work or concentration of same projects in 
one area, however when you try to ask some of the NGOs , 
they just ignore because they say that they are only 
accountable to their funders , so it is actually hard to know the 
actual contribution of some NGOs on the ground’’. 
However the ACAO admitted that the districts always ensure that a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) is signed with NGOs before any operations  start in the districts but 
also noted that there are also cases of uncooperative NGOs after signing the MOU. Findings 
also indicate that some NGOs do not want to disclose their sources of funding nor their 
budgets so it is impossible for the districts to know which kind of specific activities are 
funded by NGOs and how much money is being spent on activities in the district.  
To illustrate the point, the ACAO said: 
204 
 
“A district political official may be called to officiate on the 
ceremony of distribution of animals in the communities by a 
particular NGO and the district authorities were not informed at 
the inception of the project”. 
However interviewees from the NGOs and local governments indicated that collaboration has 
been very limited and some little collaboration which exists has been with very few 
International NGOs. The major local NGOs in the surveyed local governments indicated that 
NUSAF implementers have not engaged them for collaboration and also mentioned that their 
respective roles in NUSAF are not clear and thus poorly specified in the NUSAF 
implementation guidelines. For effective and cost effective implementation of NUSAF it 
would have been advantageous to involve the local NGOs in mobilization and capacity 
building. This is because the NGOs are already on the ground and they can also promote 
participatory planning and can work together  with the local governments more especially at 
the sub-county levels which are constrained in terms of skilled manpower.   
Other evidence indicates the unwillingness of some NGOs to tarnish their credibility with 
working with NUSAF because of the previous enormous corruption scandals witnessed in the 
project. A case in point is one big local NGO which rejected funds to the tune of 1 billion 
Uganda shillings to implement livelihoods NUSAF projects in Northern Uganda and 
Karamoja regions. This is because the NGO feared that being associated with the NUSAF 
project will damage its credibility in the face of its International Donors whom they fear that 
they can lose the longterm support whereas they know that NUSAF is a short term project of 
which many commentators from NGOs and Civil society mention that NUSAF will 
‘’collapse’’ any time the NAADS way. A number of NGO officials consulted during the 
study expressed skeptism about the capacity of local government staff  to implement NUSAF 
2 effectively alone  given the bad experiences with other huge government programs e.g. 
NURP 1, NUSAF 1, NAADS and LGDP, fearing that resources in NUSAF 2 could have the 
same fate of being swindled or used sub-optimally. 
A NUSAF district technical official also indicated the risks of 
working with some NGOs: 
“In Northern Uganda some of the NGOs and CBOs are not 
credible, many were formed for optimistic causes, because of the 
availability of NAADS and NUSAF resources targeting NGOs and 
the need to tap these resources for personal gain’’. 
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The issue of uncredible NGOs working in Northern Uganda is implied by the 
following statements from a former Member of Parlianment: 
“Some of the programs by the NGOs are imposed on the people. For 
example in 2010 I stopped 2 lorries of cassava cuttings not to be 
distributed in my constituency of Omoro County, Gulu district 
because it was November coming to the dry season and the farmers 
had not even prepared the fields  and the cuttings were dry and poor 
quality. Here the NGO just wanted to ``Clean its Books``.The would 
be beneficiaries were not consulted to tell them (NGO) their 
priorities and prepare their gardens and also advise the supplier on 
the best time for the delivery of the planting materials.This is why 
many programs in Northern Uganda both Government and private 
have not had a high impact in the region”. (Former Member of 
Parliament-MP). 
 
11. Institutional arrangements and governance structures  
NUSAF implementation guidelines indicate that it will be implemented through institutions 
at both the center (state level) and through a decentralized implementation at district and sub- 
county level. Provisions recommend that NUSAF will be implemented through community 
based approach. Evidence indicates that some of the NUSAF components have a high degree 
of overlap with some other government programs for example, Community  Agricultural 
Infrastrural Programme (CAIIP), NAADS and ALREP indicating the need to streamline the 
implementation of these programs. 
The most important agency at the center in the implementation of NUSAF is the Office of the 
Prime Minister (OPM) (Refer to NUSAF Institutional Structure figure 4.5). This location of 
NUSAF in OPM is problematic because NUSAF would have been located elsewhere, for 
example MAAIF which is central for improving agricultural livelihoods. Another challenge is 
that NUSAF guidelines recommend the use of private facilitators and this left the local 
government technical staff alienated.  Many of the local government staff felt that they are 
left out of the NUSAF livelihoods development process and  this was more pronounced in 
NUSAF 1 project and therefore it was rather difficult to bring them on board in NUSAF 
phase two.  
One local government senior technical staff said: 
“The implementation of NUSAF with its parallel 
structures and the sidelining of the existing local 
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government techinical staff in the implementation of 
NUSAF is a serious mistake. This is because most of 
the work done now on many of the sub-projects is of 
very low quality because the technical staff at the local 
governments were not involved in their design, 
supervision and monitoring.’’ 
Other key informants voiced concern over the parallel system of NUSAF project to the local 
government structures. Here a case in point is lack of the full involvement of the district local 
government staff in the implementation. Other authors for example Jones (2009), Robinson 
(2005) and Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2008) also noted the institutional challenges in the 
NUSAF design, that is the decision to use parallel structures in the implementation of the 
program. The authors noted that the Community Driven Development approach of NUSAF 
effectively excluded and alienated the state from the NUSAF implementation process and 
further showing to the people of Northern Uganda that the state previously was not interested 
in their needs. According to Brock et al. (2002) at the time of inception of NUSAF donors 
were advocating for NUSAF to be linked to the ongoing Local Government Development 
Program (LGDP). This research findings also are in line with Robinson (2005) who said that: 
“Politicians usually complained about NUSAF 
program as a substitute for political action required to 
tackle the underlying causes of poverty in Northern 
Uganda”. 
According to my field experiences in the North during the survey , I 
also completely agree with Lange (2008) who noted that: 
“The danger of using non-state actors to deliver 
development is that it may have a negative effect on 
people’s interest in politics, increase cynicism about 
the government, retard peacebuilding  and even finally 
weaken the democratic process”.  
Key informants mentioned that it would have been better for NUSAF to offer incentives for 
the government existing civil servants to offer services, for example to work as facilitators 
and Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) in programme implementation. From the survey 
findings from all the local government officials interviewed complained that NUSAF is not 
providing them facilitation to complement the project’s work. The absence of facilitation 
allowances from NUSAF acts as a dis-incentive since the local government staff are not 
interested to carry out NUSAF tasks without facilitation. This is because when the local 
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government staff are involved in NUSAF activities they incur additional expenses and 
additional responsibilities in addition to their official duties. 
Another issue is that NUSAF is under Community Development Directorate, but the services 
under NUSAF are mainly all technical and the challenge is that NUSAF is only handled 
mainly by social workers. There is need to include the technical people in agriculture and 
veterinary fields. Findings indicate that there is some lost linkage of NUSAF 2 to the 
Production and Marketing Department at district level which trickles even down to the lower 
local government levels. There is a weak institutional arrangement because the NUSAF 
project should have been linked to the right departments. In addition there is no Institutional 
Framework between NAADS and NUSAF. 
Interaction with district officials also revealed that there is a problem of conflicting 
guidelines from the OPM, MoFPED and other line ministries in regard to supervision and 
monitoring of PRDP of which the NUSAF project is part. Yet the districts must supervise the 
projects to know whether they have been implemented and done properly. As a result of 
inadequate or poor supervision, beneficiaries at several projects complained of sub-standard 
work. For example there was incredible evidence that some buildings like poultry houses had 
developed cracks during construction or immediately after completion. Therefore these 
shortcomings remain serious challenges that retard or hamper the full realization of the 
NUSAF strategic objectives especially of rebuilding and empowering the community and 
revitalzation of the local economy. 
 Key informant interviewees indicated that only indicative figures to show the total resource 
availability from NUSAF are provided to districts. In addition, evidence shows that in all the 
districts surveyed the NUSAF resources and specific budget lines are not integrated budgets 
with the district local governments’ yearly budgets. Interviewees at the district level indicated 
that this challenge is as a result of NUSAF failing to provide information in time in as far as 
community sub-projects are concerned and also be able to integrate them into the annual 
budget in line with the local government planning cycle in order to harmonize the planning 
and monitoring at the local government level.  
Evidence shows that NUSAF faces serious challenges of reporting and coordination. For 
instance the challenge identified by the key informants is to be able to coordinate the big 
component of agricultural livelihood activities in NUSAF from the Office of the Prime 
Minister (OPM) and also to be able to work with staff from the districts and sub-county in the 
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Production Directorate who are under the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and 
Fisheries (MAAIF). Key informants interviewed in MAAIF mentioned that there is a 
missiong link in terms of information flow and coordination between the OPM in the NUSAF 
implementation and some technical officers at MAAIF said that they do not know what is 
going on with NUSAF implementation and reffered this researcher to the district levels for 
information regarding NUSAF implementation. 
Demand-side factors 
1. Household level 
Education level 
The challenge of NUSAF is that the sub-project cycle is being transaction and document 
intensive. There are a lot of documents required to be prepared before the farmers can access 
the benefits. This document intensive process is a problem to the implementers and 
beneficiaries alike. In the first instance evidence from Process Net-Map shows that these 
implementation manuals and procedures are too complicated for the beneficiaries members to 
understand and use. This finding is illustrated by the statement below 
One beneficiary complained that:  
‘’the document intensive process renders the 
whole NUSAF implementation system futile’’. 
The lack of adequate education in the rural communities of Northern Uganda complicated 
processes that required preparation of paper work, handling documents and trainings. The 
process of generation of feasible sub-projects up to approval is transaction intensive for 
instance it requires a lot of time, technical skills and paper work and cost. Evidence shows  
and this was not well anticipated by NUSAF designers  in the post-conflict conditions.  
Human capital 
Here human capital refers to the stock of knowledge, habits , social and personality attributes 
including creativity embodied in the ability to perform labour so as to produce economic 
value. Displacement through the conflict led to a big loss in human capital. This loss has been 
through death and migration to other peaceful areas. Many people dont want to work or live 
in the post conflict North . This is due for fear of the resurgency of the war . People are not 
sure whether really the war ended. The post conflict North has a limited physical and social 
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infrastructure which does not attract the technical staff. Poor education services for family, 
poor road infrastructure, poor health services, poor banking services and high incidences of 
crime present challenges for the local governments in the North to attract technical staff from 
other regions. 
Household income 
NUSAF implementation guidelines stated that 20% of NUSAF’s overall project costs should 
be raised locally as counterpart to the funding supplied by the World Bank and the Uganda 
Government. NUSAF operational guidelines request for the farmers’ contribution before 
accessing the NUSAF funds as a matching fund. The guidelines recommend that there will be 
minimum of 5% for VGS and CRCM and 20% for CDI sub-project components and in 
addition there were also requirements at household level which had to be fulfilled in order to 
qualify to benefit from the NUSAF project e.g. planting of trees, sanitation (presence of 
toilets in the household applying for funding) etc. Findings indicate that this level of 
community contribution was very high for the poorest of the regions of Uganda. This 
problem was echoed by all the local government, district and sub-county leaders  interviewed 
and they said that this provision was outrightly rejected during the design and consultative 
meetings on NUSAF 1 by the district leaders. But the district leaders complained that these 
stringent conditions were forced into the design of NUSAF once again by the technocrats.  
Insights from the focus group discussions indicate that many of the poor farmers could not 
comply with the tough requirements to access NUSAF 2 by the communities because of the 
high poverty levels in the post conflict region.  
One respondent stated: 
“How is a community so poor like ours which has been 
devastated by war be given conditions in order to access the 
livelihood resources when at the same time the aim of the 
project is to move us out of poverty?. This issue of conditional 
access to funds should be revisited and given according to the 
level of poverty in the regions and households’’.  
Evidence from the field and from respondents across all social sectors strongly indicates that 
many of the communities were not very positive in regard to complying with the conditions 
for access to funds and also other evidence points to the fact that the cause of this rejection 
apart from the prevailing poverty in the area was instigated by the local leaders the majority 
of whom belonged to the opposition parties to the ruling NRM party. 
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Evidence shows that there was a challenge that many of  the would be beneficiaries could not 
comply with the co-funding provisions. Participants in the focus groups complained that there 
were very tough requirements before a household could access the NUSAF funds since they 
are just IDP returnees and are just settling in and have immediate needs for example building 
houses and ensuring food security. Interviewees indicated that  those elite members and well 
to do members  of the community who could contribute as per the NUSAF provisions, in 
some cases negotiated a share of the sub-project assets with those who could not contribute 
This finding was especially very common with technologies which are private goods like 
improved seeds and fertlizers which could be sold again even at far lower prices than the 
prevailing market prices. 
2. Community level 
Social cohesion and social capital 
Findings from this survey indicate that in Northern Uganda family structures and dynamics 
have changed.  Due to the war there are weakened family and community systems. During 
the war and after relative peace had returned to the North collective action declined among 
the returnees. Before the war respondents indicated that there was strong collective action, for 
example collective forms of land preparing, planting,weeding and harvesting. Evidence 
shows that IDP camp inhabitants just cared for their own family survival and this norm 
continued even as people returned to their villages when peace returned to their areas. 
Pre-conflict agricultural expertise 
Findings show that the groups lacked capacity to manage resources of which they had no 
prior expertise before the war conflict. Evidence from the Process Net-Map suggests that 
there was mismanagement of the NUSAF projects by the beneficiaries especially the 
livestock enterprise sub- projects. Findings from the field visits showed that there was lack of 
technical capacity by the communities to look after the animals. Similarly,  evidence shows 
that the beneficiaries were not prepared enough in time to receive and manage the NUSAF 
sub-project assets. There was evidence in the field where the animals were not cared for 
properly like feeding, spraying etc. This caused death of many of the animals and onsidering 
evidence from the interviews, many of the beneficiaries lacked interest in animal rearing 
compared to crop production eg. maize, cassava, sorghum, simsim , ground nuts, which is the 
main enterprise in Northern Uganda.  Respondents indicated that with the VGS component, 
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in NUSAF 1 almost all of them collapsed and those that succeeded were not sustained. 
Members complained that group leaders mismanaged the groups and in case of re-stocking 
programs many animals have since died. There are expensive sign posts where these projects 
were but if you go to the site itself you find no activity. 
One political leader said: 
“Northern Uganda people are predominantly crop farmers  
and not so much of them are animal keepers that’s why in 
some cases they even hire people from western Uganda 
(predominantly cattle keeping area) to help them look after 
their animals for a fee’’.  
Another finding was a failed Zero grazing Heifer Project just because many members of the 
community were not used to such intensive livestock management before the war. 
Interviewees stated that if you give a heifer cow maintaining it is a challenge for the 
recipient.  
Like one respondent said: 
“Those improved zero grazing cows are very difficult to 
manage because they are fed and cared for better than the 
people who keep them. They need houses which are better 
than ours. Imagine my self the beneficiary Iam living in a 
small grass thatched hut and then you tell me that part of the 
money for this project should buy materials like iron sheets 
and cement. Yet I live in just a small hut and in the end the 
cow will end up living in a structure better than mine”. 
Farmers’ needs and priorities 
Some of the political leaders interviewed mentioned that though NUSAF is a good project for 
them, it  is making their life very difficult with complaints from their electorate about the way 
the program is being run. During sensitization the program offered high expectation to every 
member of the community and assured them that everybody will benefit directly from the 
NUSAF resources and assets. 
A politician mentioned: 
“We promised all the members from the community to 
benefit directly from NUSAF, but what we are facing now as 
a result are the overwhelming demands in form of sub- 
project proposals emanating from the communities and when 
we ask NUSAF technical officials to get projects for our 
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people signs indicate that they have limited capacity in terms 
of funding in order to respond to the community 
expectations’’ (District political leader). 
NUSAF being a Community Driven Project (CDP), implementation guidelines call for 
complete community involvement in the selection and implementation of their sub-projects. 
However a number of challenges were reported in the focus group discussions. A case in 
point is the poor selection of projects in the livelihood component of NUSAF for instance 
Oxen and Ox-ploughs supplied, but there were no inputs supplied to ensure short term 
livelihoods of food security for the returning IDPs. Evidence indicates that the involvement 
of the  community in some of the NUSAF sub-projects implemented has been minimal to the 
extent that some beneficiaries complained about the relevance of the sub-project enterprises 
selected to their needs and expectations. This challenge had a negative bearing on the 
legitimacy, ownership and sustainability of the various projects under the various 
interventions.  
A local CBO official commented that:   
“When people are not consulted on a range of issues and lack the 
necessary knowledge about the investment priorities and their 
feasibility in their own situations, their contribution in the 
development and recovery process is minimal. Ultimately this 
affects the number of the beneficiaries both at planning and 
reporting stages’’. 
Another respondent said that: 
‘’NUSAF provided a negative menu. Why didn’t they provide 
money (cash) for business for returnees because this can be a much 
needed fast provision of livelihoods for returnees in post- 
conflict?’’. 
Also some respondents in the focus group discussions reported issues of poor project 
planning. To illustrate this, for example in case of Oxen project some of the beneficiaries 
were supplied with oxen but for some unknown reason did not get an ox-plough. This was a 
big challenge to the poor IDP returnees to hire ox-ploughs which the majority of farmers 
could not afford. 
In many of the NUSAF affiliated groups, it was noted in the focus group discussions that they 
have members with different enterprise interests and this is the reason why after getting the 
sub-project funding from NUSAF the groups dis-integrated and in many cases conflict results 
on how to share the resources in their midst. Similarly, there were challenges of the misuse of 
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animals by the beneficiaries, some animals (cattle) for re-stocking purposes were slaughtered 
and sold illegally to other elite or well to do members of the community at far lower market 
values. In addition other animals e.g. Goats were sometimes used for traditional ceremonies 
like paying dowry (bride price) and other traditional ceremonies. All the above problems 
indicate the failure of NUSAF to encourage and mentor the formation of strong and 
sustainable groups on the demand driven basis, entrepreneurship and cooperation among the 
group members.  
The lack of full beneficiary participation in project identification was shown by the rather  
poor maintenance and supervision with many of the NUSAF assets and technologies 
remaining incomplete and in other cases un used or abandoned for example there was a bore 
hole abandoned and then ransacked and others under utilized. The borehole was located in an 
area with low population compared to other areas but attracted to the area by one popular 
political  individual. Evidence from the survey districts showed an abandoned poultry house 
and borehole and dug well showing no physical activity at the site for a long time. 
Local organization capacity and culture 
Key informant interviewees indicated that the negative attitude of many of the rural people in 
Northern Uganda, especially the youth has hampered the smooth implementation of 
livelihhoods projects like NUSAF. Many interviewees indicated that there is negative attitude 
in the region . To illustrate the point, because of the 20 years of fighting and being forced ito 
IDP camps, the communities developed negative attitudes towards the NRM government. 
Similarly even the youths who were born in the camps do not believe that they were born in 
the camps because government wanted to make their parents and relatives safe. They were 
told by some of their relatives that the government kept them in camps in order to make them 
suffer. This makes them believe that nothing is good from the government and don’t want to 
participate fully in local government led programmes. Findings indicate that this negative 
attitude has been aggravated by the high levels of suspicion from many respondents in the 
fous group  discussions that the local leaders are corrupt because of being beneficiaries of 
numerous inputs and assets from various sub-projects because they support the existing NRM 
government. 
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The Community Development Officer (CDO) commented 
that: 
“Communities in Northern Uganda are desperate and still 
depend mainly on ‘’hand-outs’’. The lack of income 
generating opportunities makes the community unable to 
participate in the recovery programmes and sustainability 
of such interventions becomes difficult”. 
Findings indicate that in Northern Uganda there are millions of people living in rural 
communities and lack the means and access to higher education. Many of the former IDPs 
have been unable to pursue primary education and therefore cannot fully participate in the 
recovery programs. This challenge of lack of technical capacity is illustrated by the statement 
below: 
“Due to the length of the LRA conflict, rural community 
members need to be empowered to ‘’restart’’ their lives. They 
have become accustomed to emergency relief efforts and expect 
the local government and NGOs to continue giving them ‘’hand 
outs’’( Officer from Invisible Children-NGO). 
Another type of governance challenge identified in NUSAF is the weak institutional and 
technical capacity of the local communities. Findings indicate that the local community who 
are also supposed  to play an active  role in the implementation of the sub-projects are either 
technically incompetent or are not empowered to challenge work of a contractor. Interviews 
with beneficiaries of some of the infrastructural projects e.g. water project and community 
road under NUSAF, beneficiaries could not tell even which contractor did the work. During 
the focus group discussions, respondents complained that they as end users are never 
informed by the relevant authorities about the projects before or upon commencement of 
works and under what terms. So the local leaders are unable to monitor the projects because 
they lack information on the Terms of Reference (TOR). The respondents in the focus groups 
said that they just see a contractor coming and starting the work. They said that they do not 
have a clue on whether they are supposed to play a part in the monitoring of the contract.  
Implementations guidelines in NUSAF require the creation of committees (CPMCs and PCs)  
whose members are elected by the community and are given responsibility on behalf of other 
group members for project design and implementation. Evidence from interviews, focus 
group discussions show that in practice this institutional arrangement has not worked 
efficiently because the committees have not managed to cope with the transaction intensive 
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and speedy procedural and organizational  requirements of NUSAF due to issues to do with 
education. Findings indicate inadequate institutional capacity of the committees. To illustrate 
this point,  in the majority of the groups visited there is little evidence of minutes of group 
and committee meetings on a regular meeting as required in the implementation provisions.  
Findings indicate that committees in the rural areas with mostly illiterate or semi illiterate 
leaders faced enormous challenges and this affected the number of sub-project applications 
i.e. less sub-project applications were generated  from rural areas compared to the urban areas 
at a particular time. 
Another recipient of a re-stocking improved goat program and a 
group leader complained that:  
“some group members think the animals belong to the district or 
sub-county. He stated that there is one instance where the recipient 
of the improved goat breed called the Veterinary officer at the 
local government and told him to come and take away his goat  
because he could not manage the feeding and veterinary medical 
bills. He said that this challenge is as a result of not involving 
people who are going to benefit and asking them what they 
actually want and assessing what they can manage’’. 
Another related challenge identified in the focus groups is that NUSAF being a Community 
Demand Driven project, there was a challenge in terms of the NUSAF affiliated groups 
which is the lack of capacity  to monitor the work of the service providers, for instance on 
projects like poultry farming and zero grazing which required construction work. Similarly it 
was difficult for the communities to find the contractors who could offer quality services to 
their projects. Because of these problems, the long term viability of such sub-projects is 
highly doubted and beneficiaries will incur more costs of maintenance and ultimately issues 
of sustainability will emerge.   
Land availability and tenure security 
It is acknowledged in several research for example, Bukenya (2010) and Parkinson (2008)  
and documents on agricultural development strategy in Uganda  that access to land continues 
to constrain so many small holders. Issues of land access even become a greater constraint to 
production when farmers are advised by program implementers and extension workers to 
engage in enterprises oriented towards commercial farming and require big chanks of land, 
for instance livestock farming. Field observations indicate that the  post-conflict region of 
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Northern Uganda has unique challenges in as far as land issues are concerned. Evidence 
indicates that the acquisition of land for the construction of public utilities and sub-project 
facilities is an an issue that has the potential to derail the good development intentions of 
NUSAF because evidence shows that there are a number of cases where some of the 
programs under NUSAF that require larger pieces of land have exacerbated conflicts in the 
communities. For example many of the NUSAF  sub-projects failed due to problems brought 
about by land access and ownership. Here in some instances the livestock were distributed to 
some people who had no land of their own for grazing. In other cases the problem was that 
someone who is the owner of the land on which the project is to be located for instance, 
houses for poultry later tried to take the project assets especially when the projects went idle.  
To illustrate this finding, there was a case in district B where one beneficiary who hosted the 
poultry enterprise sub-project appropriated the poultry house from the sub-project group to 
whom he had  lent the site of the project and removed the iron sheets and other materials and 
used them for his personal house elsewhere. Because the group members lacked the 
ownership rights, it was very difficult to make a legal challenge and this has given the  sub-
project group members who own land comparative advantage to gain from the failure of these 
group projects. Findings indicate that NUSAF failed to take into account the contextual 
factors in the Northern region. There is incredible evidence that NUSAF failed to engage 
with the local structures of power, for example  involvement of traditional leaders to solve the 
land issues, disputes and also explore the previous issues associated with working together in 
groups in Northern Uganda. 
Another challenge identified  is that while women played an active role in the success of 
many sub-projects, the majority of them do not ownership rights over  land and the majority 
do not participate in decisions concerning land and and to not have control over agricultural 
proceeds and these are still big challenges in the implementation of NUSAF. Evidence 
indicates that the main cause of this land governance challenge is because of the traditional 
constructions in the Northern region. Evidence shows that the main reason for this occurrence 
is due to the strong patriarchal and cultural attidutes in the region which has led to the 
impediment of access to the land by womem . During the study, it was noted from interviews 
and personal observations that women in Northern Uganda play a critical role in contributing 
to the economic wellbeing of their families because they are key players in food production 
that ensures food security and household incomes.  
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Findings from the study indicated that women lacked full control over the land in their 
households and according to the traditions in the North, the final decision concerning land is 
left to the husband as the head of the family. ie. in Northern Uganda  land is customary 
owned and this becomes difficult for women to indepedently own land. As a result, evidence 
shows that this prevented some women from successfully engaging in certain types of  
enterprises which required substancial amounts of land. To illustrate this point, there was a 
case in one of the sub-counties where a women group wanted to have a sub-project of poultry 
but found difficulty to identify a host farmer because most of them were reluctant to convince 
their husbands to provide a sub-project site at their homes. This led to the delay in the 
implementation of the sub-project. This challenge of lack of access to land confirms earlier 
work by FOWODE and OXFAM in 2004 and Bukenya (2010) , where it was noted that even 
though women are estimated to provide 90% of agricultural labour in Uganda, only 7% of the 
agricultural land is under their control. Similarly according to OPM evaluation of PMA in 
2005 and Bukenya (2010) it was noted that the most important gender concern for the PMA 
was women`s lack of ownership, control over land and productive assets and it was 
recommended that land reform is a major issue to be addressed if women are to benefit from 
development initiatives.  
Another challenge identified from this survey resulting from problems of land access is the 
limited access to finances by women. Women face challenges of accessing finances from 
formal credit institutions like banks sice the majority cannot afford the collateral security 
which in most cases is land. This confirms earlier work by Mwaka (2009) in a needs 
assessment study in which she found out that a big number of women have low access to 
finance with 57.9% from Acholi (Northern Uganda) and this limits women’s active 
participation in productive activities which require a substancial financial input. 
Gender issues  
During the  conflict that seriously affected Northern Uganda for 2 decades, women became 
the most vulnerable victims of war. Evidence shows that very many people experienced 
violence through killings, rape, kidnappings as well as forced marriages and unwanted 
pregnancies. Findings indicate that today in Northern Uganda many women are heads of 
families and alone have to ensure the food security and survival of their children alone. 
Survey findings indicate that the low level of education of women is one of the challenges in 
women’s participation and inclusion in the NUSAF implementation. Whereas the majority of 
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the sub-project group members are women and 30% of the council members are supposed to 
be women, their capacity to participate is low because many of  them are not educated. It was 
noted that very few women have leadership positions in the farmers’ institutions under 
NUSAF, for instance Procurement Committees (PCs) and Project Management committees 
(PMCs). This finding echoes earlier work by Isis-WICCE (2011) report on PRDP review and 
UWONET (2011) evaluation of the Gender Capital for Peace Recovery and Development 
Plan, which revealed that on deciding service delivery modalities in the Acholi sub-region 
women are not involved and usually women in decision making positions do not usually have 
a chance to present their views fully. I agree with the Isis-WICCE which calls for local 
governments to ensure that the views and voices of women are taken into account in the 
PRDP/ NUSAF and that government programmes benefit equally women and men, girls and 
boys and these programmes take care of their special needs and interests. 
Transaction costs 
Key informant interviews in the case study indicated that financial management is a 
particular challenge where the communities characterized by capacity contraints are required 
to open accounts for their sub-projects in the nearest bank into which the funds are disbursed 
from the NUMU –OPM account on  authorization from by district executive committee. 
These funds are made through separate disbursements (three tranches) according to the 
implementation provisions ( see step 16 in the Process Net-Map in figure 6.5 ). Findings 
indicate that at the community level some of the sub-project groups especially those far away 
from big urban centres face problems in the form of limited number of banking services  in 
their communities. Visits to banks involves travel for long distances and may even require to 
travel outside the district in order to access banking services. Bank services in the Northern 
region of Uganda are so scattered and they are found only in major towns for example Gulu, 
Kitgum and Pader this is because many of the banks withdrew their services from smaller 
towns during the war conflict in the region. This challenge reduces accounts accessibility by 
the farmers and increases the opportunity costs of farmers to visit banks let alone the high 
transaction costs and the time involved. Additinary it is also risky to move with cash for long 
distances because of the high incidences of thuggery in Northern Uganda. Other bank 
administrative burdens of opening bank accounts are a challenge to the sub-project 
beneficiaries e.g. printing of individual photograpths, travel costs etc., which are additional 
costs to the rural poor farmers. For instance the challenge to travel from Lamwo district to 
Kitgum town where the banks are located in about 20 kms distance and there is no readily 
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available transport any time of the day. Travelling such distances is expensive and dangerous 
to the beneficiaries to move with cash in regions which are not very secure, with many 
reported cases of thuggery in the area.  
Field evidence shows that members of the procurement committee faced other transaction 
costs in addition to the scattered nature of banks in the area. For example access to 
information on their sub-project approval process from the sub-counties and districts. In 
addition many of the group leaders who were signatories to the sub-project accounts had to 
move long distances to access bank services. Evidence shows that it was also risky for the 
group leaders to move with cash because of the high incidences of thuggery in the area.  
According to the NUSAF implementation provisions, representatives of farmers and 3 
signatories have to go to the bank with a letter of approval of LC1 who is a member of the 
ruling party by law which is a governace challenge of political capture. Bank delays e.g. 
opening accounts and getting the necessary documents for instance a bank can take about a 
month to produce the cheque book for the sub-project group. Similarly findings show that the 
communities face challenges of high transaction costs for example travelling to districts to 
access information and also additional costs of photographs, accessing the bank and even 
negotiation during the community procurement process by the sub-project procurement 
committee because they lack information on the different enterprises they have selected. 
The poor communities incurred transaction costs in terms of access to information and 
transport costs plus opportunity costs to follow up their project files up to the final stage at 
the district leve. Respondents said that access to NUSAF officers at district level is not easy 
as some secretaries of the officers ask whether you have an appointment. Many of the 
villages are far away from the district headquarters so the poor farmers apart from lack 
adequate funds for transport, they also do not know which correct people and which offices 
are to consult. So some of respondents  mentioned that they had to make numerous trips to 
the district headquarters in order to get some credible information about NUSAF 
implementation. As one key respondent said: 
 
“Lack of transparency on which project was rejected and the 
reasons why made the victims of war conflict to be victimized 
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again’’. Just putting the lists of successful projects at the sub-
county notice board does not tell us the truth’’. 
3. Local government level/central level 
Political interference 
Provisions in the NUSAF implementation guidelines mandate the use of local political 
leaders for the mobilization of communities, for example at the grassroots the local council 1 
is the one concerned with grassroot community mobilization. Findings show that the majority 
of the local council leaders were usually associated with other political elite at the upper 
levels e.g. LC 3 and LC 5.  This offers a substantial scope for political capture and political 
interference in the implementation of the program more especially at step 2 and 3 of the 
Process Net-Map in figure 6.5. To illustrate this point, information in NUSAF projects 
usually flows through political channels for example in the parish information flows through 
local council 2 and in the village it is through local council1. Therefore those who are not 
political allies are usually left out of the process. In the focus group discussions some 
participants complained that the local council leaders LC 1 and LC 2 usually gave 
information quite more easily for those who are known supporters of his or her political 
party.  
When mobilization favors a few people, this in turn may reduce the interest and commitment 
of the communities who are intentionally ``sidelined’’ in  the programme implementation and 
as a result political capture makes the programme fail to promote activities targeted towards 
the weaker and vulnerable sections of the society e.g. IDPs, returnees, demobilized soldiers, 
widows, women etc. Closely related to this, interviewees said that politicians preferred to 
issue favors to members of his family and political party or those henchmen close to him 
while other members were less likely to receive it.    
Secondly, respondents in the Process Net-Map mentioned that there is a challenge of the 
involvement of LC 3 who is the political head of the sub-county (for details see step 9 of 
Figure 6.5) in the procurement process i.e the chairman LC 3 participates  in a meeting for 
opening and selecting of the best bidder. Respondents said that at step 9 of figure 6.5 it was 
common for those people who are not political allies of the LC 3 to be left out and be 
punished by their lack of loyalty by not getting the supply contract. The LC 3 influences the 
selection of the best bidder. In one of the sub-counties surveyed, the LC 3 chairman felt so 
221 
 
powerful in his area that he called himself the ‘’President’’ of the sub county and usually he 
was  feared to be challenged by the technical officials at the sub-county when he said 
anything. 
Other findings indicate that the choice of sub-projects to be funded was linked to politicians 
i.e. either to politicians more so at the district level (councilors) influencing the vetting 
decisions in favor of the sub-project applications coming from their home sub-counties and 
sometimes encouraging them to send as many applications as possible at a faster rate to be 
able to benefit at the expense of those constituencies that are slow to bring in applications. 
This was done such that these politicians can gain political capital out of the political 
patronage opportunity from NUSAF as they prepare for the next elections. In the focus group 
discussions district and sub-county politicians that is the chairmen and councillors (these are 
area representatives) were mentioned as the most politically influential people in this process. 
Conflict of interest 
Respondents reported conflict of interest problems. There was evidence that some LC 3 
chairmen and councilors (politicians) have their own supply companies, so how can they then 
certify the quality of their own supplies. In the Process Net-Map participants reported that 
due to their political influence and power, the LC3 chairmen can go to the extent of 
influencing and challenging the group members. That is, they tell their constituents that it is  
because of their political might that they have NUSAF 2 in their area. Here the procurement 
committee members are humbled and cannot oppose the suggestions of LC 3 in the selection 
process of the best bidder. Similarly the LC 3 gives the possible suggestions of those he 
prefers (his henchmen) to benefit from the NUSAF assets. 
Respondents reported conflict of interest problems because there was evidence that some LC 
3 chairmen and councilors have their own supply companies.  So they cannot certify the 
quality of their own supplies and also criticize that their own companies have brought in poor 
quality inputs. In the influence Net-Map process, participants reported that due to their 
political influence and power, the LC3 chairmen can go to the extent of influencing and 
challenging the group members that it is because of their political might that they have 
NUSAF 2 in their area. Here the procurement committee members are humbled and cant 
oppose the suggestions of LC 3 in the selection process of the best bidder and here the LC 3 
gives the possible suggestions of those he prefers or his henchmen to take up the supply 
contracts. 
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7 QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS   
Overview 
The aim of this quantitative survey was to follow-up on the governance issues identified in 
the qualitative survey and to quantify the beneficiaries’ experiences and perceptions of 
governance in the implementation of NUSAF and NAADS programmes.This section focuses 
on the respondents’ perceptions on different issues concerning the target programs’ 
implementation. The study was also aimed at assessing the citizen- government relations in as 
far as program implementation in post-conflict areas is concerned. This section was also able 
to quantify the extent of problems in the implementation process i.e. participation of different 
age groups in the programmes, motivation to join the groups, adequacy and level of 
satisfaction of the NAADS and NUSAF programs in the eyes of the beneficiaries, group 
cohesion, access to information and perceptions about the different levels of government by 
the beneficiaries in as far as programme implementation is concerned. This information was 
collected at farmer group levels in both NAADS and NUSAF farmer affiliated groups 
through interviewing a randomly selected individual member of the farmer group. 
7.1 Household characteristics, income levels and enterprises  
In terms of household characteristics of the respondents who are affiliated to  NUSAF and 
NAADS farmer groups (Table 7.1), results show that the mean average age of all the 
participants is 43 years of age. This finding clearly shows that very few youths are being 
involved in the NUSAF and NAADS program activities. This finding confirms earlier 
findings in the qualitative survey in section 6 of this thesis where the youths were not 
interested in participating in programs that promote farming as an enterprise. This finding 
clearly confirms that the interests of the youths and the priority enterprises are different from 
those of the other members of the community. 
In terms of education level of the respondents the situation is not so bad at this mean average 
level of 43 years ie. at-least 50% of the respondents have primary education. But this 
situation could be different for the youths who spent all their childhood time in the IDP 
camps with limited access to education. In terms of income the survey results indicate that 
over 70% of the respondents are poor. Such a situation of poverty in the region has 
implications for the ability of the farmers to be able to meet their co-funding obligations in 
order to benefit from the NUSAF and NAADS programs.  
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The people in Northern Uganda have relatively big family sizes i.e. about 20% have about 
four members and about 50% have more than four members in the household. The question is 
how old are the members in the family? i.e. this has implications for dependency given that 
the highest numbers of individuals in the household are still young and the availability of 
human capital in the household depends on the age of the members in the homestead. 
7.2 Household characteristics, income levels and enterprises 
Survey results in table 7.1 indicate a high percentage of widowed individuals i.e. about 10% 
of the households are headed  by female household members who according to the survey 
results have limited livelihoods’ opportunities and this has serious implications for 
vulnerability and availability of household labour for agricultural production.Results in table 
7.2 indicate that there is some perceived changes in income of the beneficiaries because of 
participation in the programs i.e. generally results show a 15% increase in income as a result 
of benefits attained in participation in NAADS/NUSAF activities. In terms of diversification, 
NAADS affiliated farmers are engaged in both livestock and crop enterprises i.e. 30% crop 
and 54% livestock while few farmers in NUSAF are engaged in crop enterprises. Just a 
meagre 8% and the majority almost 90% are supported to undertake livestock enterprises. 
Such a situation with lack diversification in NUSAF has negative implications for food 
security of the farmers who mainly depend on subsistence crop production for their 
household survival. 
Table 7.1: Household characteristics 
  NUSAF (52) NAADS (52) Overall 
Age (Mean) 41.6 39.9 43.4 
Sex Male 48.1 44.2 46.2 
 Female 51.9 55.8 53.8 
Education Level    
 None 5.8 7.69 6.7 
 Primary 57.7 42.3 50.0 
 Secondary 32.7 36.5 34.6 
 A level   3.9   5.8   4.8 
 College-diploma   0.0   7.7   3.9 
Marital status    
 Married 80.8 84.6 82.7 
 Separated   1.9   0.0   1.0 
 Divorced   0.0   3.9   1.9 
 Widowed  11.5   7.7   9.6 
 Single    5.8   3.9   4.8 
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 Main Occupation    
 Farming 92.3 80.8 86.5 
 Teaching   0.0   9.6   4.8 
 Civil Servant   1.9   1.9   1.9 
 Trading   3.9   5.8   4.8 
 Student   1.9   1.9   1.9 
Family size    
 0-4 people 23.1 21.2 22.1 
 4-8 people 55.8 42.3 49.0 
 8-14 people 15.4 28.9 22.1 
 >15   5.8   7.7   6.7 
 
What means of transport do u use? 
  
 Own Bicycle 71.1 55.8 63.5 
 Own motor cycle   3.9   3.9   3.9 
 Hire 25.0 40.4 32.7 
Type of House    
 Grass thatched 84.6 69.2 76.9 
 Semi permanent 15.4 15.4 15.4 
 Permanent   0.0 15.4   7.7 
 
School for children 
   
 UPE 69.2 66.7 67.9 
 Private 26.9 27.5 27.2 
 USE   3.9   5.9   4.9 
 
Table 7.2: Income levels and enterprises 
  NUSAF (52) NAADS (52) Overall 
Monthly Income before NAADS   
 100.000 Shs 78.9 71.1 75.0 
 100.000-500000 21.2 23.1 22.1 
 >500.000   0.0   5.8   2.9 
Monthly income after NAADS   
 <100.000 55.8 63.5 59.6 
 100.000-500.000 44.2 32.7 38.5 
 >500.000   0.0   3.8   1.9 
What enterprise are you engaged in?  
 Livestock 88.5 53.9 71.2 
 Crop   7.7 30.8 19.2 
 Retail Business   1.9   1.9   1.9 
 Crop and livestock   0.0 13.5   6.7 
 Any other   1.9   0.0   1.0 
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7.3  Access to information about NUSAF/NAADS 
In terms of information dissemination (Table 7.3) about the NAADS and NUSAF programs, 
both local politicians and local government officials played an equally important role in 
sensitization i.e. 42 % and 52.92 % respectively. However findings indicate that, payment as 
a requirement to benefit from NUSAF program constituted a large percentage of about 54% 
and other household requirements which are 38% compared to NAADS program which had 
minimal requirements, for example the percentage of beneficiaries who had to pay something 
to participate was just 15%. This indicates that NUSAF instituted stringent measures to 
participate which many of the poor people in Northern Uganda could not afford.  
  
Table 7.3: Access to information about NUSAF/NAADS 
  NUSAF (52) NAADS (52) Overal 
How to become group member   
 Required to join   7.7   7.7  7.7 
 Invited 25.0 25.0 25.0 
 Voluntary Choice 40.4 46.2 43.3 
 Invited by political leader 26.9 21.2 24.4 
How did u know about NAADS   
 Local politicians 38.46 46.15 42.3 
 Local government technical staff 59.62 44.23 51.9 
 Colleagues 1.9 7.7 4.8 
 Religious leaders 0.00 1.9 1.0 
Any requirements to join group?   
 Payments 53.9 15.4 34.6 
 Sign documents   5.8   7.7   6.7 
 Household requirements eg. Sanitation 38.5 15.4 26.9 
 All the above   0.0   5.8  2.9 
 None of the above   1.9 55.8 28.9 
 
7.4 Benefits obtained from joining the groups 
When asked about which benefits the respondents obtained, the highest number of farmers 
indicated that they obtained training i.e. 71% under NUSAF and 55.8% under NAADS. In 
addition about 60% of the NAADS and NUSAF farmers said that they were not able to 
access technologies as a result of participation in the programme activities. The highest 
percentage of farmers, overall 88.5% mentioned that they were not able to access credit or 
savings services from the NAADS and NUSAF programmes. Those who mentioned that they 
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had access to credit were mostly members of those groups that were formed before both the 
NUSAF and NAADS programmes began. 
 
Table 7.4: Benefits obtained from joining the groups 
Access to  education and training  NUSAF NAADS Overall 
 Yes 71.2 55.8 63.5 
 No 28.9 44.2 36.5 
 Access to credit or savings   
 Yes   7.7 11.5   9.6 
 No 92.3 88.5 90.4 
Group help in access to agricultural input/technology 
 Yes 42.3 44.3 43.3 
 No 57.7 57.8 57.7 
 
7.5 Working together in the community (Social capital) 
As a measure of social capital i.e. ability to work together in the communities, the majority of 
the farmers i.e. 69% overall mentioned that they did not work together in the gardens and 
93% overall said that they did not work together at all to carry out other activities. This 
finding confirms earlier findings from the qualitative survey that there is a breakdown in 
social networks after the war whereby the majority of the community members now prefer to 
work alone because of the new individualistic tendencies. This finding of increased 
individuality in the North resonates with earlier findings in the qualitative survey where 
farmers now prefer to work alone in the gardens which was not the case before the war where 
collective weeding, planting and harvesting was the norm. 
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Table 7.5: Working together in the community (Social capital) 
  NUSAF (52) NAADS (52) Overal 
Have you worked with others to weed?  
 Yes 38.5 23.5 31.0 
 No 61.5 76.5 69.0 
Have you worked with others to market your agricultural produce?  
 Yes     0.0  7.7   3.9 
 No 100.0 92.3 96.2 
Have you worked with others to build?  
 Yes   3.9  3.9  3.9 
 No 96.1 96.1 96.1 
Have you worked with others to do other things?  
 Yes   5.8   8.2  7.0 
 No 94.2 91.8 93.0 
 
7.6  Level of satisfaction and constraints in the programs 
When asked about the level of satisfaction with both NUSAF and NAADS services (refer to 
table 7.6), an equal number of farmers (34.6%) said that they are not satisfied with the 
services offered by the programmes, while those who were satisfied was 30.8% for NUSAF 
while for NAADS it was lower at 25%. In terms of constraints of farmers for active 
involvement in group activities, a highest percentage (52%) overall said that activities on 
their gardens took much of their time while co-funding obligations took second place of 
36.3% overall.  
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Table 7.6: Level of satisfaction and constraints in the programs 
 NUSAF (52) NAADS (52) Overal 
level of satisfaction from the benefits from group 
1Satisfied 30.8 25.0 27.9 
2Fairly satisfied 34.6 40.4 37.5 
3Not satisfied 34.6 34.6 34.6 
1 53.9 52.0 52.9 
2 34.6 42.0 38.3 
3 11.5   6.0   8.8 
1 36.5 36.0 36.3 
2 50.0 38.0 44.0 
3 13.5 26.0 19.7 
1 36.5 36.0 36.3 
2 50.0 38.0 44.0 
3 13.5 26.0 19.7 
1  9.6 10.0  9.8 
2 15.4 22.0 18.7 
3 75.0 68.0 71.5 
 
 
7.7 How can the problems be solved and adequacy of Services and  adequacy of 
services of services offered by the programs? 
In terms of solutions to the problems the farmers are facing, the majority i.e. 56.3% overall  
reccomended that co-funding obligations should be eliminated while 36.9 % of the farmers 
recommended that facilitation in terms of for example, transport allowance could solve the 
constraints they are facing. 
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Table 7.7: How can the problems be solved and adequacy of services to farmers  
 NUSAF (52) NAADS (52) Overal 
Solve problem by eliminate co-founding to access program services and 
assets 
 
1 61.5 51.0 56.3 
2 30.8 23.5 27.2 
3   7.7 25.5 16.6 
Solve problem by providing facilitation  
1 34.6 39.2 36.9 
2 61.5 45.1 53.3 
3 3.85 15.7   9.77 
 
General level of adequacy of services   
Adequate 23.1 13.7 18.4 
Fairly adequate 21.2 58.8 40.0 
Not adequate 55.8 27.5 41.6 
In terms of adequacy of services provided by the programs, a higher percentage of farmers 
under NUSAF (55.8 %) mentioned that the services are not adequate, while 27.5% under 
NAADS said that the services are not adequate. However a lower percentage of farmers 
under NAADS i.e. 13.7% consider the services adequate, while a higher (23.1%) under 
NUSAF consider the services provided to the beneficiaries adequate. 
7.8 Support to join group 
In terms of support to the farmers to join the groups, grassroots local politicians i.e. LC 1 
played an important role for both NAADS and NUSAF programmes (see table 7.8 for details 
). This finding of involving politicians already involved in partisan politics has implications 
for the political capture of the programme resources/assets. 
Also more than 75% overall farmers in both NAADS and NUSAF benefited from inputs and 
just 20% said that they also benefited from the extension knowledge provided by 
NAADS/NUSAF. In terms of benefits, results from table 7.8 indicate that just only 10% of 
the farmers did not get what they requested for in NUSAF while double this ie. 20% in 
NAADS did not get what they wanted or they requested for. This finding confirms earlier 
findings from the qualitative survey whereby many farmers affiliated to NAADS complained 
that NAADS promises them technologies (inputs) but they wait for a longtime for the 
promised technologies to arrive and in the end they get nothing.   
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Table 7.8: Support to join group 
  NUSAF (52) NAADS (52) Overal 
Did any body support you to join group  
 LC 1 Chairman 84.6 76.0 80.3 
 Relative   5.8   8.0   6.9 
 LC 3 Chairman   1.9   2.0   2.0 
 Councillors   0.0   8.0   4.0 
 Husband/wife   7.7   6.0   6.9 
Benefits from group in last year   
 Inputs 75.0 78.9 76.9 
 Technical Support 21.2 19.2 20.2 
 Direct Cash   3.9   0.0   1.9 
 All the above   0.0   1.9   1.0 
Did each member get the input wanted?  
 Yes  90.4 80.4 85.4 
 No    9.6 19.6 14.6 
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7.9 Main source of motivation to join NAADS/NUSAF affiliated groups 
In figure 7.1 the respondents were asked what was their motivation to join NUSAF/ NAADS 
supported farmer groups. The overall motivation for getting farm inputs (technologies) from 
the program was the highest i.e. 47%, followed by knowledge 35% and lastly 27%. This 
result confirms earlier findings in the qualitative survey which showed that the participation 
of farmers in the farmer groups is a function of the perceived benefits they expect to obtain 
from the programme such as access to material incentives for example farm 
inputs/technologies.  
Motivation to enter groups to get direct cash was surprisingly low for both NAADS and 
NUSAF i.e. about 45%. This finding could be that through sensitization at the inception of 
the programs the farmers are now aware that they cannot get direct cash from either NAADS 
or NUSAF. This finding also corroborates other insights from the field whereby the female 
farmers preffered to get benefits in kind but not cash for the fear that their husbands can 
demand the cash from them and misuse it. Other implication from this finding is that overall, 
almost 50% of the farmers have high motivation to join the groups in order to get agricultural 
advisory knowledge. The challenge for project implementers is to be able to balance between 
knowledge and the technologies (inputs) given to farmers participating in the programmes. 
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Figure 7.1: Main source of motivation to join NAADS/NUSAF affiliated groups 
 
 
7.10 Procurement issuess, accountability and access to inputs 
In table 7.9 below, respondents were asked about the problems they face in the 
implementation of the procurement process in order for them to be able to obtain the required 
inputs. All the respondents interviewed said that they faced challenges in the procurement 
process and the majority for NAADS beneficiaries i.e. 57% said that they faced challenges of 
poor quality, less quantity supplied to them plus problems with late delivery of inputs to the 
farmer beneficiaries. Qualitative results also indicate that procurement problems faced in both 
NAADS and NUSAF hinge on issues of quality, quantity and the timeliness of the delivery of 
inputs. However for NUSAF this problem was less pronounced with just about 20% of 
respondents mentioning this problem. For NUSAF the problems of poor quality delivery , 
according to the qualitative survey findings were reduced by operationalizing the community 
procurement process which enabled the farmers to procure their own inputs. This finding 
confirms earlier findings that the NUSAF procurement cycle is very long and a document 
intensive process which is a serious constraint to the majority of farmers who are semi-
illiterate. 
For NUSAF respondents,  paper work preparation appeared to be a more dominant problem 
with 50% of the respondents mentioning this problem. Also a reasonable number of 
respondents of about 30% for both NUSAF and NAADS mentioned the problem of lack of 
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information (information assymetries). In terms of ensuring accountability on the Supply-side 
the farmers said that the project implementers made it a point that they had to sign some 
documents to confirm that they received the inputs. In table 7.9 a considerable number of  
33% mentioned that they had difficulty in getting inputs from the programmes. This finding 
confirms earlier findings that there are problems of exclusion in both NAADS and NUSAF 
programmes. 
Table 7.9: Procurement issuess, accountability and access to inputs 
 NUSAF 
(52) 
NAADS 
(52) 
Overall 
 
Procurement problems (quality, quantity and timeliness) 21.4 57.1 39.3 
Procurement process paper work preparation 50.0 14.3 32.1 
Lack of information in procurement  28.6 28.6 28.6 
Did you sign something to get inputs?  
Yes 98.1 98.1 98.1 
No   1.9   1.9   1.9 
Any difficulty in getting inputs   
Yes 32.7 35.3 34.0 
No 67.3 64.7 66.0 
 
7.11 Entitlements and group leadership 
In terms of entitlements a reasonable percentage of respondents  (27% for NAADS and 31% 
for NUSAF) indicated that they did not know how much money they are entitled to in their 
groups. This has implications in that the beneficiaries are unable to hold the implementers 
accountable because they do not have the information. So as ealier mentioned, many of the 
beneficiaries just wait and take what they are given knowing that they can use it for 
something. In terms of participation in groups, 62% of the respondents mentioned that their 
group leadership is active compared to the 31% who mentioned that the group leadership is 
somewhat active. Of the group leaders interviewed, 72% said that they know about 
entitlements from their group while the remaining 28% said that they don’t know how much 
they are entitled to.     
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Table 7.10: Entitlements and group leadership 
 NUSAF (52) NAADS (52) Overal 
How much money did the group receive?   
 dont know 26.9 30.8 28.9 
 Know the amount 73.1 69.2 71.2 
How much money did the group receive? (mean) 1.71   1.7   1.7 
Are you leader in the group?   
Yes 67.3 40.4 53.9 
No 32.7 59.6 46.2 
How active in decision making?   
Leader 11.5   1.9  6.7 
Very active 65.4 57.7 61.5 
Somewhat active 23.1 38.5 30.8 
Does not participate in decision making 0.0   1.9   1.0 
 
7.12 Main benefit from joining the group 
When asked about the perceived benefits from joining the NAADS/ NUSAF affiliated 
groups, overall the farmers (61%) mentioned improved income as the main benefit and inputs 
was the second overall at 24%. Self esteem also scored a reasonable 24% indicating that the 
farmers still enjoy working  and associating in groups and this could be used as an 
opportunity for farmer institutional development. Other findings indicate that a very small 
percentage of less than 10%  (6%) regard joining the groups as beneficial to the community. 
This finding confirms earlier findings in the qualitative survey which found out that there is a 
growing sense of individualism in Northern Uganda which was not the case before the LRA 
war. Before the war people regarded the household and community as important and could 
carry out collective activities of digging, weeding, harvesting etc. which is a rare 
phenomenon in Northern Uganda nowadays.   
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Figure 7.2: Main benefit from joining the group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.13 Group participation and leadership 
In table 7.11 when the group members were asked whether the group membership has 
changed, about 30% mentioned that the group membership has declined and this was even 
worse for NAADS affiliated farmer groups where 38% mentioned that the group membership 
has declined. Sevenity nine percent (79%) of the NUSAF respondents mentioned that the 
group membership has remained the same, whereas for NAADS only 40% mentioned that 
membership has remained constant. This finding indicates that there is high fluctuation of 
membership in NAADS affiliated groups and which is an indicator of poor group cohesion in 
NAADS compared to NUSAF affiliated farmer groups. The decline in the group membership 
is related to the motivation of farmers entering the groups in order to obtain inputs. When 
farmers do not realize the inputs/ programme assets, they lose interest and group membership 
declines. 
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Table 7.11: Group participation and leadership 
 NUSAF (52) NAADS (52) Overall 
Has group membership changed?   
 Declined 19.2 38.5 28.9 
 Remained the same 78.9 40.4 59.6 
 Increased   1.9 21.2 11.5 
How is decision making in group?  
 Leader decides and informs members 5.8   5.8  5.8 
 Group members decide together 94.2 94.2 94.2 
How effective is the group.leadership  
 Very Effective 55.8 59.6 57.7 
 Somewhat effective 30.8 38.5 34.6 
 Not effective 13.5   1.9   7.7 
How many group meetings attended in  
last 6 months? (mean) 
7.0   7.9   6.1 
How much money did your household  
contribute (Shs)? (mean) 
11475.97 15740.40 7211.54 
Some members rich or poor?   
 Mostly same income level 78.9 48.1 63.5 
 Mixed rich/poor 21.2 51.9 36.5 
 
 
7.14 Challenges that group leaders face to get inputs to their members 
When asked about the challenges the group leaders faced in order to obtain the inputs to their 
members, the respondents mentioned that procurement issues (quality, quantity and 
timeliness) was the most dominant problem with 66% of respondents mentioning that the 
challenge of procurement is high. Transport problems came a distant second with 22% 
overall while information problems came last with about 10% of the respondents. Another 
key issue which came up in figure 7.3 is that for NUSAF there was a need for political 
connections to get the inputs i.e. 33% mentioned this issue, while for NAADS none of the 
respondents mentioned the lack of political connections as a problem. This finding clearly 
confirms earlier insights from the qualitative survey which indicated that in  NUSAF political 
capital was important for someone to be able to get the inputs.   
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Figure 7.3: Challenges that group leaders face to get inputs to their members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.15 Trust by beneficiaries in programme implementation 
When the different respondents were asked about the perceptions about the trust of the 
different actors in the implementation of NAADS/NUSAF activities,  the trust for their group 
leaders was the highest at 81%, followed by extension staff at 70% and central government 
officials at 60%, while the trust was lowest for the suppliers/contractors and local government 
politicians at 18% and 38 % respectively. However findings indicate that NUSAF affiliated 
farmers trusted the central government officials more than the NAADS affiliated farmers. 
This finding has implications for service delivery because earlier findings indicated that the 
respondents complained of the capture of their entitlements by the local politicians.  
Figure 7.4: Trust by beneficiaries in programme implementation 
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7.16 Perception of honesty of the beneficiaries towards the program implementers 
The mistrust of the suppliers was also mentioned in the qualitative results whereby there were 
numerous complaints of supply of sub-standard inputs, inflated prices, lesser quantities 
supplied and late delivery of inputs. Findings indicate that NUSAF affiliated farmers trusted  
 
the central government officials to a great extent (i.e. 48%) than the local government (37%). 
This confirms earlier findings from the qualitative research that the beneficiaries feel that the 
local government politicians are capturing the resources for their own selfish interests. Other 
findings indicate that, the farmers have more trust in their group leaders for both NAADS and 
NUSAF i.e. trust to a very great extent in NUSAF was 69% and 75% under NAADS. This 
finding indicates that also group trust is stronger in the NAADS pogramme compared to 
NUSAF. Another finding which has implications for service delivery in both the NAADS and 
NUSAF programmes is that the farmers in both NUSAF( 40%) and NAADS (42 %) trust the 
extension workers to a great extent more than the political wing at the central, district and 
sub-county levels. 
 
To investigate the perception of honesty by the beneficiaries towards different key actors in 
NAADS/NUSAF implementation, the respondents were asked how they trust these actors in 
as far as program implementation is concerned. Respondents perceived the technical wing to 
be more honest i.e.the NUSAF/NAADS coordinator at 50%, sub-county technicians at 41% 
and district technicians at 40%. In terms of honesty the district politicians were ranked last at 
21% overall while the subcounty politicians ranked 29%. Of all the key actors in the 
implementation of NAADS and NUSAF, the district politicians were regarded as the most 
dishonest followed by the subcounty politicians. The reason here, according to insights from 
the qualitative interviews is that the district politicians promise a lot to the farmers through 
NAADS/NUSAF programs but in the end their promises are not realized by the farmers. Also 
this confirms earlier incidences of the district politicians capturing the resources for their 
cronies and being involved in supply of sub-standard inputs through their pseudo private 
firms. The highest number of farmers regarded the project coordinators and technical staff  as 
very honest. However it should be noted that the level of honesty was higher towards 
NAADS coordinators  (42%) than NUSAF at a mere 13.73%.  
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Figure 7.5: Perception of honesty of the beneficiaries towards the program 
implementers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Perceptions of group leaders and non-group leaders under NAADS and 
NUSAF about the honesty of various stakeholders in program implementation  
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7.17  Comparisons of responses between group leaders and non-group leaders 
In order investigate whether the beneficiaries know what and how much they are entitled to, 
table 7.12 compares responses from both group leaders and non-group leaders in both NUSAF 
and NAADS. Evidence shows that a high number of non-group leaders i.e. about 41.7% said 
that they were not aware of what they are entitled to whereas a lower number of 17.9 % of 
group leaders showed that they did not know. In addition a higher number of 82% of the 
group leaders said that they know what they are supposed to receive compared to 58% non 
leaders. This finding clearly shows that there is an information gap between the group leaders 
and the non-group leaders i.e. the group leaders intentionally do not pass on the information 
on the entitlements to their members because they fear to be held accountable. 
 
Table 7.12: How much money did the group receive? 
Are you leader in the group? Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  Dont know the amount 10 17,9 17,9 17,9 
Know the amount 46 82,1 82,1 100,0 
Total 56 100,0 100,0  
No  Dont know the amount 20 41,7 41,7 41,7 
Know the amount 28 58,3 58,3 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
 
7.18 Support to join the group 
When asked about the support to join both NAADS and NUSAF affiliated groups i.e table 
7.13, both the group leaders and non-group leaders affiliated to NAADS and NUSAF were 
asked who supported them to join the particular program. Findings in table 7.13 show that the 
LC 1 (political wing of government at village level) played an important  part in mobilization  
i.e. 45% for group leaders and 37% for non-group leaders. Other stakeholders shown in in 
table 7.13 played a minimal role for both group leaders and non-group leaders. This finding 
showed that the involvement of political leaders at the grassroots  (LC1) who are by the law in 
the NRM ruling party, evidence of ealier complaints by the beneficiaries that both NAADS 
and NUSAF resources, information’/assets, have been captured by the supporters of the 
present government (NRM) and those in the opposition parties have been denied 
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information/not been mobilized to participate in the programs i.e. evidence from both 
qualitative and quantitative findings indicates that the LC 1s tended to mobilize their political 
cronies first, leaving out the non-political members of the beneficiary group which many of 
them in the post-conflict North are critical of government. 
 
Table 7.13:Did any body support you to join group? 
Are you leader in the group? Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  LC 1 Chairman 45 80,4 80,4 80,4 
Relative 3 5,4 5,4 85,7 
LC 3 chairman 1 1,8 1,8 87,5 
Councillors 2 3,6 3,6 91,1 
Husband/wife 5 8,9 8,9 100,0 
Total 56 100,0 100,0  
No  LC 1 chairman 37 77,1 80,4 80,4 
Relative 4 8,3 8,7 89,1 
LC 3 chairman 1 2,1 2,2 91,3 
Councillors 2 4,2 4,3 95,7 
Husband/wife 2 4,2 4,3 100,0 
Total 46 95,8 100,0  
      
     
 
7.19 Decision making within the farmer groups 
The findings in table 7.14 clearly show that the group leaders are more active in decision 
making at 69.6% compared to the non-group members at 52%. And the highest percentage of 
non-group leaders say that they are just somewhat active. This shows a reluctancy of the non-
group leaders in decision making concerning their issues. Ealier perceptions in the qualitative 
survey indicates that group members (non-leaders) just want to see ‘things happening’ but not 
so much interested to suggest something because they feel they have no powers and they 
know this because this has been like this since the programs started.  
Figure 7.6 above shows that both the group leaders and non-group leaders consider the 
district politicians as very dishonest, however the non-group leaders show the highest 
perception of dishonest against the district politicians and this is the same trend for the sub-
county politicians whereas the non group leaders consider the district technical staff as 
mostly dishonest at 43.8%. This finding indicates that may-be the group leaders are close to 
the district technical staff that’s why they don’t consider them mostly dishonest. Overall the 
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sub-county coordinators of both NAADS and NUSAF were considered the most very honest 
by both the group leaders and non-group leaders at 27.3% and 29% respectively. 
 
Table 7.14 :How active in decision making? 
Are you leader in the group? Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Yes  Leader 7 12,5 12,5 12,5 
Very active 39 69,6 69,6 82,1 
Somewhat active 10 17,9 17,9 100,0 
Total 56 100,0 100,0  
No  Very active 25 52,1 52,1 52,1 
Somewhat active 22 45,8 45,8 97,9 
Does not participate in decision 
making 
1 2,1 2,1 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
 
7.20 Procurement problems (comparison of group leaders and non-group leaders) 
Both the group leaders and non-leaders were asked to rate the extent of procurement 
problems on the scale of 1-3. Whereby one indicated the most important procurement 
problem and 3 the least important problem. The group leaders rated (poor and late supply) 
first at 66% and the non-group leaders at 54.2%.  The challenge of transport was rated at 27% 
for group leaders and 22.2% as most important problem. The challenge of influence of 
political leaders came as the third most important problem with 25% from group leaders and 
12% from non-group leaders. The challenge of lack of information in the procurement 
process came last , a mere 5.6% of group leaders and 13.5% of non-group leaders mentioned 
it as the most important problem. The results here show that even the group leaders have 
problems in ensuring that quality inputs are delivered to the final beneficiaries in a timely 
manner. 
8 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
8.1 Key Supply-side constraints affecting NAADS and NUSAF implementation 
Human resource management 
NAADS programme implementation hinges on provision of demand driven agricultural 
advisory services through contracting out advisory services to private  individuals, private 
companies and NGOs/CBOs. At the inception of NAADS it was assumed tha these private 
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service providers will offer better services than the existing local government extension staff 
who were considered inefficient and unreliable. Findings from this study indicate that there 
were challenges of lack of limited technical capacity in the private provision of advisory 
services.  
In Northern Uganda there were few qualified and adequately advisory services companies to 
undertake the advisory work and many companies also applied for contracts in other sub-
counties thus putting strain on the already inadequate capacity. Because of lack of adequate 
staff many companies resorted to hiring inexperienced extension workers who were more 
concerned with classroom based training and who were even poorly facilitated to be able to 
carry out the required tasks.This study agrees with earlier work on NAADS by Bukenya 
(2010), Parkinson ( 2005 ) who noted that the private sector involvement in advisory services 
under NAADS was  not adequate because sub-counties contracted  inexperienced staff who 
could not take the farmers through the practical components of advisory services. Another 
issue that led to the inadequate numbers of private technical staff was that in the NAADS 
Implementation Manual (2000), it was assumed that the existing local government staff 
would form the bulk of the private extension workers after being delayered from the civil 
service. However this delayering process has not taken place as yet. During the survey, it was 
noted that the amount of maney paid to the private service providers is too low to accomplish 
the task at hand. That is the reason why there is a high turnover of service providers in 
Northern Uganda because the transaction costs are very high i.e. due to remoteness and 
limited infrastructure. This is why the companies tend to contract out services to less 
experienced staff in order lower the operational costs. 
NAADS implementation guidelines call for the joint implementation of NAADS with the 
existing Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) at local governments. Findings indicate low morale 
of the existing local government staff towards NAADS and a feeling of being “sidelined”, the 
reason being that whereas NAADS staff are given fat salaries and well facilitated whereas the 
local government workers are not facilitated for the additional responbilities of NAADS 
work. 
NUSAF Implementation guidelines (2010) call for the sub-county CDO to work with the 
communities to identify the facilitators who had closer links in the communities ( facilitator 
should be from the area) to provide support to the communities to be able to develop feasible 
and fundable sub-project proposals. According to the guidelines, communities have a 
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mandate to recruit facilitators with the help of the sub-county CDO and pay for their services 
from sub-project funds to help them in the proposed sub-project preparation process. 
Facilitators according to the provisions are supposed to be paid  up to 2% of the total sub- 
project budget. Findings indicate that many of the community facilitatotrs recruited lacked 
the requisite qualifications in order to be able to organize the communities to come up with 
fundable proposals and also to be able to guide and support the communities to make the 
right choice of enterprises according to their capacities and sub-project feasibility. Many are 
not even trained on the implementation of CDD projects. Many of the facilitators were 
selected at district levels and sent to the communities. And moreover the renumeration of the 
private facilitators was not attractive because it was based on a commission basis depending 
on how many sub-project proposals were funded. Evidence from this survey indicates that 
many of these facilitators abandoned the work because their expectations in terms cash 
rewards were not met and they left the communities stranded. Even many of the facilitators 
payments were at the hands of the sub-project management committees who saw this amount 
of money paid to facilitators as too much and some resisted to pay the facilitators. Similarly, 
provisions indicate that there should be capacity building of the faciltators and supervision of 
facilitators, but in reality this has not taken place and it partly resulted in the low quality of 
services offered by facilitators to the communities. Similarly guidelines indicate that the CFs 
will be under the supervision of the CDO but with inadequate facilitation it was difficult for 
the CDO to supervise the facilitators and and also offer them technical backstopping.  
Evidence also showed that the facilitators misbehaved either by asking for more money from 
the group members or acting as brokers in the procurement process thereby asking for 
kickbacks from the suppliers of inputs. In summary, skilled community facilitators would be 
critical for the success of NUSAF but there was failure of NUSAF implementers to engage 
the already existing manpower on the ground at the distict and sub-county local governments 
and also to take advantage of the strong NAADS institutional structures like farmer forum, 
community based facilitators which are already very strong at the grassroots. Other evidence 
from key informants indicates that the tasks and responsibilities of NUSAF  implementation 
and monitoring was too much for the few NUSAF skeleton staff at the OPM.    
Financial management 
The centralized design of NAADS especially with planning and budgeting totally 
undermined the grassroots participation, choice of budgeting priorities and lacked a sense of 
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ownership. The budgets were just compiled at the NAADS Secretariat and then they were 
just sent to the lower local government.  
Other issues in NAADS implementation concerned the bureaucratic procurement procedures 
which led to delays in farmers receiving the inputs whereas they depended on rainfall seasons 
to be able to plant the crops. Findings indicate that the bureaucratic procedures which 
involved many actors in the implementation process were also entry points for corruption and 
misuse of funds. NUSAF implementation guidelines indicate that procurement under NUSAF 
will be implemented at 3 levels, that is; at the central government level, local government 
level and at the community where the project implementation takes place. Provisions indicate 
that the procurement committee composed of farmers will be responsible for all community 
based procurements. Evidence shows that the majority of the people in the study area are 
either semi-illiterate or illiterate. Therefore there was a challenge to the procurement 
committee to undertake the extensive sub-project approval mechanism which was rather 
bureaucratic and document intensive process. 
Evidence also shows that the direct contracting and single sourcing option of procurement 
was abused in NUSAF.  This is because the power to select the supplier was left in the hands 
of the community procurement committee which lacked technical capacity. Findings on 
NUSAF implementation indicate that many of the committees were duped of the money and 
also were supplied with sub-standard inputs. Similarly there were challenges of placing too 
much money in the hands of the communities which caused enormous problems of 
accountability. The communities who were just returnees to their villages did not have the 
capability to handle big amounts of financial resources provided by NUSAF in a responsible 
way. This challenge was anticipated earlier by the local government officials and politicians 
in the region who had earlier at the design phase of NUSAF had doubts of entrusting the 
financial responsibility directly with the communities, but this issue was ignored by the 
project design team (Robinson, 2005). 
Another challenge is that the CDD approach of NUSAF generated considerable interest from 
the communities affected by the war conflict and almost everybody in Northern Uganda was 
eager to benefit from the NUSAF assets. Because of the very big number of sub-projects 
emanating from the communities, the NUSAF budget could not fund all the projects and 
hence left many of the communities that did not benefit demoralized. This finding is 
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corroborated by various studies for example; Robinson (2005) on earlier studies on the 
governance challenges facing NUSAF programme implementation in Northern Uganda. 
Targeting 
NUSAF targeting is through groups. However due to the conflict many people who were 
seriously affected by the war, for example the war wounded, widows etc. were not active 
participants in NUSAF.  Findings indicate that many of very vulnerable people have not 
joined the NUSAF sub-project  groups because of the stringent conditions set out by the 
NUSAF guidelines for example, co-funding, household sanitation etc. Because of this 
challenge, many vulnerable people especially women have been denied a chance to benefit 
from the NUSAF livelihoods sub-component. This finding is corroborated by Martin, Petty 
and Acidri (2008) on Northern Uganda who noted that NUSAF inplementers failed to take 
into consideration the household and individual stark inequalities of the people in the North. 
This finding also is consistent with the CARE Uganda 2006 study where they found out that 
the vulnerable people do not always join groups. Findings also indicate that although women 
constitute a large number of both NAADS and NUSAF affiliated groups, they have not been 
given a chance to participate in decision making partly due to the lower levels of education in 
the communities. Also the enterprises selected under NUSAF and NAADS ought to be 
gender sensitive given the fact that about 10% of the population are widows. For example 
during this study, there was evidence that women groups were struggling to get land for their 
sub-project assets and also struggling to get credit for the capital intensive projects. This 
study agrees with earlier work by  Buvinic et al. (2007), Schindler (2010), Hilhorst et al. 
(2011) and Wisner, Ben et al. (2004) who argued that widows (female headed households) 
may constitute a group of households that are affected differently by conflict and that require 
specific attention. Collier (2007) argues that targeting widows and their families with post- 
conflict assistance and resources may break this transmission channel of poverty and halt the 
reproduction of conflict related poverty. Bahiigwa et al. (2005) noted  that, to improve  
performance of NAADS,  performance targets need to be clear that getting support to poor 
and vulnerable farmers including women is the key result expected from extension agents so 
that they do not target model farmers in order to get results. The author recommends the need 
for the formation of farmer groups which improve representation of disadvantaged groups 
such as women, youth, ethnic minorities and displaced people (Bahiigwa et al., 2005). In this 
study I agree by other scholars, for example Parkinson (2008), Bukenya (2010) and 
Muwonge (2007) who argued that the ultimate advise to NAADS is that; there is need to 
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reconceptualize extension innovations as a situated action and in addition taking into full 
account of the environmental, social-economic and historical context of those farmers to be 
targeted by any kind of proposed interventions. Evidence from the respondents indicates that 
the  NAADS program has not yet managed to achieve its  mission i.e. ensuring food security 
and moving the target farmers from subsistence to commercial farming through its popular 
‘’farming as a business’’ drive.  
 Similarly, other evidence from the study indicates that the NAADS beneficiaries were 
particularly disappointed by the general failure of the NAADS  program to meet the 
enormous demands for farm inputs and assets from the farmers. Many respondents 
complained that NAADS is spending almost its entire budget on advisory services/trainings. 
Respondents said that the advisory service component has ‘wiped’ out all the NAADS funds 
through paying of the private agricultural advisory service providers, whom they complained 
that they ( suppliers and private service providers) are even offering substandard service to 
the beneficiaries. This study also agrees with Bukenya (2010) who argued categorically that 
the challenge for NAADS is to get the right and appropriate balance ( ‘’MIX’’)  between the 
NAADS activities that deliver knowledge and skills and those that offer technology putting 
into consideration of the context  i.e. post-conflict conditions and not using one size fits all. 
In terms of constraints of farmers for active involvement in group activities, a highest 
percentage (52%) overall said that activities on their gardens took much of their time while 
co-funding obligations took second place at 36.3% overall. Therefore NAADS and NUSAF 
should also take into account the time spent on trainings to allow the farmers devote enough 
time on their gardens. 
According to the findings,  both the NAADS and NUSAF targeting is problematic. NAADS 
is targeting the ‘’Active Poor’’ i.e. the economically active farmers , for instance the nucleus 
farmers, lead farmers, model farmers and demonstration farmers. Whereas NUSAF according 
to its guidelines it is targeting not the economically active farmers. Evidence shows that in 
the post-conflict region of Northern Uganda there are very few active poor so the NAADS 
targeting strategy should also consider the context where the programme is being 
implemented. 
NUSAF assumed that it will target the very poor farmers to help them become ‘‘Active 
Poor’’ to be targeted by NAADS. The challenge here is that there is no joint targeting 
framework between NAADS and NUSAF. In reality on the ground it appears that both 
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NAADS and NUSAF are targeting the same farmers. Other findings indicate that payment as 
a requirement to benefit from NUSAF programme constituted a large percentage of about  
54% while other household requirements constituted 38% compared to NAADS program 
which had minimal requirements to be able to access its services and assets. For example the 
percentage of beneficiaries who had to pay something to participate in NAADS was just a 
mere 15%. This indicates that NUSAF instituted stringent measures to participate which 
many of the poor people in Northern Uganda could not afford. 
Other respondents had reservations of joining NUSAF affiliated groups because they said that 
being in groups does not qualify them to receive the items of their choice or preference but 
because you are a member of the group you have to abide with the pre-condition in order to 
atleast get something from NUSAF. This is why the survey found that in some villages 
farmers sold off the NUSAF assets in a few days after receiving them. There is a need 
therefore to revise the operational guidelines on enterprise selection in both NAADS and 
NUSAF in order to include a provision to support individual enterprises of choice which 
might not be a priority to the majority of group members but can help in a household’s food 
security. For example cassava and finger millet may not have a high commercial value but 
they are important for household food security of the IDP returnees. 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) 
It should be noted that the success of the NAADS and NUSAF programme is dependent on 
the ability and capacity of the various institutional structures to effectively perform their 
duties. Therefore there is need for continued capacity building and sensitization on their roles 
and responsibilities especially on the concepts and importance of monitoring and evaluation 
and the need for adequate facilitation for monitoring and evaluation of the programs. 
The NUSAF operational guidelines indicate that certain designated officers should carry out 
regular visits to NUSAF sub-project beneficiaries and sites so as to provide technical support 
and guidance to the beneficiaries, review and report on progress to ensure that the sub-
project’s objectives are achieved. Evidence from key informants indicates that  local 
government staff and NDTOs are too busy  to carry out effective monitoring  for the very 
large number of  individual sub-projects because of the limited number of skeleton staff at the 
OPM Secretariat. All of the  CDOs interviewed and given the fact that they are key 
implementers of NUSAF at the sub-county level admitted that they have not been involved 
regularly in monitoring of NUSAF beneficiaries’sub- projects. Similarly, the majority of the 
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beneficiaries interviewed said that they last saw the sub-county officials when they were 
verifying the sub-projects a few days after delivery of the NUSAF assets. Other evidence 
from respondents indicated that the politicians were mainly just involved in commissioning 
of NUSAF projects or handing over assets to the beneficiaries. 
The district technical staff (Subject Matter Specialists) for example,Veterinary and 
Agricultural officers were also not seriously involved in the monitoring and technical 
backstopping in NUSAF implementation. Findings indicate that NUSAF technical officers at 
the district level were rarely seen on the ground for technical backstopping given the fact that 
the dominatnt enterprise in NUSAF was livestock keeping. This was also caused by the 
limited facilitation because according to the NUSAF  implementation guidelines only 10% of 
the local government operational costs is for monitoring. This technical gap due to lack of 
adequate monitoring funds is mainly to blame why many of the beneficiaries enterprises 
collapsed at the infant stages.  
This study comfirms earlier findings by Robinson (2005) and Golooba –Mutebi and Hickey 
(2008) that indicated that NUSAF was implemented with parallel structures to the 
government and in isolation from the ongoing government programs for example NAADS, 
ALREP that already have strong community institutional structures e.g. farmers forum, 
Community Based Facilitators, NAADS contract extension workers, NAADS registered 
farmer groups etc. which NUSAF would have taken advantage of in its implementation. 
8.2 Key Demand –side constraints affecting NAADS and NUSAF implementation 
Social Capital 
Findings show that during the war conflict there was a breakdown of the social networks and 
this was made even worse during the displacement of virtually the whole population in the 
North into IDP camps. Upon return to their villages life style of collectivity reduced . As a 
measure of social capital i.e. ability to work together in the communities, the majority of the 
farmers (69%) overall mentioned that they did not work together in the gardens and 93% 
overall said that they did not work together at all to carry out any other activities. This finding 
confirms earlier findings from the qualitative survey that there is a breakdown in social 
networks after the war whereby the majority of the community members now prefer to work 
alone because of the new individualistic tendencies. This study also agrees with Buvinic et al. 
(2012) who mentioned that the  situation in Northern Uganda is made worse by the 
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destruction of social networks and the consequent depletion of important elements of 
peoples’ socio, economic and political capital including the previously mentioned constraints 
that accompany widowhood and female headship ( Buvinic et al., 2012). 
Land issues 
The communities in Northern Uganda mainly depend on agriculture for both food 
security and income. However as discussed before, issues of land have become more 
rampant as the former IDPs return back to their original villages. Land conflicts have 
hampered investment on land and also in some cases have led to death due to community 
conflicts. Findings indicate that among the factors that have caused these conflicts is the 
internal displacement of the communities into the IDP camps. After over 2 decades of 
war the natural barriers which were separating the land disappeared and therefore the 
returnees could not know where their land begins or stops. Another reason is the 
weakening of the traditional structures of land dispute resolution due to the displacement 
and death of the traditional chiefs. Findings indicate that many of the cases registered in 
the courts in Northern Uganda, the majority are land related cases. 
Farmers’ needs, capacity and priorities 
During the implementation of NAADS there was disappointment by farmers in the focus 
group discussions, who showed concern that the privately hired agricultural advisory service 
providers were at many times paid to provide courses that were already taught to the farmers. 
Respondents indicated that many of the courses facilitated by the privately hired service 
providers in NAADS became monotonous and in the end causing them fatique after being 
taught the same thing over and over again. The interviewees singled out trainings on banana 
production, organic manure making and cereal production as trainings that have become 
monotonous. 
According to the NUSAF 2 Operational Guidelines (2010 pp.25), the Household Income 
Support Program (HISP) sub-component of the Livelihood Investment Support (LIS) 
component is aimed at increasing productive assets to the people of Northern Uganda and in 
the process improve incomes of the targeted poor households. During the survey it was noted 
that in all the districts visited more than 70% of the HISP budget was allocated to the 
purchase of animals (ie. re-stocking program). However, the challenge identified was that the 
implementers of NUSAF did not strengthen the Veterinary extension systems in the local 
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governments which were already lacking manpower or put in place a system of private 
animal health services providers who could be able to respond to the enormous beneficiaries’ 
demands for veterinary services. This was very important given the fact that the people of 
Northern Uganda are mainly crop farmers , so for many of them it was their first time to own 
cows,  had little experience in the enterprise and most of them being poor they could not 
afford the cost of the  limited veterinary services available in the area. To illustrate the point, 
because of the high costs for veterinary services and drugs. It was noted from the survey that 
quiet a number of  farmers usually call in the veterinary services when the health of the 
livestock is out of hand i.e. when the animal is almost going to die. 
Similarly, NUSAF  sub-project beneficiaries were not prepared enough to receive and 
manage the assets. NUSAF in the first place did not train the beneficiary groups on even the 
basic animal management practices (feeding and treatment). Beneficiaries were left on their 
own after delivery of the animals. Many beneficiaries faced challenges to manage the cattle. 
During the survey I encountered instances where some beneficiaries hired other people to 
care for the animals or sold them off prematurely to avoid the high costs involved in catering 
for them. Poor management practices were the order of the day and the author encountered 
scenarios where the cows were last sprayed over six months ago and after that no single 
treatment could be afforded by the beneficiaries. Because of these reasons a high percentage 
of animals provided by NUSAF have since died. NUSAF implmenters should have in the 
first place trained the beneficiary groups on atleast simple basic animal management practices 
,support inputs provision such as shelter, fodder production training etc. and in addition 
standards should be emphasized on the quality of animals (good health, age and weight 
standards) delivered  to the beneficiaries because poor health quality of the animals was one 
of the main causes of the death of many animals under the HISP sub-component of NUSAF. 
The OPM should make it a priority to equip and strengthen the veterinary extension system at 
district and sub-county level so that the majority of the beneficiaries under HISP can access 
affordable veterinary services such as vaccines, spraying pumps for ticks which are very 
crucial for the survival of the animals. 
Other findings from the survey indicated that animals were not their ( beneficiaries) first 
priority but because in groups they had to go with the majority decisions some members were 
coersed into taking up farming enterprises they did not want. NUSAF implementers were just 
looking at the market value of some enterprises without looking at their feasibility in the 
post-conflict context of the Northern region. Enterprises like cassava, sorghum and finger 
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millet that seem to have a lower market value than cattle but very important for food security 
for the returnees were left out. During the survey it was also noted that generally 
communities were provided with cattle and goats that takes longer to yield returns and so 
many of the ‘’returnees’’ from the IDP camps to their former villages were looking for 
enterprises that could bring them quick returns to solve some of their cash needs. For this 
reason that is why many of the animals were sold off by the beneficiaries and the culprits 
alleged that the animals either died of disease or they were stolen. Here NUSAF 
implementers faced the challenge of providing private goods to the poor farmers more 
especially in post-conflict conditions i.e. many of the  beneficiaries turned the NUSAF assets 
into cash since they could be sold at nearby markets even at far cheaper prices than the 
market prices. 
In summary, the NUSAF program lacked the important elements of preparing the returnees 
mindsets which have been affected by the ‘’dependency syndrome’’ in the IDP camps which 
has prevented them to adjust to the longterm development of their households and region. 
This finding is consistent with the quantitative survey results which indicated that the 
majority of the farmers i.e 69% overall mentioned that they did not work together in the 
gardens and 93% overall said that they did not work together at all to carry out other 
activities which is a confirmation of the individualism that has developed in the communities 
during the conflict and post-conflict period. Research findings indicate that the NUSAF 
program is driven by short term needs to show that something is being done in the North 
which hampers longterm planning and this seriously undermines the sustainability of 
development interventions. Needless to say that the NUSAF project was largely implemented 
in isolation and not very well connected to the development needs, priorities and the unique 
challenges affecting the households in Northern Uganda. For instance, that’s why the bigger 
portion of NUSAF funds were budgeted for infrastructural projects to maximize the 
patronage opportunities provided by NUSAF. 
Accountability 
NUSAF Implementation Manual (2010) provisions recommend for participatory (community 
level) monitoring and evaluation with the aim of promoting a good working partnership 
between the government and community institutions in undertaking monitoring and 
evaluation. Provisions indicate that NUSAF program will employ mainly 2 participatory 
monitoring tools namely Citizen Report Card (CRC) and Community Score Card (CSC). 
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However findings indicate that Social Accountability Committees (SAC) which are 
established under the community sub-project management committee to promote social 
accountability at community level are not doing their work effectively, for example the SAC 
is supposed to meet at-least once a month and submit its reports to the sub-county CDO and 
respective communities on a monthly basis however there were no reports of the SAC 
available in the CDO’s office. Therefore the cases SAC was supposed to handle for the 
NUSAF sub-project groups like gender exclusion, nepotism, collusion and corruption have 
not been handled effectively. Findings indicate that the SAC is on paper but nothing is 
happening on the ground making public service delivery inefficient. I therefore totally agree 
with  Francis and James (2003) who argued that service delivery under decentralization has  
not been effective as expected partly because of limited civic engagement by the beneficiaries 
with local governments in ways that ensure downward accountability and equity. Thus efforts 
to improve livelihood conditions need to go beyond investments in human, financial, natural 
and physical assets and ensure that these interventions take care of the involvement of the 
beneficiaries of the service (Buckland, 1998).  
Another challenge is that the issue of accountability of the NUSAF committees for example 
the Procurement Committees (PCs) is not satisfactory because according to the findings many 
of these committees have exhibited low levels of transparency with regard to procurement 
and availing information to the members on sub-project matters. 
Institutional arrangements 
Evidence on the ground shows that NUSAF program is working in isolation. There is no 
framework to intergrate the NUSAF project into other livelihoods programs and this has not 
also been addressed in the implementation guidelines. The NUSAF Implementation Manual 
(2010 pp.73) only mentions that existing government programs e.g. NAADS, PMA and 
Prosperity For All (PFA) among others will complement the programs under NUSAF, but the 
provisions do not mention how this is to happen. The sector specialists interviewed 
complained that NUSAF wants them to do additional assignments like supervising their work 
without facilitation which is the result of the poor design of NUSAF which created parallel 
implementation structures to the district and sub-county local governments. 
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Table 8.1: Summary of Comparison of  Key Findings on both NAADS and NUSAF 
Implementation 
Key issuess NAADS  NUSAF  
Opportunities in 
NAADS  
Opportunities in 
NUSAF 
 
Demand-
side Issuess 
 
 
 
Household Level 
 
Community Level 
• The interest of 
the farmers in the 
program is 
reducing at a fast 
rate (high rate of 
group 
disintegration) 
 
Local 
Government 
Level 
• Little political 
support at both 
local government 
and the center 
 
 
Household Level 
• Set very stringent 
requirements for the 
communities to 
participate, for example 
the extremely vulnerable 
individuals i.e the 
injured by war were 
excluded 
Community Level 
• More enthusiasm about 
the project in the 
communities 
 
Local Government Level 
• Too much political 
involvement in the 
mobilization of 
communities to 
participate 
• Too much involvement 
of the private sector and 
less involvement of the 
technical sector 
specialists has 
compromised the quality 
of services and works 
under NUSAF 
 
• Existence of 
grassroots institutions 
eg. farmer forum, 
farmers associations 
• Can take advantage of 
the large number of 
NGOs, CBOs to work 
with 
• trust to a very great 
extent in NUSAF was 
69% and 75% under 
NAADS. This finding 
indicates that also 
group trust is stronger 
in the NAADS 
pogram compared to 
NUSAF. 
• Relatively high level 
of trust between the 
farmers to the 
implementers i.e 
70% NAADS 
farmers trust 
extension workers in 
as far as program 
implementation is 
concerned  
• The highest number 
of farmers regarded 
the project 
coordinators and 
technical staff  as 
very honest. 
However it should 
be noted that the 
level of honesty was 
higher towards 
NAADS 
coordinators (42%) 
than NUSAF at a 
mere 13.73%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Very strong 
political support 
from the central 
government 
towards the 
NUSAF 
program 
• Substancial 
amounts of 
funds budgeted 
for the program 
• The program 
concetrates in a 
smaller area, 
therefore the 
impact on the 
ground can be 
felt by the 
beneficiaries 
• Relatively high 
level of trust 
between the 
farmers to the 
implementers 
i.e. 60%. 
NUSAF 
affiliated 
farmers still 
trust extension 
workers in as 
far as program 
implementation 
is concerned 
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Supply-side 
Issues 
 
 
 
Human Resource 
Management 
• More 
involvement of 
the local 
government 
structures 
• The parallel 
systems of 
human resource 
management in 
NAADS 
undermines the 
incentives of the 
local government 
technical staff 
• NAADS 
disrupted the 
mainstream 
agricultural 
extension system 
 
Financial 
Management 
• High incidences 
of procurement 
problems 
 
Project 
Management 
• There is constant 
change in the 
implementation 
guidelines in 
NAADS (no 
consistency) 
• NAADS spreads 
slowly so it is 
seen as very thin 
on the ground. 
Human Resource 
Management  
Less involvement of local 
government structures 
Poor staff motivation of the 
community facilitators 
Financial Management 
• Less procurement 
problems because of 
adoption of community 
procurement 
 
Project Management 
 
• Design Features of 
program 
• There is minimal follow-
up support given to the 
farmers after delivery of 
inputs 
• Transaction intensive 
project appraisal cycle 
• Concentrated on very 
few enterprises i.e. 
livestock production is 
where most of the funds 
have concentrated. 
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9 RECCOMENDATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This Study has uncovered the governance challenges both on the Demand-side and Supply-
side confronting the implementation of both NAADS and NUSAF and at the same time it has 
generated key strategies that are needed both on the Supply-side and Demand-side in order to 
improve the program performance of the target programs of  NAADS and NUSAF (see figure 
9.1 for more information). The findings from this study indicate that contracting out the 
provision of agricultural advisory services to the private sector is not a guarantee for 
improved project (program) performance. The findings also agree with De Graaf’s (2007) 
theory (see section 2.2.1 for more details) on the causes of corruption which is a very 
important governance indicator. De Graaf (2007) noted that corruption is determined by a 
number of factors which include individual, institutional and environmental factors. The 
author argues that in order to design strategies to control corruption it should not be one size 
fits all but should take into consideration the context to determine which strategies work best 
and under what conditions. Similarly these findings also agree with Trevino (1986)  (see 
section 2.2.2 for details) who postulated that the ethical decision making power of an 
individual is influenced by organizational factors , organizational culture and environmental 
factors.  
Findings from this study established that the individual factor is a leading factor affecting 
ethical decision making because the levels of incidence of corrupt practices varied from one 
local government to another and also varied in the different programs surveyed. Other factors 
that were found to affect ethical decision making included the context and organizational 
culture. For example one of the key findings uncovered during the study as a result of 
interaction with the different people in the communities is that the people in the North feel 
that they have been neglected for a longtime by the central governmemt. The communities 
therefore thought that the coming of such programs with ‘’huge investments`` would be a 
chance for them also to enjoy on the national cake and hence if given the chance they will “ 
Chop the Money” as the common saying in Northern Uganda goes.  
An example of the organizational culture fuelling corruption in both NAADS and NUSAF, is 
the culture of previous rampant corrupt practices and a culture of impunity for those who 
have been caught in the corrupt practices. Therefore when implementers get a chance they 
become corrupt as a result of the common assumption that others have stolen and nothing has 
not been done to them, so why don’t I do it’’. Another finding is that the rich people who 
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have embezzled the money are regarded as heroes in their areas because of the philanthropy 
activities in community projects e.g. churches, schools etc. which other non-corrupt 
individuals in government cannot carry out.        
Empirical results from this study indicate that both NAADS and NUSAF in the post-conflict 
context  have concentrated and done a lot on the Supply-side by supporting numerous 
initiatives that seek to strengthen management systems like financial audits, value for money 
audits, local government public expenditure management systems etc., but very little has 
been done on the Demand-side of public service delivery. Given the numerous governance 
challenges also uncovered on the Demand-side during this study it is time now to shift gears 
and also at the same time address the Demand-side issues to strengthen the ability of the 
beneficiaries to be able to demand for accountability for the quality of public services 
provided to them. The schematic diagram ( see figure 9.1) provides a detailed road map  to 
address the governance challenges identified. In addition to the challenges mentioned above, 
many of the farmers feel frustrated that many of their expecations have not been fulfilled by 
these programs.  
The key challenges which have been uncovered during this study and warrant serious 
attention include those both on the Supply and Demand-side of service delivery. On the 
Supply-side it includes human resource management issues, for example poor staff 
motivation and capacity development, financial management problems, bureaucratic 
management structures for example complex procurement procedures, targeting problems, 
poor planning and budgeting, lack of partnerships with the private sector e.g. NGOs, CBOs 
and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Other governance challenges include; ineffective 
advisory methods, poor local government political wing and farmer relations plus problems 
with information dissemination. The key challenge on the Demand-side identified during this 
study is the high level of expectations and demands from the improvished communities 
which is far beyond the available resources that the programs can offer. In addition the 
participation of the youths in the livelihhods recovery programs is still very low as evidenced 
from the quantitative survey results. There is also a challenge of mobilization of the 
communities because of the poor citizen-state relations as evidenced from the quantitative 
survey.  
There is need to re-orient both the Demand-side and Supply-side to work together effectively 
and in unison although this not an easy task to undertake. This is because the quality of the 
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agricultural advisory services extended to the communities and the effectiveness of the 
Demand and Supply-side strategy will depend on the ability of both sides working together. 
Program implementers (Supply-side) should avoid the earlier thinking that they are the only 
ones with knowledge and information. Learning from the exact situation of farmers through 
information sharing and information exchange can give the opportunity to the Supply-side to 
improve their services. For example the beneficiaries can help the programme implementers 
to identify strategies that can work or do not work in their own situations or context. This is 
important in order to avoid statements from farmers like “ we tried all that , but it does not 
work” and now you are bringing the same idea to us ”. The detailed road map to address the 
governance challenges identified is outlined in figure 9.1. The issue of the limited financial 
and technical resources plus the overwhelming demands from the communities can be 
handled by creating an efficient and innovative information dissemination system and 
creating partnerships with NGOs and CBOs involved in the livelihoods recovery 
programmes. It is highly recommended that NUSAF and NAADS should take advantage of 
the already existing large number of NGOs and CBOs in the Northern region of Uganda in 
order to create partnerships. This strategy will enable NAADS and NUSAF to fill their 
funding gaps and avoid duplication of the limited financial and technical resources.  
      
2
5
9
 
  F
ig
u
re
 9
.1
:P
ro
p
o
se
d
 i
n
te
ra
c
ti
o
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
S
u
p
p
ly
 a
n
d
 D
em
a
n
d
-s
id
e 
st
ra
te
g
ie
s 
fo
r 
im
p
ro
v
ed
 p
ro
g
ra
m
 p
er
fo
m
a
n
ce
 
 
  
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
ut
ho
r
260 
 
9.1 Policy implications 
The research which has been reported in this thesis has explored the governance challenges 
that confront livelihoods recovery programs in post-conflict areas. In addition to the 
qualitative and quantitative research methods, it has used an innovative participary research 
tool known as the Net-Map. On the basis of the research results obtained from this study, this 
section discusses the policy implications which are relevant to policy makers, practioners, 
researchers and the beneficiaries of the agricultural livelihood programs in post-conflict 
conditions. 
            Program design 
When designing programmes  that are to be implemented in the different regions of 
the country which certainly have different environmental factors and facing different 
challenges, there is need for the indepth analysis of the context, but not to use the one 
size fits all approach in the design and implementation of the programs. This was a 
big issue most especially with the design of the NAADS program which is not 
tailored for post-conflict regions like Northern Uganda. 
Collaboration between Government agencies and NGOs/CBOs and CSOs 
Government should create a framework for collaboration with partners e.g. NGOs, 
CBOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) involved in the post-conflict 
livelihoods recovery to improve the efficiency and the sustainability of the NAADS 
and NUSAF programmes. Field evidence indicates a lot of duplication of resources 
and conflicting messages disseminated to the farmers which has resulted in confusion 
in the communities. 
Involvement of traditional leaders  
There is need to consider the involvement of existing traditional structures which are 
key to reconciliation, prevention of recurrence of conflict and land dispute resolution. 
The involvement of the traditional chiefs like the Rwot directly in the implementation 
of programmes is crucial to assist in solving the land disputes. 
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Multistakeholder involvement in agricultural livelihoods  program 
implementation 
There is need to use innovative approaches to balance between activities to be 
undertaken by private sector and local government. Programme designers and 
planners should give the local government autonomy to implement NUSAF and 
NAADS, but in addition should ensure continuous and effective oversight of the 
programs from the Central Government to avoid recurrence of the governance 
problems. 
Programs to specically target the youth 
Findings from this study indicate that participation of the youths in the livelihoods 
recovery programs was low. The government’s programs in post-conflict regions need 
to promote programs that target the youth. There is need to promote youth groups to 
ensure that their distinct needs are catered for. This calls for designing tailor made 
programmes targeting the youths in the post-conflict conditions to be able to 
encourage them stay in the rural areas which would encourage them to engage in 
productive activities like farming to improve their livelihoods. 
Focus on land isuess, accountability, access to credit facilities and information; 
• Government should set up a clear road map to solve the overwhelming land disputes 
in Northern Uganda which have hampered investment on the land. 
• The farmers indicated that access to credit facilities is still a problem in Northern 
Uganda. Programme designers should ensure that farmers can have access to low 
interest credit facilities in order to improve their livelihoods. 
• Should use effective and innovative approaches to dissemination of information to be 
able to manage farmers’ expectations. 
• Should balance between how much of the technologies (inputs) should be given to the 
farmers and how much of the advisory services is needed. 
• There is need to strengthen the accountability mechanisms in the program 
implementing agencies both on the Demand and Supply-side of public service 
delivery. 
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• Should strengthen the Demand-side through innovative approaches outlined in figure 
9.1. 
Areas for future research   
This study did not track the amounts of funds received from the Central Government 
up to when it trickles down to the final beneficiaries. Therefore the study, although 
identified that there is significant leakage of funds in NAADS and NUSAF from the 
time the funds are released from the Central Government to the Local Governments 
and finally to the beneficiaries. This study was not able to ascertain the actual 
amounts of leakages of funds. This could be an important area of research because no 
study in Uganda has investigated this area of actual amounts of leakage of funds 
comprehensively in the agricultural extension delivery sector. Some of the studies 
carried out so far concentrated on other sectors i.e. health and education. For example 
the available study in the education sector in Uganda was by Reinikka & Svensson 
(2004) who tracked the education capitation grant from the central government up to 
the final beneficiaries to assess the amount of funds that reach the beneficiaries and 
those funds that are lost due to leakages, elite capture and corruption.   
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire For NAADS/ NUSAF Affiliated Farmer Groups 
Demographic Information 
Name of 
group 
member 
Sex 
M=1 
F=2 
Age 
(Years) 
Education 
Level 
Marital Status Main 
Occupation 
Family 
Size 
 
 
 
  1. None  
2. Primary 
3.Middle(secon
dary drop out) 
4. A level 
5.College 
training( 
Diploma) 
6. Degree 
 
1.Married 
2.Separated 
3.Divorced 
4.Widowed 
5.Single 
1. Farming 
2. Teaching 
3.Civil servant 
4. Trading 
5  Student 
1. 0-4  
2. 4-8 
3. 8-14 
4. >15 
Spouse 1       
Spouse 2       
Spouse 3       
 
Are you affiliated to :   1. NAADS         2 NUSAF   
 
Household Income Levels 
What means of  transport do you use to go to the nearest town 1. Own bicycle 
2. Own motor cycle 
3. Hire 
4. Taxi 
Type of house 
 
 
1. Grass thatched 
2. Semi-permanent 
3. Permanent 
Where do your children go to school ? 1. UPE 
2. Private 
3. USE 
 
Monthly Income levels before NAADS/ NUSAF 
1 <100,000 shs 
2 100,000 -500,000 shs 
3 > 500,000 shs  
 
Income levels after NAADS/ NUSAF 
1 <100,000 shs 
2 100,000 -500,000 shs 
3 > 500,000 shs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
289 
 
1.  NAADS and NUSAF GROUP ACTIVITIES 
 
1.1 I’d like to start by asking you about the groups (NAADS/NUSAF ) groups to which you belong, your 
participation and activities 
When was the group founded?  Comments 
What kind of project (s) are you  
Engaged in? 
1. Livestock 
2. Crop 
3. Retail business 
4. Crop and livestock 
5. Any other 
 
How are the participants selected or how does 
one become a member of this group? 
1. Required to join  
2. Invited  
3. Voluntary choice 
4. Invited by political leader  
5. All the above 
6. None of the above 
 
A part from NAADS/NUSAF which other 
farmer groups do you belong to ? 
1. NAADS 
2. NUSAF 
3. None 
 
 
How did you get to know about the 
programme? 
1. local politicians 
2. Local government technical Staff 
colleagues 
3. Elders/traditional leaders 
4. Religious leaders 
 
 
 
Where there any requirements to join the 
group 
1. Payments 
2. Sign. Documents 
3. Household requirements e.g. 
Sanitation, tree planting etc. 
4. All the above 
5. None of the above 
 
Did anyone support you to join the group/ did 
you have support from any of the following 
 
 
 
1. LC 1 Chairman 
2. Relative  
3. LC Chairman 
4. Councillors 
5. Elder/Traditional leader 
6. Husband/wife 
 
In the past 6 months how many group 
meetings did you attend?  
  
During the last year what benefits did you get 
from the group?  
 
 
1. Inputs 
2. Techinical Support 
3. Direct cash 
4. All the above 
5. Other 
 
Did each member get each benefit he wanted? 1. Yes 
2. No 
 
If No what was the reason 
 
 
 
1. Lack of information 
2. was taken by the rich 
3. political influence 
4. Did not know how much we were 
entitled to 
 
What do you consider to have been the main 
source of motivation to join the NAADS 
A Financial benefits 
B Extension Knowledge 
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group? e.g.  Rank 1 is most important C Farm inputs 
D Direct cash 
What was the distribution criterion? 1 Lottery method 
2 Political Influence 
3 co-funding 
4 Other……… 
 
 
Do you know any challenges that the group 
leaders have to get the inputs? Rank 1 most 
important 
 
A Procurement problems 
 B Paper work preparation 
 C Lack of information 
 D Lack of political connection 
E Transport Problems 
F Influence by political leaders 
 
Did you sign something that you received 
inputs and did anyone come to verify that you 
received the inputs? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
 
Did you have any difficulty in getting the 
inputs? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
 
What is your relationship with the other group 
leaders? 
1 Village mate 
2  Relative 
3  Clan 
4 Other…….. 
 
Do the group leader have any connections 
with  
1- Sub- county chief 
2- NAADS coordinator  
3- Local council leader LC3 
4- LC5 
5- Councilor 
6 Councillor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How much money did you receive for the 
group? How much was spent and how was the 
balance funds used? 
1 Don’t know 
2 Know the amount 
 
Are you a leader in the group? 1. Yes        2. No  
If yes what position? 1-Chairman 
2-Secretary 
3- Treasurer 
4- Procurement Committee 
5- No position 
 
How actively do you participate in the group’s 
decision making? 
 
1  Leader 
2  Very Active 
3  Somewhat Active 
4  Does not participate in decision 
making 
 
How much money or goods did your 
household contribute to the group in the past 
12 months? 
  
What is the main benefit from joining this 
group? 
Rank ie 1 is  most important 
 
 
A Improves my household livelihood 
B Provides farm inputs/ improved  
C seed and livestock 
D Important in times of emergency 
E Benefits the community 
F Self esteem 
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Does the group help your household to get 
access to any of the following services? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
1.Education or training 
2.Credit or savings 
3.Agricultural input or technology 
4.Other (specify) 
 
 
 
Thinking about the members of this group, 
most of them are of the same Rank ie. 1 most 
important 
 
 
 
A. Neighborhood/ village 
B. Family or kin group 
C. Religion 
D. Gender 
E. Age 
F. Tribe 
G. Political Party 
 
In the past 3 years, has the membership of the 
group declined or remained the same or 
increased? 
1. Declined 
2. Remained the same 
3. Increased 
 
How is decision making in the group? 
 
 
 
1. Leader decides and informs 
members 
2. Group members decide 
together 
3. Other (specify) 
 
In your opinion how effective is the group 
leadership? 
1. Very effective 
2. Somewhat effective 
3. Not effective 
 
Are some members richer or poorer than 
others, or do they all have mostly the same 
income level? 
1. Mostly same income level 
2. Mixed rich/poor 
 
How do you trust in as far as NAADS 
implementation is concerned 
Local government officials 
 
 
1.To a very small extent 
2.To a small extent 
3.Neither small nor great extent 
4.to a great extent 
5.To a very great extent 
 
Central Govt. Officials 
 
 
 
1.To a very small extent 
2.To a small extent 
3.Neither small nor great extent 
4.to a great extent 
5.To a very great extent 
 
Contractors/suppliers 
 
1.To a very small extent 
2.To a small extent 
3.Neither small nor great extent 
4.to a great extent 
5.To a very great extent 
 
Extension Staff 
 
 
 
 
1.To a very small extent 
2.To a small extent 
3.Neither small nor great extent 
4.to a great extent 
5.To a very great extent 
 
Local politicians 1.To a very small extent  
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2.To a small extent 
3.Neither small nor great extent 
4.to a great extent 
5.To a very great extent 
Group leaders 
 
 
 
1.To a very small extent 
2.To a small extent 
3.Neither small nor great extent 
4.to a great extent 
5.To a very great extent 
 
In the past 12 months, have you worked with 
others in your village/neighborhood to do 
something for the benefit of the community? 
1. Yes 2. No       
1. Weeding/land preparation 
2. Marketing 
3. Building construction 
4. Others……. 
 
What are the three most important sources of 
information about what the government is 
doing (such as agricultural extension? On 
NAADS. Rank: 1 most important 2 second 
important etc.  
 
ARelatives, friends and neighbors 
BCommunity bulletin board 
C Local market 
D Radio 
E Political associates 
F Community leaders 
GAn agent of the government 
H NGOs 
 
Overall, what is your level of satisfaction with 
the benefits you have realized from the group 
so far ? 
1.satisfied 
2. Fairly satisfied 
3. Not satisfied 
 
What do you consider to be the three main 
constraints and or challenges to the full 
involvement of your household in the 
activities/ services of NAADS? 
Rank them ie. 1 most important etc. 
 
 
1 Other household activities/farming 
2  Financial contributions/ co-funding 
3  No benefits expected as a result of 
involvement 
4. Other………. 
 
How can the situation above be changed to 
enable you and your household be fully 
involved. ie. Challenges above and suggested 
solutions. 
1Eliminate co-funding  
…………………… 
2 Provision of facilitation 
3Reduce the number of 
trainings/meetings 
4 Other/ specify…….. 
 
What do you consider to be the 3 major 
benefits of your household from NAADS / 
NUSAF services so far? Rank them ie. 1 Most 
important 
 
 
1. Provision of extension 
services  
2.  Improved seeds   
3.  Livestock 
4. Farm inputs e.g fertilizers 
5. Provision of direct cash 
 
What are some of the main services you 
expect from government extension service that 
have not yet been provided by NAADS/ 
NUSAF? Rank i.e. 1 is most important 
A Direct Cash 
B Markets for products  
C Field Tours 
 
 
 
What is the level of adequacy of the services 
provided by NAADS/ NUSAF? 
1. Adequate 
2. Fairly Adequate 
3. Not Adequate 
 
Overall , what would you like to be done in a 1…………………………..  
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different way within NAADS/NUSA 
 
2…………………………… 
3………………………………. 
4………………………………. 
In your opinion, how honest are the officials 
and staff of the following agencies?  Please 
rate them on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is very 
dishonest and 5 is very honest.  
A. District Politicians 
B. District technical Staff 
C. Sub county politicians 
D. Sub county Technical Staff 
E. NUSAF technical Officers 
F. NAADS coordinators 
1.Very dishonest 
2 Mostly dishonest 
3 Neither honest nor dishonest 
4 Mostly honest 
5 Very honest 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Characteristics of Group Members 
  NUSAF (52) NAADS (52) Overal 
Same neighborhood    
 1 72.22 62.00 67.11 
 2 11.11 38.00 24.56 
 3 16.67 0.00 8.33 
same family or kin group   
 1 20.00 4.35 12.17 
 2 60.00 17.39 38.70 
 3 20.00 78.26 49.13 
same religion    
 2 60.00 75.00 67.50 
 3 40.00 25.00 32.50 
same gender    
 1 21.43 3.85 12.64 
 2 35.71 26.92 31.32 
 3 42.86 69.23 56.04 
same age     
 1 28.57 37.21 32.89 
 2 50.00 41.86 45.93 
 3 21.43 18.60 20.02 
 4 0.00 2.33 1.16 
same tribe    
 1 15.38 33.33 24.36 
 2 23.08 0.00 11.54 
 3 61.54 66.67 64.10 
same political party    
 2 50.00 50.00 50.00 
 3 50.00 50.00 50.00 
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Appendix 3: Subcounty NAADS Farmer Institutions 
Institution Composition Level of 
Operation 
Roles/Resposibilities 
Farmer groups All members of the 
group 
Village (LC 
I) 
Participatory planning and selection 
of enterprises for inclusion in the 
parish priority list 
Parish Coordination 
Committees (PCCs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subcounty Farmer 
Forum (SCFF) 
Chairpersons of farmer 
groups from that parish 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 farmers made up of 
the chairperson of each 
group and one other 
farmer 
Parish 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subcounty 
Paricipatory planning and selection of 
parish enterprises of group enterprises 
for inclusion in the subcounty priority 
list. 
Approves subcounty workplans and 
budgets 
Supports and facilitates farmer group 
operations 
Monitors program implementation 
Ensures inclusiveness of women and 
the youth in the program 
Advise on the strategic 
implementation of the program 
Procurement 
Committee 
Three members of the 
SC FF each with at least 
Ordinary level of 
Education, one of whom 
should be a female 
 
Chairperson of the SC 
FF and the NAADS 
coordinator as ex-
officials 
Subcounty Approves the specifications of goods 
to be procured 
Approves the TOR for service service 
providers   
Approves the shortlist for service 
providers 
Approves and awards contracts based 
on the technical committeee’s report 
Farmer Forum 
Executive 
Committee 
The chairperson of the 
subcounty farmer forum 
and two other farmers 
one of which should be 
a female 
Subcounty NAADS 
coordinator 
Secretary for production 
 
Subcounty Assists the NAADS coordinator to 
compile the subcounty NAADS 
budget based on indicative budgetary 
estimates given by the NAADS 
secretariat. 
Decides and approves the terms of 
reference for service providers 
Implementation 
Committee 
SC FF Chairperson 
Two other members of 
the farmer forum 
NAADS Coordinator 
Subcounty To oversee the implementation of 
NAADS activities in the subcounty. 
Technical 
Committee( it has 
no farmer 
representation) 
S/chief, sub-accountant 
NAADS coordinator 
Community 
development officer and 
any other extension staff 
Subcounty Prepares Terms of reference for 
service providers 
Evaluates expressions of interest from 
service providers 
Evaluates service providers’ 
proposals 
Source: Adopted from DENIVA 2005  
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Appendix 4: NAADS Phase 1 – Procument for Advisory Services 
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Appendix 5: Flow of Funds for NAADS Activities 
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Appendix 6: Flow of Funds for NUSAF Activities 
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Appendix 7: NUSAF Subproject Cycle 
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Appendix 8: Bechmarks for 12 Month Sub-project cycle 
 
